Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel (RLE Israel and Palestine)

Elie Kedourie, Sylvia Haim, Sylvia G. Haim

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781317442721
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

This book, first published in 1982, collects together ten studies from the journal Middle Eastern Studies. They tackle a variety of issues stemming from the conflict between Arabism and Zionism, before and after the creation of the State of Israel. Aspects of Arab- Jewish relations during the Mandate are considered, as are political decisions and diplomatic events that led to the end of the Mandate. After 1948, the diplomatic history of Israel and of the Arab-Israeli conflict are examined.

Arab Rebellion and Terrorism in Palestine 1929-39 The Case of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his Movement*

Shai Lachman

The Radicalisation Process and the Concept of Armed Struggle. 1929-35

The early 1930s was a decisive period in the development of the Palestinian Arab national movement which was undergoing at this time a process of political and organisational reform. While the Arab Executive Committee (AEC) headed by Musa Kazim al-Husayni was losing power and gradually disintegrating, new nationalist groups subscribing to more radical and militant ideas were emerging. This development, which took place against the background of the 1929 riots and the subsequent awakening of national awareness among the Arabs of Palestine, was the result of a growing conviction that the political struggle for Arab self-determination had failed, and that the national leadership was incapable of bringing about a change in Britain's policy vis-a-vis the Jewish National Home. While the White Paper of October 1930 was a prominent achievement, perhaps the most significant of Arab politics until that time, the nullification of its promises and the new interpretation of Britain's policy in the MacDonald Letter of February 1931 (dubbed the 'Black Letter' by the Arabs) was regarded as a major setback to the Arab cause and a complete bankruptcy of the AEC's moderate tactics.

The growing disillusionment among Arab circles found its expression in two conferences which took place in Nablus in the summer of 1931. The conferences met in protest against what the Arabs called 'the Government's arming of the Jews', and in the course of their discussions, which were very extreme in tone, the idea of armed struggle as the only means of preventing the realisation of the Zionist enterprise, and implementing the national aspirations of Palestinian Arabs, was publicly propounded for the first time.¹ These gatherings, and various events which followed in their wake, brought to the fore a new cadre of Arab activists. These were members of the younger generation and the first graduates of the Mandatory educational system. Influenced by the role played by Nazi and Fascist youth movements in Europe, they challenged the AEC and its policy, and called for new, more radical lines of action. In January 1932 the first National Congress of the Arab Youth met in Jaffa. It adopted a radical pan-Arab platform, and several resolutions with regard to promoting national products, assisting the activities of the National Fund and working towards organisation of Arab youth. An executive body was elected to supervise the implementation of these resolutions, and local branches were established throughout the country. Although its activities met with little success, the Congress of the Youth was a conspicuous expression of the growing national awareness among Arab youth and their gradual emergence as an independent and more radical political force.

I he radicalisation process was first and foremost the result of the accelerated evolution of the Zionist enterprise. During the early thirties, Jewish immigration, mainly from Nazi Germany, reached unprecedented proportions. Whereas in 1928 emigrants still outnumbered immigrants, in 1932 the number of newcomers totalled 9,500, and in 1934, 42,359. The demographic change was accompanied by marked economic development of the Yishuv, which enjoyed a steadily increasing flow of private capital and investment. This was expressed, among other things, in the renewal of large-scale land purchasing by Jews (1932 - 18,895 dunams; 1933 36,991; 1934 - 62,114), and the establishment of dozens of new settlements throughout the country.

The Arabs thus had cause for grave concern, as they saw entire regions of the country rapidly changing face. Exaggerated rumours about large-scale illegal Jewish immigration intensified the tension, convincing the Arabs that there were many more Jews in the country than the official estimates. At a secret meeting of Arab activists from Safed and the vicinity held on 26 February 1933, Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim, of Haifa, declared: 'The Jews are advancing on all fronts. They keep buying land, they bring in immigrants both legally and illegally, and they have even invaded Transjordan. If we cannot demonstrate to them convincingly enough that all their efforts are in vain and that we are capable of destroying them at one stroke, then we shall have to lose our holy land or resign ourselves to being wretched second-rate citizens in a Jewish state.' When asked how the Jews could be made to see the point, he replied: 'By doing what we did in 1929, but using more efficient methods. We have learned from our mistakes and they will not recur.'²

Unfortunately for the Arab movement, it was precisely at this time that the AEC was exposed in all its weakness and ineffectiveness. Not only was it unable to cope with the growing Zionist challenge and to prevent land transfers, but even its own members were accused of selling land to the Jews. The prestige of the AEC declined precipitously, it lost its capacity to act, and it gradually fell apart. The October 1933 demonstrations were its swan song. With the death in March 1934 of Musa Kazim al-Husayni, the last justification for its existence disappeared, and within a few months it had completely passed from the political scene. The disappearance of the AEC put an end to the last vestiges of unity in the Arab camp. This framework, which for over a dozen years had held the various rival factions together, was now replaced by five different 'parties' who began to compete for control of the national movement, thereby emphasising the internal divisions all the more. In this atmosphere of confusion and frustration, the voice of the Arab extremists preaching the intensification of the struggle against the Yishuv grew ever stronger.

The call for armed struggle came mainly from two sources: radical elements supporting the pan-Arab movement, and groups of clergy and fanatic Muslim youth who drew their inspiration from the Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni.

The pan-Arab element gave rise in 1932 to the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, founded by the veteran leader Awni Abd al-Hadi. This new party marked the first attempt by Palestinian Arabs to set up a modern political organisation based not on family-regional affiliations or on factional interests, as was the tradition, but on an agreed ideological platform and individual membership. The party's founders and activists were mostly of the urban intelligentsia, and either did not belong to or had dissociated themselves from the traditional leading Arab families.³ Another important feature was the fact that many of them came from northern cities, especially Haifa and Nablus, rather than Jerusalem. This phenomenon corresponded with the party's declared aversion to the deep-rooted family disputes which had been so characteristic of the Jerusalem leadership and its desire 'to avoid local, personal and family politics entirely'.⁴

The party platform was saliently pan-Arab. Based on the principles of the Arab Covenant (al-Mithaq al-Arabi) signed in a special meeting of Arab delegates to the Pan-Islamic Congress held in Jerusalem in December 1931,⁵ it demanded independence within the framework of comprehensive Arab unity, the abolition of the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, and the establishment of parliamentary Arab rule in Palestine.⁶ The party's leaders launched a full-scale campaign of political activities. They were engaged in abortive attempts to convene a popular pan-Arab congress in Baghdad chaired by Amir Faysal, which would work towards advancing Arab nationalist goals, while internally they waged a vigorous anti-British campaign and urged the public to refrain from paying taxes and co-operating with the government. The British Mandate was likened by the Istiqlalists to a tree - cutting it down would do away with its Zionist branch, too. The new propaganda style and the stress on anti-British activities came as a total innovation to the Arab community, which was accustomed to the Mufti's anti-Jewish stance, and had tremendous influence especially on the educated and the new youth organisations. The March 1933 non-co-operation policy and the October 1933 demonstrations, both directed principally against the British authorities, were very much the consequence of Istiqlal propaganda.

However, the Istiqlal Party proved very short-lived. Its limited political base which, in the absence of wide popular urban and rural support. never extended beyond a small circle of intellectuals and professionals; its inevitable involvement in personal and factional rivalries - especially with the Mufti and his adherents who were not at all enthusiastic about the appearance of this new rival party; its lack of financial resources; the growing antagonism between the pro-Hashemites and the pro-Saudis which divided the Pan-Arab movement in the thirties - all these weakened the party and caused its rapid disintegration and erosion amid the frictions of traditional Palestinian politics.⁷ In less than two years the Istiqlal Party had ceased to exist as an organised body, leaving behind on the political scene no more than a handful of active extremists.

The impact of the militant Muslim elements was far more important. This movement, which in effect generated the 1936-39 revolt, grew and crystallised in the context of two parallel processes: the decline, from the end of the twenties, and eventual disintegration of the Muslim-Christian front of the national movement;⁸ and the concomitant increase in power of the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), and the rise to pre-eminence of its president, the Mufti al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Particular importance was attached to the latter development; even though the Mufti had so far refrained from openly defying the authority of the Mandatory Government, his very rise to power encouraged and lent impetus to the Arab militants. Furthermore, so as not to tarnish his image as a 'nationalist' and to ward off his rivals' accusations that he was cooperating with the British, Amin al-Husayni allowed his fellow extremists to join the radical trend, while his mouthpiece, al-jami'ah al-Arabiyya, stood out in its continuous anti-British propaganda. He himself, as we shall see later, secretly encouraged militant groups and helped to lay the organisational infrastructure for the underground movement.

The developments on the socio-poiitical plane were accompanied by important changes in the patterns of organisation and activity. The Muslim-Christian Associations gradually declined and disappeared in t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• Contents
• PREFACE
• THE YISHUV, SIR HERBERT SAMUEL, AND THE ARAB QUESTION IN PALESTINE, 1921-25
• ARAB REBELLION AND TERRORISM IN PALESTINE 1929-39: THE CASE OF SHEIKH IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSAM AND HIS MOVEMENT
• THE MILITARY FORCE OF ISLAM: THE SOCIETY OF THE MUSLIM BRETHREN AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION, 1945-48
• THE ARAB STATES AND PALESTINE
• THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON PALESTINE 1945-46: THE ZIONIST REACTION RECONSIDERED
• HUSNI AL-BARAZI ON ARAB NATIONALISM IN PALESTINE
• 'WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT RECOMMENDATIONS'; BRITAIN'S DECISION TO RELINQUISH THE PALESTINE MANDATE, 1947
• JEWISH EMIGRATION AND SOVIET-ARAB RELATIONS, 1954-67
• THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR: NIGERIA AS A CASE STUDY
• INTEGRATION OF ARABS IN AN ISRAELI PARTY: THE CASE OF MAPAM, 1948-54