Social Ends and Political Means (Routledge Revivals)

Ted Honderich

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138856653
• eBook ISBN: 9781317515821
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophical Essays

Leading British, American and European philosophers contribute to this collection of essays, first published in 1976, in political philosophy. They are essays which have to do in different ways with better societies than the ones we have, and with ways of getting them. They exemplify what can fairly be called real political philosophy. Its past makers have been Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Mill and Marx, and it consists in advocacy of certain social ends and of certain means, rather than uncommitted inquiry or comment. The advocacy is of a kind, of course, which depends on analysis and argument. The book will be of interest not only to those who are primarily concerned with philosophy, but students of politics as well.

1
Political Obligation

R. M. HARE

This paper is one of a number of essays which I have written in recent years on the application of ethical theory to practical issues.¹ The objects of all these have been the same; first to do something for the morally perplexed, including myself - the aim with which I originally became a moral philosopher; secondly, to gain greater insight into the theory itself by seeing how it works in practice; and thirdly, to convince the prejudiced and obtuse majority of my profession that a formal ethical theory about the logical properties of the moral concepts, which itself begs no questions of moral substance, and can therefore be accepted by people of differing moral opinions, can shed light on practical questions, and lead in practice to their solution. It is not my purpose here to defend my views about these logical properties, but only their relevance to practice if true. Those readers who question my theoretical assumptions will have to look elsewhere for their justification.²

The expression ‘political obligation’, although it conveniently delimits my topic, ought not to be used (though it often is) without an awareness of its dangers. As I shall use the term, political obligation is not (as perhaps legal obligation is) a species of the genus obligation, co-ordinate with moral obligation; it is, rather, a sub-species of moral obligation, co-ordinate with other sub species such as social and parental obligations. Just as parental obligations are the moral obligations which we incur when we become parents (for example to feed our children) and social obligations the moral obligations that we have because we are members of a society, so political obligations are the moral obligations that lie upon us because we are citizens (politai) of a state with laws. To think that political obligations are, not a sub species of moral obligations, but a species of the genus obligation (if there is one) co-ordinate with moral obligations, might lead someone to do highly immoral acts in the name of a ‘political obligation’ conceived of as overriding morality; but, if we ask what such a ‘political obligation’ could be, or what could be its source, the resulting darkness may persuade us that this way of using the terms is radically misconceived. Be that as it may, I shall myself be speaking only of those moral obligations that we have because we are citizens, and of how they arise.

Does the fact that I am a citizen of the United Kingdom lay upon me moral obligations which I should not have if I were not? Most people think that it does: obligations, not only to obey the laws of the United Kingdom in general (there may be exceptions) but to take part in the political process in order to improve those laws if they need it, to defend them if they do not, and, in general, to perform the ‘duty of a citizen’. I shall be concentrating in the main on one of these kinds of obligation, the moral obligation to obey the laws - although I acknowledge that this obligation may lie, not only on citizens, but also on anybody, even an alien, who finds himself within the jurisdiction (most people think that foreign visitors too have a moral obligation not to steal). This moral obligation to obey the laws must of course be distinguished from legal obligations (i.e. the requirements, morality aside, of the laws themselves). That there is a legal obligation in a certain country to serve in the army does not entail that there is a moral obligation to obey the law imposing this legal obligation; a person who said that there was not would not be contradicting himself, even if he admitted that that was the law.

Onesource of confusion must be removed at the outset. It might be argued that, because moral principles have to be universal, the expression ‘the United Kingdom’ cannot occur in one. And from this it might be concluded that I cannot have any duties qua citizen of, or resident in, the United Kingdom. This is a simple mistake. The moral principle involved does not contain any singular terms like ‘The United Kingdom’; it contains universal relational terms such as ‘resident in’ or ‘citizen of’. Such a principle might be, for example, the following: ‘One ought to obey the laws of the country of which one is a citizen, unless one or other of the following conditions is satisfied, etc.’. From this, in conjunction with the premiss that I am a citizen of the United Kingdom, I can derive the conclusion that I have a duty to obey the laws of the United Kingdom, unless, etc.; but the moral principle itself does not contain this singular term.

How, then, do political obligations arise? Attempts have been made in the past to show that they arise because we have assumed contractual obligations through becoming citizens. It is now generally acknowledged that the social contract is a fiction to which no reality corresponds; there has been no contract. However, as a matter of philosophical history, Rousseau, who put forward such a theory, greatly influenced the moral philosophy of Kant, who gave as helpful an account of the nature of morality as anybody could who wrote in such an impenetrably obscure style. My own view, which owes a lot to Kant, might therefore be said to contain traces of Rousseau, as does that of Professor Rawls.¹

Sooner than speak of a fictitious or hypothetical contract, however, it is clearer to start directly from the logical properties of the moral concepts. If I am right about these, to ask what obligations I have as citizen is to ask for a universal prescription applicable to all people who are citizens of a country in circumstances just like those in which I find myself. That is to say, I have to ask - as in any case when faced with a question about what I morally ought to do - ‘What universal principle of action can I accept for cases just like this, disregarding the fact that I occupy the place in the situation that I do (i.e. giving no preferential weight to my own interests just because they are mine)?’ This will lead me to give equal weight to the equal interests of every individual affected by my actions, and thus to accept the principle which will in all most promote those interests. Thus I am led to a form of utilitarianism.²

For political, as for other, obligations we could ask this universal-prescriptive question directly of each individual case, and no general principles would be required, although, in deciding on each case, we would be accepting some universal principle.¹ Thus in theory no distinction between ‘prima facie’ obligations (which are expressed in simple, general núes) and ‘actual’ obligations is needed. But in practice it is not only useful but necessary to have some simple, general and more or less unbreakable principles, both for the purposes of moral education and self-education (i.e. character-formation), and to keep us from special pleadings and other errors when in situations of ignorance or stress. Even when we have such principles, we could disregard them in an individual case and reason it out ab initio; but it is nearly always dangerous to do so, as well as impracticable; impracticable, because we are unlikely to have either the time or the information, and dangerous, because we shall almost inevitably cheat, and cook up the case until we can reach a conclusion palatable to ourselves. The general principle that we ought to obey the law is a strong candidate for inclusion in such a list, as I shall be trying to show; there may be occasions for breaking it, but the principle is one which in general there is good reason for inculcating in ourselves and others.

In order to apply all this to politics, let us start with a very simple model of the political situation. Suppose that a hundred of us are cast away on a desert island. At once moral questions will arise owing to the fact that our actions affect the interests of the others. The answers to these questions will be given by what will most promote the interests of those affected by our actions (including ourselves, but not giving ourselves a privileged position). It will be seen that some of these questions can be answered without bringing in any reference to politics or to laws - which may not yet exist. For example, I have a duty to observe hygiene, because, if I do not, people will die of diseases as a result of my negligence, and the satisfaction of interests will therefore not be maximized. To take a specific instance; I have a duty to wash and delouse myself regularly to prevent the spread of typhus. On the other hand, some obligations arise only because of the existence or possible existence of laws. I shall call those obligations which arise independently of the existence of laws or of a state, social obligations; they arise if people are living together in a society, whether or not that society is organized politically into a state with laws. And I shall call the obligations which arise only because there is a state with laws, political obligations.

As an example of the latter kind of obligations, consider obligations relating to the possession of goods (obligations which would concern matters of property and ownership, if we had the legal institution of property on our island). Let us suppose that I have in my possession enough food for myself and to spare for a few weeks, and so have a number of others; but some people have nothing. We might well say that if no laws are in contemplation, I shall be best serving the interests of people in general if I allow my own store to be divided up. But I shall then have no assurance that this benevolent action of mine will be imitated by others who have food. And, I might reason, what is my little store among so many? I should promote people’s interests still more if I could bring it about, by an exercise of leadership, that there is set up a law, enacted perhaps by acclamation at a town meeting and enforced by volunteer policemen, regulating the distribution of the available food. It is not self-evident that the law will, if the people at the town meeting decide rationally and impartially in the interests of all, require the equal distribution of food. It may be that, because of the difficulty of enforcing the law and avoiding concealment, they will agree to those who have stores keeping part of them so long as they hand over part for distribution. It may be, also, that extra food will be allowed to those who need it in order to preserve their strength so that they can go out fishing or cultivate the land. Or it may be that extra rations will be offered as an incentive to suitable people to get them to produce food in these ways. It may even be that a system of competition, with currency and a market, will be adopted in order to spur people on to maximize their production of food. Such a system relies on laws, both to establish the currency (though barter might do, and this is in any case not the most important reason), and to secure to people the property which they have got for themselves by competition (for otherwise there will be no incentive to compete).

It is not my intention to attempt a comparative evaluation of these different economic systems. But I take it as obvious that the general interests of people in society will be promoted by having some laws regulating property and the distribution of goods. Some legal systems will promote these interests better than others; but almost any system of laws that has much chance of getting adopted is likely to promote them better than having no laws at all. And the same holds good of other laws relating to such matters as hygiene (which I have mentioned already), the settlement of disputes and the avoidance of violence. Anarchy, as those know who have experienced it, is seldom in the general interest. But one can also have too many laws.

I could have mentioned other laws too. There would probably be one requiring the able-bodied to arm themselves as well as they can and turn out to repel aggressors from neighbouring islands. But the points I now wish to make can best be illustrated by reference to hygiene. We saw that even without any laws I had some obligation to observe cleanly habits. But the enactment of hygiene laws adds to this obligation. If we can see why it adds to it, we shall understand a great deal about the obligation to keep the law. It adds to it, not because the mere enactment by the town meeting of a law lays any moral obligation on me directly, but because it alters the conditions under which I am asking my moral question.

How does it alter these conditions? Primarily by bringing it about that observance of hygiene by me has more chance of achieving its purposes, because other people, who would not of their own accord observe hygiene, are being coerced into doing so. Before the law is enacted and enforced, if I keep myself clear of lice I am not making very much difference to the number of lice biting other people. This is because, owing to general apathy, there are a great many lice about. I may not be very successful in getting even myself deloused, if we are living at close quarters. But if there is an enforced law which makes nearly all the others, from fear of the penalty, delouse themselves, my delousing or not delousing myself makes a much bigger difference to the hygiene of people in general. Consider the extreme case: everyone else has deloused themselves for fear of the penalty, and I alone have lice, and for some reason think I can escape detection. Let us suppose that besides having lice I am a typhus carrier, or that there is one sleeping near me. Then it is obvious that my failure to delouse myself will make a very great difference to the likelihood of people getting typhus; and thus my obligation to do so (because it is in the general interest) will be much greater than it would be if there were no law, and therefore little delousing, and therefore the epidemic was going to spread whatever I did.

We may now sum up the results of this unsavoury discussion by tabulating the reasons which I have so far acquired for obeying the hygiene laws. There are, first of all,

1. Prudential Reasons (ignored in what follows)
   • A.1 My own interest in not getting bitten by lice or catching typhus;
   • A.2 My own interest in not incurring the legal penalty for lousiness, with the public opprobrium entailed.
   Note that A.1 owes nothing to the existence of the law, whereas A2 owes something but not everything.
2. Moral Reasons not related to the existence of the law
   • B.1 The fact that failure to delouse myself will, law or no law, harm people’s interests by making them a little more likely to get lice or typhus;
   • B.2 The fact that if I myself get typhus I shall be a burden to others;
3. Moral Reasons related to the existence of the law
   • C.1 The fact that, because there is an enforced law, resulting in general delousing, failure to delouse myself will harm people’s interests much more, by making them very much more likely to get lice or typhus;
   • C.2 The fact that, if I break this law, it will cause trouble to the police in catching me, thus rendering necessary the employment of more policemen, who therefore cannot grow yams instead, and so harming the interests of the people who could have eaten the yams;
   • C.3 The fact that, if I break this law, it may encourage people to break this or other laws, thereby rendering a little more likely (a) the removal of the benefits to society which come from the existence of those particular laws, and (b) the breakdown of the rule of law altogether, which would do great harm to the interests of nearly everybody.

Only the reasons given under C (the last three) lay upon mepolitical obligations; and of them, the second and third are subsidiary, but have the important property that (except for C.3(a)) they might survive even if the law in question were a bad ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• 1 Political Obligation
• 2 Being Free to Speak and Speaking Freely
• 3 Respect for Persons and Social Protest
• 4 ‘Bad Day at Big Rock’: The Assessment of Political Confrontations
• 5 Rights of Persons and the Liberal Tradition
• 6 The Theory of the Collapse of Capitalism
• 7 Alienation as a Social and Philosophical Problem
• 8 Philosophical Foundations of Economic and Political Self-management
• 9 Stalinist Party-commitment and Communist Dignity