Scepticism

Arne Naess

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138908727
• eBook ISBN: 9781317440284
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Originally published in 1968. Scepticism is generally regarded as a position which, if correct, would be disastrous for our everyday and scientific beliefs. According to this view, a sceptical argument is one that leads to the intuitively false conclusion that we cannot know anything. But there is another, much neglected and more radical form of scepticism, Pyrrhonism, which neither denies nor accepts the possibility of knowledge and is to be regarded not as a philosophical position so much as the expression of a philosophical way of life. Professor Naess argues that, given a sympathetic interpretation, Sextus Empiricus's outline of Pyrrhonian scepticism provides the essentials of a genuine and rational sceptical point of view. He begins with a brief account of Pyrrhonism, then goes on to argue for the psychological possibility of this kind of scepticism, defending it against common objections, and examining some of its implications. The last two chapters provide detailed support for the rationality of Pyrrhonism, drawing mainly on certain methodological distinctions in semantics which both justify the Pyrrhonist's failure to make assertions and restrict the scope of recent epistemological arguments against scepticism in such a way as to modify severely the conclusions based on them.

V Dialectics of Modern Epistemological Scepticism

DOI: 10.4324/9781315694672-5

1 Introduction

A good deal of discussion about knowledge nowadays incorporates arguments attributed to ‘the sceptic’. But as we have seen, this figure is a very different man from the sceptic outlined by Sextus Empiricus. Typically scepticism is treated as a position which, if true, would be fatal for any attempted philosophical justification of ordinary notions of everyday or scientific knowledge. In fact it might not be inaccurate to say that the position has been generated out of the very attempt to provide such a justification; at any rate, the significance of the modern sceptic’s arguments lies precisely in their power to demonstrate that no such attempt can succeed. Sextus Empiricus would label those who hold such a position Academicians, people who hold an absolutist kind of view which he clearly distinguishes from the ‘way’ of the sceptic.

The modern sceptic, or epistemological sceptic, is made to argue that knowledge is impossible, to insist that we cannot know anything, to affirm that it is true or can be known that knowledge is not possible. ¹ Naturally enough, although this sceptic’s arguments are taken seriously and some steps in them even accepted, ² the position they support is not one that any flesh-and-blood philosopher is anxious to occupy; indeed, to be forced to do so would most likely be seen as a professional defeat by those who look upon the philosopher’s task as that of explaining, rather than replacing, well-established everyday beliefs. It is because the sceptic’s reasoning is considered intuitively false and yet logically impeccable that ‘his’ arguments are subjected to close and careful epistemological scrutiny.

¹ We should recall that some of the phrases (fonai) which Sextus calls sceptical do not, when uttered by sceptics, express any doctrine or view whatsoever. ² Cf. especially Bertrand Russell in Human Knowledge and A. J. Ayer in The Problem of Knowledge.

Two features of modern accounts of scepticism are significant to our discussion, their avoidance of contextual considerations and the elaborate terminology and conceptual structures in which the arguments are framed. A typical procedure is to consider with regard to some statement whether there are sources of error such that later events might cause one to retract a claim that the statement is true. If not, then the statement is ‘incorrigible’ and we have no right to persist in refusing to affirm its truth on the grounds that it might be false. If there are conceivable sources of error, then the statement is ‘corrigible’ and we are faced with the problem of whether or not we can ‘legitimately’ claim to know that it is true.

To cope with this problem a number of concepts are then introduced and developed. The effect of this is that the question of whether it is correct to use expressions of the form and normal intent of ‘I know that p’ becomes a matter to be dealt with within an elaborate conceptual framework. The assumption is that such frameworks provide the terms in which a general question of justifying knowledge claims is to be answered. This general question is then treated as something over and above the question of particular contextual justifications for the use of expressions (‘Should I have said “thank you”?’). The epistemologist presumes his conclusions to apply in all contexts. Although he acknowledges that for all practical purposes there is no need to refer to his arguments, he thinks of them as showing us what ‘strictly’ we can or cannot say. The assumption seems to be that any well-equipped society catering to the enlightened interest of its members would make philosophical conclusions about knowledge publicly available, perhaps in reference libraries, or better, as an addition to the telephone service so that people could at any time or in any situation or stage of debate be given the authoritative view on the matter. (We might sympathize with the unfortunate man entrusted with the task of compiling such conclusions. Faced with arguments, authoritative and apparently technically proficient, to the effect that ‘material object’ statements are/are not conclusively verifiable, that perception is a direct/indirect relation, and if indirect that ‘perception’ statements then can/cannot be known with certainty to be true (or false), that in making such statements we make/do not make inferences which, if we are to justify the claim to know such statements to be true must be/need not be valid inferences, and so on, he would almost certainly recommend suspension of judgment in his letter of resignation. Strictly speaking, of course, any headway he made would only add to the confusion.)

To deny that there were general questions about the applicability of knowledge expressions besides the considerations of context would be fruitless. It is a matter of fact that people ask them. But when they are asked and answered in terms of explicit conceptual frameworks that have no part in ordinary usage the relevance of the answers to ordinary knowledge claims becomes problematic.

The problem can be posed as the question whether epistemology concerns knowledge claims in general, or knowledge claims only as they are understood by epistemologists, that is, in their own special frameworks. If the former, then we must suppose that the typical epistemological conclusion, for example, that knowledge claims about material objects cannot be justified, leaves the ordinary kinds of justification intact. The latter are all right in their place, and it is not for the epistemologist to question, say, the standards accepted among bird-watchers or people who want to know the time. He does not wish to pose as a more conscientious bird-watcher and time-teller; nor does the epistemological sceptic conclude that no bird-watching or time-telling can be conscientious enough. Rather, he questions whether the standards accepted by bird-watchers and time-tellers amount to valid inferences, whether they allow us to bridge ‘logical gaps’, and so on. The question of justification, therefore, is one that he takes up at a quite different level and in a terminology quite alien to that of the average, or even exceptionally scrupulous, birdwatcher or time-teller. His attitude, in fact, is parallel to that attributed to the sceptic when, as we noted in an earlier chapter, he is said to arrive at a modus vivendi by accepting that it is one thing to live (to watch birds and tell the time) and another to philosophize (to make valid inferences and legitimate claims). There, however, we pointed out that since the Pyrrhonian sceptic accepts no philosophical framework, this modus vivendi is not available to him. In effect, a justification of Pyrrhonism is based on the fact that he can respond to his surroundings verbally, and in other ways, in a manner that does not require a corresponding response to propositions. Thus he is not compelled to adopt two minds towards a proposition, one practical and the other theoretical. The propositions he is asked to accept on the basis of his experiences have a depth of intention that bears no comparison with that of his own straightforward acknowledgments of the appearances.

This suggests a totally different view of the significance of epistemological discussion, and it is this view, the second alternative, that we shall explore in the following. We shall look at philosophical discussions of knowledge as linear extensions, a kind of tenacious continuation, of ordinary dialogues with a stress on explicit frameworks that is not found in the initial stages. Instead of regarding the epistemologist as an ex officio member of the community we shall see him as a participant in a comparatively rare kind of dialogue with a stress on explicit frameworks. The effect will be to present his conclusions, in particular sceptical conclusions such as ‘Nothing can be known’ and ‘No statement can be known to be true’, as statements in need of severe qualifications.

2 Standards Relative to Stage of Dialogue

Our main task will be to explore, first, the kind of debate or sets of verbal exchanges that foster or tend to foster (modern) scepticism, and secondly, the possibilities of rationally reconstructing such a tendency. This line is adopted because it seems to me that despite the wide acceptance of the view that we ought, as philosophers, to appeal to particular situations or occasions, there has been a sad and significant neglect of one kind of situation, namely that which occurs as a link in a long chain of discussion. Such links, and the chains they form part of, bring out an important aspect of the use of language which can do much to illuminate the dialectics of modern scepticism.

Philosophically the most familiar kind of verbal chain of discussion is the dialogue, and the points I would like to elaborate here arise from simple considerations of the way in which, after three or four exchanges of views in a dialogue, an expression like ‘I know’ can come to be used in a number of quite different ways. ³ More particularly a use of ‘I know that p’ at the opening of the debate may be very different from an ‘I know that p’ repeated after a long argument for and against p. The claim to know at the opening of the dialogue could be an innocent off-hand gesture compared with a coolly insistent stand in the face of arguments and after deliberations, perhaps also certain non-verbal inquiries.

¹ In the following the phrase ‘I know’ is fairly consistently adhered to instead of the long series of phrases ‘I know’, ‘He knows’, ‘I knew’, ‘He knew’, ‘knowledge’, ‘It is known’, etc. Having made up one’s mind about functions and use of ‘I know’, the conclusions on the other phrases are in the main predetermined. But only in the main. If one wishes to talk about all the expressions of the series, there turns out to be very little to say. However, there are so many differences to be noted that a painstaking exposition concerned with all these phrases would be rather confusing.

It is because of this stress on developing dialogues that I call my notes on modern scepticism dialectical. Perhaps I should apologize to Hegelians for this old, but not very profound or Hegelian, use of the word, and to Austinians for employing such a pretentiously solemn one.

Consider first this example of a simple dialogue and its consequences for the use of ‘I know’:

1. A: Do you know where Mr. Jones lives?
2. B: Certainly, I know. 12 Park Avenue.
3. A: Letters to him written to that address are returned by the post office.
4. B: Is that so?
5. C: Do you know where Mrs. Jones lives?
6. B: Mm, I was sure 12 Park Avenue was correct. But after what you said—I’m not so certain.
7. C: Do you know the address of any of the people we are going to invite?
8. B: I’m sure about some of them.
9. C: Well, this is of deadly importance. Do you actually know any of those addresses?
10. B: I dare say I do know.

But now if at step (10) of the dialogue B persists in using the term ‘know’, he is likely to have used more rigorous requirements of evidence than at (1). He is also likely to answer with higher definiteness of intention as regards both relevance of evidence and gap (or difference) between evidence and the evidenced. Or, to put it more simply, he sees the need of evidence as he is made more aware of the divergence between his contentions and the evidence he has for them.

This shows that what an individual finds reasonable to require of an ‘I know that p’ claim will show variation as we move along the steps of a dialogue. Moreover, any such variation might well be classified as ‘reasonable’, since there seems no reason why we should describe standards of evidence which remain constant as reasonable or normal and take the fluctuations in particular cases as deviations from a stable norm.

Consider, for example, how three people, A, B, and C, might embark upon the complicated project of giving a fairly large party. ‘Knowing where somebody lives’ may after some (normally) heated dialogues rank high in regard to required standard of evidence, that is, in what A, B, and C accept as adequate evidence—higher, maybe, if such a comparison could be given a good meaning, ⁴ than the overworked chemist requires when asking his assistant (at the beginning of a dialogue): ‘Is the stuff to my right or the stuff to my left triamidotriphenylcarbinol? Do you know?’ The everyday and the scientific are not clearly separated, nor the philosophical and unphilosophical as to level of requirements. Variation in stage of development in any (normal) interaction between persons can show marked (yet normal) fluctuation in standard of evidence.

¹ The comparison of relative severity of requirements across different situations or topics is extremely difficult. It would seem that the attempt to make such a comparison must lead to the construction of conceptual frameworks of methodology. However interesting in themselves, these throw little light on everyday (or even scientific) evaluation and comparison of standards. The whole idea of definite standards is, of course, to some extent an artificial creation; there is little basis in the everyday use of ‘I know’ for that fiction—however useful it is in the debate on scepticism.

In order to avert a premature suspicion that in talking of variation in terms of increase in requirements I wish to push readers in the direction of scepticism, let me stress that at the end of a dialogue requirements may very well drop. Suppose C is to be the financial supervisor of the party, and that he tends to say ‘I do not know the price, I shall have to check it and you must help me’. If A and B discover that what C labels his ‘wild guesses’ are correct to the penny, there will be recriminations: ‘You say you don’t know, but you know very well.’ C has to bring his requirements down a step; his environment will legitimately put pressure on him in that direction. He has been overcautious and hampered the preparations for the party. ⁵

² In this example an individual modifies his requirements. In other cases the group or community does. The use of ‘I know he does not cheat’ is perhaps less restricted in Middletown because ‘it is now years since those shocking revelations—well, you remember’.

Thus, either a lowering or an increase of standards may be the so-called ‘normal’ after certain phases of a dialogue. Instead of the ‘normal’, however, I would prefer to talk here of the ‘rational’, that is, of standards being decreased or increased for ...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Foreword
• Pyrrho’s Scepticism According to Sextus Empiricus
• The Psychological Possibility of Scepticism
• Scepticism and Positive Mental Health
• Conceptual Complementarity of Evidence and Truth Requirements
• Dialectics of Modern Epistemological Scepticism
• Bibliography
• Index