The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics

Elites and Shifting Relations

Bayram Sinkaya

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780815357926
• eBook ISBN: 9781317525639
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has been dubbed the 'kingmaker' in recent studies of Iranian politics, precipitating heated debates surrounding the potential militarization of the Iranian regime and giving rise to paradoxical understandings of the IRGC; whether as a military institution entering politics, or a political institution with a military history.

Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics offers a way out of this paradox by showing that the IRGC is not a recently politicized institution, but has instead been highly politicized since its inception. It identifies the ways in which the IRGC relates to national political dynamics, examines the factors contributing to this relationship, and its implications on Iranian politics from the revolution up to the present day. The book examines the three decades following the revolution, uncovering the reasons behind the rise of the Revolutionary Guards and tracking the organization's evolving relationship with politics. Establishing a theoretical framework from revolution and civil-military relations theories, this book provides new perspectives on the relationship between the IRGC and Iranian politics.

This book would be of interest to students and scholars of Middle East Studies and Iranian Studies, in particular Iranian Politics.

1
Introduction

In addition to replacing ruling elites and institutions with new ones, the revolution that took place in Iran in February 1979 profoundly changed the values and norms dominating Iranian politics. One of the new institutions that the revolution gave birth to was the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Established as an armed force with the task of safeguarding the revolution and its achievements, the IRGC has become one of the most influential organizations in Iranian politics, two decades after the revolution. ¹ The IRGC’s political clout reached a high point, leading some observers to estimate that; “… the Guard will be in the position to be a king-maker in post-Khamenei politics.” ²

This volume aims to look at the reasons and the processes that lay behind the IRGC’s becoming an influential political force. Why and how has the IRGC turned into an influential political actor in post-revolutionary Iranian politics? By answering this question, this study aims to analyze the IRGC–politics relationship in Iran during the three decades following the revolution. By considering the IRGC as part of the Iranian armed forces, this work argues that the Guard’s increasing political clout in current Iranian politics is derived from its involvement, interventions, and interferences in the political sphere, rather than its being a constitutionally mandated authority. Otherwise, if its political power had been mandated by the constitution, the IRGC would have constantly been an influential political actor. However, historical evidence proves that the IRGC was first regarded as a ‘praetorian guard’ of the political leadership and then an ideologically zealous army. In the 1990s, analysts rarely paid attention to the IRGC in their analyses of Iranian politics because it did not have any significant political leverage. The IRGC’s influence in Iranian politics has risen since the late 1990s, and only after Mohammad Khatami’s presidency has it been considered a politically influential actor.

Therefore, in analyzing the causes behind the rise of the IRGC’s influence in Iranian politics, this study will seek answers to the following questions: Why has the IRGC, the revolutionary army of Iran, been involved in politics? Involvement of the IRGC in politics raises another question: By what means has the IRGC been involved in politics? How has the IRGC, the so-called praetorian army of Islamic radicals, which was once deemed a temporary organization, become a ‘king-maker’ in Iranian politics?

A brief survey of the issue shows that the IRGC’s involvement in politics has not followed a straightforward pattern. The course of the Guards’ involvement in politics has taken various forms throughout the three decades following the revolution. Initially, the IRGC came into being as a coercive force employed by a wing of the revolutionary coalition, the Islamic radicals, in order to intimidate and eliminate rival political groups contending for political power. Later, it became a multi-faced organization. In addition to its principal role in providing security and chasing counterrevolutionaries, the IRGC acted like a cultural and political organization. Concurrently, the IRGC was involved in factional fighting whereby it struggled against the ‘moderate’ government of Prime Minister Mahdi Bazargan and ‘moderate’ President Abolhassan Banisadr.

When the Islamic radicals consolidated their power in the mid-1980s, the IRGC became a reliable armed force entirely subordinated to the political leadership. At that time, due to the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq, the military side of the IRGC became more apparent. In the meantime, it had expanded its organizational structure and enhanced its standing in the post-revolutionary institutional structure. In terms of politics the IRGC then took a low profile, fully cooperating with the political leadership. However, the conformity between the political leadership and the IRGC started to crumble with Iran’s acceptance of the UN-brokered cease-fire in July 1988, which displayed the steadily diverging positions within the political elite. Shortly after the end of the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in June 1989 unleashed a new ‘era’ in the history of the Iranian revolution.

This new era profoundly affected the IRGC’s relations with the political leadership. Although it maintained its former low-profile political position for awhile, its political character resurfaced in the late 1990s. Accordingly, the IRGC was involved in a political struggle against the reform movement that came to power at the time. Since then, the IRGC’s involvement in politics has continued in two different and contrasting forms. Unlike its contentious relations with the reform movement and the reformist President Mohammad Khatami, the IRGC established a close relationship with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his neo-radical associates that rose to power in 2005.

Apparently, the IRGC’s involvement in politics has considerably increased in the last decade. In this context, the IRGC-politics relationship raises new questions: Why did the IRGC–politics relationship take different forms at different times? In other words, why did the IRGC cooperate with some governments whereas it struggled against others? More importantly, why has the IRGC’s involvement in politics increased in the last decade?

The IRGC’s steady involvement in politics raises another question: What is the proper place of the IRGC in politics under the constitutional structure in post-revolutionary Iran? Because the IRGC is part of the Iranian armed forces, it necessitates dealing with civil–military relations in post-revolutionary Iran. Although the Revolutionary Guards were constitutionally charged with safeguarding the achievements of the revolution, which is essentially and apparently a political task, the legal regulations related to daily politics and elections barred it, like other armed forces, from engaging in party politics. Yet, there was no obstacle for those who relinquished their relationship with the IRGC to engage in politics. In this environment, does the IRGC’s involvement in politics equal a violation of the civil–military relationship envisaged by the constitution and relevant laws? Another question pertinent to this issue is whether the IRGC’s involvement in politics brings about the militarization of the political regime? Any attempt to answer those questions compels us to address another issue; in what ways does the IRGC get involved in politics?

Against this background, the analysis of the causes affecting the IRGC’s relationship to politics would help us to better understanding of contemporary Iranian politics. It would uncover the key factors shaping the relations between the IRGC and the political leadership. Additionally, through such observance, the IRGC’s role in Iranian politics, as well as the implications of its involvement in politics, should be explored. Furthermore, proper analysis may help us make future projections about Iranian politics. Therefore, this study is an attempt to explore and analyze the factors affecting the IRGC’s relationship with politics and their implications in post-revolutionary Iran.

1.1 Relevant literature

Although the IRGC’s political influence has apparently increased in recent years, it always played an important role in the consolidation and institutionalization of the Iranian revolution. However, despite the existence of large amounts of literature on the Iranian revolution and contemporary Iranian politics, the IRGC’s role in post-revolutionary institution-building and its relationship to politics were rarely addressed in the literature.

The relationship between the IRGC and politics was covered by a few studies dealing with the security establishment of the Islamic Republic. In this regard, the accounts of Nikola B. Schahgaldian and Sepehr Zabih have a remarkable place in the literature. ³ However, those studies were largely concerned with the transition of the Iranian army from a royal institution to an ‘Islamic’ one, and of the performance of the Iranian armed forces throughout the Iran–Iraq War. Yet, these studies provided valuable accounts of the formation of the IRGC. Additionally, because they speculated over the probability of a military coup in Iran, they presented insightful analyses about the IRGC’s involvement in politics. In this context, both Schahgaldian and Zabih projected that the IRGC would play a decisive role in the post-Khomeini period, despite their differences in premises. ⁴ Whereas Schahgaldian underlined the ‘autonomous’ position of the IRGC and probable dilution of its ideological zeal as the primary reason for its involvement in politics, Zabih focused on the loyalty of the IRGC to the political leadership and the elite cohesion. Zabih contemplated that fragmentation of the elite in post-Khomeini Iran may lead to the IRGC’s involvement in political disputes. The historical developments proved Schahgaldian and Zabih’s projection for the IRGC’s involvement in politics in post-Khomeini Iran to be true, albeit only after a period of paucity in IRGC’s political engagements.

Contrary to Schahgaldian and Zabih’s forecasts, the IRGC adopted a low profile in politics immediately after the death of Khomeini. Because of the IRGC’s lack of political activities in the early 1990s, the issue surrounding the IRGC and politics was widely disregarded in the literature about Iranian politics. Instead, whereas general political studies on Iran were covering issues related to Iranian politics such as political legitimacy, factionalism, and reformism, security studies on Iran focused on the government’s new armament programs. The growing interest in the new security policies of Iran and the Iranian army in the 1990s culminated in several reports sponsored by leading US-based think tanks. ⁵ These studies presented the IRGC as part of the Iranian armed forces and as a military institution charged with missile and nonconventional weapons programs. Yet, the place devoted to the Revolutionary Guards in these studies was limited to military technical issues, and this ignored the IRGC’s political engagements. Although these reports acknowledged the IRGC’s notable position in Iran and covered the institutional evolution of the IRGC, they did not address the civil–military relations in the Islamic Republic and the IRGC’s relationship with politics.

In this regard, The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, authored by Kenneth Katzman, emerged as a noteworthy study that specifically dealt with the IRGC. ⁶ Katzman addressed the IRGC’s course of institutionalization and compared it to other revolutionary armies, including the Soviet Red Army, the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army, and the armées révolutionnaries of the French Revolution. He concluded that the IRGC maintained its revolutionary zeal and autonomy, contrary to other revolutionary armies that became professionalized shortly after revolutions and subordinated to civilian governments. Therefore, despite its institutionalization within the Iranian political system, the IRGC has not professionalized and has remained an ideologically motivated military force. However, Katzman did not address the fact that the IRGC’s ideological zeal did not diminish, as predicted by Schahgaldian.

Notwithstanding his emphasis on the institutionalization of the IRGC, Katzman stopped short of providing a clear definition of revolutionary fervor, as well, at least in the context of the Revolutionary Guards. Revolutionary ideals and the IRGC’s perception of Ayatollah Khomeini’s views, that is, the IRGC’s ideological outlook, were not fully addressed in his study. In addition, he did not elaborate on the implications of the IRGC’s ideological zeal. Furthermore, although he defined the IRGC as an institution autonomous from other governmental entities, and claimed that decision-making bodies should take the IRGC’s interests into account, Katzman did not delve deeper into the role of the Revolutionary Guards in politics.

Contrary to Katzman’s observation, the IRGC has moved towards professionalism as a military organization – in terms of adopting regular military ranks, defining criteria for promotion and replacing revolutionary emotions with rational military strategies – after the end of the Iran–Iraq War, which proved that the revolutionary zeal was not enough to gain victory. Consequently, the Revolutionary Guards adopted new uniforms and rank structures similar to those used by conventional armies. ⁷ Promotion within the IRGC has also become dependent on certain rules concerning military skills and knowledge, the level of education; organizational, administrative, and managerial skills; and the level of experience in these areas. Ideological commitment and fervor are no longer sufficient for promotion in the Revolutionary Guards, but it is still necessary. ⁸ Another point related to the professionalization of the IRGC has to do with the enrollment of commissioned officers to its ranks. Whereas it was initially drawing on volunteers whose revolutionary commitment and loyalty to the regime was fervent enough for them to be members of it, the IRGC began to enroll candidates to secondary and high-level schools administered by the IRGC. ⁹

Along these lines, some scholars have argued that the growing professionalism of the IRGC would decrease differences between it and the conventional army of Iran. ¹⁰ They have also argued that as the IRGC professionalized, the ideological and political commitment of the Guards would wane as well. Nevertheless, the developments after the late 1990s demonstrated that the IRGC’s interest in politics has considerably increased, rather than decreased, as it professionalized. This case has challenged both Katzman’s approach and the principal approach in civil–military relations literature that anticipates the subordination of armed forces to the political leadership on the path towards professionalization. ¹¹

Because the Iranian armed forces did not attempt to make a coup and apparently avoided intervening in political matters throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, some observers assumed that the Iranian armed forces, including the IRGC, were loyal and subordinated to the civil authority. ¹² Cann and Danopoulos embarked on explaining the noninterventionist stance of the Iranian armed forces. They examined the indoctrination of the armed forces, divisions within the military structure and external factors such as the presence of paramilitary groups to counterweight the army and the revolutionary war as the primary factors that contributed to the armed forces’ subordination to the political leadership. However, they also revealed a burgeoning discontent among the ranks of the regular army and the IRGC with regard to the political developments taking place in Iran in the early 1990s. They put forward several reasons for the dissatisfaction of the armed forces, which, in their view, increased the possibility of a military intervention in Iran. ¹³ First, according to the authors, the end of the war diverted many officers’ attention away from an external enemy and more towards internal economic and political problems. Secondly, Cann and Danopoulos asserted that the expansion of the IRGC diminished its loyalty to the political leadership, a process that later contributed to its political dissatisfaction. M...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Revolutionary armies and politics
• 3 Revolutionary army of Iran: the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
• 4 The IRGC and politics during the transitional period (1979–1981)
• 5 The IRGC and politics in radical Iran (1981–1989)
• 6 The IRGC and politics in thermidorian Iran (1989–2005)
• 7 The IRGC and politics in neo-radical Iran (2005–2013)
• 8 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index