Stigma

Robert M. Page

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138851283
• eBook ISBN: 9781317530275
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Although references to stigma were commonplace in the field of social policy and elsewhere, the concept was often used in a rather imprecise way. Originally published in 1984, this book assesses the relevance of the concept of stigma for the study of social policy. Investigations of the concept within the welfare field have tended to be far too narrow in focus (i.e. the concept has been regarded as a technical problem which can be eradicated by greater adherence to the principle of universalism).

As a counter to this perspective, Robert Page argues that it is necessary to distinguish much more clearly between various aspects of the concept of stigma (e.g. stigmas, stigmatization and felt stigma). He examines the reasons why, and the ways in which, one particular 'welfare' group – unmarried mothers – have been stigmatized over the centuries in order to highlight the importance of examining existing patterns of 'welfare' and other forms of stigmatization within their political, economic, social and historical context. It is concluded that stigma will continue to be a key concept for both students and practitioners within the field of social policy provided that it is examined from this wider perspective.

1 The anatomy of stigma¹

References to stigma are now commonplace in the media and in general discourse. The term is readily applied to any ‘disreputable’ person, group, activity, occupation² or location. However, stigma remains a relatively imprecise concept. As Titmuss reminds us, ‘the concept itself is as elusive and complex as other key concepts like class, alienation, participation, democracy, poverty and so forth.’³ The relevance of this statement can clearly be seen if one considers just a few of the ways in which the term stigma has been defined in the social science literature.

Whether it is a visible mark or an invisible stain, stigma acquires its meaning through the emotion it generates within the person bearing it and the feeling and behavior toward him of those affirming it. These two aspects of stigma are indivisible since they each act as a cause or effect of the other. (J. and E. Cumming)⁴

In the final analysis, stigma might best be considered to be the negative perceptions and behaviors of so-called normal people to all individuals who are different from themselves. (English)⁵

In its most general sociological sense, the term stigma can be used to refer to any attribute that is deeply discrediting and incongruous with our stereotype of what a given type of individual should be. (Kando)⁶

Given the differences in these definitions (at least in emphasis), it is not surprising that the notion of stigma has acquired something of an elusive reputation. To counter this shortcoming it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the various aspects of this concept.

Stigmas

In its most literal usage the term stigma refers to some form of mark or stain. As Osborne points out:

‘Stigma’ dates back to the Greek word for ‘tattoo-mark,’ a brand made with a hot iron and impressed on people to show that they were devoted to the services of the temple or, on the opposite spectrum of behavior, that they were criminals or runaway slaves.⁷

More recently, however, the term stigma has tended to be associated almost exclusively with ‘inferior’ forms of physical appearance, conduct or ethnicity.⁸

Any discussion of socially inferior attributes (stigmas) necessarily requires some consideration of the question of social normality. A number of commentators have given attention to this subject.⁹ For example, Merton and Nisbet¹⁰ have outlined six distinctive dimensions of social norms:

(i) Norms may prescribe or proscribe conduct or merely indicate the type of behaviour which is preferred or permitted.

(ii) The extent of agreement concerning such norms will vary within society.

(iii) There are likely to be varying degrees of commitment amongst those who accept a particular norm.

(iv) Informal or formal sanctions may be applied to those who fail to conform to a particular social norm.

(v) Norms differ in the type of adherence required (i.e.norms may require implicit or explicit support).

(vi) The ‘elasticity’ of norms will vary. With some norms adherence to a restricted range of conduct may be required whereas greater flexibility may be permitted with others.

Although this classification is useful, it does not provide any means for precisely identifying prevailing social norms. Indeed, any classification is likely to be deficient in this respect given the diversity of opinion over the question of what actually constitutes a social norm. Nevertheless, there is likely to be some agreement concerning what can loosely be regarded as the ‘major’ social norms in society (many of which will be embodied in legal codes). As Plummer contends:

Groups may reject societal definitions, but they cannot wish them away or remain unaware of them. You cannot steal, murder, rape, be blind, deaf or mentally ill without being aware that you are violating some publicly held norms.¹¹

However, in a discussion of societal and situational deviance, Plummer clearly acknowledges that the relative dimension of social norms cannot be ignored.

A simple distinction must be made between ‘societal deviance’ and ‘situational deviance’. The former is that conduct described as deviant in the public, abstract and reified values systems which all societies must have – even though individual actors may dissent from them, and even though such systems need not be clear, non-contradictory, or without competition. The latter is that conduct which emerges as deviant in interpersonal encounters. The former – while relative cross culturally – is perceived as absolute by most members of a society and possesses moral authority; while the latter is capable of considerable relativity. The former thereby sets constraints on what can be called deviant in any given society though these constraints are far from being rigid and fixed.¹²

It would appear, then, that reactions to norms infractions are likely to vary to some degree. As Cohen points out, the public may respond to deviance in a number of ways.

It can be indifferent – the problem doesn’t concern us, ‘let him do his thing’; it can welcome the deviance, heralding it, for example, as pointing the way for society to advance; it can be punitive, advocating deterrent and retributive measures, ranging from £5 fines to the death penalty; or, finally, it can be progressive, advocating various treatment and therapeutic measures ostensibly designed for the deviant’s ‘own good’.¹³

It seems, therefore, that stigma will not necessarily attach to all types of norm infractions. For example, adults who indulge in activities associated with childhood such as ‘train-spotting’ may well be regarded as odd or eccentric but it is unlikely that they will be stigmatized unless their conduct is perceived as evidence of an established stigma attribute such as mental illness.

In general, stigma has tended to be associated with those inferior attributes which are commonly regarded as major norm infractions. Certain attributes, such as physical handicap, have had stigmatic connotations for many centuries¹⁴ whilst others have only been negatively regarded for much shorter periods of time.¹⁵ (It should also be noted that the stigma which attaches to a particular attribute in one historical period may decline in another e.g. divorce.¹⁶) In addition, the rationale for a particular stigma may change over time. For example, the unmarried mother was stigmatized in earlier centuries because her conduct directly contravened the teaching of the Christian church. However, since the mid-sixteenth century the dependency of unmarried mothers on public aid has been the main reason for such stigma (see chapter 3).

Goffman has identified ‘three grossly different’ types of stigma which exist in contemporary society.

First there are the abominations of the body – the various physical deformities. Next there are the blemishes of individual character perceived as weak will, domineering or unnatural passions, treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty, these being inferred from a known record of, for example, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality, unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political behaviour. Finally there are the tribal stigma that can be transmitted through lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family.¹⁷

According to Goffman:

In all these various instances of stigma … the same sociological features are found: an individual who might have been received easily in ordinary social intercourse possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those of us whom he meets away from him, breaking the claim that his other attributes have on us.¹⁸

Goffman also outlines two ways in which each type of stigma can be ‘carried’¹⁹ (discredited and discreditable). Goffman uses the term discredited to describe those who presume that their stigma is known about already or is immediately obvious to others (usually because it is visual in nature). In contrast, the term discreditable is used by Goffman to describe those who believe that their stigma ‘is neither known about by those present nor immediately perceivable by them.’²⁰ (See Table 1.1.)

Table 1.1 Stigmas and the ways in which they may be carried

Types of stigma	Ways in which stigmas may be carried
	Discredited	Discreditable
1 PHYSICAL	Paraplegic in a wheelchair	Woman who has undergone a mastectomy
2 CONDUCT	Well-known criminal e.g. Myra Hindley, Ronald Biggs	‘Secret’ homosexual
3 TRIBAL	Negro	Jew

In general, those with physical or tribal stigmas will tend to be discredited rather than discreditable. For example, the blind or the physically handicapped will find it difficult to ‘conceal’ information about their stigmas from others. There will be exceptions. A paraplegic sitting at an office desk which effectively conceals any hint of disability may be thought of as physically able by others who do not know of her disability.

Individuals with conduct stigmas are more likely to be discreditable than discredited. In many cases, such individuals are able to limit public information about their discrediting attributes. For example, a lesbian may decide to ‘pass’ as heterosexual with colleagues at work and with casual acquaintances. For others, such passing may not be possible. For instance, ‘Great Train Robber’ Ronald Biggs has become so well known that his name has even been used by a British car manufacturer in an advertising campaign (The Mini: Nips in and out Quicker than Ronald Biggs).

It must also be noted that varying degrees of blame attach to the types of stigma outlined by Goffman. In general, those with physical or tribal stigmas are granted a measure of social acceptance because they are not considered to be personally responsible for their ‘failing’. As such, they may tend to elicit favourable rather than unfavourable reactions from others. As F. Davis states in a discussion of the physically handicapped: ‘…in our society the visibly handicapped are customarily accorded, save by children, the surface acceptance that democratic manners guarantee nearly all.’²¹

There are exceptions to this generalisation. For example, Cahnman argues that the obese are perceived as blameworthy.

… contrary to those that are blind, one-legged, paraplegic, or dark-pigmented, the obese are presumed to hold their fate in their own hands; if they were only a little less greedy or lazy or yielding to impulse or oblivious of advice, they would restrict excessive food intake, resort to strenuous exercise, and as a consequence of such deliberate action, they would reduce. Actually, the moral factor which is thus introduced aggravates the case. While blindness is considered a misfortune, obesity is branded a defect.²²

Those with conduct stigmas are generally considered to be personally responsible for their failings. It is commonly believed that such individuals have deliberately chosen to behave in socially unacceptable ways. As such, they are liable to be treated unfavourably by others. Again, there are exceptions. For example, a woman who gives birth to an illegitimate child as a result of being raped may be seen as blameless rather than blameworthy.

Pardo has paid particular attention to this blameless-blameworthy dimension of stigma in his research in Canada.²³ Using a non-stigmatized ‘normal’ as a baseline for comparison, Pardo attempted to discover how a group of undergraduates would respond to various stigmatized individuals: a blind man – physical stigma; an ex-convict – moral stigma; a blind ex-convict – multiple stigma. Pardo tested three hypotheses.

1 People will tend to evaluate a blind man more favourably than an ex-convict. (Pardo termed this a justice effect.)²⁴

2 People will tend to compensate a blind victim of an accident more generously than an ex-convict who has experienced an identical mishap. (Social responsibility effect.)²⁵ (In order to test this particular hypothesis, Pardo asked his respondents to award damages (of between 1,000 and 3,000 dollars) to in...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 The anatomy of stigma
• 2 Stigma: the social administration approach
• 3 Stigma and the unmarried mother
• 4 Stigma and social policy: wider dimensions
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index of authors
• Subject index