Perspectives on Social Psychology

Clyde Hendrick

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138837829
• eBook ISBN: 9781317562368
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Originally published in 1977, this volume was intended to provide a relatively elementary and clear overview of some of the more important approaches to social psychology at the time. There are a number of perspectives on this discipline, but here, instead of traditional theoretical approaches (e.g. field theory, role theory or S-R) the point of view is from the general perspective. The first chapter approaches social psychology as an experimental science, with the history and philosophic traditions discussed, as well as the current state of the field. Other chapters approach the discipline from the perspectives of symbolic interaction, social development, and ethology. The final chapter is devoted to the uses of mathematical models in social psychology.

This volume was intended to serve as a helpful integration of the field, and will still be useful as a text in its historical context.

1

Social Psychology As An Experimental Science

Clyde Hendrick

University of Miami

INTRODUCTION

Social psychology is many things and has numerous facets. Today it is predominantly an experimental laboratory science. In fact, Klineberg (1965, p. 10) identified the experimental approach as the most direct trademark of the discipline. Social psychology is a relatively young discipline, having arrived at a mature status only since the Second World War. Murphy (1965) discussed three historical characteristics that led to the emergence of this new discipline. First, agreeing with Klineberg’s emphasis, Murphy noted the forging of an experimental method that was potentially applicable to social behavior. Second, there was a turn toward a social direction in general experimental psychology. Finally, enough data and materials had to accumulate so that systematic texts could be written and courses offered.

During the 30 years since the Second World War, social psychology has become a burgeoning discipline. Sahakian (1974, p. 126) speaks of the discipline optimistically, stating “Today … social psychology stands in all of its majesty, with society depending on it for the investigation and solution of a number of its major problems.” At present this optimistic assessment is not generally shared, and a period of reassessment which will be discussed in a later section in this chapter, has begun.

Experimental social psychology as a discipline may be characterized in several ways. It is, first of all, a scientific community of people (Crane, 1972) who tend to share a similar scientific language, a relatively common way of professional life, and a similar value orientation. The value orientation involves consensus on a variety of things; the most prestigious publication outlets; who does good or bad research; the most desirable academic settings in which a social psychologist may lead a professional life; the important leaders or role models in the discipline; etc. The discipline may have a system of social stratification the same as any other science (Cole & Cole, 1973); indeed, social psychology may even contain a power structure of sorts (Strickland, 1976; Lubek, 1976), in which a relatively small minority of people control access to publication outlets, grant funds, and entry into the job market. The value orientation is initially transmitted in graduate training and is reinforced by face-to-face contacts at professional meetings, informal communication networks, and the gate-keeping function of publication outlets and hiring practices.

Experimental social psychology may also be characterized by its methodological orientation. The orientation relies heavily, almost predominantly, on the laboratory experiment for the conduct of inquiry. The high priority given the laboratory experiment is also part of the shared value consensus of members of the discipline. The lore of the laboratory experiment is massive, and this chapter will be concerned in a major way with the nature of experimentation in social psychology and the presuppositions underlying this approach.

Finally, experimental social psychology may be characterized as a substantive content discipline, a discipline that focuses on some areas of human life and ignores other areas. The focus on content proceeds in two ways. Some researchers focus on theory and its development. Currently, most such theories focus on specific topics (for example, attraction, attitude change, dissonance, etc.), although there is still some concern with general theoretical systems such as field theory, psychoanalytic theory, and S-R theory.

The second way in which content is dealt with is to focus on a phenomenon in question, to ascertain the various interrelated empirical variables that bear on the phenomenon in one way or another. This focus is on the variables relevant to the social phenomenon or process and is little concerned with theoretical development, although there may be nominal hypothesis testing to satisfy an earlier ethic that research should be conducted to affirm or deny a theory. With this focus on the collection of facts and empirical relations in a specific content area, the literature within that area tends to grow prodigiously, become encapsulated within itself, and effectively get cut off from other areas that would be closely related from the perspective of a general theory. For example, the research on interpersonal attraction proceeds in its own fashion independently of the research on attitude change. Even a simple theory of modest scope could view pro and con feelings toward people as one specific type of attitude formation and change, and thus the study of attraction would become a subunit of the general area of attitudes. Logical though such a grouping might be, the two topics remain separate as a perusal of introductory social texts will quickly testify.

This tendency for encapsulated content areas to develop in social psychology has led to discontent and a sense of fragmentation and probably has contributed to the sense of malaise or crisis currently existing in the discipline. The crisis in social psychology is given extended treatment in a later section.

In summary, experimental social psychology is best characterized in several ways. It is a network of social relationships among a dispersed group of academic scholars who share a common set of professional values and a communication network. Experimental social psychology, in contrast to many other social sciences, places high value on the manipulative laboratory experiment as the best path to the accumulation of social knowledge. Finally, there is considerable concern with miniature theories (for example, attraction, impression formation, etc.), but there is perhaps even stronger concern with the empirical study of the phenomena per se, with only secondary interest in the development of strong theories about the phenomena.

The Matter of Definitions

There are many definitions of social psychology. Most experimental social psychologists would agree with Allport (1968a) that the “focus of interest is upon the social nature of the individual person” (p. 3). Relative emphasis on the social system or the individual may vary, but most experimentalists perhaps tend to emphasize the individual. This emphasis is captured well by Allport’s classic definition. “With few exceptions, social psychologists regard their discipline as an attempt to understand and explain how the thought, feeling, and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others” (p. 3).

Moscovici (1972) defined three kinds of social psychology, but would agree that the type specified by Allport’s definition is dominant. Moscovici called this approach taxonomic, with the aim of determining “the nature of the variables which might account for the behavior of an individual confronted with a stimulus” (p. 50). Social stimuli, according to this approach, are on a continuum with nonsocial stimuli, not essentially different in nature (see also Stotland, 1965). This study of effects on the individual necessarily concerns itself with reactions to an environment; hence, social psychology is susceptible to various kinds of behavioristic influence.

Moscovici also noted a differential social psychology, which is concerned with personality characteristics. The differential approach uses trait variation in attributes (for example, leadership, achievement motivation) as the mechanism for explaining social behavior. This approach is popular but it is not dominant. There is a suspicion of “merely correlational” research, in which variables are manipulated by “chronic” variation as opposed to the active “acute” manipulations of the laboratory experiment. Thus the differential approach does not have the prestige among social psychologists that the taxonomic approach has. There has been a tendency among some researchers during the last decade to combine the chronic and acute manipulations to form a subdiscipline of “experimental personality.” Whether this approach will become a viable discipline in its own right remains to be seen.

A third approach to social psychology identified by Moscovici was called systematic. This approach tends to focus on the phenomenon of dependence and interdependence among individuals. Zajonc (1966) stressed this definition. The study of social relations or interaction among individuals was perhaps the original vision for an experimental social psychology. Certainly it seemed to be Lewin’s general approach to the study of group processes. However, the study of interaction in all of its complexity proved too difficult for the laboratory experiment. The conception of independent-dependent variable is not well suited for capturing the interlocking dynamics of ongoing interaction. Consequently group processes qua group were not studied very much. The systematic approach to the study of groups was transformed into the taxonomic approach, so that the study of conformity, communication, etc. was essentially translated into the effects of other individuals (for example, social pressure) on one individual’s response (for example, a measure of conformity).

The taxonomic approach reflected in Allport’s definition is without doubt the dominant approach to social psychology today. It is well suited to an S-R, independent-dependent variable, unilinear causal view of social behavior. As developed in later sections, this approach reflects a philosophy that underlies most of experimental social psychology. Only recently have attacks (e.g., McGuire, 1973) been leveled seriously at this predominant view.

It will be useful to examine briefly the two major metaconcerns of experimental social psychology – the nature of theory, and the experimental approach.

Theory in Social Psychology

General theoretical orientations have had considerable impact on social psychology. They are still drawn upon for general ideas and moral support, but no one thinks seriously any longer of “testing” or “confirming” these general theories. The first volume of the most recent edition of The Handbook of Social Psychology (Lindzey & Aronson, 1968) is devoted to such systematic positions. There are discussions of stimulus-response, Freudian, cognitive, field, and role theories in social psychology. Perhaps the best statement is that these theories are not really theories in any specific sense, but rather approaches or guiding orientations that provide a language for the conduct of research, and, to a limited extent, may suggest the direction for research.

The trend during the last two decades has definitely been toward smaller theories that deal with limited topics, what Robert Merton (1957) called theories of the middle range. There are a great many such theories. Undoubtedly, Festinger’s (1957) dissonance theory has been the most popular and productive of research.

In some respects this trend toward miniature theories is surprising. No doubt the general orientations were seen to be inept, but no one attempted to replace them by better general theories. Rather the trend was toward selected topic theories. This trend is surprising in the sense that it violates the urge toward general explanatory paradigms. Lewin’s call for theories of unrestricted universality was very clear. Also, some of the theories of the natural sciences were considered as suitable models to follow in this regard.

Moscovici (1972) presented an interesting analysis of this issue which is worthy of note. Moscovici felt that the decline in theory is due to (or at least correlated with) the growing empiricism in social psychology. There are three aspects of this empirical trend.

1. Social psychologists are in general antispeculative in outlook. In the same sense that experimental psychology eschewed philosophy earlier, social psychology today eschews anything tainted with metaphysics and beyond the realm of empirical proof.

2. Theories are variously regarded. One approach is to view theories as conventions (free and somewhat arbitrary creations) that are fruitful as long as they generate research. In this way, theory is a language and a tool that is subordinated to the empirical method. Theories viewed in this way are not “grand thought devices,” but simply disposable tools. If they do not work they can be discarded. The need for a convenient tool would lead to neater, more precisely stated theories that are more productive in empirical research. Increased emphasis on precision would usually lead to more circumscribed content domains. To the extent that this argument has merit, one would expect that the use of mathematical models in social psychology will increase greatly in the future, an approach that Harris (1976a) has vigorously advocated.

3. The growing emphasis on experimentation and away from the observational approach of the field is also conducive in a different way to the miniaturization of theory. To be most efficient the laboratory experiment requires a very narrow theory for test. In fact, it requires a specific hypothesis, ideally cast in an if-then implicational form. The purpose of experimentation is in this way subtly transformed from testing general theories to testing a specific hypothesis, which does not necessarily have a broader epistemological context than the bare statement of the hypothesis itself.

In this role social psychologists often devote enormous energy to testing hypotheses. Because hypotheses are often personal creations, there may be considerable emotional investment in them. Researchers set out to “confirm” their hypotheses, and they can draw considerable support from the philosophy of science for the “logic of confirmation.” In this way, experiments often seem to serve the function of justification of the hypothesis rather than the discovery of new knowledge. McGuire (1973) presented an incisive discussion of the demonstrational nature of many hypothesis testing experiments. Social psychologists do not tend to follow Popper’s (1968) conception of falsifiability of a theory in which one’s pet hypothesis must survive the “destruction test” of an experiment.

In general then, theory construction and testing in the broad sense has been subordinated to the logic of confirmation of hypothesis testing in a narrow specific sense. Moscovici suggests what he conceives to be a more fruitful conception of theory formation as a dialectic competition between theory and experiment. “Experiment and theory do not stand in a transparent relation to one another; it is the role of the theory to make experimentation unnecessary, and the role of experimentation to render the theory impossible” (p. 46). This position seems to advocate an adversary relation between theory and experimentation, instead of the usual conception of a complementary relation. There may be considerable merit in this conception, and it would be of interest to see the conception developed more fully.

There are several consequences of the decline in theoretical emphasis. One consequence is that social psychologists are sometimes accused of belaboring the obvious, of testing commonsense aphorisms. Another consequence is that the death rate of new knowledge is almost as rapid as its birth rate. Several commentators have complained about the lack of cumulativeness in research data. A third consequence of the change to miniature theories is the relative isolation of different research areas, which results in a sense of fragmentation, as was noted above.

The trend toward specific, small-scale theories seems undeniable. On a positive note, such theories are often testable in a way that was not possible with the more general formulations. Over a number of specific experiments it is often possible to obtain a sense of confirmation or disconfirmation for the theory. Precision of statement is necessary for the testing process. Undoubtedly, if anyone were smart enough to create a theory of social behavior both very general and very precise, it would be done. Until the Einstein of social psychology emerges, however, we must make do with the miniature theories.

The Experimental Approach

Social psychologists have always been concerned with method and have used (and still do) a wide variety of them. One volume of The Handbook of Social Psychology is devoted exclusively to methods. However, it is clear that the laboratory experiment (and secondarily the field experiment) is considered the most useful methodology. In fact the ordering of topics in the methods volume of the Handbook gives a reasonable assessment of the prestige rank ordering of the various methods. The initial, excellent chapter by Aronson and Carl...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• 1. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS AN EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE
• 2. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
• 3. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY FROM A SOCIAL-DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
• 4. ETHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
• 5. MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
• Author Index
• Subject Index