China's Military Procurement in the Reform Era

The Setting of New Directions

Yoram Evron

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780367598860
• eBook ISBN: 9781317478935
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The decisions that shape the policy of weapons procurement are an important area of national security policy. This is all the more true for China, which during recent decades has vacillated between different sources and directions of military build-up.

This book explores the politics of military procurement in China under the successive leaderships of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. It shows how China's political and military leaders have sought to adjust military procurement policy to meet China's strategic objectives, to relate it to non-military needs, to strike a balance between the import of weapons and indigenous production, and to determine the connections between hardware and other components of military power. Exploring in detail five major shifts in the nation's military procurement, it traces the considerations and negotiations among China's civilian and military leaderships. By doing so, it offers both a conceptual framework and empirical grounds for evaluating the factors that shape China's military procurement directions, as well as their limitations, prospects, and operational implications.

As the first book to study comprehensively and systematically the attributes shaping China's military procurement, it will be of great interest to students and scholars of Chinese politics, Chinese history and military and strategic studies.

Part I

Background factors

1 Weapons and technology in China’s military history

The defense industries in Communist China began their rise almost ex nihilo. After nearly a century of warfare, insurrection within, and the disintegration of the ruling system, China was barely left with industrial infrastructure, capital wealth, or the science and technology needed to produce modern weaponry. Incipient signs of industrialization, including a few arms factories built in the second half of the nineteenth century, faded after the collapse of imperial rule in 1911 and China’s wars under the Republic (1912–49). To grasp the profound influence of these callow attempts at military procurement during the Communist period we should return to the imperial era and examine the perceptions and patterns of activity in the military sphere at that time.

The imperial era

Decisions on military buildup do not emanate only from “objective” conditions, such as level of threat and the military capability of one side as against its rivals. They are also driven by the state’s early military fortunes as perceived by its civil and military elites, as well as their accumulated knowledge and values in strategy-related issues; as aforementioned, this can be generalized as military culture. In the case of Communist China, senior military and civilian leaders were greatly influenced by the strategic experience and culture of the earlier dynasties. They would scour classical military writings for solutions to the strategic situations they faced, and were influenced by fundamental positions on the role of military force amidst political complexity (Wang 2000: 7–8; Li Jijun 2002: 82–3; Wu 2002: 85–6; Peng and Yao 2005: 87). Mao Zedong’s heavy reliance on classical Chinese military writings and the 2006 decision to include Sun Zi’s Art of War for study at Chinese military academies are just two examples (Schram 1989: 53–4; “The Art of War by Sun Zi” 2006).

Imperial China’s military heritage should therefore be regarded as a basic element in the study of Communist China’s military development. However, the ambivalent attitude to the military sphere in China’s historiography and thinking impedes examination of past experience and perceptions (Van de Ven 2000: 10–11). On the one hand, generations of scholar-officials were ideologically repelled by the exercise of military power because of the pacifist assertions of Confucian texts and Sun Zi’s strategic ideal of subduing the enemy without fighting (Johnston 1995: 117–22). On the other hand, Chinese history was replete with examples of the use of force to eliminate external and internal threats, out of which a well developed military tradition emerged. Chinese dynasties attained their ruling power by resorting frequently to war, and emperors invested abundant resources in equipping and training their armies.¹ Ambivalence to military power was reflected in the conceptual sphere as well. As Johnston’s seminal work Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History demonstrates, the classical Chinese military texts contain two different sets of strategic preferences which constitute two strategic cultures: one based on Confucian values with a preference for nonviolence and accommodating strategies, the other favoring offensive strategies and violence over compromise (Johnston 1995: 155).

Nevertheless, in the early Song dynasty (960–1279), or even earlier, an antimilitarist turn clearly occurred in China, which led to a demilitarized culture that by and large has existed ever since. Chinese scholars and statesmen were used to thinking of China as a peace-loving civilization that shunned aggression and conducted its wars solely for defense (Di Cosmo 2011: 2; Van de Ven 2000: 6). This view was deeply rooted in the influential Confucian tradition, but it was also the result of court politics. In their attempt to describe the ruling dynasty favorably for future generations and contending with the military elite for political influence, the Confucian officials at court gave laconic accounts of warfare and downplayed the importance of the army in the official historical records (Swaine and Tellis 2000: 58).

The pacifist view was additionally supported by the fact that from the founding of the chain of imperial dynasties in 221 BCE until its dissolution in 1911 China’s rulers did not embark on military campaigns to extend the empire’s borders beyond its traditional sphere – this at least is how they have been conceived in Chinese collective memory throughout history (Lorge 2005: 436–7; McNeill 1982: 33–5). In truth, the boundaries of the empire expanded significantly down the years. For instance, during the reign of the last dynasty (Qing, 1644–1911) the territories of Taiwan, Chinese Central Asia (Xinjiang), Mongolia, and Tibet were all attached to China. Also during the Qing dynasty, even before the fateful encounters with Western armies, militaristic stirrings began, and were considered alien to Confucianism (Waley-Cohen 2005: 111–41). Nevertheless, territorial expansion did not erode Chinese self-perceived pacifism as it did not exceed the boundaries of an area deemed by the Chinese their heartland and strategic periphery, and within which they did not deem military activity aggressive.

Imperial military power was thus seen as aimed at preserving imperial rule and political stability within China’s traditional sphere, hence as essentially defensive and limited in its aspirations. Moreover, military forces in China were usually activated in coordination with diplomatic and economic means to reduce the cost and risks involved in military operations. The result was that the extent military forces were used depended not only on the level of threat perceived by the leadership and the existing strategies, but to a great extent on court politics (for example, Waldron 1990: 108–21). For although the army was nominally controlled by the civilian officialdom at the imperial court, in fact its high command often enjoyed relative freedom of action as well as direct contact with the emperor (Dai 2005). As a result, the actual division of power between the civil and military elites often favored means alternative to military force and recruiting the resources needed to fight a war.

This antimilitaristic dual approach long affected the material aspects of military buildup in Imperial China. Its rulers and strategists seem to have been well aware of the high economic cost of maintaining and operating an army. This of course holds for other countries and rulers as well, but it is especially prominent in the Chinese case. Unlike many of its rivals, mainly the nomadic peoples across its northern boarders, the social and economic fabric of an agricultural China was not suited to maintain large armies and wage all-out war. Extensive recruitment of manpower was detrimental to agricultural work, training conscripts was a lengthy process, loss or neglect of agricultural land entailed a heavy price, and the stationing of large contingents of troops along the borders was exorbitantly expensive. In fact, the inability to finance armies has been perceived as one of the main factors in the collapse of various dynasties (Dai 2011: 297).

The importance ascribed to the material aspect by the Chinese strategic culture is reflected by the prominent place it occupies in China’s most influential military text: Sun Zi’s Art of War. Its second chapter starts with a presentation of the economic and logistical aspects of warfare:

In general, the strategy for employing the military (is this): If there are one thousand four-horse attack chariots, one thousand leather-armored support chariots, one hundred thousand mailed troops, and provisions are transported one thousand li, then the domestic and external campaign expenses, the expenditures for advisors and guests, materials … and providing chariots and armor will be one thousand pieces of gold per day. Only then can an army of one hundred thousand be mobilized.

(Sun-tzu 1993: 159)

Furthermore:

If you expose the army to a prolonged campaign, the state’s resources will be inadequate. When the weapons have grown dull and spirits depressed, when our strength has been expended and resources consumed, then the feudal lords will take advantage of our exhaustion to arise.

(Sun-tzu 1993: 159)

From this he deduced the correct way to recruit army manpower: “One who excels in employing the military does not conscript the people twice or transport provisions a third time” (Sun-tzu 1993: 159).

Historical evidence also reflects the attempts by various Chinese rulers to limit military expenses. To save on feeding troops stationed along China’s northern boundary, which usually demanded China’s greatest military effort, the border garrisons were required to provide for themselves. For the larger part of imperial history they did so by setting up farms and raising crops and animals for food, while other conscripts were assigned to work at sponsored farms probably established for the same purpose. The occasional adoption of an appeasing policy toward the northern tribes in order to reduce military conflicts is another manifestation of this attitude (Waldron 1990: 82–3; Loewe 2011: 83).

The attempt to reduce the costs of the army and its unpopularity also influenced the development of military technology in China. A common argument is that unlike the Western military tradition, the traditional Chinese approach did not ascribe major importance to weaponry in a country’s military strength. Instead, it stressed strategy and the way a war was conducted (Zhang and Yao 2004: 131–8). Nevertheless, until the invention of gunpowder weapons in the thirteenth century, the Chinese invested great effort in improving weapons; even if some types were imported from abroad (e.g., horses and chariots) China’s contribution in this field was significant. The crossbow, various types of fortification, ships of unprecedented size, and gunpowder were all developed in China. The same applies to bombs, rockets, and the first cannons.² Nevertheless, from the fourteenth century military technology in China ceased to advance, eventually lagging far behind the military-technological revolutions in the West (Krause 1995: 22). While a comprehensive discussion on the reasons for the ending of progress in Chinese military technology exceeds the confines of this book, its impact on China’s military development in later generations was so significant that it cannot be ignored.

The halt resulted from a combination of strategic, economic, and bureaucratic factors. The conclusion of the internal wars that led to the accession of the Ming dynasty in 1368, and the curtailment of the large-scale maritime expeditions a few decades later, focused the dynasty’s attention on the Mongolian threat in the north. But successive campaigns there failed and the court’s resources dwindled, so the dynasty replaced its offensive strategy by stationary defense, based on the Great Wall. However, confronting the rapid movement of the Mongolian horsemen, the Chinese forces found the rate of the gunpowder weapons of the time too slow, therefore lost interest in them. In addition, regardless of rapid technological and administrative developments in iron casting, transportation, finance and the like during the Song and Ming periods, the concomitant centralization of state power as well as court politics adversely affected arms development. First, free competition, considered an important factor in the development of military technology, was curbed. Second, the traditional hostility between the civilian bureaucracy and the military establishment, as well as the corruption of court officials, damaged the quality of government supervision of the weapons production system and obviated any economic incentives for innovation in this field (McNeill 1982: 27–33; Chase 2003: chs. 2, 6). This situation portrays the grand paradox in arms development in China: its innovations in weaponry were stymied despite its great technological progress, which ranked it at the time the most advanced country in the world.

Matters developed otherwise in the West. The Mongolian armies, which by the thirteenth century had reached the Adriatic Sea, were the first to introduce gunpowder technology into Europe. It developed further there due to the spread of fortification warfare across the continent and the ceaseless armed conflict resulting from its political fragmentation. The outcome was the invention of the most efficient models of ordnance weapons and cannon (Chase 2003: 142–4). These firearms, which were much more advanced than the gunpowder weapons developed by the Chinese, made their way back to China at the beginning of the sixteenth century through Portuguese and Dutch traders, and later through the Jesuit missionaries. The court of the Ming dynasty overcame its opposition to the import of foreign expertise because of the ever more disastrous military reverses it suffered at the hands of the Manchurians. After a number of failed attempts by the Chinese to cast cannons themselves, some Chinese officials persuaded the court to request of the Jesuits to do the work. After the overthrow of the Ming dynasty by the Manchu armies, the new Qing dynasty tried to learn the technique from the missionaries, but they declined to transfer the know-how, and continued to supervise the work themselves. For its part the dynasty strove to reduce military expenditure and refrained from acquiring modern innovations in weaponry from Europe (Waley-Cohen 1993: 1530–9; Spence 1969: 9, 14–15). Early in the eighteenth century relations between the imperial court and the Catholic Church gradually deteriorated, until their complete severance. Thereupon the development of military technology in China ceased. It was renewed only due to the turbulence in the empire, partly caused by the next encounter with Westerners in the first half of the nineteenth century.

The Self-Strengthening Movement and the Republic of China

This encounter, this time with the European powers, led within less than half a century to the First Opium War against Great Britain (1839–42), followed two decades later by the Second Opium War against Great Britain and France (the Arrow War, 1856–60). Failing to match the Western powers’ naval strength, and beset with significant local military threats, the Chinese imperial court was forced to admit its military weakness. Together with severe organizational problems, the Chinese leaders blamed the technological backwardness of the empire’s military forces. The nineteenth-century scholar-official Feng Guifen proclaimed, “What we then have to learn from the barbarians is only the one thing, solid ships and effective guns” (Teng and Fairbank 1971: 53). Consequently, some senior government officials, who had been exposed to the firepower of the Western armies, persuaded the hesitant imperial elite that significant military transformation was required, including acquiring arms and the means for their production from Western sources. Britain and France, which at the time enjoyed a temporary respite in their strained relations with the imperial court, expressed readiness to sell know-how and equipment for casting cannon and building steam warships. The Self-Strengthening Movement (Ziqiang, 1861–95) was thus launched with the intention of propelling China’s military into the modern age.

Self-Strengthening was characterized by an inner tension between intense reliance on foreigners for military empowerment and the Chinese wish to eliminate their dependence on outsiders. The effort to set up modern weapons factories was managed by senior imperial officials headed by Zeng Guofan (1811–72) and Li Hongzhang (1823–1901). They oversaw the building of shipyards and arsenals for manufacturing rifles, artillery, and ammunition. But this course of action met opposition from conservative elements at court. The first significant test faced by the limited modernization effort – the war with Japan in 1894–95 – was concrete proof of its failure. The major reasons were these: the attempt by the court to adopt modern technological means while rejecting many of the foreign values and practices that this entailed; half-hearted support by the court for the modernization move; lack of overall vision; and a serious dearth of funds (Hacker 1977; Kennedy 1978; Sun 2004; Elman 2005: 355–76). Together, these impediments prevented the development of an industrial infrastructure, transportation, and education, which were vital for the establishment of a modern weapons industry, not to say industry as a whole.

An important motive for the import of weapons and military know-how was the intention to use these means to achieve independence in the design and production of modern weapons. In 1868 Zeng Guofan wrote in reference to the arsenal in Jiangnan:

In 1862–63 … I established a factory to try to make foreign weapons. … I used Chinese exclusively and did not employ any foreign mechanics. Although a small steamboat was built, its speed was very slow. The knack of building it was not completely acquired.

(Teng and Fairbank 1971: 64)

These words expressed the gap between inability to understand the science and technology on which design and production were based and the desire for independent development. Regarding the lack of basic knowledge, he explicitly stated: “[Even] though every day we practice on their machines, after all we do not understand the principles underlying their manufacture and operation.” Yet the striving for independent development continued: “Formerly when the steamship was built by ourselves … both the boiler and engine were bought from foreign countries. … This time when we began construction we employed our own ingenuity in the study of the blueprint” (Teng and Fairbank 1971: 64–5).

These actions indicate a readiness to sacrifice the quality and efficiency of the products for the sake of self-reliance, a propensity for improvisation, and an apparent lack of understanding of basic technological processes. Consequently, foreign experts continued to direct the professional aspects of the military factories after all, and the Chinese attempts to become independent failed (Xiang 2001). Eventually, toward the start of the twentieth century the low quality of the military products, excessive manufacturing costs (including high salaries paid to foreign managers and experts), corrupt local management, and lack of complementary infrastructure in China all led to the decline of the industries established over the years of the Self-Strengthening Movement. Military modernization was postponed until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.

Moreover, the tension between external assistance and independent production, as well as China’s unstable scientific foundations, prevented the development of a modern scientific and industrial infrastructure required for an indigenous military ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• PART I Background factors
• PART II Military procurement decisions in the reform era
• Conclusion: explaining China’s military procurement decisions
• Bibliography
• Index