1 Introduction
1 AIM AND SCOPE OF THE WORK
The number of books and articles that have been written on the subject of tense in recent years is quite impressive.1 This shows both that the interest in the phenomenon of tense is great and that the problems in connection with it are numerous. It is also striking how many different âtheoriesâ of tense have been proposed. Clearly, tense is a subject on which the last word has not yet been said.
Of course, this is not in itself a justification for writing yet another book on tense. The reason why I have deemed it necessary to write this book is that the vast literature on tense still shows a couple of conspicuous gaps â gaps which need to be filled if the theory is to make any progress whatsoever.
The first gap is the absence of what could be called a âdescriptive theoryâ of tense. What I mean by this is a theory which functions as an intermediate level between the concrete data and the abstract, hypothetical treatments of tense in theoretical frameworks. It is my conviction that the reason why there has been a proliferation of widely divergent and often conflicting theoretical approaches to tense is the lack of such a descriptive theory. As I see it, a descriptive theory is a coherent set of generalizations, which function as ordering principles and render it possible to classify the observational data and hence to interpret them correctly. At present there is apparently no complete descriptive theory of this kind (though there are bits and pieces scattered around), and this is the reason why the data are so often interpreted differently. The recent literature shows too many examples of intricate theoretical constructs that are inadequate because they are based on faulty interpretations of otherwise sound observations.
To illustrate the need for a descriptive theory, I will review a couple of sets of data, which have given rise to a variety of claims. Since the claims are usually contradictory, a large part of them must of necessity be mistaken. Yet all of them are familiar in the linguistic literature,2 and all of them are claimed to be supported by the data.
1.1 As is well known, English has various means of referring to the future. The following examples illustrate some possibilities:
(1) (a) I will do it tomorrow.
(b) I am leaving tomorrow.
(c) I am going to leave tomorrow.
(d) I will do it tomorrow if I have time. (*will have)
Data like these have led linguists to formulate widely divergent claims. The fact that four different kinds of verb form are used to refer to the future is sometimes interpreted as meaning that English does not really have a future tense. Some linguists consider the form with will to represent the future tense in English and claim that there is âwill-deletionâ in the if-clause of (1,d). Some treat the use of the present tense in (1,b) and that in the if-clause of (1,d) as instances of one and the same phenomenon. Some of those that hold this view claim that there is will-deletion in both cases. Others argue that (1,d) is different from (1,b) and that the use of the present tense in (1,d) is due to linguistic economy, because futurity is sufficiently expressed by the head clause. In contrast, some linguists claim that the present tense in (1,d) is due to the fact that the speaker treats the future fulfilment of the condition as a present fact. Others say that the present tense is used in the if-clause because the if-clause is temporally subordinated to the head clause. In sum, the few data available in (1,aâd) are interpreted as evidence for widely divergent claims. Each of these claims has some prima facie plausibility and would seem to be in accordance with the data of (1,aâd). It is my belief that in order to judge which of them is/are correct and which of them are not, we must stop considering (1,aâd) in isolation. What we must do is try and build a descriptive theory of tense which is consonant not only with (1,aâd) but also with the hundreds of other observations that can be made. If we succeed in doing this, we can judge the soundness of the theoretical claims simply by checking whether or not they are in keeping with the descriptive theory as a whole.
1.2 A second illustration concerns sentences like the following:
(2) (a) I am hungry.
(b) London lies on the Thames.
(c) Johnâs dog chases cars.
(d) The exhibition opens next month.
(e) I hear you have been promoted.
(f) He just walks into the room and sits down in front of the fire without saying a word to anyone. (Palmer 1988:39)
In these six examples the present tense is used with reference to different times. In (2,a) the reference is to a relatively short interval which includes the moment of speaking. Example (2,b) refers to an interval which is indefinitely long and encompasses not only the present but also the past and the future. Example (2,c) refers to a habitual activity consisting of a repeated number of occurrences; the habit includes the moment of speech and extends into the past and possibly also into the future; it is not necessary that any of the occurrences should coincide with the moment of speech itself. In (2,d) the reference is to a future event. In (2,e) hear refers to an event that took place in the past and is still relevant at the present moment; it is thus roughly equivalent to have heard. In (2,f), finally, we have the so-called historical present, which refers to events that took place in the past.
Again, these data have given rise to various interpretations. Some linguists claim that there is no reference to the present (the moment of speech) in generic or habitual sentences like (2,b) and (2,c). Others hold that both sentences refer to a state which is represented as holding at the moment of speech. The latter group usually claim that the basic meaning of the present tense is reference to present time and that the uses in (2,dâf) are special uses. Others conclude from (2,aâf) that there is no relation between the present tense and the expression of present time. In fact, they claim that the present tense does not refer to time at all, but simply functions as the unmarked tense in the English tense system, and is therefore compatible with any time reference.
1.3 Like the present tense, the past tense (preterit) can be used in different ways:
(3) (a) Yesterday I met John in the street.
(b) The two girls were usually known by their surnames, Banford and March.
(c) I wanted to have a word with you.
(d) I would appreciate if you came on time.
Sentence (3,a) might be part of any everyday conversation. Example (3,b) is the first sentence of a literary work (D.H. Lawrenceâs novella The fox). Examples (3,c) and (3,d) illustrate so-called âmodalâ uses of the preterit: in (3,c) wanted is an âattitudinalâ preterit, which is used for tentativeness and has present time reference; in (3,d) came refers to an action which could take place in the future.
Most linguists hold that the basic meaning of the preterit is reference to past time, and that the modal uses are special ones. Others, however, point out that what all the sentences in (3) have in common is the idea of âremotenessâ or âdistanceâ: in (3,a) the preterit represents the event as temporally distant from the moment of speech; in (3,b) it represents the event as distant from present reality, i.e. as belonging to a fictional work; in (3,c) the preterit conveys the idea of psychological or social distance, i.e. modesty, tact; in (3,d) the preterit again expresses some distance from reality, since the future event is not represented as factual but as one whose actualization is only possible, and not even very likely. For linguists who set store by these considerations, the basic meaning of the preterit is not reference to past time but the expression of distance from present reality. If this interpretation is combined with the view that the present tense does not refer to present time (see above), it leads to the conclusion that there is no basic connection between tense and time. However, even this view can lead to quite different theories. Most people that believe that there is no fundamental relation between tense and time accept the view that the basic distinction between the past tense and the present tense is that between representing situations as non-actual (remote) and representing them as actual (see e.g. Janssen 1990). However, Weinrich (1964, 1970) holds that the essential difference is that the past tense is used in âErzählsituationenâ (narrative contexts), whereas the present tense is used inâBesprechungssituationenâ (contexts of discussion). And there are still other (slightly different) views besides these.
1.4 When the contents of a sentence in the present tense are reported in the form of an indirect speech clause embedded under a verb in the past tense, the embedded clause usually makes use of the preterit:
(4) (a) John said: âI am hungry.â
(b) John said that he was hungry. (*is)
The observation that we use was, not is, in (4,b) has been interpreted in at least three different ways. A small group of linguists argue that the use of the preterit in the subclause of (4,b) is in no way different from its use in the head clause: in both cases the preterit is used because the event or state in question is to be located in the past (i.e. before the moment of speech). Others argue that was is not an âabsoluteâ tense form (like said) but a ârelativeâ one. That is, the preterit is used because the state referred to in the that-clause is represented as simultaneous with the action referred to in the head clause. According to these linguists, the past tense is the tense form to be used for the expression of simultaneity if the head clause is also in the past tense. A third group of linguists (probably the majority) believe that there is a âsequence of tensesâ rule which mechanically backshifts the present tense to the past tense in clauses that are embedded under a head clause in the past tense. Some of these linguists still accept that this rule is semantically motivated, but others (e.g. Comrie 1986) claim that it has no semantic motivation whatever, i.e. that it is a purely formal rule.
1.5 The above four illustrations concern data which have given rise to a variety of different interpretations and explanations, even in theories of tense that have been developed independently of any particular theoretical framework (such as transformational grammar, Montague grammar, etc.). In treatments of tense that do make use of a theoretical framework the danger of deriving theoretical conclusions from faulty interpretations of data is even greater. One example may be sufficient here. Ladusaw (1977) observes that the sentence
(5) Mary saw the unicorn that walked.
may be true not only if the event of the unicorn walking was simultaneous with the event of Mary seeing the unicorn but also if the unicorn walked before or after Mary saw it. This observation is correct, and I will argue below that it can be explained from the fact that both clauses in (5) locate an event before the time of speech independently of each other. That is, each of the tense forms in (5) expresses no more than that the event referred to took place in the past; neither of them conveys any information as to the temporal order in which the events took place. Since the tense forms leave the temporal relation between the events unspecified (vague), and since there is no other (e.g. adverbial) indication of this relation, the sentence may be true irrespective of whether the seeing is prior to, simultaneous with, or posterior to the walking. However, Ladusaw interprets the data differently. He claims that (5) is three-ways ambiguous, and that this ambiguity is due to the fact that the sentence may be derived from three different sources: a higher past tense sentence lowered to complement position, a base past tense complement, and a base present tense complement to which the sequence of tenses rule has applied. In his opinion, these three sources correspond with the interpretations that the time of walking is before, after, or simultaneous with the time of seeing, respectively.
I think that the above illustrations are sufficient to substantiate the claim that there is not much point in developing âhigher orderâ theories of tense as long as there is no basic descriptive theory to help us to classify and interpret the data.3 It is therefore one of the aims of the present book to fill this gap and offer such a basic theory. This is done in the first half of the book. In chapter 2 I develop a full descriptive theory of tense, in which all the data (as far as I am aware of them) are given their proper places. This theory consists of a number of rules and principles which (in my opinion) provide for the different uses of the tenses in English and predict which tenses can be used in particular environments and contexts.4 Since, obviously, not all principles are operative in all contexts, ample attention is devoted to the necessary restrictions and conditions. For some of the major principles this is not done in chapter 2, but in the next chapter, where the possibilities and restrictions can be explored at greater length. Chapter 4 then closes off the first part of the book with a scrutiny of two areas of English grammar which have proved to be particularly troublesome and have therefore frequently been discussed in recent times: the use of tenses in indirect speech, and the use of the present tense vs. will in conditional clauses referring to the future. These two subjects are seen as test cases for the descriptive theory developed in the previous chapters.
The second part of the book concerns matters of a different kind. It no longer deals with the use of the tenses in simple and complex sentences and in stretches of text and discourse, but rather with the internal structure of the tenses, i.e. with the temporal schemata which they realize. Here, I think, there is a second gap to be filled in the linguistic literature. This time it is not a gap in the sense that there is no theory â the theories abound â but in the sense that...