India Migration Report 2015

Gender and Migration

S. Irudaya Rajan

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780815375937
• eBook ISBN: 9781317405559
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Social Policy
• Index: Social Sciences

India Migration Report 2015 explores migration and its crucial linkages with gender. This volume:

• studies important issues such as irregular migration, marriage migration and domestic labour migration, as well as the interconnections of migration, gender and caste;

• highlights the relationship between economics and changing gender dynamics brought about by migration; and

• documents first-hand experiences of migrants from across India.

Part of the prestigious annual series, this work will be useful to scholars and researchers of development studies, economics, migration and diaspora studies, and sociology. It will also interest policy-makers and government institutions working in the area.

1

Gender-based immigration visa?

On rationality of a legislative innovation

BINOD KHADRIA

The context

A lot has already been written towards establishing the gender-migration relationship, whether in general or particularly in Indian context. It is not my purpose, in this chapter, to contribute anything further in consolidating the state of this relationship, involving the cross-border mobility of women whether predominantly as domestic workers, nurses, care givers, entertainers, brides, wives, and so on, or also in other professions and occupations that primarily comprise men. Instead, assuming this relationship as already established and given, let me propose a small but far-reaching innovation in the domain of immigration legislation that ought to have followed. Before I do so, let me, however, introduce the context by quoting two observations on the gender-migration relationship itself:

While men once formed the majority of migrants, with women remaining at the place of origin or accompanying spouses as secondary migrants, women from developing countries such as … India now engage in migration for work purposes. Gender permeates every aspect of migration, from the decision to migrate to the process of migration and its eventual consequences. A gender perspective is essential for understanding both the causes and consequences of international migration.

(Centre for Social Research, http://www.csrindia.org/index.php/gender-dimensions-of-migration).

Political change or policies may affect men and women differently, resulting in gendered patterns of migration; laws regarding both emigration and immigration often have gendered outcomes; and policies that affect the integration, or re-integration, of migrants into societies may also affect men and women differently. This has implications for male and female migrants’ livelihoods, rights and entitlements.

(Piper, 2008, p.1).

Both these observations testify that lately scholars have paid greater attention to gender in migration analysis than earlier. Policymakers too have started recognizing the issues of gender involved in international migration. However, the policy measures have remained limited to either being protective against exploitation and discrimination, or at best welfare enhancing for women migrants. Neither has any scholar vouched for nor have the policymakers cared to consciously introduce any follow-up measures in immigration legislation to accommodate these dimensions in a proactive way. Reflecting on the rationality of introducing gender-based positive discrimination in immigration – say, in terms of introducing quotas or numbers set for giving a different kind or class of visa to women workers and students, i.e. as human capital and ‘semi-finished human capital’ (Majumdar 1994). I have, in this chapter, proposed the introduction of such gender-based quotas of visa over and above all other classifications of immigrant admissions in various destination countries where Indian migrants go. Two questions would arise here: 1. What are the rationales for introducing this, from the point of view of India and from the point of view of the destination country? 2. What further data and research are required to strengthen the case?

Usually, most destination countries have immigration quotas for issuing visas based on the requirements of the labour market. These are based on points system about which I need not elaborate here. In the affirmative-action debate, one does not come across an adequate or intellectually satisfying defence of positive discrimination favouring women over men even in education or employment (Khadria 2000); immigration quotas for women in that context would perhaps be a far cry. Nevertheless, the underlying rationale for introducing gender-based quotas in immigration for women is that it would yield unique results when compared with visa quotas based on occupational groupings. There is a unique justification in accessing even the family unification target through positive discrimination aimed at women rather than generally through general family relationships like parents, children, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, cousin, and so on.

Turning points in the OECD and Indian perspectives

The focus of gender studies in the field of international migration and diaspora has generally been on the downside – highlighting marginalization, discrimination and exploitation of women in the low-paying unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in the non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. There is, however, likelihood of a role reversal coming up between the high-skill attracting and low-skill absorbing countries: the discourse with respect to Indian emigration to the OECD countries, in contrast to that directed towards the Gulf and South-east Asia has of late provided a new connotation to the term ‘3D’. In the past, these were jobs not in demand from the native population. From being engaged in these ‘dirty, difficult and dangerous’ jobs, the Indian migrants in the OECD countries are expected to demand – over the next two decades – other jobs which would be more likely to be called, ‘demanding, desirable and diasporic’. This would happen not because these jobs are not in demand from the native citizens but because the indigenous supply of skilled labour or human capital – whether high-skilled ‘knowledge workers’ or low-skilled ‘service workers’ – would not be adequate to meet the requirements in the OECD countries.

At the same time, contrary to the distinguished futurologist Peter Drucker’s forecast, the divide between the high mobility of high-skilled ‘knowledge workers’ and low mobility of the low-skilled ‘service workers’ may not sustain because, with jobs even in agriculture and recycling becoming more and more ‘demanding, desirable and diasporic’, the OECD would attract large number of low-skilled immigrants. These will be the sectors where – in the wake of the ongoing climate change, which is leading to the emergence of a global ‘green economy’ – too few green jobs would be created, as an International Labour Organization (ILO) report of 2008 has predicted (ILO 2008). The report said that the global market for environmental products and services is projected to double from the present US$1,370 billion per year to US$2,740 billion by 2020. Half of this burgeoning market would be in the energy efficiency sector and the balance in sustainable transport, water supply, sanitation, and waste management. By 2030, employment in alternative energy sector may rise to 2.1 million in wind power and 6.3 million in solar power, as renewable energy would generate more jobs than fossil fuels do. Projected investments of $630 billion by 2030 will translate into 20 million additional jobs in the renewable energy sector, leading to newer dimensions of migratory flows in directions so far unanticipated, it has been predicted. Lately, therefore, India has emerged as the most sought-after source country for the supply of all skill types of workers in the developed OECD host economies.

Immigration trends are thus changing over time. While individuals and families once migrated permanently from one place to another, more and more of today’s migrants engage in temporary or cyclical migration patterns. Let me take the OECD countries as the destination for Indian migrants. While talking of international migration from India to the OECD, it is important, however, to keep in mind that the OECD is neither a homogenous region nor limited to the so-called traditional ‘north’ geographically. Based on the historical and contemporary nature of this migration, the OECD can be classified into six broad groups of countries: the United States and Canada in North America; United Kingdom in Europe; Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific; West European countries in the European Union (EU); Japan and Korea in East Asia; and East European new members of the EU.

Almost 80 per cent of the highly qualified migrants from India have continued to choose the United States as their ultimate destination for more than a decade. Canada is the second-best choice, and also as a route to move to the United States. The United Kingdom has always been a preferred destination, except that migration to the United Kingdom was overtaken by the United States in the 1970s because of downturn in the British economy followed by restrictive immigration policies. Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific are another group of destination that attracts Indians.

All the OECD countries in these three groups of destinations are primarily English-speaking and that is one major factor behind these flows being large, as compared to the other three groups of OECD countries which are non-English speaking. Western Europe is still a slight exception because of its historical links (Dutch, French and Portuguese) with the Indian subcontinent, and also because of its contemporary initiative in starting tertiary-level education in the English language to cater to (and to capture the clientele of) the overseas students from India (and China). Japan and Korea have dominated in attracting more of the semi-skilled and unskilled migrants from India because of their Asian culture and Buddhist values. East European countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and so on) have themselves started experiencing emigration to the West-European EU countries, and to fill the vacuum there labour is being imported from India (and the other two South Asian countries, viz., Bangladesh and Pakistan).

Also, one has to keep in mind that although efforts are on within the EU to harmonize policies, migration is one area where immigration in the EU from any third country or countries is still a sovereign turf of the EU member states, and therefore guided more by bilateral agreements with the source countries. There is also some amount of competition among the EU countries to attract the highly skilled workers and tertiary-level students from India, despite the introduction of a EU-wide ‘Blue Card’ along the lines of the American Green Card, to attract an estimated 20 million high skilled workers by 2020, large proportions of them from India.

In the 1990s, the policy reform in India focused on removing the barriers to the world markets. Around the same time, in the migration sphere too, the centre of focus showed signs of shifting from source-country determinants of migration to destination-country determinants. In the 21st century, as the trend shows today, it has been speculated that in the years to come over the current decade till 2020, migration flows would be driven by the global demand for human capital – an excess demand for 54 million workers in the developed countries, met mostly by a surplus supply of 47 million workers in India (US Census Bureau, BCG 2002–2003, cited in GOI 2008). As migration has been largely looked at as a one-sided game of loss or gain, there are talks about emergence of turning points in Indian emigration – from ‘brain drain’ of the 20th century to that of ‘brain gain’ in the 21st century. These expectations are fired by the Indian diaspora abroad remitting increasing volumes of money to India and/or themselves returning home with enhanced skills and huge investible savings that would help India’s stride towards becoming a ‘super power’. The expectations are high because remittances and return migration are ‘seen’ to be growing on a linear trajectory with increasing degree of transnationalism that the diaspora acquires through formal and/or informal memberships of more than one nation – i.e. either through naturalized citizenship/dual citizenship of destination and source countries, and/or through legal permanent residency and acculturation in the destination country. However, there are ‘unseen’ caveats that make this linearity less predictable in the future than meets the eye.

Two social implications of temporization of migration

OECD had observed a decade ago that while growth of permanent settler admissions in the developed northern countries from Asia grew slowly, temporary worker entrants grew rapidly in the initial years of the 21st century (OECD 2004). This temporization of immigration has promoted return migration of workers to homeland or a third country after a stay of, say, 5–7 years in that country of destination. In 2010, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) observed that in recent years return migration had acquired the thrust of policy by many northern governments (IOM 2010). Most of this happens under the new name of ‘circular migration’ rather than return migration. This has its own social implications that I had pointed out elsewhere (Khadria 1999, 2009, 2012). Let me mention just two of these – one in the OECD destination countries and the other in a developing origin country like India.

The implication in the destination country arises from a corollary that although the size of a diaspora in the labour market of a destination country can keep rising with temporary or circular immigration, because the individual human faces that comprise it keep changing with the continuous return of some of them to their homeland, the element of racial conflict in the destination society could be expected to come down to a low level of equilibrium. An explicitly stated policy of promoting return migration, involving only temporary stay rights for foreigners would thus allay the fears, in the minds of the native citizens, of being competed out by them. If so, it could naturally be a welcome preference for the strife-prone destination countries. Socio-psychologically speaking, this acts like a ‘safety valve’ that would suit the interest of those OECD host countries where racial xenophobia against the foreigners’ presence in the labour market is often a political headache for the state, and would be welfare-enhancing.

On the other hand, the social implications of temporary migration on the migrants and their family members in a developing origin country like India could be welfare-reducing as the benefits of return migration would be pre-empted by the welfare loss taking place during emigration. Not only India, but also other countries in South Asia, like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka get overwhelmed by the bandwagon of promoting return migration benefitting them at the macrolevel. So far, these developing countries of origin have been complacent about the microlevel interests of their people being adversely affected by these key trends. For example, a natural corollary of any individual migrant’s decision to return home – when inherent in the decision of onward migration itself – would be the question of the spouse joining or not joining abroad in the first place: Whether to resign when leave would not be commensurate with the emigrating spouse’s engagement abroad?

Under the circumstances, temporary migration would entail a compulsory separation among the members of the family, leading to splitting of the family and its nomadization, so to say, and making the return of the worker too a type of ‘forced migration’, although all the decisions within the concerned migrant’s family would seemingly remain ‘voluntary’. This would entail a loss of welfare in the country of origin, because, for instance, the largest barrier to accepting an international post is family consideration (62%) (Hindustan Times, Shine supplement, page 3, September 23, 2008). Other barriers come far later, like language (13%), difficulties returning to country of origin (8%), security (5%), cost (5%), and living standards (4%). This is an issue, which despite being largely uncharted so far, would perhaps be important enough to be included in the agenda of social policy responses towards neutralizing the adverse effects of international migration on the migrants.

Would immigrant quotas for women reduce racial strife and unite the families?

Apart from the macrolevel engagement of the policymakers, migration researchers across the world ought to increasingly endeavour observing and analysing the day-to-day life of the individual migrants and communities because of the hope that migration would be recognized as applied human discipline one day. An immediately relevant space for collaboration between researchers and policymakers could be in seeking answer to a question: Why should there be quotas for women migrants within other quotas? Would more women immigrants reduce racial strife in destination countries and would they unite the families in destination and/or home countries?

The answer may lie in seeking answers to a series of follow-up questions: Are women more tolerant of strangers than men? Who influences the migration and/or return decisions within families the most – men or women? Who has a dominant vote in taking decisions to stay on in the destination country – men or women among the high-skill and low-skill migrants? We have the data of male and female Indian students studying abroad; why are these not highlighted? What are the stay rates of Indian women students; are they higher than those of boys? Why are spouses (read wives) of H1B visa holders now being allowed to work in the United States? Is it because of gender equality or is it because there is a shortage of workers that is being met? Will a gender-based positive discrimination bring the migrant’s family to centre stage of migration policy?

Lately, at different points of contemporary history, migrants and diasporas have been looked at for their effects, allegorically, either as bane or boon in the host countries, and either as traitors or angels in the motherland (Lal 2006). How would women migrants figure in this – as bane or boon in the host country, and traitors or angels in the home country? Gender...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• List of contributors
• 1 Gender-based immigration visa? On rationality of a legislative innovation
• 2 Migrant women at the discourse–policy nexus: Indian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia
• 3 Stepping into the man’s shoes: emigrant domestic workers as breadwinners and the gender norm in Kerala
• 4 Economic migration of women: challenges and policy with reference to Indian emigration to the Gulf
• 5 Addressing the missing link: women domestic workers migrating from South Asia to the Gulf
• 6 Vulnerability of women in international marriage migration
• 7 International mobility of skilled women: overview of trends and issues
• 8 Indian international students: a gender perspective
• 9 Gendered mobilities: negotiating educational strategies in Kerala
• 10 Reducing vulnerabilities of ‘women in migration’: cross-border migration experience within South Asia
• 11 Adivasi women in India’s migration story
• 12 Gender dimensions of migration in urban India
• 13 Confined to the margins: female migrant workers in urban areas
• 14 Understanding female migration pattern in India: exploring the driving forces
• 15 The missing men: sex ratios and migration
• 16 Survival, struggle and the promise of a new future: living and working conditions of migrant workers in Kerala
• 17 Health-seeking behaviour among the interstate migrant labourers
• 18 From Kerala to Kerala via the Gulf: emigration experiences of return emigrants
• 19 Transnational flows: extent, patterns and implications for Gujarat
• 20 Wage differentials between Indian migrant workers in the Gulf and non-migrant workers in India
• 21 The disposable people: irregular and undocumented migrants
• Index