China-Malaysia Relations and Foreign Policy

Razak Abdullah

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138829268
• eBook ISBN: 9781317571964
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

When Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, paid an official visit to China in May 1974, it secured Malaysia a place in the annals of regional diplomatic history as the first ASEAN country to establish full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. This book analyses the process of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China, and provides a detailed explanation and understanding of the decision- making process in Malaysia.

Shedding light on the roles played by the various principal actors in the process of foreign policy formulation and the influences - both internal and external – that shaped Malaysia's behaviour, the book highlights why Malaysia decided to pursue a policy of normalisation with China, culminating in the visit in 1974, and in particular why it became the first ASEAN country to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese. After Malaysia's recognition of Beijing, two other ASEAN states followed suit, namely Thailand and the Philippines, and the book discusses whether there was some degree of policy coordination amongst ASEAN countries in dealing with China, or if both these countries gave way for Malaysia to be the first. The book also looks at the policy debates within some ASEAN countries regarding relations with China, either conducted officially or unofficially, bilaterally or otherwise.

This book will be of interest to scholars of Asian Politics, Asian History, International Relations and Foreign Policy.

1 Introduction

The purpose of the study

When Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, paid an official visit to China in May 1974, it secured Malaysia a place in the annals of regional diplomatic history as the first Asean country to establish full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).¹ According to Tun Razak, he made this journey in order to ‘sow the seeds of mutual understanding and trust between Malaysia and the People’s Republic of China’.² He also expressed the hope that it would be the basis of an enduring friendship between the two countries and would contribute to lasting peace in East Asia. While this statement provides the official public objectives for the trip, it does not explain why Malaysia decided much earlier than its neighbours to embark on the path of normalisation with China; neither does it explain the decision-making process leading towards the normalisation of relations with China. The official statements provide little insight into the various policy considerations behind the decision.

This study, with a detailed explanation and understanding of the decision-making process in Malaysia, thus contributes significantly towards the appreciation of the reasons for the normalisation of relations between the two countries. It also sheds light on the roles played by the various principal actors in the process of foreign policy formulation and the influences – both internal and external – that shaped Malaysia’s behaviour. As the China factor was intertwined with domestic politics, the study gives us an especially significant window through which to examine the linkage between internal and external factors.

Key questions

This study seeks to address a number of key questions. First, the main thrust is to explain why Malaysia decided to pursue a policy of normalisation with China, culminating in the visit and Joint Communiqué of May 1974. There were two critical steps involved, namely, the initial and more diffuse decision to embark on the road towards normalisation and, subsequent to this, the specific decision to establish formal ties with China in May 1974, thereby putting Malaysia at the forefront of the development of Asean’s relations with China.

The year 1970 has been chosen as the starting point of this process since it was then that a change in the Malaysian leadership, with Tun Abdul Razak Hussein becoming the country’s second prime minister, resulted in a significant shift in Malaysia’s foreign policy, moving it from a pro-west policy orientation to the adoption of a more neutral stance. Although the changes were evident before 1970, the rise of Tun Razak to the country’s leadership confirmed this shift.

A second question that this study seeks to resolve is why Malaysia became the first Asean country to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese. After Malaysia’s recognition of Beijing, two other Asean states followed suit, namely Thailand and the Philippines, giving the impression that there was some degree of policy coordination amongst Asean countries in dealing with China, or that both these two countries gave way for Malaysia to be the first. This current work, therefore, explores the policy debates within some Asean countries regarding relations with China, either conducted officially or unofficially, bilaterally or otherwise. Inter alia, this study seeks to establish whether there was a China policy within the Asean grouping, that is, some kind of loose collective understanding reached amongst its members to coordinate their national policies towards Beijing. Or, alternatively, was it Malaysia’s own initiative, and simply explained to the individual countries, with the others subsequently following Kuala Lumpur’s move? And was it the case that there was some element of competition amongst a number of Asean states as to which member would be the first?

To answer this requires an examination of how the issue of China was addressed by Asean, and to look at bilateral discussions amongst officials, especially between Malaysia and other members of this organisation. It also focuses on how Malaysia viewed its Asean neighbours, within the context of its own pursuit of its evolving ties with China. In other words, to what extent was Kuala Lumpur’s policy towards China influenced by the perception of other Asean countries towards China, and specifically towards the development of Sino-Malaysian ties?

Significance and contribution of the study

This study makes a distinct contribution in a number of ways. First, it contributes to the overall understanding of the formulation of Malaysian foreign policy. It provides a fuller explanation than is currently available in the literature of the factors that influence the decision-making process, at least during the period under review here. As will be seen later on, there is little academic work done on Malaysian foreign policy, and as such this study offers a contribution towards this body of literature.

Second and more specifically, this study helps us to understand the processes and policy discussions of a small country like Malaysia when it deals with a giant neighbour. Interesting too is that this small country took the regional lead, and as noted earlier this study highlights the policy debates between Malaysia and some of its Asean partners over the issue of China and the broader questions of regional security. Finally, this is the first extensive study examining Malaysia’s process of normalising relations with China.

China is today seen as an ascending power. This perception has been influenced not only by the country’s rapid economic development, but also its enhanced regional and global roles, coupled with its military potential.³ While relations between China and Malaysia at first did not see any real improvements – going beyond diplomatic niceties – ties between Kuala Lumpur and Beijing did undergo significant changes, following China’s open door policy from 1978 onwards, as symbolised by Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernisations programme. Today, both countries enjoy good and cordial relations, with Malaysia not subscribing to the notion that China poses a military threat,⁴ at least not publicly.

Arising from this, there is a need to manage Kuala Lumpur’s relations with China at many levels, from bilateral, regional to global. As China’s stature and prestige grow, so too will its role. As a result, Malaysia, like other regional states, will have to deal with a rising China. Various regional architectures and forums, such as the East Asia summit, inaugurated in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, are increasingly being seen as platforms through which China could be managed. While the lessons learnt from the normalisation process could well be limited in the context of today’s world, they nonetheless can provide us with a better appreciation of the kinds of processes and behavioural factors that have influenced Malaysia–China relations.

Methodology employed

This study places emphasis on the interplay of internal and external factors, as well as the roles of various individual decision makers, in its explanation and understanding of the decision to normalise relations with China.

It does, however, also take cognisance of the broad literature on the foreign policy of developing countries. There are several perspectives that have become the primary focus of scholarly works involving the developing world and the international system, namely the regime survival perspective and that of weak states.⁵

It could be argued that the very purpose of foreign policy is to obtain state or regime security and, as many developing countries are still structurally weak, regime survival appears to be a significant aspect. In other words, within the context of foreign policy analysis of Third World states, it is necessary to examine the nature of the state, in particular, of the ruling elites. In most instances, it is their interests which form the very basis of both internal and external policies.

While this is a reflection of weak states and the leaderships’ preoccupation with maintaining power, it suggests the need to give primacy to the domestic domain in any explanation of foreign policy. As the role of personalised leadership is prominent in states that have weak institutions, any study of the foreign policy of such countries must take into consideration such a critical domestic factor.

While Malaysia is basically classified as a developing state, as it shares the attributes of such countries, such as relatively weak institutions, a muted and tamed mass media, as well as autocratic-based leadership, it does exhibit some characteristics that place it not entirely in this category of states. While many developing states are precarious and suffer from a lack of legitimacy,⁶ resulting in instability, Malaysia has enjoyed a prolonged period of stability, despite periodic disruptions such as the racial riots of 1969. Malaysian political elites are not entirely preoccupied with regime survival, as their political legitimacy is not seriously challenged. The country has also been able to develop economically, transforming an essentially agricultural and rural-based economy to one that is more industrial, based on manufacturing and the service sector. By way of comparison, when Tun Razak became prime minister in 1970, the country’s GDP per capita was US$319, by 1974, it had doubled to US$793, and in 2004, it had grown to US$4,731.⁷ This generally positive economic success has allowed the country to enjoy a high degree of stability.

Therefore, while the approaches adopted by many scholars focusing on the developing world or states are generally relevant, a more refined and modified approach appears to be more useful. Like most countries, both developed and developing, as external policies are often extensions of the internal dynamics of states, Malaysia’s foreign policy is determined by the linkage of domestic and external factors. In order to have a better understanding of the making of Malaysia’s foreign policy, this work also discusses the politics of personalised leadership, which provides a vital input in the decision-making process. In sum, having examined the approaches undertaken by works on the foreign policy of the Third World, this study adopts a thorough examination of the internal and external factors, as well as the idiosyncratic factor in order to gain a better understanding of the process and decisions behind Malaysia’s normalisation policy towards China. The justification for the foreign policy analysis model chosen is provided in Chapter 2.

Division of chapters

With Chapter 1 as an introduction to this present work, Chapter 2 explores the broad literature on the foreign policy analysis of developing states. This chapter begins by providing an overview of the sub-field of foreign policy analysis, and turns next to an analysis of developing states examining, in particular, Ayoob’s idea of the Third World security predicament.⁸ As the thrust of this study focuses on linkage politics, this chapter attempts to define both Malaysia’s internal and external domains and the connection between them. This chapter also examines the role of personalised leadership in the decision-making process in Malaysian foreign policy.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of Malaysia’s policy towards China from independence in 1957 to the end of Konfrontasi in 1966. The key question that this chapter explores is the reason why Malaysia did not fully normalise its relations with China during this period. The twin internal issues of the local communist movement as well as the local Chinese connection are discussed. Externally, there were a number of factors that prove to be important considerations for the decision makers, such as the cold war environment, the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split and Beijing’s involvement in the Indonesian Konfrontasi against the country, all of which had an impact on the perception of the Malaysian leadership towards Beijing.

Chapter 4 addresses the strategic shifts during the critical years of 1967 to 1969. These years are significant to this study as a number of important events took place, and they warrant special analysis in order to evaluate their impact on Malaysia’s policy towards China. Regionally, the strategic environment saw a dramatic change, especially with events in Vietnam, while at the same time Malaysia had to come to grips with the British policy of withdrawal from east of Suez, which led to some sense of vulnerability, even though British military ties would remain in place, albeit at a much reduced level. More positively, this period also saw the birth of Asean in 1967, which started to forge a sense of confidence amongst the founding members. Domestically, the racial riots of May 1969 proved to be a watershed for Malaysia as, inter alia, they sowed the seeds for a change in the leadership, with the ascendancy of Tun Razak and, with that, a significant change in the country’s foreign policy.

Chapter 5 examines the policy changes brought about by Tun Razak and their impact on the country’s ties with China. It begins by providing an overview of the personality of the new prime minister, as well as some discussion of salient changes in policy. Tun Razak introduced a major shift in Malaysia’s foreign policy, and this is discussed in the context of its impact on the country’s China policy. This chapter also explores the ramifications of some of the significant changes in the external environment, in particular in US–China and Sino-Soviet relations.

Chapter 6 focuses on the decision-making process, with its concomitant policy debates as well as personalities involved, leading to the critical decision to normalise relations with China and, with that, the eventual visit of Tun Razak to both Beijing and Shanghai in May 1974. It examines the preconditions for normalisation both sides had and how they were dealt with. This chapter expands the range of influential factors to consider developments at the sub-regional level, in particular, relations with some members of Asean and their impact on the Malaysian political elites’ decision.

Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the historic 1974 trip. It examines the visit’s agenda, focusing primarily on the Joint Communiqué as well as the significant meetings Tun Razak had with Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou and Vice Premier Li.

Chapter 8 explores the internal and external implications of normalisation. It examines the impact of formal ties on several key domestic issues, such as the internal communist threat, the position of the local Chinese as well as domestic politics. This chapter also assesses the extent to which this visit contributed to enhancing the personal image of Tun Razak, in particular, increasing his popularity with the local Chinese community in Malaysia. The immediate outcome of this was the victory of the ruling party in the general election of 1974, Tun Razak’s first as prime minister. Externally, it focuses on how formalising ties with China had an impact on regional affairs, in particular on Kuala Lumpur’s Asean neighbours. The final chapter draws some conclusions about the nature of the foreign policy-making process in Malaysia, in the context of a region that had undergone profound economic, political and strategic changes in the cold war era.

Notes

1 Indonesia ha...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Foreign policy analysis: defining the parameters for developing states
• 3 The evolution of Malaysia’s foreign policy towards China: from independence to the end of Konfrontasi, 1957–1966
• 4 Shifts in Malaysia’s internal and external environments, 1967–1969
• 5 Tun Razak and changes in Malaysian foreign policy, 1970–1972
• 6 The decision-making process and the road towards normalisation, 1972–1974
• 7 An assessment of the 1974 China visit
• 8 The domestic and regional limits of normalising ties with China
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index