The Virtues of Aristotle

D. S. Hutchinson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781317375395
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Originally published in 1986. Both moral philosophers and philosophical psychologists need to answer the question 'what is a virtue?' and the best answer so far give is that of Aristotle. This book is a rigorous exposition of that answer. The elements of Aristotle's doctrine of virtue are scattered throughout his writings; this book reconstructs his complex and comprehensive doctrine in one place. It also covers Aristotle's views about choice, character, emotions and the role of pleasure and pain in virtue. The celebrated function ( ergon ) is considered carefully as well as the doctrine of virtue being related to Aristotle's metaphysics and categories.

1 Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9781315673189-1

What is the point of studying Aristotle’s theory of moral virtue? In the first place, many interesting questions are raised, in metaphysics, philosophical anthropology and philosophical psychology, as well as in moral philosophy. These, and the answers Aristotle provides, are worth studying in their own right, especially since he deals with them in a manner which is wonderfully systematic and consistent. The scope of Aristotle’s concerns in this area, the coherence of his approach, and the plausibility of his answers must surely be unique, and we would be unfair to ourselves, as well as to our predecessors, if, before undertaking our examination of these issues, we did not examine the most reputable of their accounts of them.

In the second place, Aristotle’s philosophy of virtue is intimately and inextricably connected with other aspects of his moral philosophy. It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that Aristotle’s moral philosophy is nothing more than a discussion of the virtues (both ethical and intellectual), together with supplementary discussions of various peripheral topics (happiness, pleasure, friendship, etc.). Aristotle is one of the few moral philosophers to have conceived of his subject primarily as a study of the various virtues. This approach probably reflects an attitude on Aristotle’s part that the virtues are interesting phenomena and pose interesting questions for theory; the study of them is worth pursuing for its own sake. See, for modern treatments of the virtues, von Wright’s The Varieties of Goodness (Ch. VIII), Foot’s Virtues and Vices (Ch. I), and Wallace’s Virtues and Vices.

But Aristotle’s approach also seems to stem, in large part, from his belief that, since acquiring the virtues is acquiring what matters for us, studying the virtues is studying what matters. Much modern moral philosophy seems to start from an opposing assumption, that what matters for us is to have the correct beliefs about ethical questions. Since our circumstances vary in a complex way, it would be very laborious for such a theorist to tell us all the beliefs which we ought to have in all our various circumstances, and in this predicament, the theorist often refers to more general principles. Two termini of this process of abstraction are utilitarianism, with its absolutely general injunction, and Kantianism, with its purely formal injunction. And other varieties of moral theory share this (ultimately Platonic) assumption that what we need, to live properly, is knowledge about practical matters.

Aristotle does not share this assumption.

If arguments (logoi) were enough to make men good, we would have had to supply them, and they would rightly, as Theognis says, have won many great rewards. But as things are … they are incapable of encouraging most people to nobility and goodness. … It is difficult, if not impossible, for argument to remove what has long since been engrained in a man’s character. (NE179b4–18)

His advice is different; he would have us practise doing what is good, for without practice ‘nobody has the slightest prospect of becoming good’ (NE1105b11–12). His advice is not usually followed, however; ‘most people do not do these things, but think that they are being philosophers by resorting to argument (logon) … but their souls will not be made good by such philosophy’ (NE1105b12–18). Arguments and theories are by themselves useless. Aristotle does say that the really virtuous man will have practical wisdom as well as all the various virtues of character, but he also says that one cannot acquire practical wisdom without first acquiring the virtues, for vices cause us to be deceived about what goods are really worth pursuing (NE1140b17–20 and 1144a23–bl). What matters for ethics is acquiring the virtues, not acquiring theories and principles of conduct.

Aristotle has another reason to hold that acquiring theories and principles of conduct is not what matters; he does not believe that they provide the right sort of help to people, even if the people in question had good traits of character and were otherwise receptive to moral instruction. He believes that they are of little help because the subject matter of ethics, since it is indeterminate and irregular, cannot be captured in rules and precepts.

Our discussion will be adequate if it is as clear as the subject-matter allows, for, as with manufactured goods, one does not expect the same precision in all discussions, and good and noble actions, which the present study investigates, admit of much variation and irregularity. (NE1094b11–16; see also 1098a26–29, 1103b34–1104a5 and 1165a12–14)

Since the subject as a whole is like this ‘the account of particular cases has even less precision, for they do not fall under any skill or precept, and the agents themselves must always consider what is appropriate to the occasion’ (NE1104a5–9). These facts create a problem for legislators because ‘all law is universal, but about some things it is impossible to say anything both universal and correct … the problem is not in the law or in the legislator, but in the nature of things, since the subject matter of practical affairs just is like this’ (NE1137b13–19). And a concrete consequence in ethics is that, ‘as with other matters of perception, it is not easy to determine by reasoning how far and how much [a man must deviate from the mean] to be blameworthy; such things depend on particular facts, of which perception is the judge’ (NE1109b20–23; see also 1126b2–4). This perceptual skill, which is an essential part of practical savoirfaire (NE1142a23–30), comes only with the virtues.

This ‘eye of the soul’ does not acquire its fully-developed state (hexis) without virtue, as has been said, and as is obvious. Reasoning about practical matters has a starting-point, viz. ‘the end, what is best, is such-and-such’, whatever it may be (let it be, for argument’s sake, any old thing), and this is not evident, except to the good man; badness corrupts us and causes us to be deceived about the starting points of conduct. So it is clear that it is impossible to be practically wise without being good. (NE1144a29–b1; see also EE127b34–1228a2 and for the metaphor of perception NE1143b11–14)

So Aristotle has two reasons to believe that ethics is not primarily a matter of enumerating principles of conduct. First the mere acquisition of such principles is ineffective, except under special circumstances, when we already have the virtues, and, second, such principles are necessarily defective in the face of the irregularity and individuality of practical matters, which means that they must be supplemented by a sort of perceptual ability, which comes only with the virtues. In these matters I agree with Aristotle. It is realistic to think that our acquired character traits, not our beliefs about practical issues, are what determine the calibre of our lives, especially since our beliefs about practical matters seem so often merely to express our character traits and not to influence them, nor, for that matter, our conduct. The study of the virtues is the fundamental task of ethics.

This book is a study of Aristotle’s doctrine of the virtues of character. Except for occasional remarks, I shall not discuss the intellectual virtues, practical wisdom, the unity of the virtues, friendship, pleasure, happiness, fortune, weakness of will or responsibility. These are interesting topics, I know, but I have acted in the belief that one must understand Aristotle’s ideas about the virtues of character before studying these topics. Nor have I discussed the whole of Aristotle’s doctrine of virtues of character, for I have not included the doctrine of the mean, the relativism associated with that doctrine, or the harmony of the virtues, nor have I included the individual virtues. These would be the next stage in this sort of investigation, but for present purposes I have restricted myself to answering a precise question: ‘What is a virtue of character?’

Someone who wanted Aristotle’s answer to this question would naturally turn to the Nicomachean Ethics II, 5 where it is argued that a virtue is a state (hexis) because it is neither a capacity nor a feeling. But this discussion will not give the reader satisfaction, because he will not immediately understand what a hexis is, he will not understand how it is related to capacities and to feelings, and he will have no confidence in the exhaustive enumeration with which Aristotle starts his argument; he says, ‘since there are three kinds of thing in the soul, feelings, capacities, and hexeis …’ (NE1105b19–20). He will not understand what the connection is which Aristotle sees between a hexis and evaluation; ‘by “hexis” I mean those things in virtue of which we are in a good or bad condition with respect to the feelings’ (NE1105b25–26). Nor will he understand the connection between virtue and choice; ‘the virtues are choices, or they involve choice’ (NE1106a3–4). My purpose in this book is to assist such a reader. The discussion in NE II, 5 and in its parallel, Eudemian Ethics II,2, is a recapitulation and unification of all the elements of the doctrine of virtue which are to be found scattered elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus. So my purpose is to excavate and put on display all the elements of Aristotle’s philosophy which are used in these two passages, the knowledge of which illuminates and shows to be successful Aristotle’s argument.

Even though my project is very narrowly conceived, what remains for study is a surprisingly extensive and sophisticated body of doctrine. Aristotle has a great deal to say about what a hexis is. It is a special sort of disposition, which is itself a quality; it is special by being especially well entrenched in the thing of which it is a hexis. A hexis is either an excellence or an aberration; an excellence is a hexis which is a perfection, and something is perfect when it is most in accordance with its nature. In the case of man, we reach an understanding of his nature, and therefore of what his excellences are, by means of the celebrated function (ergon) argument, which makes more explicit the fundamental Aristotelian principles of value. This argument reveals that in the human case an excellence is a hexis which is natural. There are two sorts of rational hexis, and excellences of character are rational by being obedient to reason. Excellences of character are dispositions for feelings, dispositions of desires, and dispositions to enjoy or dislike things. They are also dispositions to choose courses of conduct, choice being deliberately reached decision. These are the elements of Aristotle’s doctrine of virtue; they constitute an impressively unified system and they are expounded and argued with admirable subtlety and care.

In my exposition (which roughly follows the order of topics above) I have attempted to move from the more general to the more specific; this order displays the systematic connections best. But this is not necessarily the order in which Aristotle came to his various views, nor is it necessarily the order which will be most useful to every reader. Readers who are most interested in Aristotle’s metaphysics might start at the beginning, but readers who are most interested in Aristotle’s moral philosophy might start at the last chapter and work backwards, and other readers might profit by reading in some quite different order, as long as they were prepared to follow cross-references.

None of my exposition depends on any view about the supposed order in which Aristotle wrote his works. It is immaterial to my purpose whether the common books (NE V, VI and VII) belong to the Eudemian Ethics or to the Nicomachean Ethics, but I continue to refer to them by their NE chapter and line numbers. My policy has been to assume that all of Aristotle’s writing on this topic is harmonious and complementary, until proven otherwise, and I have not been forced to abandon that assumption in any important particular.

All translations from the Greek are my own, and the editions which I have used are listed in the Bibliography. I have left two Greek words untranslated – hexis (plural hexeis) and ergon (plural erga) – and from now on they will be treated as naturalised English words. No English word does justice to either of them, and since much of the discussion is concerned with illustrating their sense, it seems best to burden the reader with as few preconceptions as possible. In the case of logos, I have used ‘reason’ and cognates as often as possible, and deviations from this convention will be signalled by a transliteration. In the case of aretē I write ‘excellence’, except where the context indicates that it is excellence of character which is under discussion in which case I write ‘virtue’. In the case of prohairesis, I write ‘choice’.

Although this work is primarily exposition, I have not refrained from criticising Aristotle’s views. The reader will discover that I rarely do so, but this is only because I have been convinced by all those ideas with which I do not explicitly disagree. I have tried to mention every helpful discussion by other interpreters of passages which I have discussed. But I have deliberately omitted that (very large) body of interpretation which discusses these passages in the light of purposes unhelpful to the present enquiry, so that my text may not be clogged, and the reader’s attention not diverted, by material only apparently relevant. Finally, it may sometimes seem that my style of exposition is brusque; in my experience few readers, if they are not convinced by a set of brief arguments for a position, are persuaded by any longer or more elaborate set, and the net effect of putting all my possible remarks into the text would be to slow it down.

2 What a hexis is

DOI: 10.4324/9781315673189-2

I Metaphysics

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues by a process of exhaustive enumeration that the virtues of character are hexeis. ‘If, then, the virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, what remains is that they be hexeis’ (NE1106a10–12). We need to find out what a hexis is, both for the purpose of finding out what the content of Aristotle’s doctrine is, and for the purpose of deciding whether the enumeration of candidates from which Aristotle starts is complete. Aristotle gives us this account of what hexeis are: ‘by “hexeis” I mean those things in virtue of which we are in a good or bad condition with respect to the feelings’ (NE1105b25–26). Whether Aristotle is right to confine his attention, in this context, to feelings, is an issue which will have to be postponed to Chapter 4. But Aristotle asserts at least this much in NE II, 5: a hexis is something in virtue of which we are in a good or bad condition in some respect.

This is related to part of what Aristotle says in a general account of hexis in his philosophical lexicon, Metaphysics Book V. At V 20 his entry for ‘hexis’ reads: ‘… “hexis” also means a disposition in virtue of which the thing disposed is well or ill disposed, either in itself or with respect to something else – e.g. health is a kind of hexis, for it is such a disposition’ (Met1022b10–12).

These two accounts of what a hexis is are not the same. The common ingredient of both these accounts is that it is something in virtue of which evaluative attributions are true. But while the NE account says that the thing which has a hexis is in a good or bad condition, the Metaphysics account says that the thing which has a hexis is well or ill disposed. These are not the same because while everything in virtue of which a thing is well- or ill-disposed is in a good or bad condition (trivially, in a good or bad condition with respect to that disposition), the converse is not true. The converse is not true because there may be ways of being in a good or bad condition which do not involve being well or ill disposed at all. Being well or ill disposed is a particular way of being in a good or bad condition, as Aristotle makes clear in his account, at Metaphysics, V 19, of ‘disposition’: ‘disposition’ means the arrangement of that which has parts in respect of either place, capacity or form – it must be some position, as indeed the word “disposition” shows’ (Met 1022b1–3). It follows from this account that for there to be a disposition of a thing, the thing must be complex. It must have parts, in the sense of the V25 account of ‘part’: ‘again, “part” means that into whic...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Title Page1
• Copyright Page1
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 What a hexis is
• 3 Man: his ergon and his excellence
• 4 A virtue is a trait of character
• 5 The virtues are concerned with choice
• 6 A virtue is a hexis of character
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index of Aristotelian passages
• General index