1 Introduction
One of the most intriguing features of the human population of the planet Earth is the remarkable uniformity with which its different subgroups have organized their societal life. The Earthlings themselves pay a lot of attention to their numerous internal conflicts and tensions, which is why isomorphism between the competing and warring groups is often ignored. On the other hand, the strife between these groups makes the similarities between them even more mysterious. The Earthlings are divided into clans called nations, which are in many respects replicas of each other. They have a government, the usual ministries and agencies, and they apply the same global standards in, say, analyzing the economy or counting and classifying the population (J. W. Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997, pp. 145ā146). All these nations also have a flag and a national anthem, which represents the 19th and 20th century European musical tradition. In most cases you can also find certain cultural institutions such as art museums, theatres, or symphony orchestras, which have become emblems of modern nations (Adams, 1999, 2010; Alasuutari, 2001, 2009a). Thus the Earthlings obviously form a single global culture, a tribe who take pride in calling themselves modern.
One could think that the isomorphism found in the nationsā institutional organization is due to a strong chief that tells the clan leaders how to organize things and what to do next. Yet in fact the tribe of moderns does not have a chief or government and the nations emphasize their sovereignty in decision-making. Nevertheless, in different walks of life from clothing to management models and government policies, same ideas circulate and materialize in national policies. To take an example, in 1981 Norway established Childrenās Ombudsman with the task to keep an eye on childrenās position in society. This institution has proliferated to other countries particularly after 1989 when the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted. At the moment, more than 50 countries out of 193 UN member states have Childrenās Ombudsman or equivalent body. Thus moderns appear like a school of fish, making the same turns and adjusting their movements to each other, even when they are not forced to adopt similar models. In other words, in many respects this global tribe without a chief behaves as if it had one.
Yet moderns often refuse the idea that clans resemble each other and that they belong to the same tribe. Rather, the literature on this topic more commonly emphasizes internal divisions and strife. It is pointed out that the human population comprises several civilizations and hundreds or thousands of different cultures. For instance, the majority populations of the roughly 200 countries found on the globe are often called national cultures, and in addition it is common to talk about minority cultures or peoples without a state. Because of all this cultural diversity, nation-states are rarely populated by a culturally uniform nation, and several states acknowledge multiculturalism created by a number of āethnicā groups of which the nation is composed. To provide another figure, there are more than five thousand languages spoken on the Earth (Swaan, 2001).
At the face of the diversity, rivalries and inequalities between and within people living in different corners of the globe, global isomorphism is a truly amazing phenomenon. How is it that worldwide models emerge and spread? How do nations learn about each otherās strategies and policies and how do they enter the agenda of national politics and policymaking? Since nations value uniqueness and independence, how is it possible that they nevertheless seem to follow or imitate each other? What is the role of international organizations in this? These are the questions addressed in this book, which attempts to understand global dynamics and governance.
One challenge in explaining why national states and their policies are so similar is that popular and scientific theories of society and the global order are a key tool of governance. That is, social science experts and policy consultants interpret the social world for policymakers and ordinary citizens, thus defining, justifying, or criticizing policy options. In that sense there is no simple dividing line that separates the correct account of the global system from false ones. A theory may be incorrect but if decision-makers believe in it, it informs the decision-makersā view of reality and hence become relevant as an aspect of the human reality in question and real in its consequences. Actors may even arrange a whole organizationāsay, a rehabilitation institutionāas a realization of an incorrect theory of the problems it is supposed to solve or cure. Thus, a holistic explanation of the way the global system works must be able to account for the major theories of the social world and to show their role in and effect on the system itself.
Considering this complication, in this book I argue that a neoinstitutionalist view of the social world is best capable of explaining the way the global system works. The neoinstitutionalist perspective means that, instead of starting from ready-made postulates such as the human actor as homo economicus or the primacy of the relations of production, we study in detail and make sense of peopleās activities in their historically formed institutional contexts. Individuals are not treated as separate from their social and material environment but rather, the institutions that shape peopleās living conditions and the prevalent understandings of those institutions are treated as elements of the cultural system under scrutiny. From this perspective social order and social change are a constantly updated outcome of actors creating their social world by negotiating their options and positions in existing institutional conditions. And simultaneously these conditions constitute actors, providing them with the āframes of meaningā that inform their aspirations. As to the global system, it can be best described as a realization of the global culture of moderns. So, to explain the global isomorphism and the way national paths are synchronized through national policies, we need to understand the culture of moderns as a belief system.
The rest of this introduction is organized in the following manner. In the next two sections I am going to discuss key beliefs of moderns: the belief in socio-economic development and beliefs about leadership and dominance. In this context these beliefs are important becauseāin and when moderns notice global isomorphismāthese are the prevalent ways in which moderns explain similarities between national policies. The subsequent sections will then move over to explaining global isomorphism through a transnational diffusion of policy models and other ideas. In these sections I will discuss how the global spread of ideas has been studied and theorized in previous neoinstitutionalist research and what kind of contribution this study will make to it. Finally, I will introduce the data and methods of this study.
The belief in socio-economic development
As previously said, moderns are commonly reluctant in conceiving of themselves as a single culture, a global tribe. Therefore they have other means to account for the fact that different countries resemble each other and that governments often adopt similar policies. Often such similarities are naturalized by the belief in a universal trajectory or āsocio-economic developmentā that determines how any country must be changed over time on its way to becoming increasingly affluent, ādeveloped,ā and, indeed, āmodern.ā According to this belief, to develop beyond a certain stage, certain reforms become necessary functional requirements. Therefore different national governments end up making those reforms independently, regardless of any external influences. This line of thought maintains that social change in any country is steered by an inherent gyroscope that leads the way forward.
In its different guises this belief is one of the secrets behind modernsā success in spreading their culture. Moderns spread their influence by denying that they are a culture at all. Being modern is understood as an epithet of different national cultures, not as proof of being member of a single tribe. That is, what is āmodernā is thought to be opposite to or beyond culture, which, in turn, is associated with old habits and traditions. Hence, nation-states emphasize their uniqueness as a national culture by taking examples from the area of āexpressive cultureāāsuch as variations in language, dress, food, traditions, landscapes, and familial styles. However, being a āmodernā society is proved in the area of āinstrumental culture,ā and in this area being similar to other modern societies is a matter of pride rather than a problem.1 Yet doing what other nations are doing is not considered copying, because it is thought that all nations are just following the law-like process of change called āmodernization.ā
This peculiar concept of modernization is related to the high respect moderns place on science. Moderns not only believe that science can tell us not only how things are but also how different problems must be solved. These solutions, for instance machines developed with the help of scientific research, are often placed against culture as something based on false beliefs regarding the laws of nature. When applied to governing and organizing human life, this concept leads to the assumption that the more the organizational arrangements are based on scientific research, the more āmodernā they are, and the more similar they are to each other. That is because at any moment of time one can find a single best solution to a problem, or at least the ābest practicesā are close to each other.
On the other hand moderns commonly believe that along with scientific progress, humankind learns more and more about their environment and therefore develops better and better ways to solve its problems. Hence current best practices are discarded and replaced by new ones. In that way it is believed that humankind is led by scientific development towards an ever better, affluent, or efficient model of society.
Although the concept of socio-economic development entails the conviction that social change is led by an in-built gyroscopic mechanism, it does not preclude the idea that policymakers or citizens should not be consulted about future development. On the contrary, researching, and theorizing about the developmental mechanisms of āmodern societyā and suggesting solutions to socio-economic problems are the bread and butter of the social sciences.
The theory that the development of societiesāin other words nation-statesāis led by āevolutionary universalsā owes particularly to the work of Talcott Parsons (Parsons, 1964, 1966). He drew on the sociological tradition established by figures such as Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tƶnnies, and Max Weber, which he systematized into a theory of differentiation as a necessary requirement of socio-economic development (Alasuutari, 2004, pp. 140ā158). Parsons was also active in translating his theories about the functional requirements of further development into policy consultancy. In the re-democratization of West Germany after World War II, Parsons consulted the US State Department in designing German economic and political reconstruction and influenced the Marshall Plan (Gerhardt, 1996, 1999, 2002).
Currently modernization theory as first codified by Parsons is not considered as an up-to-date theory, although it does have its supporters (see e.g. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Yet if you scratch the surface of social science theorizing, you will find an underlying tacit concept of modernization or socio-economic development. It is evident for instance in the constant flow of new concepts that claim to capture a new developmental trend to which actors need to adjust. Hence, social scientists have talked about emergent eras such as post, late or fluid modernity or a trend such as globalization or reflexive modernization (Bauman, 2000; Beck, Bonss, & Lau, 2003; Beck, Giddens, & Lash, 1994; Harvey, 1989; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). Such trends are typically considered as a natural outcome of a long historical development or as the unleashing of a tension inherent in āmodern society.ā
The tacit concept of socio-economic development is also the bedrock of the advisory authority of intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations (IGOs and INGOs) such as the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, the World Bank or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Through the international standards, declarations, and recommendations produced by these bodies, āalmost every aspect of social life is discussed, rationalized, and organized, including rules of economic production and consumption, political structure, and education; science, technique, and medicine; family life, sexuality, and interpersonal relations; and religious doctrines and organizationā (J. W. Meyer, et al., 1997, p. 162).
National governmentsā policies are thus synchronized with each other through consultancy rather than by giving orders. The need for reforms and solutions for the weaknesses detected are promoted by knowledge about the best possible means by which to reach the goals such as to strengthen democracy, to make public administration more efficient, and to enhance economic growth. As Meyer and others (1997) say, in each arena the range of legitimately defensible forms is fairly narrow, but nations adopt isomorphic policies of their own free will. That is because moderns believe in functional requirements of socio-economic development.
Yet the assumption that there is indeed a single developmental path, marked by stages at which certain reforms become necessary, does not hold. Existing research shows that whether a nation-state enacts a particular worldwide model depends on how well-connected the decision-makers are to international organizations that promote them (e.g. Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005; Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, & Meyer, 2008; Shandra, 2007). Consequently, governments make reforms that are badly suited to their current situation (J. W. Meyer, 2004).
Beliefs about leadership and dominance
Thus, in actual fact, nations often adopt similar policies voluntarily because they want to be similar to others and belong to the tribe of moderns. Yet when moderns reflect on this issue, they tend to find other reasons than imitation to similarities between national paths. Most importantly, there is suspicion that some influential actors outside or āaboveā the nation-state pull the strings behind the scenes by promoting certain policies. Although nation-states are formally independent, there is constant talk about open or concealed domination by powerful global actors, about structures of global governance and about the origins of the ideas and models, considered as indications of influential players. In fact assumptions about influence, dominance, and coercion are a prevailing framework within which international relations are viewed and researched.
Emphasizing strife between different clans is well founded in light of the history of humankind, which is full of wars and atrocities. There have always been real or imagined groupings of clans. During the 20th century, the so-called East-West or communist-capitalist division was a popular way to divide the clans into friends and allies, and these two camps fought for their support and influence within the rest of the clans. When the so-called Cold War era ended, it became popular to conceive of these divisions in more cultural or religious than political terms. For instance Samuel P. Huntington (Huntington, 1993, 1996) argued that six major civilizations divide humankind.
Similar to the talk about alliances of like-minded nations, the dominant ārealistā paradigm in the areas of international relations and world politics maintains that the international system is driven by anarchy, egoism, groupism, and power politics (Donnelly, 2008). Since there is no higher authority above nation-states, as in Thomas Hobbesās state of nature, the international world is viewed as a potential āwar of all against all,ā in which all nations and groups seek for and secure their own interests (Cerny, 2012). Higher ends are subordinated to the underlying requirements of survival and national self-interest (Waltz, 1979).
The view of the world in a state of struggle, with the strong nations dominating the weaker ones, is not only an academic theory. The national interest is also a self-evident starting point in political discourse in all countries. It is not only a legitimate motive; it is also the only morally impeccable one for politicians or political groups to promote their policy proposals. Hence policies and strategies are constantly justified by what is best for āusā and by the need to maintain our ācompetitiveness.ā Consider the way Gary Lunn, Minister of Natural Resources, justified the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act in the Canadian Parliament:
(Parliament of Canada, 2007b, p. 538)
As the extract illustrates, the national interest is such a central motive that other objectives like the planet Earth from an ecological catastrophe are often justified by arguing that the measures proposed are also good for the nation.
Considering that the clans of moderns are institutionally copies of each other and often follow each otherās moves like a school of fish, it may seem surprising that they choose to stress that nations are separate sovereign actors engaged in mutual rivalry, competition and power play. This paradox can be understood by taking into account the modernization framework discussed earlier. Although other nations are seen as competitors, they are viewed like athletes of the same sport, playing by the same rules and aiming at ever better results. Nations compete for their position in the continuous run for an increasingly efficient society that guarantees the wealth and wellbeing of the population. That is why nations want to āleadā the development rather than ālag behind.ā Let me quote a statement by Mr. Carnahan in the US House of Representatives debate on America Competes Reauthorization Act of 2010:
(U.S. Congressional Record, 2010, pp. 2ā3)
In this state competition discourse, being at the forefront of socio-economic development is viewed as a means for a nationās success and influence. Competitiveness creates jobs and thus contributes to the wealth and wellbeing of the population. In addition, scientific and technological leadership means that the businesses coming from those countries impose technological standards on the whole world and secure an income from licenses from other countries and companies. Technologically advanced corporations also gain market share and spread throughout the globe.
Talking about the spread of standards and businesses from dominant countries to the rest of the world sounds like moderns, after all, acknowledge that they are or are becoming a single global tribe. That is not quite the case, though, because moderns commonly refuse to see modernity as a culture. Rather, they see it as the result of organizing social life m...