The Military in Post-Revolutionary Iran

The Evolution and Roles of the Revolutionary Guards

Hesam Forozan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138913028
• eBook ISBN: 9781317430735
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, also known as the 'Sepah', has wielded considerable and increasing power in Iran in recent decades. Established in 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini as a paramilitary organisation charged with protecting the nascent Islamic regime and countering the untrustworthy Imperial army (or 'Artesh'), the Sepah has evolved into one of the most powerful political, ideological, military and economic players in Iran over recent years. The Sepah is entrusted with a diverse set of indoctrination apparatus, training programmes and system welfare provisions intended to broaden support for the regime. Although established as a paramilitary organisation, the Sepah developed to have its own ministry, complex bureaucracy and diversified functions, alongside its own network and personnel. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the Sepah and its role. It examines the position of the Sepah in Iranian state and society, explores the nature of the Sepah's involvement in politics, and discusses the impact of the Sepah's political rise on Iran's economy and foreign policy. Contemporary Iran can only be fully understood by an awareness of the ongoing in-fighting among regime factions and increasing popular demands for social change – knowing about the Sepah is central to all this.

Part I
The Sepah in the post-revolutionary state and society

1 Civil–military relations in post-revolutionary Iran

Introduction

This chapter provides the conceptual framework of this book. It engages with theoretical literature on civil–military relations in order to conceptualise both the relationship between the Sepah and its political authority, and its role in non-traditional military spheres – in particular, in politics and the economy. To this end, this chapter compares the case of post-revolutionary Iran with authoritarian regimes in communist China as well as with certain regimes in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East (Turkey, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, Chile). This comparison of the Sepah, including its politicised counterparts, with these authoritarian polities yields interesting insights. Similar to the aforementioned politicised armed forces, the Sepah’s role extends beyond defending the country’s borders from external threats to include internal security and other domestic functions. As with authoritarian political systems run by a single party, it is imbued with ideology, although, in this case, the ideology is religious rather than secular. Unlike state forces in dictatorial regimes such as communist China, the Sepah is not subject to political control by an organised party apparatus, yet it has remained loyal to the conservative core of the regime. Finally, other than its internal role in suppressing unrest, its vital role in popular mobilisation is unparalleled by those of its counterparts. In recognition of these features that are distinctive to post-revolutionary Iran, this chapter proposes an alternative model of civil–military relations in the IRI.

Theoretical perspectives

The armed forces in post-revolutionary Iran represent an interesting post–Cold War case in the developing world: that of an armed force which has been resilient to democratisation. Similar to armed forces elsewhere, the IRI armed forces are tasked with protecting the state from internal and external threats. Because the IRI armed forces have always been at an advantageous position with access to instruments of coercion, they presented the post-revolutionary civilian elite with a serious predicament: how to build a strong military to protect the state and at the same time curb its potential to dominate the state or push aside its civilian elites (Kamrava 2000: 67; Alagappa 2001: 29). This, according to Samuel P. Huntington, is a key dilemma of civil–military relations which applies to both the developed and developing worlds.

Post-revolutionary Iran is not an exceptional case of ‘civilian control’, as this dilemma is indeed a salient feature in other modern states. To address this dilemma, Huntington proposes the professional or objective model of civilian control as an ideal type, as opposed to what he calls ‘subjective civilian control’. In subjective control, there is no clear-cut boundary between the civil and military spheres. The civilian authorities seek to maximise their control over the military by inculcating it with their political values and ideology. In such cases, a maximisation of civilian power further politicises the military while stripping it of its professional expertise (Huntington 1957: 80–85). The most successful model of civilian control is a professional or objective one. The professional or objective model of civil–military relations hinges on the proper balance between the civil and military spheres, under which each sphere engages in its own appropriate expertise. The civilian ‘acknowledges the integrity of the military profession and its subject matter’ and ‘the military man has the right to expect political guidance from the statesman’ (Huntington 1957: 72). A professional military that embodies military-specific characteristics, namely expertise, corporateness and responsibilities, is apolitical. In this regard, civilian control of the military is maintained ‘not because the military groups share in the social values and political ideologies of society, but because they are indifferent to such values and ideologies. The military leaders obey the government not because they agree with its policies but simply because it is their duty to obey’ (Huntington cited in Stepan 1971: 60).

Despite its influence among academics and policy makers, Huntington’s thesis has not been immune to scholarly critique. Various works on civil–military relations have noted that professionalisation and politicisation are not always mutually exclusive and may not be inversely linked, particularly in developing countries. Some observers argue that the notion of professionalisation furthers the military’s political posture, rather than depoliticising the military. For example, according to Abrahamson, professionalisation leads to the creation of professional military men who embrace certain corporate interests and beliefs and tend to take ‘political actions’ which are congruent with ‘those interests and beliefs’ (Abrahamson 1972: 17). Abrahamson argues that military professionalisation creates a problem for civilian control and undermines the authority of the civilian officials to formulate policy without considering the interests of the military. If civilian officials implement policies that are in conflict with the military’s interests, they are likely to face greater pressure from a ‘highly professionalised than from a lower professionalised officer corps’(Abrahamson 1972: 17).

In practice, the armed forces in many countries contain elements of both subjective and objective or professional models of civil–military relations. In Latin American countries, for example, particularly in the case of the Peruvian and Brazilian militaries in the late 1950s and 1960s, ‘the professional standards coexisted with increasing politicisation’ (see Stepan 1973: 48). As Alfred Stepan points out, in both countries the increasing professionalisation of the military did not yield to its depoliticisation but contributed to its ‘new professionalism’ based on highly interrelated political and managerial skills (Stepan 1973: 52). Beyond the Latin American experience, an overall look at many countries in Asia and the Middle East – such as Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and communist China – brings to the fore cases of professional yet politicised militaries.

Another limitation of Huntington’s thesis is its overt focus on the internal characteristics of civil–military relations to the exclusion of external factors. In this respect, Morris Janowitz and Alfred Stepan point out that a complete analysis of the military’s political behaviour must not only focus on the internal factors associated with organisational characteristics of the military, but must also look at the interaction of such characteristics with the political system (Stepan 1971: 55; Janowitz 1977: 23) Another political theorist, Michael Desch, shows how external and internal threat conditions influence civilian control of the military. According to Desch, a state that faces a high external threat and low internal threat exhibits the strongest civilian control, while a state encountering ‘high internal threats and low external threats should experience the weakest civilian control, and is more predisposed to intervene in politics’ (Desch 1999: 14). In the same vein, Stepan shows how the Brazilian military’s perception of internal threat led to its ‘new professionalisation’ by shifting the military’s emphasis to the ‘highly interrelated political and security skills’ needed to deal with the internal security sphere (Stepan 1973: 50).

Beside its limited focus on the role of the military and purely in terms of its discussion of civilian control, however, Huntington’s professionalisation thesis has little persuasive power in explaining the complexity of civil–military interactions, particularly in cases where the military is not only a national defence actor, but an equally influential actor in society (Bienen 1981: 364). The involvement of the military in non-military fields is particularly prominent in developing countries, where the military takes on an increasing role in politics, the economy and society. With this in mind, other than looking at military institutions and their models of civilian control, a complete survey of civil–military relations (in general) and of the military’s political functions (in particular) must pay attention to the military’s broader interactions with political processes, its extra-military involvement in society and its reactions to external factors (Bienen 1981: 364). The following section will provide an outline of the dominant models of civil–military relations in the cases of authoritarian political systems, namely, in communist China, Latin American and Middle Eastern countries and Asia – situations marked by highly politicised militaries. The pattern of civilian control in each case will be examined in terms of its ‘particular contexts, national histories and external environment’. These serve as intervening factors by shaping aspects of civilian control and influencing its outcomes (Bienen 1981: 369). Moreover, particular attention will be paid to the broader involvement of individual militaries in the national economies and their interactions with political elites. These non-military involvements and relations are distinct, but are closely related to civilian control.

The following models of civil–military relations will provide a conceptual tool for analysis of the Sepah’s relationship with its political civilians and its growth over the years, as well as for assessment of how it compares and contrasts with its historical counterparts.

Patterns of civil–military relations in authoritarian political systems

Within the literature on militaries in authoritarian political systems, two general models of civil–military relations are of relevance to this study. In this book, these models are called the totalitarian model and the praetorian model. The former is used to denote the mode of civil–military relations which is controlled by party-state political systems, such as those of communist China; the latter refers to civil–military relations in countries with a highly interventionist military, such as Pakistan (1958–1971, 1977–1988, 1999–2008), Turkey (1960–1961, 1971–1973), Egypt (1953–1968, 1968–2011), Brazil (1945–1963, 1964–1968), Peru (1968–1980) and Argentina (1945–1955, 1968–1988). The term ‘praetorian’ in reference to these countries highlights the weakness of their political institutions compared to those of their military – a condition which provides fertile ground for the military’s takeover of the political system (Huntington 1968: 168; Perlmutter 1974: 4–20).

The totalitarian model exists in communist China. As in the professional model outlined by Huntington, the communist totalitarian model places emphasis on military expertise. Nonetheless, civilian supremacy is maintained by the indoctrination of the military with the civilian government’s norms and political ideas. The communist authority’s aim is the creation of an army that is both ‘red and expert’. Theoretically, civilian control is maintained according to Mao Tse-tung’s famous proclamation: ‘Power grows out of the barrel of the gun. Our principle is that the party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the party’ (Nordlinger 1977: 16). According to this principle, the army is politically dependent on the vanguard party, although it reserves the right to ‘limited institutional independence’ in areas pertaining to ‘maintaining internal order and waging wars’ (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982: 784). The military is also penetrated by various control channels, which include the political commissars in military divisions and political-intelligence surveillance. As a result, the potential source of tension between the military and the party is resolved by the integration of the political ideas of civilians and officers. The army is distinguished from civilian authority in terms of professional expertise, but is harmonious with it in terms of a shared ideology (Nordlinger 1977: 12).

Despite the foregoing generalisation on the differentiation between the Communist Party and the Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), a detailed look at the Chinese experience shows that the party’s control of the military in its present institutional form did not happen overnight, but developed over many years. While the party has always maintained supremacy over the army, there was a greater symbiosis between the two during the revolutionary stage under Mao. During this stage, as Perlmutter and LeoGrande point out, the party and the PLA depended on one another to survive and a blurry line existed between the functional and institutional boundaries of the military and non-military structures (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982: 76). This blurry line between the two structures had its origin in the foundation of the communist system in China, which was established by the waging of guerrilla warfare by political-military elite revolutionaries (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982: 76). Thereafter, Mao and his successor, Deng, sought to strengthen subjective civilian control by cultivating charismatic leadership; civilian control was achieved in part by imposing personal loyalty on the military (Lee 2006: 445).

The post-revolutionary period, however, brought about a transition of Chinese civil–military relations, in the form of a movement from charismatic control to institutional subjective control. This transition was defined by a transfer of leadership from the revolutionary cadre to technocrats and by more clearly defined boundaries between the party and the army. This institutional control, which lasts to the present date, places much more emphasis on the professional training of the army, which continues to act politically on behalf of the party. In contrast to charismatic control, the politicisation of the army is subject to institutional party control, and the party does not have to rely on personal charismatic revolutionary figures to maintain civilian control (Lee 2006: 443–445).

With regard to its economic activities, the PLA serves as the instrument of the party and takes part in national development and economic enterprises on its behalf. The PLA’s involvement in economic activities can be traced back to the very origin of the communist state. Because of its engagement in guerrilla war and its involvement in the establishment of the communist political order, the PLA was entrusted with aiding the political elite with non-traditional military responsibilities and national programmes. Military subordination to the state manifested in the capacity of the state leaders to mobilise the military in order to contribute to major national projects (Mani 2007: 603).

The revolutionary leadership instilled the PLA with the doctrine of self-reliance to finance its defence budget (Lee 2006: 439). With the inauguration of free market policy and economic reforms, the PLA’s economic activities entered a new phase. As the military was called on to cut down its military spending, so did its business expansion reach an unprecedented peak. The PLA’s enterprises entered into a wide range of market-oriented activities, and the PLA thereby evolved into an economic conglomerate that encompassed 20,000 enterprises by the late 1980s (Mulvenon 2001: 7). Nonetheless, such expansion could not continue unchecked. Amidst growing concerns over the PLA’s commercial activities, especially in the aftermath of revelations about its corruption and profiteering, the Chinese authority ordered the divestiture of military enterprises. While the Chinese military continued its activities in the industrial sector, the level of success the divestiture act achieved in compelling the military to abandon its substantial wealth and revenue in the commercial sector is unique among developing countries, and is a testament to the strong capacity of the Chinese state and its totalitarian civilian control.

The praetorian model is based on weak civilian control and a highly interventionist military. Although the civilian government is held up as an ideal form of governance in praetorian societies, in reality, because of the ineffectiveness of civilian institutions in resolving conflict, military intervention is the norm during moments of political instability. Military entry into politics is more often carried out by civilian initiatives than by the military alone (Perlmutter 1974: 13). The praetorian model often develops in societies that exhibit high levels of political mobilisation and low levels of political institutionalisation. Such a society is ‘praetorian’ in that it is characterised by highly politicised institutions which are ill-equipped to cope with mounting political demands and pressures emanating from various political groups and interests (Huntington 1968: 192–260). In praetorian societies, the military is also politicised and inclined towards political intervention, but because of its superior organisation, all political groups – including the executive, various members of Parliament and other politically relevant elites – seek to co-opt the military to boost their political power (Stepan 1971: 62). It is not unusual for the military to overthrow a dysfunctional government, particularly when various political actors support it in that endeavour. In this respect, military interventions can be differentiated in terms of three types of civil–military relations within the praetorian model. Drawing on Amos Perlmutter’s 1974 study, civil–military relations in praetorian societies can be classified as being of the ‘praetorian arbitrator’ type or the ‘praetorian ruler’ type (Perlmutter 1974). There is also another type of civil–military relation to be discussed here, which is the ‘military-civilian mixed’ type (see Bienen and Morrel: 1976).

In the praetorian arbitrator type of civil–military relations, the civilians designate the military as the arbiter and protector of civilian stability from the barracks. The role of the military as arbitrator varies from that of ‘moderator’ to ‘guardian’ in different praetorian societies (see Stepan 1971). In both cases, however, the military acts primarily as a caretaker following the overthrow of the executive, and is entrusted to hand over political power to an acceptable authority after a certain time limit. While the military-as-moderator, such as that in Brazil (1945–1964), was expected to be subservient to the executive within the limits of law, it reserved the power to act as a moderator of the political conflict and to overthrow a dysfunctional and ineffective government if necessary. In this role, military action was legitimated by at least a segment of civilian strata and the formal and informal rules of the country on the grounds of stabilising the political and economic situation per se (Stepan 1971: 66...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part I The Sepah in the post-revolutionary state and society
• Part II The Sepah in politics, national economy and foreign policy
• Conclusion
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index