The War on Drugs in Sport

Moral Panics and Organizational Legitimacy

Vanessa McDermott

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781317607939
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Social Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book is an innovative and compelling work that develops a modified moral panic model illustrated by the drugs in sport debate. Drawing on Max Weber's work on moral authority and legitimacy, McDermott argues that doping scandals create a crisis of legitimacy for sport governing bodies and other elite groups. This crisis leads to a moral panic, where the issue at stake for elite groups is perceptions of their organizational legitimacy. The book highlights the role of the media as a site where claims to legitimacy are made, and contested, contributing to the social construction of a moral panic. The book explores the way regulatory responses, in this case anti-doping policies in sport, reflect the interests of elite groups and the impact of those responses on individuals, or "folk devils." The War on Drugs in Sport makes a key contribution to moral panic theory by adapting Goode and Ben-Yehuda's moral panic model to capture the diversity of interests and complex relationships between elite groups. The difference between this book and others in the field is its application of a new theoretical perspective, supported by well-researched empirical evidence.

1 Locating Legitimacy and Moral Panics

A legitimacy-inspired moral panic framework provides a valuable analytical framework that can be applied to a contemporary social issue. I illustrate this claim by considering the doping debate as an institutionalized moral panic. The emphasis here is to use a moral panic lens to consider the way that doping impacts on, and challenges, the legitimacy and moral authority of SGBs in terms of governing and controlling their particular sporting community. I first outline the significance of legitimacy and moral authority in modern social life before moving to summarize the moral panic theoretical framework. I contrast that with the current dominant approach to drugs in sport to highlight that a legitimacy-inspired moral panic framework provides an alternate way to consider the issue.

Legitimacy

The work of Weber provides a useful starting point to discuss legitimacy and moral authority in modern social life. Weber was concerned with identifying the basis of legitimacy and moral authority in differing modes of domination and administration, particularly in relation to their universality and stability (Cantelon and McDermott 2001; Thomas 1984; Weber 1969). While primarily considering political institutions (Spencer 1970), Weber also recognized that domination can occur in a range of relationships, such as “a family, a business or economic enterprise, the state or a church” (Thomas 1984, 225). What is important for this book is that Weber (1969) emphasized that the ability of any social system to maintain order reflects the need of any power or group in a position of authority for its claims to legitimacy to be perceived as valid. This is significant, as belief in the validity of such claims confirms the moral authority of claim-makers to determine appropriate attitudes and conduct for the group and the types of rules to maintain stability. As Weber (1969, 214) stated:

It is by no means true that every case of submissiveness to persons in positions of power is primarily (or even at all) oriented to this belief…. What is important is the fact that in a given case the particular claim to legitimacy is to a significant degree, and according to its type, treated as ‘valid’ … this fact confirms the position of the persons claiming authority and that it helps to determine the choice of means of its exercise.

Weber argued that legitimate authority, using rules to orient behavior and achieve social order and stability is based, in part, on the fact that “it has been established in a manner which is recognized to be legal” (Weber 1954, 130). Weber termed this form of domination “rational” or “legal.” From this perspective, claims to legitimacy are based in a “belief in the legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands” (Weber 1947, 328). The validity of the authority of those in positions of power, Weber (1969, 954) explained:

… may be expressed … in a system of consciously made rational rules (which may be either agreed upon or imposed from above), which meet with obedience as generally binding norms whenever such obedience is claimed by him whom the rule designates. In that case, every single bearer of powers of command is legitimated by that system of rational norms, and his power is legitimate insofar as it corresponds with the norm.

Compliance based on perceptions of legitimacy requires a framework that combines rules and regulations ‘grounded’ on prescribed norms because these support the legitimacy of authority and expectations of compliance (Matheson 1987). For Weber, these represent different aspects of the same phenomenon that underpin all ordered human interaction. He classifies these as comprised of two fundamental components: norms and authority (Spencer 1970). Elaborating on the relationship between these, Spencer (1970, 124) writes:

Norms are rules of conduct towards which actors orient their behavior. Ordered interaction is achieved when a high probability exists that a significant number of actors in a given context will orient their behavior to the same norms. The essence of authority is a relationship between two or more actors in which the commands of certain actors are treated as binding by the others. Authority is thus a sphere of legitimate command and where authority exists ordered interaction is also possible.

Legitimacy is essential to the ability of either norms or authority to ensure social order and stability (Spencer 1970). The reference to “actors” emphasizes the subjective element in this process. For Weber (1969, 214), subjectivity could be conceptualized as a function of self-interest, custom or belief in the existence of legitimate order, noting that: “Loyalty may be hypocritically simulated … on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in practice for reasons of material self-interest. Or people may submit from individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable alternative.” However, Weber did not view these considerations as representing sufficiently reliable forms of compliance. Rather, he suggests that irrespective of the motivational foundation, what is important is that the claim to legitimacy is treated as valid (Matheson 1987; Weber 1954). Whether considered from the perspective of individuals’ motivations or the legitimacy of authority, both require explanatory frameworks that “legitimate” or “make rightful” the particular behavior (Matheson 1987, 200). As Matheson (1987, 200) notes: “Power-holders have an interest in securing obedience motivated by a belief in legitimacy, for legitimate authority is a less ‘costly’ form of authority than either coercive or reward-based authority…. Legitimate authority obviates the need for surveillance and rewards, since subordinates feel obliged to obey no matter whether there is a ‘reward’ for compliance or not.”

In other words, neither fear of sanctions nor expediency alone will generate perceptions of legitimacy. Rather, it requires subjective acceptance by social actors based either on voluntary agreement or decisions by an authority held to be legitimate (Pakulski 1986). Perceptions of legitimacy leading to compliance require a framework of rules and regulations underpinned by prescribed norms or values (Matheson 1987). Irrespective of their form, the subjective component of these frameworks suggests an element of negotiation (Holton 1987). Rather than a reliance on routine submission or imposition of authority from above, successful governance requires support, or consent, which while voluntary is nevertheless predicated on perceptions of the legitimacy of authority (Pakulski 1986; Spencer 1970). Legitimacy, Suchman (1995, 574) writes, “is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially structured system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”

Legitimacy emerges as a dynamic concept that is not necessarily clear or easily applied. Rather it appears to be “multi-dimensional” (Pakulski 1986), which implies that its operation is dependent upon the nature of the problem under discussion (Suchman 1995). The subjective, evaluative component of legitimacy means that dominant groups must actively work to generate and maintain support for their legitimacy and moral authority, including compliance with regulatory frameworks (Pakulski 1986, see also Bernstein 2004; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Cashore 2002; Grafstein 1981; Hurd 1999, Koppell 2005, 2007). Applying a legitimacy-based explanatory model to SGBs is complicated by the monopoly position of many of these organizations, with their legitimacy rarely questioned (Connor and Kirby 2011). Palmer (2000, 364) describes elite SGBs, such as the IOC, FINA or FIFA, as “powerful organizations which enjoy wealth, celebrity, status and global influence on a scale with few rivals.”

One application of legitimacy to the issue of drugs in sport is the work of Donovan et al. (2002) and their development of a Sport Drug Control Model (SDCM). They suggest that compliance with anti-doping regulations is more likely if those regulations and enforcement agencies are perceived as legitimate. They also note that perceptions of legitimacy are influenced by scientifically accurate testing protocols as well as consistent and equitable application of any sanctions. Research testing the SDCM with elite Australian athletes suggested that legitimacy was less influential than other elements of the model in terms of athletes’ appraisals of threats and benefits associated with PED use (Gucciardi, Jalleh and Donovan 2011). A later survey of elite Australian athletes found that athletes’ view that anti-doping procedures were fair enhanced their perceptions of organizational legitimacy, which meant that anti-doping compliance was more likely (Jalleh et al. 2014). These findings suggest support for Donovan et al.’s claim that compliance is linked to perceptions that enforcement agencies are legitimate and hold the moral authority to impose such a regulatory framework.

Morality is important sociologically, as it orients social actions that mark community boundaries based on a set of social criteria, or rules, which evaluate “behavior and goals as good or bad, desirable or undesirable” (Ben-Yehuda 1986, 495; Lidz and Walker 1980). In modern complex societies, moral boundaries and evaluations of behavior undergo constant processes of negotiation and renegotiation by social groups and, as a result, legitimacy cannot be taken for granted (Ben-Yehuda 1986). Emphasizing this point, Ericson et al. (1991, 8) write that:

Moral authority is always subject to consent, and legitimacy is always something that is granted. There is institutional space for choice in consenting to a given moral authority and in granting legitimacy, albeit circumscribed by institutional frames and their imprints on reality and morality.

Frames include stipulating appropriate norms, classifying certain behavior as prohibited as well as sanctions attached to that behavior (Entman 2004). An organization’s ability to obtain consent and support for the legitimacy and authority to stipulate ‘frames’ hinges on two central elements. These are that organizations establish a normative order for their particular community and that rules and regulations are created in a legally correct manner (Habermas 1976). This highlights Weber’s (1969) point that compliance requires a framework based on norms or values with decisions perceived as legitimate because they are derived from appropriately formulated and enacted procedures or laws. Further, maintaining legitimacy and moral authority requires organizations to search for and sanction individuals deviating from procedural norms (Ericson et al. 1991). In other words, organizations must make convincing claims that their actions are in accord with existing social norms supported or enforced by appropriate procedural laws. Failure to do so carries the potential for a crisis of legitimacy to emerge.

The notion of crisis is useful as, rather than a total collapse, it helps to conceptualize social change as a transformative process mediated through cultural agency and conflict (Andrews 2000; Holton 1987). For an organizational crisis of legitimacy, this may include accounts (using, for example, socio-historical case studies as presented later in this book) examining how organizations institutionalize conflict and reconstruct relationships experiencing stress (Holton 1987). From this perspective, and in the context of drugs in sport, the 1998 Tour de France doping scandal contributed to a crisis of legitimacy for the IOC. That scandal transformed anti-doping approaches, resulting in the creation of WADA as a new institutional anti-doping response (Chapter 2, this volume). The establishment of WADA transformed interactions between sporting organizations, including strengthening existing relationships and incorporating new actors, such as the state and policing bodies, into the realm of sporting regulation (Rasmussen 2005; Chapter 3, this volume). Organizational interactions bring issues of governance and control into the frame. These relationships are often contentious, with various groups seeking to retain the authority and legitimacy to control their particular sporting community (Chapter 4, this volume).

In such a contested environment, maintaining or restoring social order and stability leads organizations to implement behavior-defining rules and enforcement practices, such as codes of conduct (Stewart, Nicholson and Dickson 2005), that define behavioral boundaries of their sporting community. In Weberian terms these represent “consciously made rational rules” (Weber 1969, 954) as stabilizing mechanisms to regulate the particular organizational community (Ericson et al. 1991; Chapter 3, this volume). Enforcement practices, regulatory frameworks or procedural mechanisms are concerned with moral principles and justifications, questions of right and wrong, and must be open to public scrutiny to be seen as legitimate (Battin et al. 2008; Bok 1989). This emphasizes the point that claims to legitimacy and moral authority cannot be taken for granted, as Wuthnow et al. (1984, 222) emphasize in reference to Habermas’s work on legitimation:

The legitimacy of the modern state no longer rests on tradition or absolute values, but is rooted in conceptions of proper procedures—procedures deemed legitimate if they have been established according to norms of legality and constitutionality and if they conform to certain conceptions of citizenship and representation. They are intended to serve as mechanisms for negotiating policies oriented towards the common good…. They are not taken for granted as the way things simply must be, but are consciously subjected to scrutiny to determine if they in fact produce desired consequences.

Although directed at modern state governance, Habermas’s analysis can be extended to organizations as procedure or “obsessive attention to detail is the defining characteristic of legitimacy in modern bureaucratic life” (Ericson et al. 1987, 356). The area of interest for this book is the location of control, power and authority in the modern sporting environment.

Heightening this importance of legitimacy are the significant financial rewards associated with the modern industrial sporting complex. Sport has become a global industry with a significant economic impact in terms of revenue generation. This has implications for sporting organizations, media organizations, private corporations as well as state bodies. For example, in the 2004–05 financial year the income generated in Australia by organizations involved in sport and recreation was AUD$8,820.5 million. This added a total industry value of AUD$2,349.6 million, the equivalent of 0.3 percent of Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2004–05 (ABS 2006). As Connor (2009) notes, estimates revealed that in 2000 sport added GB£9.8 billion to the British economy and employed around 400,000 people, just under two percent of the workforce. Financial benefits from sport include contracts with individual athletes, clubs, venues and leagues creating sponsorship as a multi-billion dollar global industry (Andrews and Jackson 2001). Commercial sponsorship of sport is not new. Rather, Tomlinson (2005, 39) explains, the difference in the modern sporting context is the “scale of commercial involvement,” with sponsorship that targets “whole sports, not just individuals; establishing exclusive rights for set periods, not just one-offs.”

Added to this are lucrative new markets created by a globalized media (see also Amis 2005; Harvey and Law 2005). Houlihan (2002) writes that since the 1960s there has been an increasingly interdependent relationship between sport and media organizations. Sporting events are televised to huge audiences, providing broadcasters with a valuable mechanism with which to tap into consumer markets. For example, NBC and its parent company General Electric reached an agreement with the IOC for the 2010 Vancouver Winter and the 2012 London Olympics worth a ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Acknowledgments
• Permissions Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1 Locating Legitimacy and Moral Panics
• 2 Historical Overview: The International Olympic Committee, Legitimacy and Doping
• 3 The World Anti-Doping Agency: Legitimacy and a Moral Panic
• 4 The Australian Football League: Legitimating the War on Drugs in Sport
• 5 Mediating Legitimacy and Moral Panics
• 6 Legitimacy, Doping and the Grassroots Sporting Community
• Conclusion
• Appendix 6.1: Interview Research Methodology
• Appendix 6.2: Interview Participants: NSOs, Information & Education (n=28)
• Bibliography
• Index