Moroccan Foreign Policy under Mohammed VI, 1999-2014

Irene Fernandez-Molina

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138796614
• eBook ISBN: 9781317634232
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

This book presents a comprehensive survey of Moroccan foreign policy since 1999. It considers the objectives, actors and decision-making processes involved, and outlines Morocco's foreign policy activity in key areas such as the international management of the Western Sahara conflict and relations with the other states of North Africa, relations with the European Union, especially France and Spain, and relations with the United States and the Middle East. The book links the behaviour and discourses analysed to differing conceptions of Morocco's national role on the international scene - champion of national territorial integrity, model student of the EU, and good ally of the United States - and shows how these competing approaches to the country's foreign policy enjoy different degrees of domestic consensus, and result in different degrees of legitimation for the regime.

1 Objectives, actors and decision-making under Mohammed VI

Within the domestic sphere, what Morocco witnessed in July 1999 can be viewed, according to the classification proposed by Joe D. Hagan, as a ‘regime change involving a change in the effective head of state, but no change in the basic political make-up of the ruling group’ (1987: 347). This concept of regime change does not necessarily involve a systemic change or transition, but also includes ‘change within a given type of political regime’ (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004: 387). Overall, discontinuity in Moroccan foreign policy under Mohammed VI was to be less marked on an internal level than it was to be in terms of regional and international constraints, since the latter two environments were significantly disrupted from late 2001 onwards as a consequence of the 9/11 attacks. In other words, the origin of the perceptible changes would be more often exogenous than endogenous.

Morocco was not the only Arab country to undergo succession of the head of state at this point in time. Along with King Hassan II, King Hussein of Jordan and the Syrian President Hafez al Assad died in 1999–2000. The three of them were among the oldest and most charismatic Arab leaders, and were considered to be the most skilled in the arts of diplomacy. The three of them – including also the republican president – were dynastically succeeded by their sons, who were around 40 years old at the time. In these circumstances, it was logical to wonder about the implications of ‘heritage’ in the realm of foreign policy, where the particular ‘inside-outside game’ which had hitherto guaranteed the survival of these regimes was played out, even more so considering the closed nature of their decision-making systems and the importance of leadership, personality and charisma as foreign policy resources, both externally and domestically. The new political leaders seemed to have fairly limited margin for manoeuvre, as they faced somehow paradoxical external expectations, i.e. pushing through substantial internal reforms while maintaining continuity in their countries’ external orientations (Charillon, 2002). Mohammed VI’s distinct choice of continuity in foreign affairs can be explained both by the structural constraints on his action imposed by the regional and international context, and by his own inability – lack of experience, resources or authority – to change the course followed by the state administration and his inherited circle of advisors. A third factor could be that his pressing need for legitimation dissuaded him from straying from the path traced by his predecessor, which had been endorsed by a relative domestic consensus. In that case, continuity would largely result from adjusting foreign policy behaviour and discourse to already settled identity-related norms for reasons of ‘self-image’ and ‘self-preservation’ (Barnett, 1998: 11–12).

Following his succession to the throne, various observers highlighted the lack of training, experience and ‘lust for power’ of the new King, whom his father had kept away from the tasks of government (Dalle, 2004: 22, 632). Despite Hassan II’s simultaneous efforts to turn his offspring into a ‘diplomat king’ in his image and likeness, as was evident from his education – law studies, master’s thesis on the Arab-African Union between Morocco and Libya (1984–1986) (Ben El Hassan Alaoui and Chraïbi, 1985), traineeship at the European Commission and PhD thesis on cooperation between the European Economic Community (EEC)/European Union (EU) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (Ben El Hassan Alaoui, 1994) – the image that Mohammed VI at first projected was one of frivolity and a lack of interest in state affairs.

Mohammed VI’s inaugural speech concerning foreign policy was given in late April 2000 on the occasion of the National Day of Moroccan Diplomacy, and is a highly revealing source for analysing the main functions assigned by this King to foreign policy as well as his conception of the diplomatic apparatus. It unsurprisingly started with a reference to the past: in order to contribute to ‘the greatness [grandeur], glory, splendour and prosperity we want for our people’, foreign policy should honour the kingdom’s magnified diplomatic tradition and the legacy of the previous monarch. Building on this, and assuming the ‘interdependence of internal and external issues’ which characterised the era of globalisation, the King provided an indicative definition of foreign policy as a ‘prolongation’ of domestic politics and highlighted the necessary contribution of the former to achieving the overall goals of the state. Conversely, and symbiotically, he also advocated capitalising in the area of international relations on the new image of ‘democratic and modernist Morocco’ (Sehimi, 2003: 109). The general objectives of Moroccan foreign policy were formulated as follows:

• International recognition of Morocco’s de facto control over Western Sahara: ‘enshrining Morocco as a country that has regained its territorial integrity’.

• Extension of domestic policies and contribution to the ‘objectives of the general policy of the state’.

• Promotion of economic development: ‘exploiting the opportunities for expansion and fruitful exchange offered at external level’.

• Integration of Morocco into the globalised economy: ‘taking best advantage of globalisation [mondialisation], integrating into the global economy, while reducing its negative impact on our development’.

• Diversification of Morocco’s external relations into new regions (America, Asia): ‘exploring new spaces for economic cooperation’.

• Maintaining Morocco’s traditional role as regional stabiliser: ‘consolidating Morocco’s position as a pioneering regional pole and a factor of stability and peace within its Maghreb, Arab, Islamic, Euro-Mediterranean, African and American environment’.

• Promoting Morocco’s image in the eyes of the international community: ‘its diplomacy must now be mobilised in order to capitalise on the new image […] of a democratic and modernist Morocco, which is mobilised around its sovereign, an example of moderation and tolerance’.

(Speech by Mohammed VI, Rabat, 28 April 2000)

A second key royal speech on foreign policy was delivered in August 2002, on the forty-ninth anniversary of the Revolution of the King and the People. Within a regional and international context which had been deeply disrupted in the aftermath of 9/11, the arguments of Mohammed VI on the feedback between foreign and domestic policies remained the same: ‘The degree of democratic development of a state is nowadays a determining factor for its international standing; and its ability to cope with these challenges has become dependent on the effectiveness of its diplomatic action’ (speech by Mohammed VI, Tangier, 20 August 2002). The continuity of this basic approach was again made clear two years later, with just the addition of growing concern for global security and the fight against terrorism (speech by Mohammed VI, Rabat, 30 July 2004).¹

A ‘new’ approach: ‘economic diplomacy’ and reform of the foreign service

These defining royal speeches reflected what were purportedly the two major innovations envisaged by Mohammed VI in the realm of foreign policy, which were closely connected to each other: paying greater attention to the ‘economic dimension’ of foreign policy and reforming the foreign service in order to set up an ‘efficient’ diplomacy with ‘renewed structures’. In subsequent years, indeed, the extension of a new economistic official discourse into various foreign policy areas was coupled with attempts to develop and promote a new technocratic foreign policy elite – although tangible results were at most limited.

Whilst the assignment of economic functions to diplomatic missions abroad was far from a novelty in historical terms, at the turn of the millennium Moroccan decision-makers showed an increasing awareness of the huge challenges that the national economy was facing as a result of its liberalisation, opening up and integration into the global system. In terms of trade alone, this country had shifted in just two decades from strong protectionism to an earnest strategy of trade opening and diversification by all means (Escribano, 2007: 188–193; Abouddahab, 2010b). Accordingly, new demands were placed on so-called economic diplomacy, both at macro level – relations with multilateral economic institutions – and micro level – support for the internationalisation of Moroccan companies and national exports, attraction of foreign direct investment and contribution to the development of priority sectors such as tourism. The context within which this new leitmotif became widespread was marked by the diversification of the actors involved in external relations, the loss of the monopoly in this area by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the increasing participation of economic and technical ministries, the development of parallel diplomacy and the improvement of information and communication media for all parties (Belalami, 2006: 1–8, 79).

Against this background, it was at the beginning of Mohamed VI’s reign that economic diplomacy was enshrined as an official foreign policy priority, as the economistic and technocratic leanings of the Rabat authorities became also increasingly explicit (El Messaoudi and Bouabid, 2007; Tozy, 2008). In accordance with a ‘royal project’ defined by the ‘primacy of economics over politics’,² foreign policy officials started to shape an allegedly depoliticised and pragmatic economistic discourse, which was applied with different variations to relations with the EU, Maghrebi regional integration, the kingdom’s positions within the Arab League and its alliance with the Gulf countries, and its proclaimed new African policy. The foreign minister appointed in April 1999, Mohamed Benaissa, claimed in the National Day of Moroccan Diplomacy in 2004 that ‘three quarters’ of the activities of his department concerned economic issues (MAEC, 19 April 2004). This ‘priority’ of economic diplomacy was reaffirmed once again by deputy minister Youssef Amrani in 2012 (MAEC, 15 February 2012).³

On the other hand, various political actors of different persuasions had pointed out the need to restructure the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, including both the central administration and the foreign service, since the late 1990s – not long after the 1995 reform (decree 2–94–864, 20 January 1995) which ‘created’ this ministry under its current denomination, fixing its organisational structure and regulating its functions (Janati-Idrissi, 1999: 126–130). This was also one of the concerns of the nascent independent press. For example, in 1999 Le Journal published an investigation revealing the high levels of inefficiency and corruption within the Moroccan embassy in Washington, which had until that time been headed by Benaissa himself, and its negligence in defending the Moroccan positions on the Western Sahara conflict before a crucial body such as the United States Congress (Le Journal, 30 October–5 November 1999; Amar, 2009: 151). Within ordinary political debate, some of the responsibility for the dysfunctions of Moroccan foreign policy was attributed to ‘the weakness, even decadence, of the diplomatic service’: ‘This body is appointed on the basis of patronage and favouritism, not competition’ (Abouddahab, 2006: 63). Recurrently highlighted deficiencies included the lack of resources, arbitrary criteria for accessing the diplomatic career and the inadequate training of the latter’s members. Moreover, until 2011 ambassadors were appointed directly by the King, without any government involvement (Abouddahab, 2006: 72–73).⁴

Discontent also became visible within the foreign ministry itself. Evidence of this was the white paper anonymously circulated by a dozen senior diplomats in December 2002, following the confirmation that Benaissa would remain at the head of this ministry under the new government of Driss Jettou (2002–2007). The document, copies of which were sent to Jettou, the Directorate-General for Studies and Documentation (DGED, the external intelligence agency) and the King’s entourage, railed against Benaissa’s management and denounced with facts, figures and names the incompetence, disorganisation and abundant irregularities which plagued the daily operations of this department. Its authors ended up asking for a parliamentary investigation to be launched. The reasons for their rebellion could be found in their proximity to Abdellatif Filali, former prime minister (1994–1998) and Benaissa’s predecessor in this portfolio (1971–1972, 1985–1999)⁵ as well as the expectations raised by the speech on the reform of diplomacy given by Mohammed VI in August of the same year (Le Journal Hebdomadaire, 7–13 December 2002).

In fact, the official response to widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the Moroccan foreign ministry and service came in the form of two royal speeches in April 2000 and August 2002. The first of them, already mentioned above, proposed some of the objectives of the envisaged reorganisation of the foreign ministry, according to a model of ‘centralised planning and decentralised implementation’ of foreign policy (El Houdaïgui, 2010: 317–320): improving its coordination capacity, both within the central government and with the diplomatic missions; enabling the involvement of all kinds of parliamentary, associative, economic, cultural and media actors in tasks of parallel diplomacy; and enhancing the role of the ambassadors, imposing higher demands in terms of competence and capacity for initiative (speech by Mohammed VI, Rabat, 28 April 2000). Two years later, Mohammed VI announced major changes in both the central structures of the foreign ministry and its peripheral administration:

We have issued Our High Instructions to ensure the upgrading [mise à niveau], modernisation and reorganisation of our diplomatic apparatus. The procedure envisaged for implementing this reform must affect the structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, its mission of driving, coordination and follow up, as well as the actions and working methods of our diplomatic and consular representations.

The stated aim was to achieve a diplomatic service that was ‘more active and enterprising, rational and persuasive’, ‘forceful and offensive without being aggressive’, by ‘renewing its tools and means of action’ (speech by Mohammed VI, Tangier, 20 August 2002). The new economic imperatives were the most frequently repeated justification for the changes announced. At the same time, some observers drew attention to the temporal proximity between this speech and the Perejil crisis with Spain in July 2002, which had provoked harsh domestic and foreign criticism of the management of Moroccan foreign policy.

The reforms launched in November 2002 within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused on four key areas: modernisation of budget management and accounting; introduction of new technologies (computers, internet) and bringing the administration closer to citizens (establishment of regional delegations aimed at migrants); enhancement of the economic diplomacy (appointment of a new cohort of economic advisors with demonstrated training and experience to 40 embassies and consulates) (Belalami, 2006: 22, 54–55, 116); and, above all, a change in the approach to the management of human resources.⁶ The latter objective encompassed measures such as the reform of the status of diplomatic and consular personnel, the introduction of more defined and objective criteria for appointments and promotions, the systematisation of public examinations and the codification of rules for destinations abroad. Overall, it was intended to enhance the value of professional qualifications and encourage competitiveness and performance within the diplomatic and administrative staff of the ministry. For this purpose, the recruitment policy was planned until 2010, internal promotion mechanisms were reactivated and the system of remuneration (allowances, compensations, etc.) was improved (Maroc Hebdo International, 3–9 December 2004). For critics, however, all this was nothing more than a ‘réformette’ which avoided addressing the root problems (Le Journal Hebdomadaire, 7–13 December 2002).

Evidence of attempts to implement some of these measures included the publication of a ‘Guide of the Moroccan diplomat’ in 2009 (MAEC, 2009) and a ‘Charter of values of the Moroccan diplomat’ in 2011, the latter highlighting the importance of ‘patriotism’, ‘dignity’, ‘openness’, ‘communication’ and ‘professionalism’ (MAEC, 2011). Later on, after the constitutional reform of July 2011, a new decree concerning the powers and the organisation of the foreign ministry was adopted, the main novelty of which was the addition of a new Directorate-General for Economic Promotion, Cultural Action and Public Diplomacy to the two existing directorate-generals dedicated to bilateral and multilateral relations (decree 2–11–428, 6 September 2011; MAEC, 7 July 2011; Hespress, 11 July 2011).⁷

Training a new technocratic foreign policy elite

In terms of human resources, one of the pending issues on which the King had placed greater emphasis in his speech given in August 2002 was the improvement of mechanisms for selecting and training the diplomatic staff.⁸ The three most ambitious initiatives in this area were the launch of the Master of Arts in International Studies and Diplomacy (MAISD) at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane (AUI) in 2000, the creation of the Moroccan Royal Academy of Diplo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction and analytical framework
• 1 Objectives, actors and decision-making under Mohammed VI
• 2 The tribulations of a ‘territorial champion’: the international management of a changing Western Sahara conflict
• 3 The Sisyphean game of Maghrebi integration and normalisation with Algeria
• 4 A ‘model student’ in search of a differentiated relationship with the EU
• 5 Moments of truth and paybacks: from the Advanced Status to the Arab Spring
• 6 The unbalanced postcolonial triangle with France and Spain
• 7 An uneasy loyalty: remaining a ‘good ally’ of the United States in times of Middle East turmoil
• Conclusions
• References
• Index