The Radical Right in Late Imperial Russia

Dreams of a True Fatherland?

George Gilbert

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781138476707
• eBook ISBN: 9781317373025
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

The revolutionary movements in late tsarist Russia inspired a reaction by groups on the right. Although these groups were ostensibly defending the status quo, they were in fact, as this book argues, very radical in many ways. This book discusses these radical rightist groups, showing how they developed considerable popular appeal across the whole Russian Empire, securing support from a wide cross-section of society. The book considers the nature and organisation of the groups, their ideologies and polices on particular issues and how they changed over time. The book concludes by examining how and why the groups lost momentum and support in the years immediately before the First World War, and briefly explores how far present day rightist groups in Russia are connected to this earlier movement.

1 Precedents and origins

Many rightists were passionately interested in the past and looked to Russia’s conservative heritage for answers to contemporary problems. A central element of right-wing movements across Europe during the fin-de-siècle period was myths of tradition, and how to manipulate these for the end of increased public support. This chapter will consider the nineteenth-century influences on the right and the first stages of the movement’s development in the early twentieth century. Processes of modernization and change in Russia meant that this was a crucial stage in the development of autonomous conservatism. Rightists adopted several principles of nineteenth-century Russian conservative ideology, including: an idea of separation from the West; the sanctity of the tsar’s divinely ordained power; a belief in the estate (soslovie) system as a basis for social hierarchy; support for the peasant commune as the unit around which to arrange economic development; and criticisms of liberalism, parliamentarianism, and socialism.¹ Yet from the outset there were different exponents of this unstable ideology. The challenges of modernity in the Russian Empire threatened the above precepts, and a series of crises at the outset of the twentieth century created a pessimistic mood among conservatives, providing the background for a surge in right-wing group formation. The right’s obsession with moral ruin was closely connected to earlier changes in Russian society, culture and politics. Rightists in the twentieth century placed great emphasis on what they saw as Russian traditions, and their adoption of older conservative ideas is central to understanding their activity, as well as to see what exactly the perceived negative changes in society were that rightists reacted against.²

Nineteenth-century influences

Conservatism in Russia developed in reaction to events at home and abroad. Elements of what was to become a developed ‘conservative’ ideology had existed in Russia long before the nineteenth century, but it was during this period that it acquired political and cultural significance, with principal exponents in elite society expounding a conservative vision. It was in reaction to the materialism and rationalism of the enlightenment period that modern European conservatism first took shape; in particular, it was in response to the French Revolution that Russian conservatism became more organized. Russian conservatism emerged as a romantic, nationalist movement, stimulated principally by the growth of state power, cultural change in the Russian Empire, and fear of foreign revolution. One of the leading figures in the literary and cultural world of nineteenth-century conservatism was Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1826). His seminal political work, the Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia, first appeared in Russia in 1810 and was presented to Alexander I in 1811.³ In writing that ‘an old nation has no need of new laws’ Karamzin pre-empted later rightist criticisms of the Russian state and bureaucracy copying western modes of development.⁴ Temperamentally Karamzin was quite unlike any right-wingers that appeared later, but they had shared a view that a revolutionary crisis was threatening civilization: both saw that the roots of this crisis lay in Europe. His criticisms of the main ideals of the French Revolution – liberalism and equality – were much the same as later rightists, who shared his anti-revolutionary consciousness.

Though there was a more general and imprecise fear of revolution, there were particular factors within Russia that vexed educated conservatives operating within the auspices of the state. One particular source of consternation was the rise of a Russian intelligentsia, pro-Western and anti-state, among educated society. The seminal event of the first half of the nineteenth century in this regard was the Decembrist Revolt of 1825. The implications of this for Russian conservatism were great indeed: it led to a desire to explicitly formulate an ideology on the part of the state that recognized rulers, state and subjects in a formal doctrine. Therefore, conservatives were beginning to respond to thinkers such as Petr Chaadaev who criticized Russia’s social, intellectual and institutional heritage. One figure with a direct influence on later right-wingers was the Minister of Education under Nicholas I, Sergei Uvarov (1786–1855), who in 1831 promulgated the doctrine of ‘official nationality’, or the Uvarov triad. This became the guiding doctrine of the Russian state and conservative elite during the nineteenth century. It presented as ideals the centrality of Russian religion; the necessity of strong centralized autocratic government to maintain the power of the state; and the idea of Russian nationhood, exemplified by the strength of the people: in short, Orthodoxy, autocracy and Russian nationality.⁵ Temperamentally and ideologically, Uvarov was a moderate and divorced from the romanticism and mysticism that began to permeate the highest echelons of the imperial regime under Nicholas I. A great irony of not only the right’s adoption of the concept of nationality (narodnost’) in a later era but also the regime’s use of it under Alexander III was how different their interpretations were from the original conception. In the 1830s, narodnost’ was an attempt to provide an ideological formula uniting a diverse set of peoples in an empire where autocracy was paramount; it did not yet have the more reactionary, negative connotations of later years. It did, however, mean that nationalism was established as a central feature of the power of the Russian Empire, and, especially, its ideological legitimacy. Uvarov’s principles were retained, and largely re-interpreted by rightists as the rather cruder ‘faith, tsar and fatherland’.⁶

One of the most important features of the twentieth-century right was its spontaneity and independence from the ethos of tsarism. A crucial stage in the development of autonomous conservative groups was the appearance of the Slavophiles in the 1830s and 1840s.⁷ In spite of their differences from later rightists, they paved the way for the development of conservative groups outside of the regime. Later right-wing groups would adopt the language, symbolism and ideals of the Slavophiles, and, like rightists, the Slavophiles were deeply influenced by an ideal of the Russian past. Thinkers such as Ivan Kireevskii (1806–56) and Aleksei Khomiakov (1804–60) were inspired by the ideals of Karamzin and Uvarov, particularly, a belief in the inapplicability of western systems of rule to Russia. Russian religion was particularly important to the Slavophiles; these thinkers emphasized Russian Orthodoxy as the principle around which to organize the nation’s socio-economic development. This entailed increasing criticism of the West, which they argued had become corrupt and decadent. Though western Europe and Russia had Christianity in common, thinkers such as Kireevskii perceived a growing distinction between their own version and Western Christianity, which they described as superficial and nihilistic; additionally, it had pejorative associations with Roman Catholicism. This can be clearly seen in Ivan Kireevskii’s Reply to A. S. Khomyakov [sic] (1839), where he described the superiority of Russian Orthodoxy over Roman Catholicism. ‘What a rich culture we might assume among our lower orders … this culture might not be superficially brilliant, but it is profound … it is inner and spiritual’.⁸ The Russian people (narod) were given an elevated role in Kireevskii’s writings, pre-empting the populists of the 1860s. We can see an idealistic, romantic view of the Russian land, people and nation developing among these Slavophile groups in the first half of the nineteenth century. The idea that the ‘inner’ life, as Kireevskii wrote, should be celebrated over modern, Western political conceptions such as civil rights, the rule of law and an enhanced administrative structure (developments in the external life) had a clear echo among rightists in a later era who decried ‘modern’ politics, the bureaucracy, and a litany of reforms that they saw as unacceptable compromises on the part of the state. They also greatly feared the cultural impact of the ‘Westernizers’, a diverse group of people that included thinkers such as Aleksandr Herzen, Nikolai Chernyshevskii and Nikolai Dobroliubov.

The Westernizers and the Slavophiles were two aspects of the Russian intelligentsia, united by their obsession with the West. Both groups desired change in Russia, albeit different sorts and at different rates.⁹ Prominent Slavophiles such as the historian Mikhail Pogodin (1800–75) and the poet Fedor Tiutchev (1803–73) were deeply attached to the romantic ideals of Karamzin. Nicholas I, despite his own conservatism, accurately perceived the difference between these thinkers on the right and the autocracy. The most important parallel between such thinkers and later rightists – who, incidentally, rarely quoted the first wave of Slavophile thinkers – was increasing criticism of the practices of the Russian state. Pogodin wrote directly to the tsar to criticize the institution of serfdom, and, in a telling phrase, demanded the liberation of the Russian people to allow them to enact their spiritual mission of spreading the Orthodox Christian message around the world. Nicholas I’s regime was deeply alarmed by internal criticism and ‘denied these groups the positive role that they sought in society’. In the Nicholavean era, views separate to those of the government were not readily tolerated. The Decembrist Rebellion had demonstrated the danger of autonomous activity, and criticism of the status quo emanating from conservative thinkers was as dangerous as that from the left.¹⁰

Though the Slavophiles accepted the autocratic principle, these autonomous groups increasingly protested against the existing conditions and structures of Russian society. Thinkers such as Kireevskii and Tiutchev were social critics who viewed Russian serfdom with great dismay. However, they were different from the later rightists in that they saw the possibility of preserving the autocracy while instituting widespread social reform. The publicist Konstantin Aksakov (1817–60) wrote to Alexander II in 1855 that autocracy would lead to the strengthening of the Russian people. ‘For the Russian, absolute monarchical government is not an enemy, not something to be opposed, but a friend and a defender of freedom – of that true, spiritual freedom’.¹¹ Aksakov’s focus on the ‘Russian people’ in his writings shows the populist potential in his thought. Like many right-wingers after 1900, he championed the idea of an assembly of the land (zemskii sobor), which could provide a bond between the Russian people, their ‘native soil’ and the regime. This concept derived from a centuries-old idea of uniting the Russian people with the tsar; the zemskii sobor was a congress that included the nobility, clergy and representatives of merchants and townspeople (the third estate), therefore representing all elements of the feudal system. The first assembly was convened by Ivan IV (popularly known as the terrible) in 1549, and thereafter was primarily used to confirm legislation that Ivan had already passed. In focusing on the people, the zemskii sobor and a return to the land, Aksakov had much in common with the left-wing populists (narodniki), despite his conservative inclinations. In spite of his support for untrammeled autocracy, he also attributed a clear role for the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Preface and acknowledgements
• Note on transliteration, dates and translation
• Abbreviations
• List of major individuals and groups
• Map of the Pale of Settlement in the Russian Empire
• Introduction
• 1 Precedents and origins
• 2 In reaction to revolution
• 3 Across the empire
• 4 Popular mobilization
• 5 Russia renewed
• 6 Towards catastrophe
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index