European Identity Revisited

New approaches and recent empirical evidence

Viktoria Kaina, Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, Sebastian Kuhn

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780815372936
• eBook ISBN: 9781317502395
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

It has been argued that the emergence of a European collective identity would help overcome growing disparity caused by the increasing diversity of today's European Union, with 28 member states and more than 500 million people.

Research on European integration is facing the pressing question of what holds 'Europe' together in times of crisis, growing distributional conflict and instability in its neighbourhood. This book departs from the ideas of group cohesion in the EU, and reflects on the newest dynamics and practices of European identity. Whilst applying innovative qualitative, quantitative and experimental research methods and an interdisciplinary approach, this volume looks at a variety of issues such as European citizenship, mobility of European citizens, space-based identities, dual identities, student identity and value-sharing. In doing so, this volume presents new perspectives on this complex and dynamic subject and points to potential solutions both in the academic discourse and the political practice of the EU.

This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of European integration, European studies, international relations, citizenship studies, political sociology as well as more broadly in the social sciences.

Part I
Theorizing European identity

Recent conceptual perspectives

1 The citizenship–identity nexus in the EU revisited

Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski

Introduction

Although some conceptual research exists on the link between citizenship and collective identity in the European Union (for instance, Kostakopoulou 2001; Guild 2004; Delanty/Rumford 2007; Bellamy et al. 2006; Føllesdal 2014), the link between the two phenomena is still underresearched. This is quite surprising, as both citizenship and identity belong to key concepts in social sciences and have been developed in central research agendas in European studies. For that reason, the aim of this chapter is to offer some ideas about how to systematize the relationship between citizenship and collective identity and how it can be applied in the study of European integration. The chapter ‘recycles’ some ideas from the 2006 book European Identity: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Insights. Even though the basic argument about the citizenship–identity nexus remains the same, I explore it further at the conceptual level and point to potential challenges to European citizenship and identity in the EU after 2009 (see also Karolewski 2010).

My point of departure is that both citizenship and collective identity have frequently been discussed in highly normative terms, which often prohibits their wider exploration, in particular regarding novel political systems such as the EU. In such debates, citizenship often assumes the high standard of a lost ideal, where citizens are higher ‘beings’ in ethical, ontological and legal terms. In the same vein, some scholars bemoan the derivative, thin or underdeveloped shape of European citizenship, which differs from the political and social standards of a full-fledged national citizenship (for instance, Delanty 2007). On the other hand, we encounter praises for European citizenship based mainly on transnational mobility rights or as a part of nested citizenship (cf. Bauböck 1994; Aradau et al. 2010). A similar ambivalent approach is visible with regard to European identity. On the one hand, there are expectations about a strong and resilient nation-like identity of the EU, without which the EU would never be capable of being truly democratic (Smith 1992; Scharpf 1999). On the other hand, more pragmatic approaches point to the possibility and sufficiency of less demanding communicative processes that would require some form of transnational communication (Risse/Kleine 2010; Risse 2010, 2014a, 2014b).

I argue in this chapter that we might escape these varying normative expectations about citizenship and identity in Europe by connecting both categories in a more systematic manner. As a first step the chapter will disaggregate citizenship into three generic models. Next, I will turn to the concept of collective identity, in particular its semantic core and two semantic dimensions. Then, I will discuss three models of citizenship, including their corresponding identities. As a final step, some examples of the EU’s citizenship–identity nexus will be explored and specific challenges for today’s EU discussed.

Citizenship and its generic models

The three models of citizenship (republican, liberal and caesarean) are generic models in the sense of Weberian ideal types, as their function is to systematize our thinking about social phenomena. All three generic models of citizenship correspond to three different aspects of citizenship: civic obligations (republican citizenship), rights and privileges (liberal citizenship) and compliance (caesarean citizenship). The republican model of citizenship is based on the Aristotelian ideal of the citizen, for whom politics is a means of leading a good life. This model is strongly communitarian and obligation based. In contrast, the liberal tradition of citizenship draws strongly on the liberal understanding of politics, where citizens are individuals whose primary concern is the realizing of their individual interests and passions, rather than achieving any human ideal of good. Thus, liberal citizenship is rights accentuated. The third model is caesarean citizenship, the roots of which can be found in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, where being a citizen means to think of politics in terms of threat and survival. This model is compliance oriented, as it highlights the idea of a decisive ruler who guarantees the security of the citizens.

Republican citizenship

The republican approach to citizenship focuses on the duties of the citizens in a democratic community. On the one hand, it follows the idea that political participation is the way of realization of human good, since only political participation allows for an active liberty – that is, freedom to make laws that one can live by (Colish 1971; Sandel 1999; Shaw 2003). On the other hand, there is a clear moral prescription for the citizen to politically participate in the affairs of the community. The citizen is primarily a ‘holder of duties’ vis-à-vis the polity, as the holding of political office is regarded as a necessary burden resulting from the republican aversion to a permanent political class (Dagger 1977; Segall 2005). Hence, the republican citizenship is not only active and participatory, but it also rests on communitarian virtues. This model of citizenship does not clearly differentiate between the society and the democratic polity. The political community, which Aristotle called koinonia politike, is viewed by proponents of the republican model as the only appropriate way of life for an individual, since individuals are citizens by nature and only in the political community can they find their human and moral fulfilment. In this sense, the polity possesses an ontological and ethical priority with respect to the individual. In the modern version of the republican model, the welfare state replaces the ancient society based on slavery, in which the citizen possessed the time and the resources to actively participate for the sake of public interest. In a sense, the welfare state is a modern equivalent of the republican citizenship model, since the citizen has to be materially and socially independent in order to make political decisions dedicated to the common good. As republican citizenship relies heavily on the communitarian virtue of the citizen, citizenship might become a burdensome and dangerous duty requiring even the sacrifice of life (Aron 1974).

Liberal citizenship

The liberal model of citizenship is rights based, in contrast to the obligations oriented republican citizenship (cf. Patrick 2000; Scorza 2004). This results from a paradigm in which individuals are guided in their actions by private interests and passions, with politics being merely one area besides economy, religion, culture, science, etc. In this model, public space does not represent any moral supremacy, since political power comes into being by the voluntary decision of rational individuals. The government function is not to fulfil a supreme human good, nor are citizens’ actions subordinated to the shared public interest. The elected government’s main role is to deter citizens’ transgressions of other citizens’ rights. The gravest of these are offences against individual freedom and property (Locke 1988 [1690]; Larmore 1990). Any number of individuals can exercise political power collectively by electing a government, as individuals entrust political power to deputies of the people or trustees who can be discarded, should they fail their electors. Against this background, citizens enjoy by and large passive liberty, which is expressed by the rule of law, rather than democratic participation. What is more, citizens might not be necessarily interested in participation but rather in an undisturbed accumulation of wealth. A liberal citizen could even choose to live under a despotic regime but under the rule of law – one which allows him the freedom to advance his affairs in private and guarantees the security of his property – rather than to live in a democracy accompanied by insecurity and disorder (Ignatieff 1995). The government is to guarantee security of contracts, to reduce transactions costs and to offer information to the participants in the market who suffer from dilemmas of collective action (North 1993; Kato 1996). In the liberal citizenship version, citizens are private holders of rights (including rights to welfare) and have at the same time minimal responsibilities (first and foremost taxpaying) vis-à-vis the government. Certainly, liberal citizenship includes some civic virtues such as individualism, pluralism and toleration. However, these virtues differ visibly from republican civic virtues.

Caesarean citizenship

Whereas republican citizenship aims for the common good, and liberal citizenship highlights the individual’s rights and interests, the caesarean model of citizenship is regarded by its protagonists as a remedy against the decline of political order and chaos. In the writings of Thomas Hobbes, the peacekeeping state is the result of consent among individuals who decide to permanently surrender political authority over themselves to Leviathan, the omnipotent ruler (Hobbes 1996 [1651]). Individuals are unfit to live peacefully by themselves, as they cannot trust each other (Hobbes 1991 [1642]: 100). A strong ruler is thus regarded as the only solution to political chaos which would otherwise tear society apart and claim the lives of its citizens (Hobbes 1990 [1682]). Consequently, the ruler, like the Roman emperor Caesar, is free to make laws according to his will, even if capricious and despotic, for he guarantees the survival and security of his citizens. As a consequence, the caesarean model of citizenship is not about the rights and obligations of citizens but about the effectiveness of political decisions and the compliance of the citizens who submit to an authority in the face of potential danger.

Carl Schmitt (1996 [1932]) had developed this perspective in its modern version further and argued that the essence of politics is the ability of citizens to think in terms of ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ (Rasch 2000). Whereas shifting majorities in democratic polities are sufficient for liberal citizens to cooperate with each other by entrusting the governors with political tasks, Schmitt regards it as mere legality as opposed to real legitimacy (Schmitt 2004 [1932]). Consequently, caesarean citizenship stresses the compliance component of citizenship, the subjecthood of the citizens and their fear-induced homogenization under the tutelage of the leader. In the post-9/11 version, caesarean citizenship stresses security politics as the major concern of the state. Security politics become the basis for the collective identity construction, as the state increasingly uses technologies of surveillance and shifts the focus from a rights-oriented citizenship to a neurotic citizenship (Isin 2004; Lyon 1992). Neurotic citizens define politics in terms of their permanent insecurity; their preference for liberty and freedom becomes surpassed by the fears of survival in view of possible terrorist attacks and uncontrolled migration.

The concept of collective identity

The concept of collective identity can be explored with regard to its semantic core and two semantic dimensions as well as its internal dynamics. The semantic core of collective identity pertains to the notion of ‘citizenship identity’ as an explicitly political notion (Kymlicka/Norman 1994). It implies that despite many social roles, political preferences, self-government rights and specific territorial attachments, there is an overarching citizenship identity relating to the shared political community. Such citizenship identity would be capable of integrating societies characterized by ‘deep diversity’, a notion Charles Taylor (1993) uses to describe the existence of cultural, national and ethnic structures of a society, entailing different collective goals.

In this sense, political collective identity is referred to as a sense of political commonness among individuals that fosters a general commitment to the public interest. The sense of commonness means that individuals regard themselves as equal citizens belonging to the same political community, whereas the basis for this feeling of belonging is secondary. As the semantic core has an explicitly political meaning, the collective identity is not solely based on perception of difference and delimitation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, but also entails behavioural implications for citizens as members of political community (Guibernau 2013).

Dimensions of collective identity

The orientation dimension of collective identity can be analyzed both horizontally and vertically. First, there is a horizontal orientation of the we-feeling among individuals that denotes the sense of commonness irrespective of the sources of this feeling. This sense of belonging to a political community (regardless of its territoriality) can assume, for instance, a form of an emotional attachment or an ethical commitment. The horizontal orientation of identity, i.e. the sense of belonging, ties individuals as members of the same group, thus relating to the internal relations within a community. Certainly, any form of belonging implies also a boundary making, as it always excludes people not belonging to the group at hand. Nevertheless, some forms of collective identity do rest on the concept of exclusion, from which they draw their bonding power. But in the case of citizenship identity, the intra-community relations among individuals/citizens are of greater significance, as these relations are based on the idea of a political equality among the community members. The horizontal orientation is a necessary condition for collective identity, but it is not a sufficient one.

Second, a full-fledged political collective identity should be additionally explored with regard to a vertical orientation, which pertains more strongly to the citizens’ actions vis-à-vis the shared community. Within this vertical orientation, collective identity can be defined by its effects upon individual behaviour. If the sense of commonness does not result in a general commitment to the public interest, it falls short of becoming a full-fledged collective identity in the political sense. Hence, the vertical orientation of political collective identity describes citizens’ behaviour in terms of moral resources such as loyalty or solidarity directed at the political community. Loyalty towards the community generates refraining of citizens’ actions, whereas solidarity engenders committing actions. Depending on whether loyalty or solidarity dominates the vertical orientation, collective identity becomes stronger or weaker. We could even list moral resources as indicators of the ‘thickness’ of collective identity in a hierarchical order of loyalty, solidarity and sacrifice, where the latter represents the highest form of vertical commitment.¹ The term ‘vertical orientation’ suggests that citizens refer to an abstract idea of community, which transcends their perceptions of experienced similarity and their face-to face communication with other community members. The abstract idea of community appears at a higher level than the individual one, as the public good or the public interest becomes integrated into the citizens’ behavioural preferences (Anderson 1991).

Dynamics of collective identity

Apart from the politically defined semantic core of collective identity and the orientation of collective identity, we can use the notion of ‘identity dynamics’ to explore political collective identity even further. The dynamic nature of collective identity stems from the relationship between the we-component and the I-component of individual identity. According to Norbert Elias, individuals maintain a we/I balance, where we-feelings relate to the collective identity of individuals and the I-component describes the personal, idiosyncratic aspect of individual identity (Elias 1991: chapter III). The we/I balance might lean towards the I-component while containing a minimal amount of the we-feeling (weak collective identity). If there is a continuous long-term shifting process toward...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Figures
• Tables
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Introduction
• Theorizing European identity Recent conceptual perspectives
• 1 The citizenship–identity nexus in the EU revisited
• 2 Theorizing European identity Contributions to constructivist international relations debates on collective identity
• 3 European identity after Ockham's razor: European identification
• Measuring European identity New methodological outlooks
• 4 European Union symbols under threat Identity considerations
• 5 Experimental exposure to the EU energy label Trust and implicit identification with the EU
• 6 A Europeanisation of identities? Quantitative analysis of space-based collective identities in Europe
• Explaining European identity Fresh empirical evidence
• 7 Crisis, resilience and EU citizenship Collective identifications of EU migrants in Norway and Denmark
• 8 Dual identity and its mechanisms National and European identity in the Italo-Slovene border area
• 9 Does immigration contribute to the formation of a European identity? A multilevel analysis in western Europe
• 10 European identity and diffuse support for the European Union in a time of crisis What can we learn from university students?
• 11 Commonality and EU identification The perception of value sharing as a foundation of European identity
• 12 Building ‘us' and constructing ‘them' Mass European identity building and the problem of inside–outside definitions
• 13 ‘In search of the unknown' An essay on the need for non-knowledge in European identity research
• Index