Pharaoh

Alexei Mukhin

• Publisher: Arts & Science Achievements Foundation
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781732768703
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Biografie in ambito politico

President Vladimir Putin has become a legendary person in Russia once and for all.After the Crimean events in 2014, his authority among the society is indisputable.Attempts to exert pressure on him from outside only caused his popularity to grow.This is due to the peculiarity of the Russian nationality – Russians close the ranksin the face of external danger. However, there is the other side of the coin: theleader-worshipping gave rise to hypertrophied responsibility, and now any unpopularmeasure taken by the Government poses risk for his reputation.

Basically, in the institutional sense, President Putin has become a kind of Egyptian pharaoh,with whom the population of the country associates the achievements and failures of the government.

The delusion that Putin alone controls all processes exists in both Western countries and Russia.This is not true: there is a well-organized group of his associates, who actually exercise control.This dissonance is fatal for Putin, as there is a request today that he stay at the helm after 2024,and it is very strong. Putin himself has repeatedly said that he would like to live a normal life «for himself»,which can be humanly understood. A very sensitive period, which is already called the «transfer of power»in the country, is expected in the future, and many pressure groups are getting ready for it.

Chapter 1
RUSSIA AND THE USA – THE UNDERLYING REASONS FOR ENGAGEMENT AT THE CURRENT STAGE

Russia and the United States are too similar to peacefully coexist: the former has its imperial past, the latter – its imperial present. The messianic perception of reality, the higher calling, the attempts to change the course of history – both their own and that of other countries – based on idiosyncratic ideas about justice and values, the cultivation of great politicians – all these factors prevent Russia and the United States from remaining neutral with respect to each other for even a short frame of time[9].

After the so-called “Munich speech” delivered by the Russian president in February 2007[10], it was George W. Bush, not Vladimir Putin, who launched a new round of confrontation between the two great nations. The posture of Bush, followed by Barack Obama, formed the starting point for constructing a new system of relations with Putin personally, which in itself led to the global confrontation between the two powers.

Many in Russia believe that Putin successfully used the developing situation – specifically both American presidents’ mistakes – to lead the country out of the “deadly embrace” of the United States, in which it had been held since the time of Boris Yeltsin and the G8, and thereby restored Russia’s status sovereignty.

Mistakes that change the world

One of the foremost recent trends is a global external information attack on President Putin in particular, and on Russia in general. The opponents of the current Russian regime, however, have been unpleasantly surprised to discover that, rather than destroying his political position, these attacks have only mobilized the Russian population around the President. A similar process had already taken place in the 1930’s and 1940’s, when Stalin’s opponents hoped that the population of the Soviet Union would “surrender” him to Hitler after the so-called “Great Terror”[11], with which western historians, prone to exaggeration, are fond of regaling the impressionable public. At the current stage, like in the 20th century, it appears that efforts to simulate conditions to provoke an internal crisis in Russia from the outside have played a cruel joke on the simulators – as in the past, their efforts have had the exact opposite effect.

The external factor for the new wave of mobilization became the enemy image that emerged gradually, as Washington’s rhetoric towards Russia and Putin personally took on an increasingly rigid tone. When sensing danger, people tend to defend themselves, uniting around a strong leader.

The examples of Muammar al-Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Bashar al-Assad, most often cited in connection with the “demonization” of Putin, are, of course, an element of the global game played by Russia and those countries opposing the G7. An impression has been created that Gaddafi and Hussein were killed merely to set a precedent of the illegal removal of a legitimate leader of a sovereign state, that is, with the goal of exerting psychological pressure on the other participants in the processes, including Putin personally.

It must be noted that the Kremlin, since the Stalin times, has always regarded these types of challenges very seriously. The Russian society, impressed by the act of demonstrative liquidation of Gaddafi, immediately reacted by consolidating around the supreme authority, having once again confirmed that the Russian public, as well its elite, contrary to expectations, have not yet turned into individual consumers willing to change their rulers under pressure from the outside just to maintain their socio-economic status. This is evidenced by the unprecedently high level of support for Putin by the population in 2014-2017 and the continued loyalty of the elites under the conditions of the maximum pressure on him by Washington and Brussels.

Since 2012, Vladimir Putin openly exploits the image of an enlightened conservative – Russian nationalist, which, as practice shows, has proved to be very advantageous against the backdrop of politicians of different countries, who waste themselves on social and political posturing. Herein indeed lies the second secret of Putin’s popularity in his own country and abroad.

As part of the project to discredit Putin, foreign media have gradually popularized the “imperialist” theme of the restoration of the USSR. In reality, Putin believes that it makes sense to create an entirely different kind of state, one that builds partner relationships with its neighbors[12]. Today he maintains this point of view and expresses it publicly. Unfortunately, it is that very notion that provokes pervasive irritation among globalists who instead insist on erasing the Russian national identity and relegating it to a category of folklore.

In general, the withdrawal of Russia from the G8 format clearly benefitted the country and, in fact, rather than alter its “anti-Western power status”, has allowed Russia to build new systems of interstate relations and to strengthen the old ones. We should note that, in addition to the assets freeze, the notorious sanctions banned U.S. legal entities and individuals from conducting any transactions with the listed officials.

The Russian political, financial, and other institutions emerged out of the psychological shock rather quickly and stressed in every way that their state was stable or even improving. For instance, the net profit of Bank Rossiya, which was one of the first subjected to the sanctions, increased in January-April 2014 by 30% compared to the same period of the previous year, amounting to 1.9 billion rubles[13]. In addition, it is known today that Bank Rossiya has started operating in Crimea and Sevastopol.

In essence, by responding to the emerging challenges as the head of state, Putin stimulated the provision of preferences within Russia to the institutions subjected to sanctions from the outside, thereby strengthening the prerequisites for the growth of the national economy and the development of the national infrastructure. As a result, many representatives of Russian business began to invest, forcibly or willingly, exclusively inside Russia.

At the same time, German companies, including the chemical concern BASF, the Siemens group, Volkswagen, Adidas and DeutscheBank, unequivocally expressed their opposition to broader economic sanctions against their Russian partners. It is notable that at the beginning of the “sanctions war” there were about 6,200 German companies in Russia – more than all the other European countries combined. After a while they were forced to gradually give up their positions and de facto adopted the sanctions as a reality. Germany’s trade with Russia could be called relatively modest – 76 billion euros in 2013 (at its peak). Yet, while Russia consumed only 3% of German exports, Germany met 30% of its oil and gas needs from Russia[14]. Accordingly, the loss of access to Russian energy products hurt the German economy first and foremost.

American companies, which had much less at stake in Russia, similarly expressed their concerns regarding the sanctions to Barack Obama’s Administration, the initiator of the anti-Russian activity, but in private – officially they were compelled to comply with the orders of the U.S. ministries.

Incidentally, during the period from 2014 to 2017, the interest of Western investment funds in, for example, Russian real estate grew significantly. Large funds have contemplated investments in commercial facilities in Moscow (including the Deka Group, which includes Deka Bank and a number of subsidiaries, investing in securities and real estate, as well as the American fund Tishman122Speyer). The fact is that the average yield in Europe, acceptable to investors, is 5-6% per annum, whereas similar investments in Russia yield 9-11% per annum[15]. Considering all the negative political and macroeconomic trends, real estate in Russia generates a much higher yield than that in Europe. Of course, Western funds try not to attract attention to such investments, for obvious reasons.

Tools of influence: Brussels-Beijing

Despite demonstratively high “morale”, Russia, in particular Putin’s team, has rather cautiously weighed the prospects of a long-term competitive confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin understands that the main instruments of influence of the U.S. on global processes are its military machine and the so-called “dollar system”.

The systemic principle of currency competition provokes the dominant forces – primarily the U.S. – to exploit many tools of influence, including those that are unjust from the point of view of international law: from financial emissions to direct political and even military pressure.

Critics of the existing U.S. economy-oriented system often say that in recent years, it has essentially functioned as a classical “financial pyramid”, forcing users to permanently expand their foreign exchange reserves in U.S. dollars.

The basis of the international trade economy after the Second World War has been in energy resources, especially oil. Most likely, oil will continue to provide a vital basis for development in the 21st century[16]. Nevertheless, it is becoming evident that the future global world order needs a much broader energy agenda. The latter involves the intensive development of the gas industry and alternative energy sources.

That is why the United States, trying to restore its global domination, is searching for cheap sources of energy around the world. Those persons or countries that hinder – or may potentially hinder – the U.S. from achieving this goal become “victims of political circumstances” with amazing and threatening regularity.

Under complex global conditions, the United States plans to become a leader in the formation of the gas market infrastructure, just as it had previously formed the oil market together with Saudi Arabia. However, this initiative comes into direct conflict with the aspirations of the Russian leadership, which advocates de-monopolization of decision-making in this sphere.

In order to establish new rules and infrastructure in the global energy market, Washington plans to involve the mechanisms of the G20, emerging here as a rival to Russia and China. That is why Russia has become the main target in this poignant struggle, which today is called the “sanctions war”, but is, in fact, an instrument of unfair and illegal competition, as both Russia and the United States are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), both subject to its rules.

The success of the new American geopolitical strategy will be assured if the U.S. manages to establish its new rules in the gas market and to provide new transport routes for gas supply, ousting rivals in the face of Russia and Iran (as well as several other countries) as the main source of the world’s energy reserves.

At this interim stage, the U.S. perceives a key objective in easing the dependence of Europe on Russian gas. The so-called “Ukrainian crisis” was inspired, inter alia, to solve the artificial “problem of energy dependence” of the European Union on Russia. The informational support and theoretical justification of this thesis was initially developed as early as the middle 2000’s, in the wake of the artificially organized “gas wars” between Russia and Ukraine[17].

Additionally, Washington is already working to fuel the growth of gas consumption in China. This is achieved through the involvement of Beijing in the international initiatives in the field of ecology and climate conservation – today the Chinese economy depends on coal, which has an excessively high level of environmental hazard. Incidentally, China was also the country where the “color revolution” model was employed (Hong Kong, September 2014).

It should be noted that the United States has prepared very well for large-scale investments in the gas transportation infrastructure in Asia, where Russia has its interests, too. Moreover, given the difficult geopolitical situation, the U.S. plans to develop this infrastructure in such a way as to avert the possibility that China could seize control over it – Beijing should only act as a gas consumer with ever-growing needs.

For this purpose, United States plans to locate a number of key elements of the gas infrastructure on the territory of India and in the countries of South and South-East Asia. At the same time, it is predicted that Washington will intercept any prospects of Beijing obtaining gas from Central Asia.

Putin’s implacability in geopolitical issues, as well as his active endeavors in building the Russo-Chinese bilateral relations, have played their own role in NATO having gone through a kind of political reincarnation, albeit to date absent clear prospects for financial development and plagued by global controversies among the alliance member countries.

NATO’s prospect for success - by maintaining attractiveness for member countries - had historically rested upon the bloc’s apparent ability to fight without losses, due to its huge technological superiority, and primarily, its prevalence for various high-precision weaponry.

However, operations in Iraq and Libya, which had no anti-aircraft defense systems, along with the rejection of a global missile strike against Syria (which, on the contrary, had both the air defense and other types of weapons) led some experts to believe that NATO “is capable of fighting” only with those countries, which cannot deliver manpower losses to the alliance[18]. Poland and the Baltic states must have assessed adequately the fact that NATO did not render direct military assistance to either Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine in 2014.

As a result, the American part of the alliance’s leadership was compelled to resort to certain distortions of re...

Table of contents

• FROM PUBLISHER
• Chapter 1. RUSSIA AND THE USA – THE UNDERLYING REASONS FOR ENGAGEMENT AT THE CURRENT STAGE
• Chapter 2. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PORTRAIT OF VLADIMIR PUTIN: HOW HIS PAST IS RELATED TO HIS PRESENT
• Chapter 3. PUTIN’S ASSOCIATIONS AND INTERACTIONS
• Chapter 4. PUTIN IS FROM THE 1990’S: THE SECRET OF POPULARITY
• Chapter 5. THE INFORMATION WAR AGAINST PUTIN
• Chapter 6. SYRIA: PUTIN’s IDEAL WAR
• Chapter 7. “INTERFERENCE” IN THE U.S. ELECTION – “RUSSIAN HACKERS” AND GLOOMY PROSPECTS FOR INTERSTA
• CONCLUSION. PUTIN OF TOMORROW – WHO IS HE?
• Putin reloaded. What is next?
• APPENDIX
• ABOUT AUTHOR
• REFERENCE AND BIBLIOGRAPHY