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Part 1
Problems
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TWO
The social question and
the urgency of care
Iain Wilkinson
In the 19th century âthe social questionâ held currency as a term denoting the misery of the poor, downtrodden and underprivileged members of society. It also represented a call to debate with the bounds our social responsibilities and our dispensation to care for the social needs of others. Those asking âthe social questionâ were morally and politically concerned to alleviate the âsocial sufferingâ experienced by people forced to live on low wages and in poor housing conditions. It was further understood to signal a commitment to combat the social causes of peopleâs poor health conditions. âThe social questionâ was taken to express a shared understanding that there was something deeply wrong with the material conditions under which many people were made to exist; and further, that there was an urgent need to set social arrangements in place to make their lives worth living.
We are living through times where, as Tony Judt puts it, the social question has been âreopenedâ (Judt, 2010, pp 174-8). Britain is now one of the most economically and socially divided countries in the world. The net income of the top 10% of households is around 10 times higher than that of the poorest 10% (about ÂŁ80,000-ÂŁ90,000). Around one-fifth of the population live in poverty (living on 60% or below of the UK median disposable household income of ÂŁ25,400), and for children, this rises to 28.6% (Cribb et al, 2013; ONS, 2016). For the vast majority of people (about 95% of the population) disposable incomes are either in decline or stagnating, while among the richest top 1% of households they are rising at an ever-accelerating rate. The best-off (top 1%) currently have a minimum annual household income of around ÂŁ190,000, and among these the average personal annual income is estimated to be ÂŁ253,923 (Dorling, 2015; see also The World Wealth and Income Database at www.wid.world).
Such pronounced levels of income inequality are accompanied by significant health inequalities. According to the most recent studies the gap in life expectancy between the most materially advantaged and most deprived parts of Britain is around 8 years (79.1 to 71.2 years) for men and 6 years (83 to 77.7 years) for women, while differences in health life expectancy (the number of years in which an individual can expect to live in relatively good health) are even more pronounced, at 16.7 years for males and 16.8 years for females (ONS, 2015). Data from the London Health Observatory reveal that differences in life expectancy could be as high as 25 years when comparing the mortality rates of some of the richest wards in Kensington and Chelsea to the poorest wards of Southwark. It is anticipated, moreover, that on current trends, these differences are all set to increase.
Some of the most alarming evidence for the declining living standards of the poorest sections of society is identified in the numbers of people experiencing conditions of food poverty. Over the last financial year The Trussell Trust handed out 1,109,309 food supplies to people who have been left hungry due to poverty (The Trussell Trust, 2016). Moreover, a recent survey by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN) on the prevalence of food insecurity experienced by adults throughout the world reveals that while as many as 4.7 million British people are now regularly going a day without eating a meal, an additional 3.7 are also classified as âfood insecureâ, where they are experiencing difficulties gaining access to food because of their monetary poverty (FAO, 2016).
These are among the conditions that lead some commentators to note the resemblances between contemporary British society and that of the 1920s. Income and wealth inequalities and allied social variations in life expectancy are now akin to those of the early decades of the 20th century before the creation of the modern welfare state. On many accounts, moreover, the British welfare state is in a pronounced state of crisis. It is understood to be abandoning its mid-20th century commitments to provide social security for those in need, and no longer holds that the goal of social justice should be pursued through the reduction of socioeconomic inequalities. The ever more precarious human consequences of some 30 years of unbridled neoliberalism and free market fundamentalism are all too plain to see. There is no shortage of lamentations for the loss of an earlier more mutually concerned and more caring society. There is plenty of protest being issued against the state to which we have been reduced, and the âdog-eat-dogâ values we are made to live by. There is an all too obvious need for movements of progressive social change.
In this chapter my interest lies in the contribution that sociology might make to this. We are living amidst social problems that C. Wright Mills famously portrayed as foodstuff for the âsociological imaginationâ. Following other sympathetic critics of his work, I hold that, while we should still take seriously his contention that this is a âmost needed quality of mindâ for enabling us to âgrasp history and biography and the relations between the two within societyâ, there are many deeply vexed and unresolved methodological and political problems that remain when it comes to understanding how peopleâs âpersonal troublesâ might be transformed into âpublic issuesâ (Mills, 1959, p 6). We should read Mills as operating with a vision for sociology that invites us to debate with its practices, aims and value. The arguments developed in The sociological imagination require much more refinement, and in some important aspects, they also need a considerable amount of updating and revision.
I offer a contribution to inquiries into the ways in which the sociological imagination might be fitted to equip us with the moral wisdom and practical initiative to involve us in creating more humane forms of society. In this, the public value of sociological research and thinking is held up for debate. I argue for an alliance between sociological inquiry and practices of caregiving. I review Jane Addamsâ model of âdoing sociologyâ as a pioneering example of what might be possible here. At the same time, I attend to some of the ongoing institutional obstacles and cultural constraints that are set to deny and oppose this. I further contend that, insofar as sociology remains divorced or disconnected from caregiving, on the model advocated by Mills, it risks leaving people frustrated with no more than a potentially demoralising critique of the structural conditions that bring harm to human life.
I begin by reviewing some of the critical debates surrounding the legacy of C. Wright Mills that have taken shape in the context of the current vogue for âpublic sociologyâ. I then move on to make the case for a return to the types of social inquiry and sociological learning advocated by Jane Addams. I conclude by outlining some of the critical and practical challenges that are hereby set for a sociology that approaches the task of being âprosocialâ as involving the practice of care for others.
Public sociology and the frustrated legacy of Mills
One of the more significant movements in early 21st-sociology is that which seeks to advance a âpublic sociologyâ. Following Michael Burawoyâs 2004 Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association, there has been widespread and heated debate over the cultural character of contemporary sociology (Burawoy, 2005a). Here, many share in the understanding that as far as any involvement in shaping the contours of public debate over how we should live and what we should do is concerned, sociology is mired in a crisis of relevance. It is argued that professional sociology is largely divorced from any concern with communicating its findings to the public at large, and as a result, takes place as a purely academic exercise. At one level, âpublic sociologyâ is understood to involve a commitment to render sociological knowledge communicable in a jargon-free and accessible manner so that publics might better appreciate its insights and grasp its value. At another level, it is heralded as a movement to re-politicise sociology and regenerate âits moral fibreâ (Burawoy, 2005a, p 5). It is taken to involve sociologists in normative commitments where they make open declarations of values to promote social justice and equality, and here it has come to be associated with initiatives to involve sociology in the promotion of âdemocratic socialismâ (Burawoy, 2005b).
C. Wright Mills is widely recognised as the âchampionâ of such an approach, and it is often the case that commentators identify âpublic sociologyâ as a movement to consolidate his legacy and advance his ambition (Burawoy, 2005a, p 9). On Millsâ account sociology should provide us with a critical âquality of mindâ that enables us to link the frustrations borne in our personal lives to the wider social forces and institutional arrangements that govern our fate. He further holds that where this is achieved, it promises to transform problems experienced at an individual level into collective social issues. He contends that where sociologists are mainly preoccupied by projects of âgrand theoryâ, methodological dispute or with marketing their expertise as data gatherers and analysts to government or industry, they are set to deny the moral relevance of sociology and to compromise its human value. He declares a commitment to sociology as an emancipatory form of critical thinking and as a humanitarian practice. Mills abhors the careerism, bureaucratisation and marketisation of academic sociology. By contrast he seeks to advance the sociological imagination and its promise as vital elements in the pursuit of progressive social and personal change.
It is in these respects that many declare themselves to be inspired by his writing to follow his example. It is argued, however, that Mills fails to provide his readers with an adequate demonstration of how to set sociology on this mission. It is frequently observed that what Mills achieves by way of his critical attitude and style is not matched by an adequate demonstration of how âthe sociological imaginationâ should be used as a guide to action. For example, Millsâ account of the âcraftâ of sociology is perceived to be dismissive of the attempt to understand how people actually experience the day-to-day trials and tribulations of their lives. He appears to be more concerned with packaging sociology so that it can occupy a space in the critical magazine culture of âNew York intellectualsâ than with making it relevant to society at large (Burawoy, 2008, p 372). It is argued that Millsâ sociological standpoint is that of the maverick outsider, who, as an independent intellectual, occupies a vantage point from which he is better able to grasp what is really going on the in the world. He is more concerned with writing to provoke debate among the intelligentsia than with documenting âordinaryâ peopleâs experiences so that we can hear their voices and empathise with their personal contexts. In this regard, moreover, it is suggested that Mills sometimes appears to be proceeding as though direct association with people caught up in the immediate problems of milieu would diminish his critical effectiveness and contaminate his thoughts. While arguing for a critically engaged sociology, he takes the position of a critical outsider operating above the many practical difficulties, moral confusions and inherent messiness of everyday life.
It is further argued that his sociological imagination lacks political imagination (Burawoy, 2008, p 369). He is perceived to be more concerned with advancing a value position than with developing a praxis; that is, Mills does not offer much by way of practical guidance on how to turn social problems into public issues. His main advice to sociologists concerns their manner of writing. Mills contends that in order to be relevant they must be concerned to craft a style of writing that is broadly accessible and that works to communicate sociological insights beyond the confines of the academy. He holds that sociologists should commit themselves to developing a new âpolitics of cultureâ where texts operate to provoke moral disquiet among their readers so as to stoke their political concern. He is essentially concerned with advancing a critical sociology that operates as a catalyst for change. He does not offer much, however, by way of instruction or advice on how to practically change society so as to make possible a fuller experience of humanity and benevolent community.
When it comes to the vital question of âhow, then, should we live and what should we do?â, Millsâ sociological imagination lacks moral relevance. While advocating a standpoint of moral concern he does not offer much by way of advice on how to proceed in terms of moral action. While encouraging sociologists to declare value positions that stand critically opposed to the dehumanising conditions under which many people are made to live, Mills does not appear to be concerned with equipping sociology to move beyond a position of protest. On his model, sociology is chiefly concerned with proclaiming value positions that are set against the ways we live now; he does not appear to be worried by the need to practically demonstrate how we should live differently so as to realise more humane forms of society.
Above all else, Mills is preoccupied with the production of critique. However, what he achieves by way of a critical rebellion against âmainstreamâ academic sociology is not matched by an adequate demonstration of an alternative form of emancipatory practice. In this regard it might be said that his appeal lies more in his status as a radical outsider than as a model social reformer. He has more to say about what he is against than what he is for. Insofar as he is taken as an example for âpublic sociologyâ, there is a risk that this is cast more as a means to sound alarms over what is wrong with the world than as a commitment to develop sociology for the purpose of realising alternative and better social arrangements. In an earlier account of âpublic sociologyâ, and one from which Mills claimed to draw inspiration, this was explicitly recognised as a risk that should be faced head on. Here, moreover, it was held that, properly conceived, and so as to better understand our human social condition, sociology should be troubled by an active engagement with how human social life is made possible through committed practices of care.
Jane Addams and the first public sociology
In order to grasp the intellectual currents and tensions running through Millsâ thought, it is important to understand that he is seeking to reinvigorate a classical tradition of American pragmatism, and especially the components of this that are committed to advance models of social democracy along the lines advocated by John Dewey. It can be argued that Mills understood the critical spirit of American pragmatism to have been curtailed by its failure to develop a sufficiently elaborated theoretical analysis of presiding structures of inequality within modern capitalism, and that this was the reason that he devoted himself to producing works of critique. If this is the case, however, one might argue that he travelled too far in this direction, for Mills appears to have lost sight of some of the founding premises on which pragmatist traditions of social inquiry are based, and by which they aim to promote more effective forms of social democracy. On this view, those concerned with âpublic sociologyâ might worry not so much about the character of their critical thinking, but more about their conceptions of how to set sociology in practice. Moreover, this is the ground on which Jane Addams sought to locate her approach to âdoing sociologyâ.
Recent attempts to rehabilitate the status of Jane Addams as a major figure in classical sociology have underlined the ways in which her activities in the Hull-House settlement on the Near West Side of Chicago between 1889 and 1935 were expressly concerned with an attempt to realise the practice of social democracy along the lines advocated by John Dewey. Indeed, it is noted that Dewey credited Jane Addams with demonstrating how his philosophy should be carried out as a practicable âway of lifeâ (Seigfried, 1999, p 219). From her writing in works such as Democracy and social ethics (2002 [1902]), moreover, Addamsâ sociology is recognised as being founded on a deep reflection on Deweyâs ideal of a democratic community that seeks to solve its problems and promote its interests through a quest for mutual sympathy and shared experiential understanding.
Addams holds that, when set to work in universities as an academic discipline, sociology not only evades its object of study, but also distances itself from the means to acquire adequate knowledge of society. On her model, sociology should operate within social settlements with the aim of putting theory to the test in action. She argues:
The most pressing problem of modern life is that of a reconstruction and reorganization of the knowledge we possessâŚ. The settlement stands for application as opposed to research, for emotion as opposed to abstraction, for un...
