Managerial Prerogative and the Question of Control (Routledge Revivals)

John Storey

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781138822627
• eBook ISBN: 9781317586166
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Social Science Research & Methodology
• Index: Social Sciences

In both Marxist and non-Marxist scholarship there has been a remarkable neglect of the managerial control of labour. John Storey's analysis of the modern labour process shows that managerial control is in fact more precarious than has been so far recorded. This book, first published in 1983, reassesses the Braverman theory of the inexorable degradation of work, and demonstrates the need to go beyond not only Braverman but also most of the ensuing attempts to complement or repair his underlying thesis. The book will be of interest to students of the social sciences.

Chapter 1

CONTROL AND THE LABOUR PROCESS: TOWARDS A DIALECTICAL APPROACH

In both marxist and non-marxist scholarship there has been until recently, a remarkable neglect of the managerial control of labour. Even today this neglect stands only partially remedied. Yet in the current conjuncture with a deep recession emboldening top management in a resolve to reverse the post-war challenge from below, this issue demands even more urgent analysis. Interpretation of contemporary developments in work control has been significantly hampered by this relative theoretical hiatus. (1)

Indices of a more hawkish managerial approach are legion. Ironically, the man who was persuaded by Tony Benn to act as chairman of the KME workers’ co-operative (though he remained for less than a month) has articulated the new mood more forcibly than most. At a seminar he convened for managing directors and personnel managers, Len Collinson, a director of numerous companies and a chairman of Collinson Grant Consultants, declared:

‘Managers for 20 years have had a buffeting and bashing from governments and unions and have been put into a “can’t win” situation. Many have been fire-fighting and many have given in. We have an opportunity now that will last for two or three years. Then, the unions will get themselves together again; and the government like all governments will run out of steam. So grab it now. We have had a pounding and we are all fed up with it. I think it would be fair to say that it’s almost vengeance.’ (2)

This ‘new reality’ has been developing for a decade or so, a decade which has been witness to a dramatic volte-face in industrial relations. The much-vaunted ‘challenge from below’ has been sublimated by talk of a ‘managerial resurgence’. Attention has shifted from stoppages at Ford, BL and other favourite hot spots to a new litany of redundancies, closure plans, new working practices and disciplinary codes. In a more than literal sense Red Robbo (Mr Derek Robinson, the erstwhile Longbridge convener), has been supplanted by Michael Edwardes. In the 1960s and 1970s the figure at centre-stage was the shop steward; by 1980 Geoffrey Armstrong, Director of Industrial Relations at BL, could present a lecture on the new industrial relations in that company without once even mentioning shop stewards. (3) BL have secured shopfloor ballot approval for the Edwardes ‘streamlining plan’; they have introduced new working practices; and they implemented a scheme that dilutes the power of the shop stewards. (4) Following a protest or ‘riot’ in November 1980 at Longbridge, 8 shop stewards were sacked. The strike of 1,500 workers which followed was greeted with warnings that strikers would be replaced by the unemployed from the Birmingham dole queues. These are just a few instances of a tougher managerial stand at BL.

Meanwhile at Ford UK a similar pattern was being enacted. In response to a series of unofficial stoppages, most notably at Hale-wood, Ford introduced a new disciplinary code. The code provided for the suspension without pay of workers who failed to operate normally or failed to carry out an instruction from a supervisor. Moreover, the code further stipulated that management would then request other employees to re-man the job which had stopped. If the request was refused, lay-off without pay would then commence for all employees who could not be ‘gainfully employed’. ‘This approach does not in any way alter the company’s normal policy of applying progressive disciplinary action to individuals. It is a new sanction directed at employees who act unconstitutionally by stopping work’ (Ford Supervisors’ Bulletin, Halewood, 14 November 1980) . Of interest here too is that the new measures were introduced, as far as the unions were concerned, as ‘disciplinary fait accompli’ – i.e. without negotiation or discussion at the FNJNC. Indeed, the company’s tough attitude is revealed by the fact that they were determined to announce their intentions directly to all employees, prior to the union’s proposed meeting to discuss the matter. (5) Of course, following a strike, the new disciplinary code was in the end withdrawn – but not before it had been used. In its very first utilisation of the code Ford suspended 22 men at Halewood who refused to obey a foreman’s instruction to cease switching jobs. Workers swop jobs to break the monotony, but they are only allowed to do so officially if production targets are being met.

Similar developments were meanwhile occurring in other major companies. Peugeot was able to close the Linwood plant with a minimum of resistance. At British Steel, Ian MacGregor secured agreement for his ‘rescue plan’ which inter alia involves new working practices, elimination of over-manning, reduced absenteeism and overtime and intensified working arrangements. Again the tactic of a personal letter to the workforce was deployed, and again the threat of liquidation was used. MacGregor’s approach is reminiscent of the Edwardes style – perhaps it is no coincidence that MacGregor was originally on the BL board before he went to BSC. Stiffened by the wider economic situation, management has an enhanced opportunity to push through its control plans without resistance. As Ian MacGregor wrote in the final paragraph of his personal letter to all employees: ‘To do the things we have to do without major interruption or controversy, we must have the total co-operation of the workforce. If the plan is put at risk, we may end up having to take much more drastic action’ (12 December 1980).

Managers in general may not be seizing the opportunity to the extent that consultants like Len Collinson would like to see, but the general reversal cannot be doubted. Strikes have fallen and unemployment has risen; pay settlements were roughly half in 1981 what they were in 1980; de-manning proceeded apace; the full impact on the trade unions has yet to be gauged. 1980–81 saw a fall in union membership largely because of the sheer loss of jobs. The TGWU lost 8 per cent of its membership – i.e. nearly 200,000. The role of the shop steward has been questioned more intensely not only by BL management but by other employers and more publicly by Richard Dixon of the CBI.

These examples are but particular instances which signal further developments in the continuing drama of management and the question of control. The persistent struggle for control and the rival proclamations of asserted ‘rights’ can be claimed as a, or perhaps the, central issue in the whole study area designated as ‘industrial relations’. As Beynon observed – ‘This conflict over rights is a fundamental one and permeates union-management relations’ (1973: 114). The title of this present book intimates that control is precarious, that a secure situation of being ‘in control’ cannot be assumed. On the contrary, its perpetual incompleteness and its subjection to question is to a varying extent the norm. Employment situations imply some control by management; yet there is frequently also some struggle so that the control of management’s arbitrary exercise of its ‘prerogative’ is also in question.

But despite these considerations and despite the events briefly depicted, there has been as noted at the outset a general neglect of management control strategies by industrial relations analysts.

Speculation on the reasons for this neglect cannot be allowed to detain us at this point but a few observations are necessary. Within marxism, for example, it has been suggested that, with its gaze firmly fixed on the replacement of capitalism, naturally little energy has been devoted to exploring possible developments emerging in control and resistance at the point of production. Moreover, Coombs (1978) has added that the long neglect of the labour process within marxism stemmed not from ‘mere isolated error’ but reflects a fundamental distortion in orthodox marxist analysis perpetrated by the Second International and by Soviet Marxism. This distortion he identifies as derivative from an uncritical acceptance of economic and technological determinism (Coombs 1978:81). In so far as this is true, and it is only at best a rough generalisation, the intricacies of strategy and counter-strategy would tend to be overlooked. Sociology for its part seemed to allow the problem to fall between two stools – macro-structures of class relations on the one hand and the micro-relations of informal groups on the other. That amorphous body known sometimes as ‘organisation theory’ tended to obscure the study of management control as a problem area because it took it so much for granted. The problematic lay elsewhere – usually in further ‘rationalising’ formal organisational structures. The academic study of industrial relations similarly had its eyes diverted towards the ‘problems’ of trade unions, industrial conflict and collective bargaining.

Of late, however, the general theme of the control of work has been exciting ever-mounting attention. This is particularly so within the marxist-informed literature but also, though to a lesser degree, outside it. Michael Poole (1975) approached the subject of workers’ participation from a ‘power perspective’. Bowen (1976) used the concept of control to interpret relationships in the steel industry. Boreham and Dow (eds) (1980b) have marshalled a collection of papers which straddle economics and sociology while addressing the general theme of the impact of capitalist crisis on work experience. Purcell and Smith (1979) edited a number of essays on industrial relations which sought to address the theme of ‘the control of work’ – theoretical development did not, however, seem to be a prime target. Purcell and Earl (1977) in an earlier paper advanced clear conceptual guidelines on the theme of control and controlling. Interesting and provocative studies which illuminated the theme of work control also emerged in Beynon (1973) and Nichols and Beynon (1977). Additional recent works of note include Nichols (ed.) (1980), Edwards (1979) and Hill (1981). And forthcoming appraisals of cognate interest include Wood (ed.) and Gospel (ed.). This last collection examines managerial strategies in industrial relations from a historical perspective. (6)

Parallel to the shift in focus in industrial relations towards the question of control, and to the explanation of that control in terms which situate it within the wider logic of capitalism, has occurred a similar shift in the organisational studies literature. This field, long-noted for its managerialist assumptions and problematics, has spawned a critical wing (Clegg and Dunkerley 1977; Clegg and Dunkerley 1980; Salaman, 1979; Benson, 1977). Some of this radical organisational literature has been concerned explicitly with questions of control and power (Kouzmin, 1980; Goldman and Van Houten, 1980; Singleman, 1980). Even a cursory review of the papers gathered together under the first two editions of the ‘International Yearbook of Organization Studies’ (1980a and 1980b) will reveal the shift intimated here.

This critical strand of organisational literature has reformulated the central problems. The erstwhile strenuous efforts to generate an all-embracing organisation theory which would be applicable to all ‘types’ of organisation (hence the superfluity of typologies and taxonomies), are now declared redundant – and indeed misguided. Thus Salaman observes:

a genuine sociology of organisations is not assisted by the efforts of some organisational analysts to develop hypotheses about organisations in general, lumping together such diverse examples as voluntary organisations, charities, political parties and employing organisations. Such an ambition results in generalisations of an extremely high level of abstraction. It also obstructs the analysis of those structural elements which are dramatically revealed in employing organisations but not necessarily in all forms of organisation (1979:33).

This interest in the organisational processes of capitalist employment relations inevitably brings these ‘new’ organisational theorists in alignment with a similar development in industrial sociology; in the kind of economics generated by the Conference of Socialist Economists in the UK, and the Union for Radical Political Economists in the United States, and into general alignment with the radical strand of industrial relations’ theorising.

Harry Braverman’s (1974) ‘Labor and Monopoly Capital’ has of course been the catalyst for much of the contemporary debate within the marxist and neo-marxist corpus. He eloquently traces the degradation of work which was wrought by scientific management techniques in the service of monopoly capital. Braverman is vitally significant for his contribution in re-igniting debate on the managerial control of the labour process – a phenomenon essentially unexplored since Marx’s elaboration in ‘Capital’. Of course he alone was not responsible for the intense interest recently aroused on the theme of hierarchy and the fragmentation of labour. Marglin (1971), Gorz (1972) and Katherine Stone (1973) had already produced significant theses in this area and Braverman utilised these. R.C. Edwards (1972) was also producing cognate work and has continued to do so (1975, 1976, 1979). In general terms the theme of control of the capitalist labour process has flourished. In the USA it has found particular expression in the ‘Review of Radical Political Economics’, ‘Telos’, and ‘Radical America’. In Britain, the theme has been given close attention in the journal ‘Capital and Class’ and in the CSE’s collection of readings under the title ‘The Labour Process and Class Strategies’ (1976).

Subsequent investigations have identified important shortcomings in Braverman’s account despite acknowledgment of its seminal contribution (Friedman, 1977; Palmer, 1975; Brighton Labour Process Group, 1977). In essence there are three central complaints which unfold in these and the many other related treatments and reviews of Braverman. (7) Foremost is his general neglect or at least minimisation of worker resistance. (8) Trade unions, for example, are dismissed in a couple of lines (1974:10). But it is not only his neglect of unions which his critics identify here. They complain at the portrayal of capital as essentially uncontested at any level. Friedman (1977) finds this particularly misleading; he argues that Braverman requires a theoretical revision. The interplay between control and resistance in varying situations generates a force which actually shapes the nature of the control system itself. The second criticism often made is that Braverman places too much emphasis on Taylorism as the sole or main thrust of capital’s control strategy. As Nichols observes, ‘there are other forms of control as well as de-skilling and capital has more shots in its locker than Braverman implies’ (1977:194). And Coombs suggests, the obsession with Taylorism ‘underestimates capital’s room for manoeuver’ (1978:84). The third type of complaint from Braverman’s critics fixes on his failure to locate adequately the alleged incipient tendency towards Taylorism in concrete historical contexts (Elger, 1979). Elger contrasts this with an account which suggests Taylorism developed in response to the crisis at the end of the last century.

It is important to recognise that these three problems are in fact interrelated. The neglect of worker resistance and the exclusive focus on Taylorism and de-skilling indicates not only empirical shortcomings (see for example the evidence produced by Palmer, 1975) but points up a key theoretical weakness. So far, despite a plethora of apparently disparate criticisms no one seems to have attempted to bring these together in order to allow a new stage for theoretical advance. Instead there have been partial attempts to ‘correct’ for shortcomings in Braverman. Par excellence in this regard was Friedman’s (1977) delineation of the two major strategies utilised by employers – direct control and responsible autonomy. These criticisms are themselves vulnerable to the kind of counter-claim made, for example, by Zimbalist (ed.) (1979) who mounts a vigorous defence of Braverman. He maintains that Braverman was well aware of worker resistance and of the modifications made to the Taylor system. It was not these ‘details’, however, which concerned him but rather the general ideological thrust and impact of Taylorism. While short-term tactical manoeuvres might exist the underlying scientific management philosophy still rules. ‘Responsible autonomy’ had already been taken into account by Braverman and treated accordingly as ‘only a short-run and often cosmetic variation’ (Zimbalist 1979:xxi). Hence Zimbalist views the case studies collected in his own book as reaffirming the Braverman thesis and as contributing to the task of putting flesh on the skeletal form. (9)

I will argue, however, that it is not merely a question of filling out the details of Braverman’s scheme that is required. Rather, fundamental theoretical amendments are needed. There remain basic problems in Braverman’s account. (10) Managerial strategies are quite varied – and frequently for valid reasons. The thesis of an incipient tendency towards deskilling remains suspect. Braverman concentrates much of his analysis on the plans, propaganda, sales talk and conceptualisations of the agents of rationalised working and thereby avoids addressing the problems of implementing such schemes. He, like Marglin, tends to reify de-skilling as an abstract imperative. In consequence analysis of managerial control strategies is insufficiently located within a wider theoretical scheme which would permit investigation of why control was required and under what circumstances it would be pressed home. The uneven-ness across sectors and within sectors is accordingly underemphasised and its significance underexplored. Equally, managerial strategies are not situated in the contexts of particular periods or against the backcloth of the theory of valorisation and accumulation. The real subordination of labour as explained by Marx faces contradictions – again these are left untouched by Braverman’s scheme.

The argument advanced in this book is that the most productive way to embrace the fruits of Braverman’s work while at the same time taking account of the key shortcomings indicated by his critics, is to adopt a dialectical approach. This it is argued offers the best chance at this time of understanding the dynamic nature of the control of production. It allows also consideration of the wider social and economic context within which control strategies are shaped. It should permit a better consideration of the resistance of labour and the reciprocal interrela...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• 1 Control and the Labour Process: Towards a Dialectical Approach
• 2 Rationality and the Real Subordination of Labour: Weber and Marx
• 3 Braverman and Beyond
• 4 Work Control in Context
• 5 Management
• 6 Managerial Prerogative
• 7 The Control of Work
• 8 Struggle and Resistance
• 9 Control and Democracy
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index