1 The Būyid social imaginary
Social and cultural contexts
“If we want a history of philosophy written in a genuinely historical spirit, we need to make it one of our principal tasks to situate the texts we study within such intellectual contexts so as to enable us to make sense of what their authors were doing in writing them,” contends Skinner.1 Thus this chapter provides a discussion of the relevant background of Būyid society in order to help the reader appreciate how al-Tawḥīdī’s ethical ideas, including his concept of ṣadāqa, can be related to their social and intellectual contexts. The Būyids’ rise to power in Baghdad brought a new structure of polity as they introduced their own governmental and religious practices, which shaped the nature of social life and which were carried over into the ways of interaction between themselves and persons of different social groups. Baghdad, especially, became a hub for men from all parts of the Islamic world and for many social groups that demonstrated a capacity for social agency with various degrees of effectiveness.2 As such, the social structure of the Būyids left an impression on all aspects of life, including intellectual life and the production of knowledge. New values and patterns of conduct appeared, as well as a greater sense of insecurity, confusion, and intellectual curiosity that led to a tendency to intensify certain trends that had emerged in pre-Būyid society, resulting in greater exclusionary boundaries for intellectual, religious, and ethnic groups. This historical background is useful in making sense of al-Tawḥīdī’s role in this society and what he was doing in putting his ethical ideas into action, as well as understanding how his ideas offered an alternative form of a lived experience. This historical background will also allow the reader to see al-Tawḥīdī’s ideas as elements in a wider intellectual discourse or system of beliefs and to contextualise his activities within the intellectual generation that was involved in the investigation of similar concepts.
Būyid political identity
It is generally accepted that the period of 334–440/945–1048 under Būyid rule was a turning point in Islamic culture.3 The arrival in 334/946 of Aḥmad b. Būya (regnal name Mu‘izz al-Dawla, d. 356/967) to Baghdad marked the establishment of a dynasty in Iraq and western Iran following a political vacuum and a period of decline in the authority of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate which had failed to recruit and maintain a reliable army during the first half of the fourth/tenth century.4 The Būyids changed this political reality by putting an end to the period of anarchy and civil strife surrounding the office of the chief emir (amīr al-umarā’). The early Būyids also limited the activities of both the caliph and the vizier, and reinforced the supremacy of the army and succeeded in subsuming the office of amīr al-umarā’ by giving it a new shape and turning it into an established institution with definite duties.5
The Būyids (also known as the Buwayhids) were originally Daylamites, who lived in the mountainous areas of the northern Iranian provinces of Gīlān and Daylam.6 They were, by all accounts, warlike people who had newly converted to Shī‘ī Islam, and it was thanks to the activities of the three mercenary soldier brothers ‘Alī, Aḥmad and Ḥasan b. Būya, the sons of a poor fisherman, that one of the most powerful ruling families in the period was produced.7
In Baghdad, Baṣra, and other major localities centred on Fārs and Rayy, the Būyid brothers exercised their authority. This symbolised a shift in social hierarchy by the transfer of power from one social group to another (Arabs to non-Arabs). It also represented a shift from one religious sect to another, and from the ethics of one group or denomination to another (Sunnīs to Shī‘īs) and it is beyond doubt that this shift would have influenced the relationship of the Būyids with the various institutions and the different groups in their society.
From the start, the Būyids and the ‘Abbāsid caliphs had a complicated relationship with each other. Given their humble social origins, their uncertain religious affiliations, and their position as outsiders in the Islamic world, the Būyids realised their limitations and the need to find their place in the old established order of the caliphate. Formerly the caliph, who either claimed legitimacy on the basis of a direct succession to the Prophet, or as the delegated agent of God on earth, enjoyed a monopoly on political authority and was also charged with safeguarding religious law. In this period, the Būyid military commanders, although Shī‘īs, had no credentials by which to claim succession to the Prophet as a source of legitimacy.8 Therefore, they acknowledged their need to endorse a new theory for governance, and they found it to their advantage to preserve the ‘Abbāsid caliphate in order to establish their own authority over the entire Muslim community.
For the Sunnī majority, the caliphate was a public religious symbol of legitimate governance and of the unity of Islam.9 The Būyids were careful not to offend this sentiment by preserving the caliphate as a source of legality for all rule and acts of governance. Thus although the role of the ‘Abbāsid caliph was reduced to merely a spiritual and religious head of Islam, he remained a stable centre of support for those aspiring to leadership from the Būyid family in their struggles for political power, even if the individual caliph was unable to exercise the rule himself.10
Thus, the relationship between the Būyids and the ‘Abbāsid caliphs was shaped by mutual interest.11 In exchange for official recognition by the ‘Abbāsid caliph, the Būyids presented themselves as governors under the ‘Abbāsid caliphs and identified for themselves the responsibility of protecting the Islamic community.12 They acted as though they accepted the legitimacy of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate although it continued to represent to them the supremacy of the Arabs. For example, many of the honorific titles (laqabs) held by the Būyid emirs sounded similar to regnal names and were legalised by the caliphs (sometimes under threat of force). These titles portrayed the Būyid kingship as the guardian of the ‘Abbāsid caliphate and of the Muslim community.13 As such, the Būyids were not only able to legalise their authority over the Sunnīs, but also to strengthen diplomatic relations with other dynasties by manipulating the moral authority which the Sunnī caliphs still enjoyed by right.14 Thus, Būyid rule was in theory authorised by the caliphate, but in reality it was legitimatised by an urgent need for public order.15
In the absence of divinely-sanctioned authority, the Būyids also aspired to have their own practices, create their court protocol, and construct their own political identity. There was a deliberate revival of Persian culture as manifested in their interest in neo-Persian literature to the extent that Persian poets, such as Firdawsī were welcomed at the court of Bahā’ al-Dawla (d. 403/1012).16 The Būyids, following their predecessors, also revived some of the traditions of Persian kingship.17 The reappearance of the old Sāsānid title of Great King, Shāhanshāh, was an example of their activities and a bears witness to a resurgence of the Persian consciousness that gave the Būyids a title of legitimacy independent of the caliphate.18 The Iranian orientation of the Būyids was also evident in the restoration of Iranian political ideology and they stayed loyal to their Daylamī tradition, adopting a tribal means of governance. Family relations generally were seen to be foreordained and not acquired, and were important as the direct social interpretation of genealogy (nasab). They formed internal networks that governed the relationships of the ruling Būyid elites, and determined their interactions with each other. The dynasty was divided into three principalities; one was in Fārs with its capital Shīrāz, ruled by the eldest brother ‘Alī, whose relationships towards his younger brothers were shaped by deep family ties and paternal feelings. The two other principalities were in the Iranian mountainous area with its capital Rayy and in Iraq with its capital Baghdad, which were ruled by the youngest brothers, Ḥasan and Aḥmad respectively. While both of them showed complete subservience to their elder brother ‘Alī, the kingship remained hereditary in their descendants within the territories of their principality.19
Being unable to justify their rules on the basis of being divinely appointed, the Būyids also had to invoke high moral principles as they rose to power in order to establish their autonomy.20 A good example is the famous philologist and historian of the fourth/tenth century, Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī (d. after 350/961), who had contacts with important scholars and was highly respected by dint of his vast learning. In his Chronology on World History, al-Iṣfahānī describes the series of riots and disturbances, which later caused the ‘Abbāsids to cede authority to the Būyids.21 He portrays the coming of Abū al-Ḥusayn b. Būya as a manifestation of God’s will to save the caliphate and the people of Baghdad from the state of anarchy and devastation which had forced its inhabitants to abandon it.22 The Būyids tried to impart an Islamic meaning to their authority on the basis of divine will, to show that their culture was no less Islamic than that of the ‘Abbāsids. This highlights the difficulty of separating the political and religious aspects of communal life in Būyid society.
With the death of Mu‘izz al-Dawla (d. 356/967), the founder of the dynasty, two main patterns of behaviour emerged among Būyid emirs: (a) greed, oppression and hedonism, shifting political alliances, and selfishness; and (b) an intense passion for power, titles, and glory. Apart from ‘Aḍud al-Dawla (d. 37...