Towards an Articulated Phenomenological Interpretation of Architecture

Phenomenal Phenomenology

M. Reza Shirazi

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781138229259
• eBook ISBN: 9781134679720
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Architecture
• Subtopic: Architecture General

This book sheds light on the contemporary status of phenomenological discourse in architecture and investigates its current scholastic as well as practical position. Starting with a concise introduction to the philosophical grounds of phenomenology from the points of view of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, it presents a critical reading of the works of some leading figures of architectural phenomenology in both theory and practice, such as Christian Norberg-Schultz, Kenneth Frampton, Juhani Pallasmaa, and Steven Holl.

Highlighting the main challenges of the current phenomenological discourse in architecture, this book formulates a more articulated method of 'phenomenological interpretation' – dubbed 'phenomenal phenomenology' ? as a new and innovative method of interpreting the built environment. Finally, using Tadao Ando's Langen Foundation Museum as a case study, it investigates the architect's contribution to phenomenological discourse, interprets and analyzes the Museum building using the new heuristic method, and thus provides a clear example of its applicability.

By introducing a clear, articulated, and practical method of interpretation, this book is of interest to academics and students analyzing and studying architecture and the built environment at various scales.

1 Introduction

The problem of phenomenology

Spiegelberg argues that there is neither such a thing as a system or school of phenomenology, nor is there a solid body of teachings that allow us to give an exact answer to the question ‘What is phenomenology?’ For him, it is illusory to assume that there exists a unified philosophy denoted by the term phenomenology: ‘Phenomenologists are much too individualistic in their habits to form an organized “school”’ (Spiegelberg 1982: xxvii). This extensive individuality is enough to convince him that ‘There are as many phenomenologies as there are phenomenologists’ and to arrive at the following conclusion: ‘It is certainly true that, on closer inspection, the varieties exceed the common features’ (ibid.). This diversity and ambiguity raises a number of critical questions: are phenomenologists really so different and diverse? If so, how do we understand them as ‘phenomenologist’? Is there anything in common? Don't they share some concerns and ideas in common? Are phenomenologists essentially diverse or they are just dissimilar? Can we find a secure common ground in phenomenology?

Spiegelberg argues that although it might be much more appropriate to refer to this loose status of phenomenology as a circle (Kreis) – one which has several sub-circles within the larger circle – due to the differences and dissimilarities between phenomenologists and phenomenologies, nevertheless, in philosophy it appears safer to refer to phenomenology in philosophy as a ‘movement’.¹ He justifies his proposition as follows:

(1) Phenomenology is a moving, in contrast to a stationary, philosophy with a dynamic momentum, whose development is determined by its intrinsic principles as well as by the ‘things,’ the structure of the territory which it encounters. (2) Like a stream it comprises several parallel currents, which are related but by no means homogeneous, and may move at different speeds. (3) They have a common point of departure, but need not have a different and predictable joint destination; it is compatible with the character of a movement that its components branch out in different directions.

(Ibid.: 1–2)

In this sense, phenomenology in philosophy has a basic departure point, but branches off in different directions – which are related, but not homogeneous – and may lead to different destinations.

Is this explanation valid in the case of architecture? Can we speak about a ‘phenomenological school’ in architecture? Are architectural phenomenol-ogists as various as philosophical phenomenologists? Can we call the phenomenological approach in architecture a ‘movement’, like the approach in modern architecture which is referred to as the ‘modern movement’? Are there any common themes and concerns in phenomenology in architecture?

The lack of a common and general definition of phenomenology has been extensively affirmed by most of the prominent phenomenologists (Merleau-Ponty 1962; Moran and Mooney 2002; Moran 2005; Seamon 2000; Spiegelberg 1982). However, irrespective of whether phenomenology is understood as ‘a return to things themselves’ (Husserl), as a ‘method’ or ‘a way of seeing’ (Heidegger), or as ‘the essence of perception’ (Merleau-Ponty), it has been employed and adopted by architectural phenomenologists in the fields of both theory and practice. Moran proposes that phenomenology is ‘a practice rather than a system’ (Moran 2000: 4), and probably it is because of this ‘practical’ character of phenomenology that it appears interesting for architects; they find a concrete potentiality in its conceptions and themes which can guide them through the process of design and architectural creation. Architectural phenomenologists, thus, have referred to one – or sometimes more – philosophical phenomenologists, have employed their phenomenological ideas and thoughts as the departure point, and finally developed and appropriated them to establish a new architectural understanding.

On one side, architectural theorists believe that a phenomenological understanding of the world has the capacity to be used as the foundation for a vivid interpretation of the status of both contemporary and historical architecture, and consider it as an authentic and reliable way of knowing the built environment. They believe that phenomenology is able to catch the essence of the things and phenomena, and bring us close to our existential being. They have not only theorized a way of interpreting the built environment, but also – whether consciously or unconsciously – established a set of criteria by which they evaluate validity, invalidity, and the challenges of a movement, style, or work of architecture. As a good example of this, we can point to the work of Norberg-Schulz, who proposes and develops an understanding of architecture based on Heidegger, and criticizes architectural movements and works by means of evaluating them according to his self-established measures.

In the field of theory, architects’ attitudes towards phenomenology should be understood in the light of their growing attention to philosophy. Questioning what the contribution of philosophy to architecture or architectural education is, Harries answers: ‘In one sense very little: no clear direction; perhaps a few pointers; mostly questions, putting into question presuppositions of our approach to architecture that are often taken for granted and thereby opening up new possibilities’ (Harries 1997: 12–13). In other words, the main task of philosophy concerning architecture is to question, to help us rethink architecture, to question its taken-for-granted assumptions and presuppositions, to give us opportunities to find new ways through the given situation. Philosophy teaches us how to think deeply and broadly, and phenomenology grants architects this potentiality. It provides architects with a powerful and reliable ground from which they can establish their unique way of perceiving the built environment and develop their individual way of thinking.

For Norberg-Schulz, phenomenology is ‘a method well suited to penetrate the world of everyday existence’ (Norberg-Schulz 2000: 15). In this sense, like Heidegger, he understands phenomenology as a method instead of a typical kind of philosophy, by which he can explain the world, and hence the world of architecture. Pallasmaa discovers phenomenology as ‘“pure looking at” phenomenon, or “viewing its essence”’ (Pallasmaa 1996b: 450). By means of a ‘naïve seeing’, as he states, we will be able to approach the ‘essence of things unburdened by convention or intellectualized explanation’ (Pallasmaa 2001a: 21). Harries feels uneasy concerning the classical understanding of phenomenology as a pure and firm ground and argues that with regard to dwelling and authentic thinking we should not be firm. Phenomenology does not mean to prepare a strict goal, an unshakable ground, but a ‘way’, a journey through history, through the past, present and future: ‘To deny all appeals to nature in the name of convention is to leap over human reality as it has evolved. To appeal to nature as a ground that assigns us our place is to sacrifice the future to the past, freedom to necessity’ (Harries 1991: 12). According to Eduard Führ, phenomenology in architecture enables us to understand architecture ‘as a part of our life-world’ (Führ 1998b) and brings us close to phenomena. David Seamon explains that the aim of phenomenology is to capture the underlying commonalities that mark the essential core of the phenomenon. He writes that:

The phenomenologist pays attention to specific instances of the phenomenon with the hope that these instances, in time, will point toward more general qualities and characteristics that accurately describe the essential nature of the phenomenon as it has presence and meaning in the concrete lives and experiences of human beings.

(Seamon 2000)

He believes in phenomenology as a ‘kindly seeing’, ‘seeing with new eyes’ (Seamon 1993) and a ‘revelatory seeing’ (Seamon 2000), which presents a ‘careful description’ of phenomena (Seamon 2007). Perez-Gomez argues that in an era in which architecture has lost its metaphysical dimension and is no longer a privileged form of reconciliation between man and his world, only phenomenology is able to overcome the fundamental dilemma that modern philosophy inherited from Descartes, by means of rediscovering the primacy of perception.

By revealing the limitations of mathematical reason, phenomenology has indicated that technological theory alone cannot come to terms with the fundamental problems of architecture. Contemporary architecture, disillusioned with rational utopias, now strives to go beyond positivistic prejudices to find a new metaphysical justification in the human world; its point of departure is once again the sphere of perception, the ultimate origin of existential meaning.

(Perez-Gomez 1983: 325)

On the other hand, phenomenology is a considerable resource for architects and professionals, or in other words, for ‘phenomenology in practice’. Looking at ‘things’ and studying architectural themes phenomenologically enables architects to think deeply about them, approach the essences of phenomena, and try to reveal them through architectural images and details. Thus, phenomenology presents them with a great and essential source of inspiration. As Steven Holl explains:

Phenomenology concerns the study of essences; architecture has the potential to put essences back into existence. By weaving form, space, and light, architecture can elevate the experience of daily life through the various phenomena that emerge from specific sites, programs, and architectures. On one level, an idea-force drives architecture; on another, structure, material space, color, light, and shadow intertwine in the fabrication of architecture.

(Holl 1996: 11)

These statements clearly illuminate the concrete potentiality of phenomeno-logical thinking in relation to dealing with things, establishing ideas, and giving them reality.

All these interpretations of phenomenology and its capacity show that architectural phenomenologists believe in the potentiality of phenomenology as a ‘way’, a ‘method’ or an ‘approach’ through which the problems of architecture will be discovered and revealed more adequately. It presents them with a deep understanding of architectural themes and problems, opens up new pathways to an authentic perception of the built environment, and helps them to crystallize their findings in their architectural works.

In this context, this book intends to shed light on the contemporary status of phenomenological discourse in architecture and to investigate its current academic position, as well as its practical position. Starting with a concise introduction to the philosophical grounds of phenomenology from the points of view of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, the text presents a critical reading of the works of a number of leading figures in architectural phenomenology from both theory and practice, such as Christian Norberg-Schultz, Kenneth Frampton, Juhani Pallasmaa and Steven Holl; it highlights the main challenges of current phenomenological discourse in architecture; and it formulates a more articulated method of ‘phenomenological interpretation’ – dubbed ‘phenomenal phenomenology’ – as a new and innovative method of interpreting the built environment. Finally, using Tadao Ando's Langen Foundation Museum as a case study, it investigates the architect's contribution to phenomenological discourse, interprets and analyses the Museum building using the new heuristic method, and thus provides a clear example of its applicability.

While there are numerous texts that explore the phenomenological debate, the way these theoretical debates can inform a practical approach to perceiving and interpreting the environment is widely overlooked. In other words, although these texts evince a strong theoretical discussion, they don't give tangible examples of how the theories can be applied empirically in analysing and interpreting the built environment. The dearth of concrete examples has been somewhat amended at the city scale in the classic work of Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture; however, little has been done at the scale of the architectural complex or individual building.

The structure of the book

This first chapter aims neither to prepare a comprehensive review or discussion of phenomenology in philosophy, nor a critical investigation of it, but rather to introduce an ‘architectural reading’ of phenomenological discourse in philosophy, focusing on that body of work which has most influenced and affected phenomenological discourse in architecture. The foremost concerns of the phenomenologists, along with their direct or indirect architectural implications, will be examined, starting with the works of Edmund Husserl, founder of phenomenology, and concentrating on Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, two major phenomenologists whose ideas have been studied extensively by architects and architectural theorists.

Chapter 2 deals with phenomenology in architecture. The figures discussed here have been selected both on the basis of their relationship to the phenom-enologists presented in Chapter 1, and to the case study architect, Tadao Ando. Norberg-Schulz is explicitly Heideggerian, and is one of the main figures to have produced a major body of research and discussion on the phenomenology of architecture. He employed phenomenology as his departure point in interpreting and understanding architecture, and always maintained his belief in this approach. Juhani Pallasmaa as an architect and theorist is more Merleau-Pontian and has written extensively on the phenomenology of architecture. Frampton, deeply influenced by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, is a leading figure in this regard and his ideas such as critical regionalism and tectonics have clear phenomenological implications. Holl is a Merleau-Pontian architect who aims to use phenomenological ideas and concepts in architectural works and projects. Furthermore, Norberg-Schulz and Frampton have written on Ando and their writings will be analysed and criticized in coming sections. The reflection in this chapter is also supported by the ideas and views of other scholars who have presented a deep phenomenological understanding of architecture, such as Karsten Harries and Eduard Führ. At the end of each section in the chapter, a critical review considers the strengths and shortcomings of the ideas discussed.

Chapter 3 presents the current status of architectural phenomenology and discusses its main challenges. It argues that phenomenology in architecture is neither a school nor a circle, nor does it introduce a movement, in the manner of the international style and modern movement. It finds that it would be safer to call the state of phenomenology in architecture a ‘discourse’, a developing and ongoing discourse that is based on investigations and studies that have common concerns and intentions, but aim at various directions and destinations.

The chapter summarizes the major challenges and problems of phenome-nological discourse in architecture as follows. First, phenomenology in architecture appears as a fragmentary and collaged phenomenology, in which fragmentary interpretations of different works are produced in order to present and illustrate a preconceived theme. One may refer to this method of interpretation as ‘latitudinal phenomenology’: presenting ‘one’ supposed phenomenological concern through different works, rather than supplying a comprehensive ‘longitudinal interpretation’ of ‘a’ work. The result is an inarticulate understanding which does not enable a comprehensive perception of the architectural work that can enable us to establish an articulate ‘image’ of it in our mind. Second, phenomenological interpretation in architecture is mostly an exterior phenomenology. It mainly considers architectural work from without and pays attention to aspects of its external appearance, such as façade and volume. In this way, a phenomenological reading remains a reading from a distance, from the gaze of an observer who stands outside the building and views it from selective positions. Moreover, here the phenome-nological interpretation of architecture appears constrained and static. It is largely from the perspective of an observer who chooses to stand at certain points and consider particular dimensions and aspects of the work. In this way, the essentially mobile nature of the body and the fundamentally mobile quality of perception are neglected. In other words, the body is understood as a ‘static body’, positioned in front of the work, not as a ‘moving body’, passing through the work.

Chapter 4 shows that although Ando never explicitly mentions phenomenology, his manner of contemplating architecture is analogous and parallel with the way that architecture is contemplated by architectural phenome-nologists or philosophers. Studying this contribution from the perspective of different topics and with reference to Ando's writings and interviews it will be concluded that although Ando never establishes a systematic approach to phenomenology in architecture, his attitude towards architecture and architectural matters – for example, on the one hand, his attention to place, body, genius loci and direct experience, and on the other hand, his resistance against standardization, universalization, superficial postmodernism and excessive technology – situate him within the ‘realm of phenomenological discourse’ in architecture.

The first section of Chapter 5 critiques Norberg-Schulz's interpretation of Ando's Vitra Conference Centre, arguing that his interpretation suffers from shortcomings that are rooted in the ‘partial...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Routledge Research in Architecture
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Architectural foundations of phenomenology
• 3 Challenges of architectural phenomenology
• 4 The status of architectural phenomenology
• 5 Phenomenology between the words
• 6 Phenomenology between the lines
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index