The New US Strategy towards Asia

Adapting to the American Pivot

William T Tow, Douglas Stuart, William T Tow, Douglas Stuart

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781138822634
• eBook ISBN: 9781317586104
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Barack Obama's "rebalancing" or "pivot" strategy, intended to demonstrate continued US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in a variety of military, economic, and diplomatic contexts, was launched with much fanfare in 2011. Implicit in the new strategy is both a focus on China – engagement with, and containment of – and a heavy reliance by the United States on its existing friends and allies in the region in order to implement its strategy. This book explores the impact of the new strategy on America's regional friends and allies. It shows how these governments are working with Washington to advance and protect their distinct national interests, while at the same time avoiding any direct confrontation with China. It also addresses the reasons why many of these regional actors harbour concerns about the ability of the US to sustain the pivot strategy in the long run. Overall, the book illustrates the deep complexities of the United States' exercise of power and influence in the region.

1   Setting the context

Douglas Stuart and William T. Tow

The Barack Obama Administration’s ‘pivot to Asia’ represents the fourth stage in a process of American strategic adjustment which has been ongoing since the late nineteenth century. The first three stages in this process were guided by the concept of the ‘Open Door’ (following the Spanish–American War), anti-communist containment (following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China), and a policy of ‘hegemony light’ which was based upon the Nixon Doctrine and the US opening to China (Gray 2009). The ongoing pivot campaign is best understood as an effort to preserve ‘hegemony light’ in the face of an unprecedented shift in global power from West to East.

One essential precondition for the success of the US pivot to Asia is the acceptance of, and the active support for, the pivot by America’s regional friends and allies. This volume is designed to help US policymakers and security experts to appreciate the specific strategies, priorities and concerns of these Asia-Pacific governments, as they relate to the pivot. The first section of this book introduces readers to the pivot strategy, and to the situation that Washington faces in the region. Douglas Stuart places the Obama Administration’s pivot in historical and geostrategic context. William Tow surveys the policy challenges that Washington faces as it engages in regional ‘order building’. Jeffrey McCausland analyses the pivot from the perspectives of deterrence, extended deterrence and reassurance.

The remaining chapters in this volume present the very diverse (and, in some cases, incompatible) points of view of experts from most of America’s Asia-Pacific (and Indo-Pacific) partners. Readers will identify certain recurrent themes in these chapters. The first such theme is a generally positive reaction to America’s effort to preserve and enhance its influence in the Asia-Pacific region. American representatives often discover that they are ‘pushing on open doors’ when they meet with their Asian counterparts to discuss the pivot (see Keatley 2013). Contributors to this volume discuss various forms of security cooperation with Washington, including bilateral, multilateral and ‘minilateral’ arrangements. Many of the authors also express a willingness on the part of their governments to go further in support of the pivot, if the United States can reassure them that the pivot is politically, economically and strategically sustainable. They also seek reassurance from Washington that the pivot will be managed in such a way that it will not force them to choose between China (which is a major source of prosperity for many of these nations) and the United States (which is a major source of security).

Concerns about the sustainability of the pivot have intensified over the last two years, as the United States has been pulled away from Asia by numerous developments, including the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, the Iranian nuclear issue and Russia’s campaign of coercive diplomacy toward Ukraine. To reassure its Asian friends and allies, the United States replaced the term pivot with a more strategic-sounding term, ‘rebalance’. However, most of America’s regional partners will keep their options open until they are convinced that the United States is in it for the long haul.

Several contributors to this volume also argue for a multifaceted form of pivot as the best way to bolster regional security without precipitating a confrontation with China. Some commentators express concern that the United States has relied too much on military forms of cooperation, at the expense of economic and diplomatic initiatives. Washington is certainly committed to this type of multifaceted engagement with its regional partners and with Beijing, but US policymakers are also painfully aware that it is only in the military realm that America has a decisive advantage that can be translated into influence in its dealings with China. Several contributors to this volume discuss US plans for a new Air–Sea Battle strategy as a possible tipping point in America’s campaign to influence Beijing without encouraging increased hostility.

One reason why it is so difficult for Washington to manage the pivot to Asia is because it must constantly walk a tightrope between contradictory goals. The goal of both engaging and containing China is the most obvious example. Another important challenge for the United States is the need to reconcile policies designed to reassure its regional friends and allies with policies designed to increase ‘partner capacity’ in the form of defence budgets, basing agreements and security-related memoranda of understanding. Finally, Washington must tread carefully in pursuit of its goal of moving beyond its traditional ‘hub-and-spokes’ network of bilateral defence arrangements to a more complex and interdependent ‘web’ arrangement in the Asia-Pacific. As several of the authors in this volume make clear, such US efforts will inevitably confront deeply held resentments and suspicions, and significant territorial disputes between and among key regional security partners.

Since this volume is meant to be an audit of the opinions and interests of America’s friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific, it does not include a chapter by a Chinese expert. Beijing is neither a friend nor an ally of Washington. Forty-two years after the US opening to China, the bilateral relationship is still adversarial, and still burdened with the legacy issues that complicated US-Chinese relations at the time of Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing. The American pivot to Asia represents a new chapter in this story, but it is not viewed by Beijing as a positive development. The editors also chose not to include a chapter that summarizes Chinese views on the pivot since those views are uniformly negative and since Chinese policies and statements are discussed by most of the contributors to this volume.

Goals and concerns of America’s regional friends and allies

Our survey of the opinions of Asian and Indian defence experts begins with a chapter on America’s most important regional ally: Japan. Ken Jimbo notes that Japan ‘welcomes the concept’ of rebalance, but ‘many questions still need to be answered’. He surveys these military and diplomatic questions and then relates them to recent developments in the US-Japan bilateral security relationship and ongoing debates among Japanese defence planners regarding new strategic concepts such as ‘dynamic defence’ and ‘dynamic deterrence’. Not surprisingly, the author focuses much of his attention on Chinese military modernization and China’s intentions in the South China and East China Seas. He concludes with a call for US-Japan ‘joint development of tailored regional deterrence architecture’.

Changsu Kim presents a South Korean perspective on the US pivot. He concludes that because of special historical and geopolitical circumstances, Seoul views the pivot differently from other Asian governments. These circumstances include: six decades of existential threat from an unpredictable and heavily armed North Korea; close military cooperation with, and dependence upon, Washington since the Korean War; geographic proximity and economic interdependence with an increasingly powerful China; and unresolved disputes with Japan that can be traced back more than a century. Kim refers to these factors to explain why the pivot has relatively little salience for many South Korean defence experts. He concludes that, while the American pivot ‘appears quite reasonable’ as a guide to US global strategic adjustment, it needs more time to be better understood and supported by key Asian governments, including South Korea.

No Asian government has a greater stake in the success of the American pivot than Taiwan. Fu-Kuo Liu’s chapter helps readers to understand both the risks and opportunities of the pivot for Taiwan. At a time when Taiwan is restructuring its forces and undertaking new forms of defence cooperation with Washington in response to dramatic improvements in Chinese military capability, Taipei is concerned that the United States will mismanage the pivot in some way that precipitates a confrontation with Beijing. The author also reminds readers that Taipei’s security calculations extend beyond the Taiwan Strait, to include territorial disputes with other regional actors (Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam) in the East China and South China Seas. Like several other contributors to this volume, Liu concludes that the greatest threat to the future of the pivot is America’s financial health.

Charmaine Misalucha has contributed the most theoretically ambitious chapter to this volume. The question that she addresses is how the United States ‘sold’ the idea of the pivot strategy to Southeast Asia. After a survey of the literature relating to strategic communication she discusses how the Obama Administration has told the ‘China story’ to its South-East Asian friends and allies in a way that is designed to solicit their support without forcing them to choose between Washington and Beijing. She concludes that the United States has persuaded Southeast Asian governments in general, and the Philippines in particular, that the pivot serves their interests. However, she also recognizes these Asian governments are still not convinced about the sustainability of the idea.

Thailand poses special problems for the Obama Administration as it attempts to ‘sell’ its pivot to Asia. Kitti Prasirtsuk and William Tow survey these problems and identify their sources. They note that Thailand is a ‘reluctant ally’ of the United States, and that many of Thailand’s security concerns relate to local issues that are not, and cannot be, within the scope of the US-Thai alliance. They stress the Thai foreign policy priority of preserving ‘room to manoeuvre’ when confronted with evolving great power rivalries, and remind Washington that Thailand is committed to ‘an intensifying and comprehensive relationship with China’. The authors applaud the fact that both Washington and Bangkok are cooperating to enhance their capabilities for non-traditional security cooperation (for example, disaster relief), but they caution the United States not to assume that the interests of the two governments converge on other forms of ‘hard power’ security cooperation. Prasirtsuk and Tow also comment on the 22 May 2014 military coup in Thailand, which has made it even more difficult for Washington to sustain its defence relationship with its ‘reluctant ally’.

Ralf Emmers depicts Singapore as a nation acutely aware of its vulnerabilities and realistic about its options. Washington has been viewed as an indispensable source of security since the founding of the Republic of Singapore in 1965. From time to time, Singapore has taken steps to shore up that relationship and encourage Washington to preserve a substantial military presence in Asia. The author cites the decision by the city-state to allow American littoral combat ships to use its facilities as one recent example of this type of bilateral cooperation. However, Emmers also makes it clear that Singapore is closely monitoring US activities in the region for signs that Washington cannot, or will not, sustain its commitment to the pivot. He also reminds readers that Singapore, like virtually every regional partner of the United States, is concerned that Washington will manage the pivot in such a way that it will force America’s friends and allies to choose between the United States and China.

Australia has been one of America’s most reliable and effective allies since the Second World War, but Brendan Taylor advises readers that it would be a mistake to assume uncritically that Australian defence experts and policy-makers are unanimous in their support for the US pivot strategy. Drawing upon a distinction that was developed by Graham Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph Nye Jr (1985), Taylor divides Australian commentators into three schools: hawks, doves and owls. The hawks, whom Taylor believes are ‘gaining the ascendancy’ within the government of Tony Abbott, support close military collaboration with Washington in order to send a strong deterrent message to Beijing. The doves are opposed to any campaign of anti-Chinese containment. Instead, they favour ‘working actively to reduce tensions’ between Washington and Beijing, even if this requires Canberra to say no to its American ally from time to time (the phrase is from the most influential spokesperson for the dove position, Hugh White 2012–13). The author counts two former prime ministers among the doves: Malcolm Fraser and Paul Keating. Finally, Taylor summarizes the argument of the owls, who support close security cooperation with the United States but reject the argument that this must be at the expense of an active and ambitious policy of diplomatic and economic engagement with China. The author lists former Prime Minister John Howard among the owls. Taylor concludes his discussion of the evolving security debate in Australia by stating that although the US-Australian relationship is in ‘remarkably good shape’, neither Washington nor Canberra can afford ‘undue complacency’.

Every nation in the Asia-Pacific responds to the US pivot according to its unique geostrategic situation and its foreign policy priorities. Robert Ayson makes this very clear in his analysis of New Zealand’s reaction to the American strategy. Some of the concerns that dominate the debate in Wellington are shared by all of America’s regional friends and allies. Will Washington be able to extricate itself from the larger Middle East? Will budget pressures in the United States mean that the American decision to increase the proportion of US naval assets in the Pacific translate into ‘a larger slice of a smaller pie?’ However, most of Ayson’s chapter focuses on concerns that are specific to New Zealand, because it is ‘a long way from many of the places that matter militarily to the United States and to other regional powers’, and because New Zealand’s geographical orientation is toward the South Pacific. Ayson also notes that the US-New Zealand security relationship, which had been in limbo since the mid-1980s, was actually improving before the announcement of the pivot. So Wellington must be concerned about the possibility that the pivot strategy will actually disrupt the ongoing process of careful and gradual bilateral defence cooperation.

Mahesh Shankar reminds readers that, while the ‘core emphasis’ of the US pivot is the Asia-Pacific, the US strategy requires an ‘Indo-Pacific’ orientation if it is to be successful. He quotes former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s assertion that Washington has made a ‘strategic bet on India’s future’, and in his chapter he introduces readers to the issues that are likely to determine the success or failure of that bet. While noting that ‘by and large’ the US pivot is viewed positively in New Delhi, Shankar also discusses the factors that could make India circumspect in the enthusiasm with which it seeks to tie itself closely to the American agenda in the region. These include American mismanagement of the diplomatic aspects of the pivot which might undermine India’s ‘strategic autonomy’. New Delhi might also become cool to the US pivot if it concludes that America is not able to sustain its commitments to the Indo-Pacific region. Political and economic developments within India could also result in a turning away from foreign affairs, with problematic implications for US-Indian security cooperation.

All of the chapters in this volume make it clear that the American pivot to Asia is still a work in progress, and that its future is by no means certain. At the core of the US strategy is the recognition that Washington cannot ‘rebalance’ its presence and its influence in the Asia-Pacific without the active support of its regional friends and allies. However, every one of those regional actors is still closely monitoring the pivot in order to assess risks and opportunities. In particular, no regional actor wants to be forced to make a choice between Beijing and Washington. The good news for America and for the pivot is that the United States is fully committed to a policy of productive cooperation with China. The bad news is that American efforts to ‘make room for China’ could still be overwhelmed by the pressures associated with the evolving power transition situation. As the history of international relations makes clear, power transitions are among the most reliable predictors of war. If America’s friends and allies conclude that America’s management of the pivot strategy is increasing the risk of either entanglement in a United States– China confrontation or abandonment by Washington in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness, they will rely upon the kinds of insights presented in this volume in order to assess their options and perhaps renegotiate their relations with the United States.

References

Allison, Graham T., Carnesale, Albert and Nye, Jr, Joseph S. (eds) (1985) Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War, New York: W.W. Norton.

Gray, Colin (2009) After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, January.

Keatley, Robert (2013) ‘How China Helps the Pivot’, National Interest, 21 March, nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-china-helps-the-pivot-8249?page=2 (accessed 11 March 2014).

White, Hugh (2012–13) ‘White-Papering the Cracks: A Blueprint for the Asian Century?’ The Monthly, 85 (December–January).

Part I

Asia’s place in America’s global strategy

2 Obama’s ‘rebalance’ in historical context

Douglas Stuart

When Barack Obama’s Administration first announced plans to accord top priority to the Asia-Pacific in its global foreign policy planning, it referred to the campaign as a ‘pivot’ to Asia.¹ It soon became clear, however, that the term created problems for Washington, since key friends and allies interpreted a pivot as a brief, tactical manoeuvre.² As a result, the United States has settled upon the term ‘rebalance’ to describe the priority that it accords to the Asia-Pacific. This term makes much more sense, not just from the point of view of marketing, but also from the point of view of historical accuracy, since the Obama Administration’s engagement with Asia is the next stage in an American grand strategy of balance of power that has been evolving since the late nineteenth century. The core of this grand strategy has been an American commitment to block any government from achieving hegemonic dominance in the Asia-Pacific. US policies designed to serve this strategy have met with varying degrees of success, but the commitment has endured for over a century. This chapter begins by surveying the history of America’s grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific. I then discuss the challenges that the Obama Administration has faced, and will face, in its effort to rebalance US grand strategy in this rapidly changing region.

Phase I: 1784–1907

The history of America’s progressive involvement in the Asia-Pacific during the nineteenth century is illustrative of the concept of ‘acquisitive individualism’, which Robert Kagan (2006: 11) has described as the ‘powerful engine’ of America’s westward expansion. Beginning in 1784, when the Empress of China arrived at the port of Whampoa, American merchants were attracted to the Pacific for lucrative trade opportunities: fur pelts (from the United States), ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of contributors
• Preface
• List of abbreviations
• 1. Setting the context
• Part I: Asia’s place in America’s global strategy
• Part II: Northeast Asian partners and allies
• Part III: Southeast Asian partners and allies
• Part IV: The wider Indo-Pacific region
• Index