Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War

The NATO information service

Linda Risso

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9781138940239
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317974864
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book offers the first account of the foundation, organisation and activities of the NATO Information Service (NATIS) during the Cold War.

During the Cold War, NATIS was pivotal in bringing national delegations together to discuss their security, information and intelligence concerns and, when appropriate or possible, to devise a common response to the 'Communist threat'. At the same time, NATIS liaised with bodies like the Atlantic Institute and the Bilderberg group in the attempt to promote a coordinated western response. The NATO archive material also shows that NATIS carried out its own information and intelligence activities.

Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War provides the first sustained study of the history of NATIS throughout the Cold War. Examining the role of NATIS as a forum for the exchange of ideas and techniques about how to develop and run propaganda programmes, this book presents a sophisticated understanding of the extent to which national information agencies collaborated. By focusing on the degree of cooperation on cultural and information activities, this analysis of NATIS also contributes to the history of NATO as a political alliance and reminds us that NATO was – and still is – primarily a political organisation.

This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, Cold War studies, intelligence studies, and IR in general.

Part I
The history of NATIS

1 The foundation of the NATO Information Service, 1949—1951

The early post- Second World War years saw numerous attempts to develop some form of propaganda and intelligence cooperation within the West. Not all attempts were equally successful, and in fact, with the exception of the Anglo-American intelligence cooperation, other forms of bilateral agreements either were limited to specific geographical areas and themes or were short- lived. As for information coordination within international organisations, the creation of the Western European Union in 1948 and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 opened the way to new forms of propaganda and intelligence coordination. Such organisations created new intergovernmental forums for the exchange of information, ideas and methods about what was perceived as the common enemy: communism in its national and international forms. Coordination was crucial to establishing a coherent and effective front to respond to the wellcoordinated hostile attacks coming from the communist side. At the same time, the exchange of intelligence was an essential prerequisite to prepare for communist subversive activities. Yet as this chapter demonstrates, mutual suspicion, the fear that the new organisations might restrict national sovereignty and the fact that not all members had well-established national propaganda agencies meant that in the early Cold War years the exchange of information and intelligence and the degree of cooperation remained low and rather ineffective.¹

Britain was the first western country to formulate a coordinated response to communist propaganda. The Labour government in power after the war believed that the effective projection of British power, the British way of life and Britain’s achievements was the best policy for protecting British interests overseas.² A Cabinet paper published in January 1948, ‘Future foreign publicity policy’, launched a new propaganda policy, which was assisted by the creation of the Information Research Department (IRD). The new agency was part of the Foreign Office and was set up to promote the image and interests of Britain and to counter communist and anti-British propaganda attacks. The IRD benefited from the experience of the Political Warfare Executive and the Ministry for Information, both abolished soon after the end of the war, with responsibility for overseas propaganda being transferred to the Foreign Office.³ The rich body of literature on the history of the IRD shows that the initial task of the new agency was to respond to anti- British propaganda around the world, and particularly in those areas where the anti- colonialist movements were becoming louder at the end of the war. Soon, however, the IRD’s scope enlarged to include straightforward anti- communist propaganda. The IRD targeted, increasingly more specifically, West European countries, where strong national communist parties could make substantial electoral gains. The IRD produced detailed reports on communist leaders, political parties and international organisations as well as on the political and economic environment in the Soviet bloc. The material was put together in the form of factual, objective and detailed reports later circulated through the embassies or through a network of personal contacts established during the war. The targets were the so- called opinion moulders: primarily journalists, writers and trade union leaders. It is clear that the IRD could gain such an insight into life in the Soviet bloc only thanks to its close links with the secret services.⁴

In the United States, the beginning of the Cold War convinced President Truman of the need to proceed by means of both overt and covert propaganda. The Smith–Mundt Act of January 1948 provided the Department of State with a strong legal and financial basis for an overt propaganda programme, which later included all means of modern communication, including publications, radio broadcasts, films, cultural exchange programmes and exhibitions.⁵ At the same time, the Truman administration developed a covert psychological warfare programme modelled on the Office of Strategic Services established by President Franklin D. Roosevelt under the direction of the newly founded Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This covert action had the additional advantage of opening new channels to address foreign public opinion.⁶

Building upon their tradition of intelligence sharing developed during the war, British and American officials continued to exchange information about their respective propaganda policies. Yet it was only with the foundation of the IRD in 1948 and of the CIA in 1947 that the two governments achieved systematic cooperation.⁷ Close links with their American counterparts, and mistrust of their Western European partners, were defining features of post- war British anti- communist propaganda policy. In the 1950s, the launch of the Campaign for Truth in the United States and the foundation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) brought about closer cooperation between the British and Americans and marked the moment when the Americans seemed to take over the lead in the worldwide anti-communist fight.⁸ It is clear from the IRD’s archival documents that throughout the Cold War the US information staff was kept informed about most of the IRD’s activities – while the opposite was not always the case. The IRD also agreed not to carry out propaganda activities on US soil; again, the Americans did not reciprocate the commitment.

Both countries developed their own anti- communist policies, but in a series of bilateral meetings British and American officials formally agreed to establish ‘close and continuous liaison’ in the field of anti- communist propaganda so as to be able to ‘shoot at the same target from different angles’.⁹ It has been argued that although Britain was more experienced and had started its anti- communist activity earlier than the United States, the lack of resources and weaker political support meant that the Americans caught up quickly and soon the British became the junior partners.¹⁰ Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the historians who made such claims have based their work on American archival sources. The use of British documents, however, has allowed others to point out that despite their more limited means, the British continued to exert significant influence on the Americans and often were able to make use of the facilities and structures deployed by the Americans for their own use. Richard Aldrich, for example, has carried out an important reassessment of the development of British policy towards the Soviet Union in the early Cold War years based on American and British archival sources, thus producing an articulated and rich analysis of the interplay between American and British intelligence and information agencies.¹¹ Similarly, Andrew Defty has demonstrated the important role of the IRD after 1950s, particularly in adapting the United States’ information policies to European audiences so as to make them more effective.¹²

Despite their endeavours, the Americans’ attempts to create similar partnerships with the other Western European countries were to no avail. This was mainly due to the fact that in the immediate post- war period no continental European government had dedicated anti-communist propaganda agencies. The ‘manipulation’ of public opinion was seen as the preserve of totalitarian regimes and it was believed that such policies should not and could not be applied in peacetime by democratic governments. For these reasons, the continental West European governments quickly dismantled their war propaganda machinery after the end of the Second World War and it took a relatively long time to overcome the suspicion and to launch an effective information policy to respond to the propaganda attacks launched by the communists.¹³

The threat of communism, particularly in France, Italy and Belgium, meant that there was indeed great interest in collaborating closely with the United States, and more often than not the direct and indirect support of the American intelligence and information agencies was crucial in shaping the political development of such countries, as is testified by the CIA involvement in the Italian elections of 1948.¹⁴ Yet actual bilateral cooperation on a permanent basis was problematic. The United States pushed for the creation of well- funded and well- organised propaganda machineries within the new international organisations that were established at the time. The Americans thought that through such organisations they could convince the continental Europeans of the need to create their own national information agencies and to shape the development of their propaganda policies. Yet as we shall see, while the Europeans were keen to receive financial assistance and know-how from the Americans, they were reluctant to see the creation of a permanent body in which the other members would also be able to learn about the security and intelligence programmes of their neighbours.

Information cooperation within the Brussels Treaty Organisation

The foundation of the Cominform in September 1947 allowed the Soviet Union, its satellite states and national communist parties in Western Europe to carry out a coherent and energetic propaganda campaign against the West. This campaign benefited from the coordination of all information activities, generous funding and the possibility of exploiting the divisions between western powers, as well as widespread sentiments of pacifism and neutralism.¹⁵ For these reasons, according to several western intelligence agencies it was imperative to promote a similarly coherent and unified response to anti- western Soviet propaganda. The creation of permanent channels of consultation and the exchange of information about what each government was doing in the propaganda field were seen by many, and by the British and Americans in particular, as important first steps to achieving this goal.¹⁶ Yet contrary to the American faith in cooperation with like- minded governments as a primary objective, British officials had little faith in the ability of their West European counterparts to provide an effective response on their own. At the time, the Labour government saw Britain as the leader of its West European junior partners. According to the 1948 Cabinet paper on Britain’s ‘Future foreign publicity policy’:

It is for us, as Europeans and as a Social Democratic Government, and not the Americans, to give the lead in spiritual, moral and political sphere to all the democratic elements in Western Europe which are anti-communist. . .. We must see that our friends in Europe and elsewhere are armed with the facts and the answers to Russian propaganda. If we do not provide this ammunition they will not get it from any other source.¹⁷

Because of the lack of appropriate information agencies and of adequate resources, the IRD argued, continental European countries needed guidance and advice from their more expert colleagues at the Foreign Office. This IRD’s views coincided with the opinion of the foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, who supported the idea of Western Europe as a third force between the two emerging blocs, whereby ‘What we have to offer in contrast to totalitarian communism and laissez- faire capitalism are the vital and progressive ideas of British Social Democracy and Western European Civilisation.’¹⁸ Led by Britain, the West European countries would produce a concerted and multilateral anti-Soviet response.¹⁹ London was therefore in favour of closer cooperation particularly with France and the Benelux countries, but the level and form of such collaboration remained an object of controversy within the Foreign Office.

The early post-war meetings between the British, French and American foreign ministers offered an opportunity to discuss further the need for closer cooperation in the field of anti- communist propaganda. Ralph Murray, the first director of the IRD, warned colleagues about his overarching concern of compromising the IRD’s ongoing activities and making its existence known to the wider public.²⁰

It was the signing of the Brussels Treaty in March 1948 that opened for the first time the way to practical collaboration within Western Europe in the fields of intelligence and information. The treaty created the Western Union and brought together Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. It favoured political consultation among its members so as to foster economic, social and cultural cooperation among its members (article III).²¹ In March 1948, the Foreign Office set up a Working Party on the ‘spiritual’ aspects of the new organisation to study cultural and information cooperation with other Brussels Treaty members. Despite his personal doubts, Ralph Murray supported the idea of exploring ways to ‘make active use of the treaty’ and argued that the Brussels Treaty could be exploited as a possible means to facilitate the distribution of IRD propaganda material throughout Western Europe. Thus, Murray proposed the creation of a joint information executive to be established by the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty to facilitate the exchange of information, make recommendations to foster collaboration between the members and to offer training on anti-communist propaganda.²²

The Working Party was more sceptical than Murray about the benefits that cooperation within the Brussels Treaty could bring to the Foreign Office. First of all, because of conflicting policies of the members in their respective colonial outposts, cooperation seemed unworkable. The Working Party recognised that cooperation with French and Belgian governments in Africa to counter nationalist movements in colonial territories had been established rather effectively in 1949. However, competing interests in the Middle East made similar collaboration in other areas virtually impossi...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I The history of NATIS
• 1 The foundation of the NATO Information Service, 1949—1951
• 2 The expansion of the NATO Information Service in the 1950s
• 3 The NATO Information Service in the 1960s
• 4 The crisis of détente Information policy in an age of multilateral talks
• Part II NATIS and its outputs
• 5 NATO publications
• 6 Reaching out to the wider public NATO films and travelling exhibitions
• 7 Engaging with science, academia and the leaders of tomorrow
• 8 Supporting the work of NATIS from the outside The valuntary organisations
• Conclusion
• Epilogue
• Bibliography
• Index