Part I
The imāma state from its formation to the British colonial order
and if you judge between people, judge justly.
(Sura 4 Women (An-Nisā’) verse 58)
We shall start by describing the imāma system, about which little is known and which has proved particularly stable ever since its inception. Its majlis (councils), a novel Arab-Islamic institution, saw to it that the principle of Islamic shūrā with its democratic implications was implemented. And, from the outset, these institutions met the moral requirements of the Ibāḍi doctrine for justice and equity, so that Oman became their spiritual homeland. The imāma system thus provided the general framework for Omani history as well as a national and cultural reference point.
Why, and under what conditions has this system stood the test of time and adversity? This will be the main subject of discussion in this part. With the help of a rapid survey from the early beginnings of the Ibāḍi imāma and the first challenges it met (notably the fall of the imāma of al-Ṣalṭ ibn Mālek in the AH third/AD ninth century and its consequences), we shall seek to illustrate one of the major characteristics of Omani Ibadhism, namely how it functions as a living myth as well as an experiment in power.
A minority movement in Islam, initially persecuted, Ibadhism has shown that it could cope with times of internal or external adversity. It has proved that it could manage periods of consensus and of power, thanks in particular to the strong religious basis of its legitimacy and to strong-minded ʽulamāʼ.
Oman’s first internal test took the form of a long civil war when tribal loyalties were uppermost. The country was then divided into several semi-autonomous regions. But Ibāḍi identity was never really threatened throughout that period. Nor was it swamped by the Portuguese invasion of Oman (1508–1650). Yet the Portuguese were to occupy all the coastal towns and ports of Oman and this intrusion would strike a fatal blow to local trade and disrupt the general situation in the region. It would also introduce international piracy into the region for the first time. By destroying the peace and security that had reigned until then, moreover, it left the Gulf vulnerable, after a century and a half of oppression, to the succeeding stage of Western colonial occupation.
Despite five centuries during which the nation was torn apart, despite the bitterness of foreign occupation, the Ibadhite myth showed itself quite unaffected by these vicissitudes. Throughout the period, the movement had never ceased electing its imāms in the interior of Oman; it even proved capable of bringing about national reconciliation and of establishing with the Ya‘rūbite state (1624–1741), not just an era of unity and independence for the country, but also an imāma that was an exceptional example for the Islamic state.
However, these achievements were not to last long. The election of imāms from the same line tended to transform the imāma into a dynastic system. The logic of events set it irreversibly adrift until the state itself was fractured. Oman embarked on another civil war. The fall of the Yaʽrūbite imāma marked a decisive turning point in its political history and that of the Gulf. Oman would have to forge a new political and cultural identity for itself.
Disillusioned by the new nature of power, the Ibadhite movement began to turn in on itself, even in some circumstances returning to a traditional and almost voluntary state of al-kitmān (dissimulation). However, true to its principles and commitments, the movement continued to keep watch on developments in the situation of the country, marked by a general decline, and it kept alive its hope in the ideal, while waiting till it could renew its historic role.
Meanwhile, Western colonial antagonisms in the region had increased in scale and would be settled in favour of Great Britain, who would apply a steady, yet flexible strategy in pursuit of her aims. There was no lack of pretexts for intervention and it was in the name of the fight against slavery, or against the arms trade and later against piracy that Great Britain would work towards the systematic destruction of the fleets of al-Qawāsim and then of Oman.
From then until the middle of the nineteenth century, British strategy would have three main goals in view: to consolidate her complete domination of the shipping routes; to weaken Oman so as be sure to subjugate the whole country; lastly to strike at the fleet of al-Qawāsim in order to arrive at political and military domination of the region of ‘Sāḥel Oman’ and of the Gulf by imposing colonial treaties.
Preliminary chapter
Oman lies at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf, on the east side of the Arabian Peninsula; the country is surrounded on three sides by coastline extending to 1700 km, from the frontier of Ra’s al-Khaymah, near Ra’s Musandam on the Arabian Gulf, then from the Gulf of Oman via the straits of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea to the frontier of the Yemen. It currently covers 320 000 square kilometers.24 Its population exceeds 2 million and, according to the British historian, J.B. Kelly, it houses about 200 principal tribes and innumerable lesser ones.25
Oman enjoys an outstanding commercial and maritime position in the region of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The country has a relatively strong economy, based on limited exports of oil and gas, in addition to an agricultural economy built on exporting dates and citrus fruit and on fishing and pasturage. If we add the advantages of an important strategic position, Oman today, as in the past, enjoys a national economy combining internal productive resources with the inevitable commercial role of intermediary on the trade route from the Gulf to the Indian Ocean.
The civilisation of ancient Oman
This strategic land has a rich history going back, according to historians and archaeologists, to at least 3 millennium BC, when Oman is mentioned under the Sumerian name of Magan. With a much bigger territory than present-day Oman, the kingdom of Magan existed together with the kingdom of Dilmun, modern Bahrein, and the civilisation of Melukha in India. Earlier, Dilmun had been occupied by the Phoenicians before they moved away to Greater Syria and Palestine. The two civilisations of Magan and Dilmun maintained close links and were in active contact with the great civilisations dominating the region of Mesopotamia: Sumerians, Akkadians, Babylonians and Elamites.
The existence of human settlements in Oman in the third millennium is well established now. In 1973, an archaeological mission from the university of Harvard located some twenty sites, scattered over an area of around 5000 square kilometres, from Bahla in the interior of Oman to al-Mintirib in Sharqiya.26 We know, too, that Magan, as an exporter to Mesopotamia, had explored sites for smelting copper. In other words, an ancient civilisation grew up on what is now the territory of Oman and was based not just on agriculture and the export of mastic to Egypt or copper to Sumer, but was engaged in ship building and sea-borne trade.
One of the tablets of Sargon, king of the Akkadians (2371–2316 BC) shows ships from Magan, Delmun and Melukha berthing in the port of Akkad,27 further proof of the existence of a shipping industry in Magan. This opinion is reinforced by the sign of the king of the Sumerians, Dungi, on a tablet in the town of Lagash in 2050 BC, testifying to the existence of boat builders at that period.28 So, although it has left no particular cultural legacy, this civilisation appears at least to have been productive, active and open to exchange.
Oman’s vocation as a maritime state thus seems to be heralded very early and we may visualise the site of Oman playing a considerable part in communication between the various civilisations of the region for 5000 years. The English historian, Miles, relates how, thanks to the inhabitants’ experience in maritime matters, the region now called Oman had contributed to exchanges between Mesopotamia and India and vice versa.29
We know, too, that in Antiquity the influence of what is now Oman was not restricted to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean; it extended to the Mediterranean Basin as well. Miles notes that the Omani fleet would have been secondary to those of Tyre and Cordoba. Thanks to this important contribution, the commercial activity of ancient Oman was undoubtedly a driving belt between the civilisations of Mina and Babylon and from Susa to India. It was from these civilisations that the Indians derived astronomy, philosophy, alchemy and mathematics.30
From the fourth century bc it is possible to follow the trading activities of the ancient Omanis as far as china. We know that they had establishments in canton and the relations between Oman and China continued from then till the end of the Middle Ages, when new internal and external circumstances, due to the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf put an end to relations between the two countries. However, if we look a little further back, it is fair to think that the Magan civilisation began to decline with the end of the Mesopotamian civilisations. The occupation of the Indus Valley by Indo-European invaders around 1500 bc and the subjection of Mesopotamia, after hard-fought and destructive wars, first to the Assyrians in about 1200 bc then to the Achemenid Persians around 580 bc brought about a genuine decline in commercial exchanges throughout the Arabian Gulf.31
Omani origins
A return to prehistory so as to get some idea of the population and civilisation of ancient Oman is merely a necessary preliminary to the main thesis of this book. Our investigation in fact looks at the more immediate origins of the Omani identity. First, according to the Muslim historian Sayeda Kashef, the inhabitants of Oman would be of ancient Arab origin, going back to vanished peoples like the ʽAd, who inhabited the al-Aḥqāf region between Oman and Hadramawt and whose Prophet was Hūd.32
According to Wilson, Sumerians are thought to have settled in Oman in the course of the four millennia BC. Wilson calls them ‘faithful’ because they paid tribute regularly to the governors of...