Peacekeeping in Africa

The evolving security architecture

Marco Wyss, Thierry Tardy

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781317913665
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: African History
• Index: History

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of peacekeeping in Africa.

Recent events in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali remind us that violence remains endemic and continues to hamper the institutional, social and economic development of the African continent. Over the years, an increasing number of actors have become involved in the effort to bring peace to Africa. The United Nations (UN) has been joined by regional organisations, most prominently the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), and by sub-regional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Meanwhile, traditional and emerging powers have regained an interest in Africa and, as a consequence, in peacekeeping.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the trends and challenges of international peacekeeping in Africa, with a focus on the recent expansion of actors and missions. Drawing upon contributions from a range of key thinkers in the field, Peacekeeping in Africa concentrates on the most significant and emerging actors, the various types of missions, and the main operational theatres, thus assessing the evolution of the African security architecture and how it impacts on peace operations.

This book will be of much interest to students of peacekeeping and peace operations, African politics, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR.

Part I
Institutions

1 Changing dimensions of international peacekeeping in Africa

Megan Gleason-Roberts and Alischa Kugel

Introduction

International peacekeeping deployments to Africa have reached a pivotal time. Thus far, the predominant form of international peace operations in Africa has been the UN peacekeeping operations. The number of UN peacekeepers in the region constitutes almost half of all UN deployments. Africa also hosts three out of the UN’s four largest operations, namely the UN missions in Darfur (25,960 personnel), the DRC (23,470 personnel) and Côte d’Ivoire (12,395 personnel).¹ Yet multilateral peacekeeping in Africa is entering a period of change and contraction driven by a number of factors related to the evolution of both the nature of conflict, and international support to conflict-affected or post-conflict states. In addition, a number of transitions in peace operations, including those in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, and West Africa, exemplify how changes in conflict trends, the climate of fiscal austerity and the development of newly-defined crisis management tools have manifested themselves in the field.

This chapter will first explore trends in international peacekeeping deployments to Africa with a particular focus on those that are currently undergoing a period of transition. It then aims to demonstrate how alternative models of peacekeeping – including civilian-led political missions, regional deployments, and over-the-horizon security guarantees – are increasingly important tools for crisis response both in parallel with traditional peacekeeping operations and as deployment alternatives. Finally, the chapter will examine the increasingly dynamic partnerships between actors, both at headquarters and at the field level.

Overall, while the risks in these changing strategies are manifold, and often driven by rapidly unfolding situations rather than a strategic vision, developments over the past two years have also demonstrated the important role that peace operations continue to play in supporting postconflict and post-crisis states as well as the continued national demand for this type of support.

Changing dimensions in conflict and crisis management

This section will examine changes in international conflict and crisis management along three paradigms, namely the changing manifestations of conflict, increasing fiscal austerity and budgetary pressures in countries financing peace operations, and a renewed focus on political processes.

Changes in the manifestation of conflict

As the 2011 World Development Report Conflict, Security and Development notes, the global drivers and manifestations of conflict are changing. The world has witnessed a decline in the number of civil wars and the number of deaths attributable to civil conflict over the past 25 years. In Africa, while a number of conflicts continue, meaningful progress has been registered in sustainably resolving conflicts in a number of countries including Angola and Mozambique. Considerable but still fragile peace consolidation has also been achieved in recent years in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Yet underlying these positive trends, there are a number of countries throughout the world that are experiencing repeated cycles of violence, exacerbated by poor governance.² Ninety percent of all civil wars in the last decade occurred in countries that had had a previous civil war in the last 30 years. Often called failed or fragile states, these countries struggle to recover from multiple and in many cases simultaneous political and security crises. Fifteen of the top 20 countries on the Fund for Peace’s 2012 Failed State Index are located in Africa.³

In Somalia, until recently, simultaneous security and political crises stressed the capacity of national and international actors on the ground and reduced the prospect for meaningful progress towards stabilization. Hopeful signs in 2012, including the end of the transitional period and the security gains achieved in connection with the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), emphasize that there cannot be a purely military solution for the crisis in Somalia and that instead, security, governance and socioeconomic spheres must be addressed simultaneously.⁴ The strategic review of the UN’s engagement in Somalia, conducted between September and December 2012, served to emphasize the need for continued complementary efforts by international actors across different sectors.⁵

In addition, countries are coming under increasing pressure from transnational threats including organized crime, trafficking and extremism. These three threats all particularly impact stabilization efforts in West Africa.⁶ Organized crime and drug trafficking have been recognized as threats for several years, but the region is now facing a security crisis in northern Mali that highlights the risk that violent extremism poses to even more stable countries in West Africa.⁷

The impacts of increasing fiscal austerity in countries financing African peace operations

The budgets for peace operations managed to survive the first three years of the global financial crisis relatively unscathed. However, more recently states have come under increasing pressure to reduce their contributions to multilateral peace operations. In the UN, after long debates between member states, the peacekeeping budget was reduced by nearly eight percent between 2011 and 2012, while during the same period the budget requirements for civilian-led political missions were reduced by six percent. A similar trend is seen in the EU, now increasingly hesitant to deploy new large missions, and where the future of the African Peace Facility is uncertain due to budgetary pressures.⁸

These exigencies have led to disputes about how to implement cost savings, with deep divides seen among member states that provide much of the financial contributions for UN peacekeeping. In 2011, uncharacteristically public debates were seen between Western European states and the US over which missions to scale down, including those in Sudan and Liberia.⁹

In Sudan, the July 2012 reconfiguration and reduction in size of the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) were driven in large part by member states’ belief that during a time of financial austerity the mission should be able to achieve its mandated tasks with a smaller force level and enhanced operational efficiency.¹⁰ However, the force reduction took place amidst a renewed increase in fighting between the government and rebel forces, and this stalled the political process.

Budgetary constraints also played a large role in the drawdown of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which began in mid-2012 despite the UN Secretary-General’s acknowledgement in April 2012 that “none of the country’s security institutions is operationally independent” or “able to maintain stability without the support of UNMIL”.¹¹ In neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, plans for a reduction in the military forces of the UN and French peacekeeping operations after the re-establishment of constitutional order have been put on hold due to the precarious security situation, including along the border with Liberia where there has been an increase in attacks by armed groups.¹²

While civilian-led political missions are now being praised by member states and the UN for their efficiency and relatively low cost,¹³ member states are also carefully limiting the funding budgets for these types of missions. In 2011 the Secretary-General proposed to extend additional peacekeeping funding mechanisms to political missions.¹⁴ These efforts failed to garner sufficient support among member states, largely because the five permanent members of the Security Council feared they would have to pay a higher percentage of these costs, as they do for the peacekeeping budget.¹⁵

These pressures also extend to Western support for African-led operations, though the approval in February 2012 of an expanded support package, including an authorized troop increase for the AU Mission in Somalia, temporarily overcame this trend, bolstered in part by the EU’s willingness to provide increased funding for the mission through the African Peace Facility.¹⁶ The future viability of this funding source is now in question as the EU struggles to make reductions in its overall budget.¹⁷

A renewed focus on political processes

In addition to changes in the conflicts confronting peace operations, there is also a greater recognition of when peacekeeping is effective and when it is unlikely to have a meaningful impact. Numerous studies have shown the important contribution that peacekeeping can make in reducing the likelihood of a resumption of conflict. Indeed, peacekeeping missions have been found to reduce the risk of another relapse into conflict by between 55 and 85 percent, all other things being equal.¹⁸ However, the presence of multiple decades-long peacekeeping deployments demonstrates that they are not a cure-all. In some instances the continued deployment of a peacekeeping operation, in the case of some missions in Africa for a decade or more,¹⁹ represents a vivid reminder of a failure to adequately address underlying causes of conflict. Research has shown that peacekeeping operations are most effective when deployed into environments where conflict has ended, but that when deployed in situations where war is still ongoing, they have little or no impact.²⁰ This has meaningful implications for how and when to deploy peacekeepers in Africa.

Incidents where peace operations have been deployed in active conflict or where peace is only maintained during the deployment of peacekeepers have given rise to a greater appreciation for the political dimension of peace agreements and post-conflict reconciliation, including in conflicts in Africa. The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (established in 2011) has been mandated with a greater political role and lighter foot-print than its predecessor. The mission is focused on building up state structures in governance, rule of law, and security sector reform, as well as conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution – tasks not commonly associated with traditional peacekeeping.²¹

The UN is also placing a greater priority on mediation and prevention. The gradual strengthening of the UN’s Department of Political Affairs since Ban Ki-Moon became Secretary-General has highlighted increasing support among member states for its diplomacy and prevention activities.²² Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have been actively involved in furthering efforts to enhance mediation activities and strengthen conflict prevention measures, particularly in Africa. Reports by the Secretary-General in 2008 and 2009 on conflict prevention and mediation, as well as the first ever report on the use of preventive diplomacy in 2011, focus on enhancing these mechanisms and support activities.²³ Recommendations include the strengthening of partnerships and better coordination with regional organizations, particularly the AU.

As the international community continues to grapple with how to respond effectively to the crisis in Mali and support its transitional authorities, there is consensus among the UN, the AU and the ECOWAS on the need for an inclusive and credible political process to guide its efforts.²⁴ Researchers and policymakers are also focusing increasingly on how to effectively support political settlements among elites and between elites and the broader population.²⁵

This recognition comes in part from conflict-affected states themselves. The g7+ grouping of fragile states,²⁶ created in 2010, seeks to share experiences and articulate coordinated messages to the international community about international aid and support. African countrie...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgment
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction Africa – the peacekeeping laboratory
• PART I Institutions
• PART II States’ policies
• PART III Case studies
• Index