Hinduism and Environmental Ethics

Law, Literature, and Philosophy

Christopher Framarin

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781317918943
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Theology & Religion
• Subtopic: Hinduism

This book argues that the standard arguments for and against the claim that certain Hindu texts and traditions attribute direct moral standing to animals and plants are unconvincing. It presents careful, extensive, and original interpretations of passages from the Manusmrti (law), the Mah?bh?rata (literature), and the Yogas?tra (philosophy), and argues that these texts attribute direct moral standing to animals and plants for at least three reasons: they are sentient, they are alive, and they possess a range of other relevant attributes and abilities.

This book is of interest to scholars of Hinduism and the environment, religion and the environment, Hindu and/or Buddhist philosophy more broadly, and environmental ethics.

1 A plausible environmental ethic

Introduction

This book is organized around the question of whether certain Hindu texts and traditions attribute direct moral standing to animals and plants. In this chapter, I place this question within the context of contemporary scholarship on Hinduism and the environment, and offer a preliminary defense of a fundamental assumption within this literature.

Much of this contemporary scholarship focuses, at least in part, on the question of whether certain Hindu texts and traditions entail a plausible environmental ethic. While scholars writing in this area often disagree about whether a particular text or tradition entails a plausible environmental ethic, they tend to agree almost unanimously that a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to individual, living, non-human entities in nature, such as animals and plants. Consequently, the debate over whether certain Hindu texts and traditions entail a plausible environmental ethic often takes the form of a debate over whether certain Hindu texts and traditions attribute direct moral standing to animals and plants. One of the central questions among scholars working on Hinduism and the environment, then, can be answered only by means of answering the question around which this book is organized.

While it is beyond the scope of this book to definitively defend the assumption that a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to animals and plants, I review a type of argument that seems to at least put the onus of proof on those who would deny it. I also defend the argument against common objections.

1. A plausible environmental ethic defined

Much of the scholarship on Hinduism and the environment is concerned with the question of whether certain Hindu texts and traditions entail the proper treatment of nature.¹ Scholars writing in this area frame this question in a variety of ways. They ask whether certain Hindu texts and traditions prescribe “a proper human relationship to nature” (Valpey 2010: 68, cf. Deutsch 1970: 79, Jacobsen 1994: 287, Ray 1999: 218), “care for the environment” (Dwivedi 2000: 19), an “ecological approach to nature” (Rukmani 2000: 102), “ecological consciousness” (Nelson 2000: 129), “ecological balance” (James 1999: 33), “protecting nature” (Gold 2000: 317), “environmentalism” (Mumme 1998: 136), “environmental awareness” (Chapple 2009: 2), “ecological action” (Sherma 1998: 89), and so on. David Haberman simply asks, “Is Hinduism eco-friendly?” (2006: 22).

Each of these terms and phrases serve, in some way or another, as place markers for what I will call a ‘plausible environmental ethic’. A plausible environmental ethic is a theory of the environment that entails the proper treatment of nature (Norton 1984: 132–33).² In asking whether certain Hindu texts and traditions prescribe care for the environment, an ecological approach to nature, environmentalism, and so on, these authors ask whether certain Hindu texts and traditions entail a plausible environmental ethic.

Scholars writing in this area often disagree over whether a certain Hindu text or tradition entails a plausible environmental ethic. They are in nearly unanimous agreement, however, that a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to nature. That is, they are in nearly unanimous agreement that a plausible environmental ethic must claim that human agents³ morally ought to consider nature for its own sake in deciding what to do.⁴

Nature is useful to human beings, in the form of clean air and water, nourishment, shelter, recreation, and so on, and presumably human agents morally ought to consider nature in deciding what to do for these reasons. Scholars writing on Hinduism and the environment tend to agree, however, that a plausible environmental ethic must claim that these are not the only reasons to consider nature in deciding what to do. Human agents morally ought to consider nature for its own sake as well.

Scholars writing on Hinduism and the environment make this point in a number of ways. Some equate a plausible environmental ethic with a theory of the environment that attributes “intrinsic value” to nature (Deutsch 1970: 82, Tahtinen 1991: 215, Gupta 1993: 113, Jacobsen 1994: 287, Nelson 1998: 65–66, Sherma 1998: 106, Haberman 2006: 20–21, Whicher 2009: 43, Findly 2009: 343, Scheid 2010: 28, Valpey 2010: 80, Jain 2011: 76). Others equate a plausible environmental ethic with a theory of the environment that claims that nature is “sacred,” “divine,” and/or “holy” (Kinsley 1991: 230, Klostermaier 1991: 252, Tahtinen 1991: 215, Sherma 1998: 89, Sullivan 1998: 247, Dwivedi 2000: 20, Rao 2000: 26, Patton 2000: 39, Rukmani 2000: 109, Nelson 2000: 134, Lee 2000: 258, Apffel-Marglin and Parajuli 2000: 292, Alley 2000: 366, Schweig 2010: 91). And some equate a plausible environmental ethic with a theory of the environment that advocates the attitudes of “veneration” and/or “reverence” toward nature (Deutsch 1970: 82, Crawford 1982: 149, Rolston 1987: 175, Kinsley 1991: 230, Arapura 1991: 203, Coward 1998: 40, Sharma 1998: 57, Nelson 1998: 63, Sherma 1998: 95, Nagarajan 1998: 275, Kinsley 1998: 242, Dwivedi 2000: 5, Shiva 1999: 74, 2000: 5, Rao 2000: 34, Rukmani 2000:103, Narayanan 2001: 183, Feuerstein and Feuerstein 2007: 11, Chapple 2009: 29, Jain 2011: 8, 18).

The full meanings and implications of the words ‘intrinsic value’, ‘sacred’, and so on are obscure. This need not confuse the discussion, however. Since these claims are made in the context of assessing whether certain Hindu texts and traditions entail a plausible environmental ethic, these authors must take the claims that nature is intrinsically valuable, sacred, and so on to entail that human agents morally ought to consider nature in deciding what to do. If these claims do not entail that human agents morally ought to consider nature in deciding what to do, then they are irrelevant to the question of whether certain Hindu texts and traditions entail a plausible environmental ethic.

Furthermore, these authors must take the claims that nature is intrinsically valuable, sacred, and so on to entail that human agents morally ought to consider nature for its own sake in deciding what to do. The weaker claim that human agents morally ought to consider nature, but only for the sake of human beings, after all, is presumably true even if nature is not intrinsically valuable, sacred, and so on.

When these scholars say that a plausible environmental ethic must claim that nature is intrinsically valuable, sacred, and so on, then, they mean to say that a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to nature. That is, they say that a plausible environmental ethic must claim that human agents morally ought to consider nature for its own sake in deciding what to do. To say that human agents morally ought to consider nature for its own sake in deciding what to do, in turn, is to say that human agents morally ought to count the fact that some action of theirs might benefit or harm nature as a direct, prima facie reason⁵ for or against performing the action, respectively.

If a human agent morally ought to consider a tree for its own sake in deciding what to do, for example, then the fact that my action of carving my name in the tree might harm the tree constitutes a direct prima facie reason against doing so – even if this harm to the tree will not in turn harm any other entity. The fact that my action of watering the tree, in contrast, might benefit it, constitutes a direct prima facie reason in favor of watering it – even if this benefit will not in turn benefit some other entity.⁶

The word ‘nature’ is also ambiguous. It might refer to (1) nature as a whole, and/or (2) wholes in nature – such as ecosystems, species, communities, and so on, and/or (3) individuals in nature – animals, plants, and so on. Consequently, the claim that a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to nature might mean that (1) a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to nature as a whole, and/or (2) a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to wholes in nature, and/or (3) a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to individuals in nature, such as animals and plants.

Many of the authors that I discuss in this book do not define the word ‘nature’ explicitly. Among those that do clarify this term, however, none deny claim (3) – that a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to individuals in nature, such as animals and plants. Indeed, when these authors are specific about what they mean by the word ‘nature’, they invariably mention individual entities such as animals and plants. Their claim that a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to nature, then, implies that a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to animals and plants.

On this matter, environmental ethicists and scholars writing on Hinduism and the environment are in general agreement. The most influential argument in favor of this view states that the alternative – a strict holism, according to which only wholes have direct moral standing – entails a kind of “environmental fascism” (Regan 2004: 362) – “the submergence of the individual … in the glorification of the collectivity” (Callicott 1999: 71). It is hard to see how a view of this sort could avoid unapologetically prescribing the “culling” of large numbers (and perhaps a great majority) of human beings, for example (or at least widespread human sterilization) – a claim that most take to be straightforwardly unacceptable.

2. Direct moral standing and intrinsic value

At this point it is worth saying something about the relationship between direct moral standing and intrinsic value. As I’ve said, a number of scholars writing on Hinduism and the environment claim that a plausible environmental ethic must attribute direct moral standing to nature by claiming that a plausible environmental ethic must attribute intrinsic value to nature. This suggests that they take the claim that an entity has intrinsic value to entail that it has direct moral standing and vice versa. It might even be that they take these claims to be equivalent. The same is true of many environmental ethicists.

It is easy to see why they might think this. Intrinsic value is defined in a number of ways, but in its least controversial sense, it means the value that something has as an end, independent of the value of further ends to which it is a means. This is how I will use the words ‘intrinsic value’ throughout this book. If something has value as an end, independent of the value of further ends to which it is a means, then presumably human agents morally ought to consider it as an end in deciding what to do. If human agents morally ought to consider something as an end in deciding what to do, then human agents morally ought to consider it for its own sake in deciding what to do. And if human agents morally ought to consider it for its own sake in deciding what to do, then it has direct moral standing. So it seems that if something has intrinsic value, it has direct moral standing. The same line of reasoning reversed seems to imply that if an entity has direct moral standing, then it has intrinsic value.

A roughly parallel series of inferences seems to demonstrate that something has indirect moral standing if and only if it has instrumental value. Instrumental value is the value that something has as a means to further ends. If something has value as a means to further ends, then presumably human agents morally ought to consider it as a means to further ends. If human agents morally ought to consider it as a means to further ends, then human agents morally ought to consider it for the sake of other entities. And if human agents morally ought to consider it for the sake of other entities, then it has indirect moral standing. For these same reasons, it seems that if something has indirect moral standing, then it has instrumental value.

There are, however, a number of problems with these assumptions. The first is that an entity might have intrinsic value, but lack direct moral standing, simply because there are no possible circumstances in which human agents morally ought to consider the entity for its own sake in deciding what to do. In Chapter 4 I argue that both brahman and ātman seem to be examples of such entities. Since both brahman and ātman are unaffected by the actions of agents – at least according to most Hindu texts and traditions – there are no possible circumstances in which agents morally ought to consider them for their own sakes in deciding what to do. Hence both brahman and ātman lack direct moral standing. Yet surely both brahman and ātman are intrinsically valuable, if anything is. They are characterized, in various texts and traditions, as the ultimate (uttama, para, parama, and so on) human goal.

One response here might be to draw the connection between intrinsic value and direct moral standing more tightly. A number of philosophers, for example, analyze intrinsic value in terms of direct reasons. On this analysis, to say that an entity has intrinsic value is to say that there are direct reasons to act with regard to the entity (Samuelsson 2010: 523, Davion 2006: 120, Godfrey-Smith 1980: 41).⁷

If intrinsic value is understood in this way, then it is simply synonymous with direct moral standing. The problem, however, is that this conception of intrinsic value implies that an entity can have intrinsic value only if there are possible circumstances in which it might be affected by other entities. Yet it is hard to see how this could be a condition of intrinsic value in any ordinary sense. Again, brahman has intrinsic value if anything does, and yet there are no possible circumstances in which it might be affected by the actions of agents. It would be strange, however, to say that brahman lacks intrinsic value because agents cannot affect it, but that it would have intrinsic value if agents could affect it. If anything, the transcendent aspect of brahman seems to contribute to its value, rather than preclude it.

A second problem with these assumptions is that moral standing is plausibly attributed to a narrower range of entities than value is. Various scholars attribute intrinsic value to states, states of affairs, facts, properties, tropes, events, objects, and so on. Direct moral standing, in contrast, is typically attributed only to objects or wholes, since agents generally consider objects and wholes, but not states, states of affairs, facts, and so on, for their own sakes in deciding what to do. My action of giving my dog a treat might cause a pleasure state in my dog, and the pleasure state might be intrinsically valuable, but it is my dog that I consider for his own sake in deciding what to do – not the pleasure state itself. Hence an entity other than an object or whole might have intrinsic value but lack direct moral standing.

A third, related problem is that there is a good deal of debate over what kinds of entities might be the bearers of value. I just mentioned that various scholars attribute intrinsic value to states, states of affairs, facts, properties, tropes, events, objects, and so on. Many of these scholars insist, however, that only one of these types of entities might be the bearer of intrinsic value. Roderick Chisholm and others argue that only states of affairs are bearers of intrinsic value (Chisholm 1968, von Wright 1972, Feldman 1997, Zimmerman 2001). W. D. Ross and others claim that facts are the only bearers of intrinsic value (Ross 1930: 112–13, Lemos 1994), and so on. Hence these accounts deny that objects or wholes might be the bearers of intrinsic value. Even if objects and wholes cannot be the bearers of intrinsic value, however, they might nonetheless have direct moral standing. Peter Singer, for example, seems to say that only states or states of af...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1 A plausible environmental ethic
• 2 Instrumentalist interpretations
• 3 Interconnectedness interpretations
• 4 Sameness interpretations
• 5 The moral standing of animals and plants in the Manusmrti
• 6 The moral standing of animals and plants in the Mahābhārata, Part I: The burning of the Khāndava Forest
• 7 The moral standing of animals and plants in the Mahābhārata, Part II: the dialogue on vegetarianism and ahimsā in the Anuśāsanaparvan
• 8 The moral standing of animals and plants in the Yogasūtra
• Conclusion
• Appendix: The jīvanmukta objection to the argument from pain
• References
• Index