Digital Russia

The Language, Culture and Politics of New Media Communication

Michael Gorham, Ingunn Lunde, Martin Paulsen, Michael Gorham, Ingunn Lunde, Martin Paulsen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317810735
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Digital Russia provides a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which new media technologies have shaped language and communication in contemporary Russia. It traces the development of the Russian-language internet, explores the evolution of web-based communication practices, showing how they have both shaped and been shaped by social, political, linguistic and literary realities, and examines online features and trends that are characteristic of, and in some cases specific to, the Russian-language internet.

Part I

Contexts

1 The (im)personal connection

Computational systems and (post-) Soviet cultural history

Vlad Strukov

This is the cherished computer

That even Stanislaw Lern could not dream of,

That is the subject of poems and odes,

That is the pain in the neck of IBM.¹

That is the House that Jack Built.

(Humorous sketch, Jubilee celebrations, the Institute of Precision Mechanics and Computer Engineering, Moscow, 14 December 1973)

Introduction

The word “computer” (komp’iuter) is a recent addition to the Russian language. In the late 1980s it entered into use alongside the Russian term “EVM,” an acronym that stands for “electronic calculating machine” (elektronno-vychislitelₑnaia mashina). The new term was introduced deliberately to designate a personal computing machine, and, in the early 1990s, following the dissolution of the USSR and the collapse of the Soviet computer industry, it gained the additional meaning of a Western-made computing device. The change from “EVM” to “computer” signifies a change in the methods of consumption; as the tide of the chapter suggests, Soviet computers were never intended for personal, individual use—the (im)personal connection—and, therefore, the contemporary collaborative practice on the Russian internet is grounded in the early collective use of computers in the USSR. In fact, even when personal computers became available, in the official discourse the use of the term “personal” was carefully avoided; ideologically correct euphemisms were used instead, such as EVM massovogo primeneniia (“electronic calculating machine for use by the masses”; see Naumov 1987). Ironically, these Soviet ideologemes correctly defined the future of computing;—the move from specialized use by experts to mass use everywhere in the world.

In this chapter I aim to put forward a theoretical framework for the analysis of late Soviet and post-Soviet computational practice in relation to ideologies of consumption and digital subjectivities in both historical and cultural perspective. The focus of the chapter is on the personal computer conceived simultaneously as a utilitarian object, social practice, means of communication, type of organization of labor and an element in the ideological apparatus of the state. I interrogate the relationship among three nodes of enquiry—computer technology, ideology and subjectivity—both as modes of production and consumption, as well as their transformation over the period of transition to a market economy. I reposition the technologically-enhanced subjectivity by contrasting it with types of technological use. The term “impersonal” means “not having personality” and refers normally to the “impersonalizing” effect of computers (for example, see Walther and Garr 2010; Bolin 2012); in this chapter, however, the term denotes the lack of personal, private consumption of computer technologies in the USSR, presenting the Soviet computer as a collective, collaborative practice. In addition, the personal computer is regarded as a key component in Soviet and Russian systems of knowledge formation (informatika), which evolved from being a technical tool to a system of “immaterial labor” (Lazzarato 1996). The history of the relationship between computers and ideology has been explored in Slava Gerovitch’s (2002) detailed study of Soviet cybernetics, where he argues for the emergence of a whole discourse, what he calls “cyberspeak,” that shifted the boundaries between knowledge and ideology in the 1950s—1970s. In my study, I focus on the later Soviet period and Gorbachev’s perestroika, and I analyze Soviet technological ideologemes in relation to Soviet ideologies and practices of consumption, thus extending and refining the theoretical framework of the “technology versus ideology” debate.

Research presented in this chapter is multidisciplinary, and it includes archival work that traces digital history in Russia and the USSR, oral histories collected in the form of interviews with engineers who worked at Soviet computer manufacturing plants,² and digital memoirs of early practitioners of the Runet.³1 combine digital anthropology with analysis of Soviet and post-Soviet media in order to reconstruct the official and popular discourses surrounding computer technology.⁴ The chapter consists of three sections. The first provides a critical overview of early Soviet experiments with computer technologies, and it situates the computer in relation to the Soviet ideological machine. The second and third sections focus on two periods, 1985–95 and 1995–2005. These periods are designated historically (the transition from the USSR to post-Soviet Russia), technologically (the release of the first Soviet personal computers in 1985; the launch of Microsoft Windows Cyrillic in 1995, enabling coding in Russian; and the emergence of social networking sites in the mid-2000s), socially (the transition from elite to mass use of computers), and culturally (from collective to collaborative use). While the overall development of the Soviet-Russian computer industry is similar to those of other countries, it differs in that there has been a complete overhaul of the production system and a seismic shift in the understanding of the role of computation technologies over the past 25 years. These technological and cultural differences inform the discussion in the second and third sections concerning the transformation of the ideological system as well as social and cultural practice. As the Soviet-Russian tradition of computer manufacturing was interrupted in the early 1990s, my analysis begins with both the production of the hardware and the consumption of computer technologies in the USSR, and then in its latter stages focuses on consumption and artistic, commercial and other uses of computers. I demonstrate how the ideological “cyberspeak” of the Soviet era is transformed into the technological and cultural “double-speak” of the post-Soviet period and later into social and political “counter-speak” in the new millennium. The chapter concludes by considering the use of computers in Russia in the new globalized context of the Putin era.

Ideologies of computation and consumption (the pre-Gorbachev period)

In the USSR, as in the UK, the USA, France and other countries, computers appeared as part of the military-industrial complex at the start of the Gold War. In fact, a research facility for applied mathematics and computer technology was established in 1947 to run calculations for ballistic missiles and anti-missile defenses. The first analogue computational device was built in Kiev in 1951, and an automatic computing machine was assembled in Moscow in 1953. Both were designed by engineer-enthusiasts who had managed to overcome ideological hurdles.⁵ The development of the Soviet computer program was initially hindered for ideological reasons. In 1953, Voprosy Filosofii published an anonymous article entitled “Whom Cybernetics Serves,” which denounced cybernetics as a reactionary bourgeois science that was at odds with dialectical and historical materialism. Cybernetics was rehabilitated as part of de-Stalinization, leading to the establishment of a Scientific Council of the USSR Academy of Science on Cybernetics in 1958. The original ideological conflict was resolved by accepting cybernetics as a science of rationality that fostered and advanced the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. This provided scholars and engineers with the boost needed for the creation of a competitive computer industry. In fact, Loren A. Graham (1973: 324) observed that in the 1960s cybernetics enjoyed more prestige in the USSR than in any other country in the world.

If, during the Thaw,⁶ cybernetics and, by extension, computers, were at the center of the ideological debate, in the 1970s, there were firm moves to integrate computer systems into the Soviet industrial complex. In his speech at the 24th Party Congress in April 1971, Leonid Brezhnev argued for the improvement of management in the USSR:

Science has substantially enriched the theoretical arsenal of planning […] We should use these methods more widely and establish automated management systems more quickly, bearing in mind that in the long run we should establish a state-wide automated system of information collection and processing.

(“Materialy” 1971:67–8)

In the long-standing tradition of Soviet economic development, Brezhnev favored a country-wide, centrally-controlled, top-down system of collecting and processing information. As V.F. Sirenko documents, the system was necessitated by the rising complexity of industrial production, a greater variety of products and the speed of technological change (1976: 6–8). The computer and other types of automation were conceived of as means to improve the Soviet planning system. A nation-wide system for collection, storage and processing of data for economic planning, management and accounting, known by its acronym OGAS, was established in order to facilitate the work of the state central planning department, Gosplan. With its automated systems for the control of technological processes, the management of enterprise, planning calculations, state statistics and other systems, OGAS was meant to emerge as a super-system of management and control that would supersede and normalize inefficient structures inherited from the pre-war period of rampant industrialization. Therefore the Parly’s ideologists fostered the use of the computer as an administrative, managerial tool rather than as a means of production, a key component in a new electronic industry.

Instead of utilizing available technologies, the Party officials prescribed the very development of computer systems, thus making the process unnecessarily complicated and unwittingly jeopardizing the whole computer industry. For example, in 1974, Gosplan adjusted its own targets, aiming to install 1,583 computers (417 in construction, 129 in agriculture, 129 in transport, etc.) (Samborskii and Simchera 1974). In reality, there were far fewer computers available, and the technological system was forced to rely on the second generation of computers at a time when the third generation had already appeared. As a result, the ideological system supported the production of computers that had already become outdated, thus severing the link between innovation and production, as well as widening the technological gap between the USSR and the West. Furthermore, dizzied by the rivalry with the USA, the Soviet authorities financed computer projects that would surpass American equivalents in terms of speed of automation or any other easily quantifiable feature that they could use for their own ideological aims. This approach gave birth to the world’s fastest computer and the computer with the largest memory, but rarely to a technology that could provide users with a reliable service in mundane circumstances.⁷ Such a distortion of the computer industry occurred at the level of technological implementation but not at the level of ideas. Finally, computers had been integrated into the Soviet system of what Martin Gave, following on Soviet scientists, calls meta-planning—“the selection of and, where necessary, the transfer to a new planning and management system” (1980: 24–5). In other words, computers became—at least at the level of discourse—part of the state super-structure, overseeing and servicing all of society and industry. As a result, the Soviet state had major stakes in the computer industry, which were militar)?—as in the USA and other countries—but also structural and ideological. To reiterate, unlike in the USA, computers in the USSR were expected to reconfigure the structure of the Soviet economy and the state itself and, as a result, diffusion of authority occurred at the level of political and economic leadership. For instance, the Academy of Sciences was responsible for research, Minpribor for the production of the hardware, and Gosplan for various enterprises. In turn, this gave rise to technological, administrative and political incompatibilities, while at the same time creating a large class of workers trained in information management. This class—the authority at the middle level—would be instrumental in dismantling the Soviet political system in the late 1980s and privatizing industrial property in the 1990s.

It is estimated that in 1970 the USSR had about 5,000 computers, or about 20 per million inhabitants. By comparison, the USA had a stock of 344 per million, and the UK and Japan—91 and 96, respectively (Cave 1980: 190). The statistics demonstrate that personal computers were not a mass phenomenon in either the USSR or the West in the 1970s; there is, however, a clear indication that work was being carried out in this direction. The comparison also reveals that, unlike in the West and Japan, the Soviet computer was never intended for personal consumption. It was firmly rooted in the Soviet industria...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgments
• A note on transliteration and translation
• Introduction
• Part I Contexts
• Part II New media spaces
• Part III Language and diversity
• Part IV Literature and new technology
• V The political realm
• Index