Indonesia-Malaysia Relations

Cultural Heritage, Politics and Labour Migration

Marshall Clark, Juliet Pietsch

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN:
  9780415788014
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317808879
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Drawing on social media, cinema, cultural heritage and public opinion polls, this book examines Indonesia and Malaysia from a comparative postcolonial perspective. The Indonesia–Malaysia relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in Southeast Asia, especially because Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous country and third largest democracy, is the most populous and powerful nation in the region. Both states are committed to the relationship, especially at the highest levels of government, and much has been made of their 'sibling' identity. The relationship is built on years of interaction at all levels of state and society, and both countries draw on their common culture, religion and language in managing political tensions. In recent years, however, several issues have seriously strained the once cordial bilateral relationship. Among these are a strong public reaction to maritime boundary disputes, claims over each country's cultural forms, the treatment of Indonesian workers in Malaysia, and trans-border issues such as Indonesian forest fire haze. Comparing the two nations' engagement with cultural heritage, religion, gender, ethnicity, citizenship, democracy and regionalism, this book highlights the social and historical roots of the tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as the enduring sense of kinship.

1 Uneasy neighbours

Introduction

The Indonesia–Malaysia relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships in Southeast Asia, especially because Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country and third largest democracy, is the most populous and powerful nation in the region. Both states are committed to the relationship, especially at the highest levels of government, and much has been made of their ‘sibling’ identity. The relationship is built on years of interaction at all levels of state and society. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, several issues have seriously strained Indonesia’s once cordial relationship with Malaysia. Among these are strong public reaction to maritime boundary disputes, claims over each country’s cultural heritage, the cross-border impact of haze from Indonesian forest fires, the poor treatment of Indonesian workers in Malaysia, and the widespread belief that Malaysians regard Indonesians as their poor cousins. Relevant to the last of these, Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister from 1988–99, in 2007 summarised the perception of the relationship thus: ‘Malaysians are arrogant, Indonesians are jealous’ (Bayuni 2010).

In one of the few extended Malaysian commentaries on the bilateral relationship, Khalid and Yacob (2012) suggest that the unequal pace of democratisation in the two countries over the last decade has made the relationship increasingly problematic. The emergent role in the relationship of variables external to the two governments, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the mass media, has been crucial in this regard. Yet, in relation to the impact of variables external to the two governments, it is largely a story of Indonesia’s democracy, Indonesia’s NGOs and Indonesia’s mass media rather than Malaysia’s democracy, Malaysia’s NGOs and Malaysia’s mass media. We shall discuss the particular roles of democracy and NGOs later in the book. In terms of the mass media, the heavily controlled Malaysian media has been ‘intentionally sober and restrained’ in its reporting of sensitive issues involving Indonesia, thus reflecting Kuala Lumpur’s diplomatic approach to Jakarta (Khalid and Yacob 2012: 373). On the other hand, Indonesia’s liberal mass media, a capstone of its democratic consolidation progress, has played a key role in inflaming the tensions. In addition to numerous anti-Malaysia columns, editorials and blogs, several books discussing the bilateral relationship, often in highly inflammatory language, have been published in Indonesia in recent years. Almost all of them have provocative titles, such as Indonesia vs Malaysia (Susilo 2009), Maumu Apa Malaysia? (What is it that you Want, Malaysia?) (Lazuardi 2009), Ancaman Negeri Jiran (The Threat of a Neighbouring State) (Usman and Din 2009a), Panas Dingin: Hubungan Indonesia–Malaysia (Hot and Cold: Indonesia–Malaysia Relations) (Purwanto 2010) and Ganyang Malaysia (Crush Malaysia) (Efantino and Arifin 2009).¹ As we mentioned in the Introduction, the rally cry ‘Ganyang Malaysia’ harks back to Indonesia’s Konfrontasi (Confrontation) with Malaysia in the period 1963–66, when it was popularised by Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, who viewed the formation of Malaysia as a neo-colonial plot. To this day, it is a frequently used phrase in Indonesia–Malaysia rhetoric.

This chapter begins with an overview of the principal causes and outcomes of the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. We then examine the relatively stable relationship between the two countries under Suharto and Mahathir, before introducing some of the complex cultural tapestry shared by the two nations that has enabled a deep cultural affinity to form, which has greatly influenced bilateral relations in the postcolonial, post-independence eras. We gradually open up the discussion with a few case studies, such as the public spat over the Sumatran Tor-Tor folk dance and the cultural sensitivities associated with shared cultural heritage items such as the ceremonial keris dagger, found throughout the Indo-Malay world. We close the chapter by raising the possibility of alternative avenues of investigation, such as employing cultural analysis based on concepts such as the pan-Malay Nusantara (The Archipelago), or alternatives such as Jawa (Java) and Melayu (Malaya). The postcoloniality of Indonesia and Malaysia subtly infuses each of the cases discussed here, ensuring that this is, above all, a discussion of two nation-states. Alternative imaginaries for the Southeast Asian archipelago, such as those based on a shared kinship, race or ethnicity, hold little sway.

Konfrontasi

In his classic book on the Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation, Jamie Mackie (1974) argues that understanding domestic politics is crucial in understanding the period of confrontation between the two countries. More specifically, Mackie views the confrontation essentially as a result of Indonesia’s convoluted domestic politics, which were largely determined by Indonesia’s post-independence president, Sukarno. Others have chosen to frame Konfrontasi against the broader context of the Cold War, where it is interpreted as a diplomatic quandary inspired by external factors (Brackman 1966; Subritzky 1999; Jones 2002). Liow (2005: 98) prefers to consider the internal political dynamics within the Malay world, arguing that Konfrontasi ‘can also be viewed as the climax of antagonistic diplomacy between two kin states whose understanding of the basis of their relations as sovereign nation-states was evolving along diametrically opposite planes’. Although on the one hand we do not wish to overemphasise the role of external factors, on the other we would argue that the role of Malaysia is perhaps overstated in Liow’s account. Malaysia’s role was passive, at best. Instead, along the lines of Mackie’s perspective (1974), we argue that Konfrontasi is best understood in terms of Indonesia’s domestic politics, which revolved around the mercurial figure of Sukarno, a nationalist firmly committed to eradicating the last vestiges of European imperialism from Southeast Asia (Subritzky 1999).

By the 1960s, Sukarno had developed a neutralist foreign policy, dominated by his doctrine of New Emerging Forces. In essence, his ideology was one of continuing revolution against neo-colonialism, which was usually represented by the colonisers. After Indonesia had successfully claimed and incorporated West New Guinea in 1962, the last remaining colonial power of any substance in the region was Britain. By early 1963, Sukarno had led his country into direct opposition to British plans regarding Malaysia. Sukarno objected to the idea of a confederation of the former British territories and annexes of Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei with Malaya in a single political entity to be called the Federation of Malaysia. Yet when Tunku Abdul Rahman floated the Federation proposal on 27 May 1961, Indonesia raised no objections, primarily because Sukarno assumed that it was part of a decolonisation project. By January 1963, however, Sukarno had officially rejected the plan and launched a policy of confrontation (Konfrontasi). It appears that soon after his initial reaction to the Tunku’s proposal, Sukarno had become convinced that the Malaysia project was not an act of decolonisation but a manifestation of neo-colonialism in its own backyard, and that it was likely that Britain would retain its extensive economic interests in the region, not to mention its naval base in Singapore. The Jakarta elite had long held reservations about the close cooperation between Britain and Kuala Lumpur, suspecting that the latter was susceptible to colonial influence. These suspicions were quite normal in the context of the international politics of the day. Anticolonial sentiment was at its peak, and anticolonial and post-independence movements were often marked by bloody revolution, as was the case in Indonesia. Malaysia’s warm postcolonial camaraderie with Britain appeared, therefore, to be a rather peculiar aberration.

For Indonesians, it appears that Konfrontasi was a statement against the encroaching neo-imperialism that Malaysia was seen to embody. Sukarno’s ideological posturing did little to quell the flames. In addition to the various objections outlined above, Sukarno objected to the Malaysia plan because he did not approve of the continuing power of the Malay sultans in the new federation, which he regarded as ‘undemocratic’ (Cribb and Brown 1995: 86). Sukarno was also of the opinion that the federation was being imposed in the face of what seemed to be popular opposition in the territories in Borneo, an opinion that was not without some substance, particularly in the case of Brunei (Mackie 1974; Poulgrain 1998; Subritzky 1999). ‘Underlying these objections’, according to Cribb and Brown (1995: 86), ‘was also a sense of pique that Indonesia, the largest country in the region, had not been consulted at all by Britain in its planning’. Sukarno also saw Kuala Lumpur’s failure to consult its neighbour with its plans as a sign of disrespect for Indonesia’s leaders. This sense of pique, we should point out, was more closely associated with the snub to Indonesia than any residual irredentist sentiments. Although Indonesians had occasionally urged that British Borneo should be liberated from colonial rule, few had suggested publicly that it should be annexed to Indonesia (Mackie 1974). It is unclear what they might have been thinking behind closed doors. As Mackie observes (1974: 5), we know very little about the underlying dispositions and motivations of individual actors involved in the dispute, including to what extent they were motivated by pan-Malay Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia) chauvinism or anticolonial sentiments, or even by Sukarno’s ideological indoctrination.

Although Konfrontasi never reached the extremes of a full-scale war, Sukarno vigorously supported an anti-Malaysia insurgency in Borneo, which was characterised by a mix of naval blockades, organised rebellions, subversions and Indonesian paratrooper landings on Malaysian soil (Jones 2002; Mackie 1974). A direct military confrontation was always out of the question because the British, with strong military backing from Australia and New Zealand, had vastly superior forces in the region (Subritzky 1999). As an alternative, Sukarno attempted to use diplomatic pressure to force concessions, including an international campaign to exclude Malaysia from Third World gatherings. When Malaysia became a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council in January 1965, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations and began moves to organise an alternative body, namely the Conference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFO). Both the military and diplomatic elements of the confrontation came to nothing. British, Australian and New Zealand forces easily defeated the armed incursions into Malaysia and the Indonesian hostility cemented the Malaysian national identity rather than undermining it. In the diplomatic sphere, none of Indonesia’s allies from the Asia–Africa bloc followed Indonesia when it left the United Nations, which meant that Indonesia experienced a long period of diminished influence in the Non-Aligned Movement.

Despite the apparent humiliation, many Indonesians were proud of the increased attention that Indonesia was receiving from around the world. While Indonesia had little power to project beyond its own borders, Sukarno’s activist foreign policy-making was designed to give the impression that Indonesia was a great power. For a country that was deeply disappointed with the fruits of independence, Sukarno’s foreign policy grandstanding had a powerful appeal. Sukarno’s greatest attraction was his ability to unify the nation through embracing a national politics with a national agenda, which he described as a return to the armed revolution against the colonial powers. The confrontation with Malaysia was emblematic of Sukarno’s efforts to bring a sense of dynamism and shared purpose back into national political life. A similar argument can be made today in relation to the resurgence of the Sukarno-esque ‘Ganyang Malaysia’ rallying-cry. One could argue that the anti-Malaysia grandstanding of the post-Suharto era is in part an expression of the sense of chaos, anti-climax and disappointment of the postauthoritarian era, just as the confrontation of the mid-1960s must have been, to some extent, an outward function of the overall disappointment and intractability of the social and economic problems of the time (Cribb and Brown 1995).

Post-independence ambivalence

Considering Indonesia’s colonial background and the anti-Western antagonism displayed by Sukarno, it is ironic that Indonesia’s post-independence foreign policy was – and is – generally oriented toward the West. From the outset of independence, Indonesia opted to develop a strong relationship with the West and with the United States in particular. Initially, this was primarily as a means of retaining sovereignty in the face of a possible return of the Dutch (Hadiwinata 2009: 62). Consider the following argument by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sutan Sjahrir in 1945, which highlights the importance of a strong and friendly relationship with the United States:

Indonesia is geographically situated within the sphere of influence of Anglo Saxon capitalism and imperialism. Accordingly, Indonesia’s fate ultimately depends on the fate of Anglo Saxon capitalism and imperialism … It is clear that till now Dutch power has simply been a pawn in a political chess game that the British have been playing. But we must recognize that Dutch power here has by no means the same significance for American as it does for British foreign policy. In this fact lie possibilities for us to win a new position for ourselves in harmony with the political ambitions of the Giant of the Pacific, the United States.

(Leifer 1983: 8)

In the following years Indonesia opted for a supposedly ‘neutral’ position by introducing the concept of Politik Luar Negeri Bebas Aktif (independent and active foreign policy), signifying that it would not take sides in the Cold War between the US-led Western bloc and the Soviet-led Eastern bloc. Instead, according to Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2008: 184), Indonesia intended to chart its own course in international relations, based on its own perceptions of its national interests. Throughout the period of multiparty politics (1950–57), however, Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation was often contested. On the one hand, ongoing efforts were made to forge a close relationship with the United States, at least until the early 1960s; on the other hand, these efforts were endangered by President Sukarno’s growing hostility towards the ‘Old Established Forces’ in world politics, countries spearheading what he called NEKOLIM (neo-colonialism and imperialism), and advocacy of the NEFOS (New Emerging Forces). Not surprisingly, this stance caused relations with the West to deteriorate (Hadiwinata 2009: 62).

Tensions between Indonesia and the West worsened after the Bandung Conference of 1955, which signified the desire and confidence of African and Asian countries to play a more autonomous role in international politics, transcending the Cold War ideological divide. According to Herb Feith (1978: 391), ‘[a]s the U.S. government saw it, Indonesia had moved fast from a friendly neutralism to one which was pregnant with hostility’. Moreover, the United States government had become convinced that Indonesia was moving towards communism when the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) came fourth with 16.4 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections in September 1955, the first ever democratic elections in Indonesia (Anwar 2008: 188). This was seen as a blow to American interests in the region. Throughout the 1950s, the United States had been trying to persuade Indonesia to join in the anticommunist alliance that Washington was trying to forge, which was aimed at containing China and preventing communist forces from gaining political power in newly independent nations such as Indonesia.

Historians have generally agreed that Sukarno was never a communist, but, rather, a nationalist who was strongly opposed to colonialism and imperialism. His flirtation with China and the Soviet Union, as well as his trenchant anti-Western rhetoric, did not necessarily mean that he was leaning towards communism. Rather, according to Anwar (2008: 188), it was most probably an attempt to put pressure on the United States to push the Netherlands towards negotiating the issue of West New Guinea. As far as the Netherlands was concerned, when sovereignty over the Dutch East Indies was formally transferred over to the Republic of Indonesia in 1949, the province of West New Guinea was not included in the transfer. Thus the Netherlands was reluctant to engage further in the dispute, especially as the United Nations had voted on the issue, albeit with an undesirable result from Indonesia’s point of view. The United States, who did not wish to alienate the Netherlands, a valuable NATO ally, was unwilling to be involved.

Sukarno’s brinkmanship ensured that Indonesia continued to reject United States pressures to align itself with Washington, except for a brief and seemingly aberrant period in the early 1950s. According to Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2008), during the Sukiman cabinet (April 1951–February 1952), dominated by politicians from the Islamic Masyumi Party who were avowedly anti-communist, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subardjo secretly signed an agreement in Washington in January 1952, in which Indonesia would accept United States economic and military assistance under the terms of the 1951 Mutual Security Agreement. Disclosure of this agreement, however, caused controversy that led to the fall of the Sukiman government in the following month. ‘From then onward’, says Anwar (2008: 185), ‘no Indonesian government would take the political risk of formalising a security tie with the United States’. The consequent idea of holding an Asian-African conference, proposed by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, was aimed not only at promoting greater autonomy for Asian and African countries in international politics but also to distinguish his administration from the previous pro-American government. Indonesia’s general disavowal of the United States, coupled with Sukarno’s increasingly strident anticolonial rhetoric, meant that Indonesia’s response to the United States-backed Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) – a Southeast Asian counterpart of NATO that included Pakistan, New Zealand, Australia, and England, with Thailand and the Philippines as the only Southeast Asian members – was lukewarm. Sukarno also tried to pull out of the United Nations and Indonesian foreign policy veered to the left, becoming closer to communist China. It was in this context that two short-lived regional organisations were established – the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 and MAPHILINDO in 1963. The ASA (1961–66) consisted of Thailand, the Philippines and Malaya; MAPHILINDO (1963–66) consisted of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.

Both organisations failed for a variety of reasons, but much of the blame for their failure can be placed at Sukarno’s feet. ASA, for instance, was undermined from the start by its inability to persuade Indonesia to join. Th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Uneasy neighbours
• 2 Language and mythology
• 3 Cultural contestations
• 4 Museums
• 5 Islam
• 6 Ethnicity
• 7 Citizenship
• 8 Regionalism
• 9 Democracy
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index