Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong

Jonathan Harrison

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781317828433
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Modern Philosophy

First published in 2002. This is Volume VI of twelve in the Library of Philosophy series on Ethics. Written in 1971, this text looks at our knowledge of right and wrong and looks at topics of whether our knowledge of morality is a delusion and asks questions around moral judgment and they are subjective, the Universalization principle of a moral sense, God's commandments and human duties and finishes with suggestions of other reasons for actions.

INDEX

Abraham 213

Accepting 291, 294

Acton, H. B. 361 n.

Adultery 224

Advantages 337–9

Advice 253–4, 256–7, 270–3

Agreeing 290, 294–6

Analytic/Synthetic 36–42

Analyticity, A priority and 42–3, 45–50

Analyticity, Definition and 37–40, 43

Analyticity, Entailment and 39–40

Analyticity, God’s commands and 214

Analyticity, Intuitionism and 104

Analyticity, Necessity and 43–5

Analyticity, Non-propositional theories and 250–1

Analyticity not possessed by all moral judgements 67, 71, 102, 324

Analyticity, Not to be done and 307–8

Analyticity, Practical uselessness of judgements possessing 71, 73

Analyticity, Self-evidence and 60

Analyticity, Subject/Predicate propositions and 36–7

Analyticity, Synthetic propositions and 36–42

Analyticity, The naturalistic fallacy and 84–9, 97

Analyticity, The proof of moral judgments and 69–72

Analyticity, The universalization principle and 198

Analyticity, Verification and 50–4

Anselm, Saint 202 n.

Anthropology 16, 82, 229–260

Approval, Expression of 358

Approval, Nature of 110–11, 172

Approval not a means of settling moral disputes 336–7

Approval of Mankind 139–41

Approval of person other than the speaker 128–9

Approval of the speaker 108–17

Approval of the speaker’s community 128–39

Approval, Survival value of 337

A prio...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Copyright Page
• PREFACE
• Table of Contents
• I First-Order/Second-Order
• II Is Knowledge of Morality a Delusion?
• III Some Preliminary Distinctions
• IV Moral Judgments as A Priori and Analytic: The Place of Demonstrative Reasoning in Ethics
• V Moral Judgments as A Priori and Synthetic: Intuitionism and the Naturalistic Fallacy
• VI Moral Judgments as Synthetic, Contingent and Empirical: Subjectivism
• VII Ideal Observer Theories
• VIII Moral Sense Theories; The Universalization Principle
• IX God’s Commands and Man’s Duties
• X Morality and Moral Codes
• XI Evolution and Ethics
• XII Non-Propositional Theories
• XIII Moral Judgment and Some Practical Uses of Language
• XIV To Be or Not To Be
• XV Some Other Moral Judgments
• XVI Reasons for Actions
• Index