Strategy and Supply (RLE The First World War)

The Anglo-Russian Alliance 1914-1917

Keith Neilson

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781317703440
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

Based on a wide range of primary sources, this book shows the way in which diplomacy, economics, finance and strategy became intertwined during the First World War. The author examines the diplomatic, economic, financial and military relations between Britain and Russia and argues that the key to understanding the alliance is the British determination to win the war and the role Russia played in achieving this aim. British strategy is shown to be more the result of her relations with her allies, especially during the first years of the war, than a quarrel between East and West. This revision of the accepted interpretation of the strategy leads to a reassessment of the views of Lloyd George, Kitchener and Grey. The author concludes that in 1917 the British interest in Russia remained as it was earlier in the war: the maintenance of a powerful ally on the eastern front.

1

Men and Ideas

‘In moments of crisis,’ James Joll has observed, ‘political leaders fall back on unspoken assumptions.’¹ The determination of these ‘unspoken assumptions’ is essential in dealing with Anglo-Russian relations during the First World War, for much of what transpired between the two allies is not readily intelligible without some knowledge of what the British thought and expected of Russia. Such determination is complex and difficult. Not only does it require discerning attitudes and values normally not committed to paper, but also it requires the identification of the individuals who were instrumental in the creation of policy.

Even prior to identifying these individuals, some preliminary remarks are helpful. An important consideration when dealing with British policy towards Russia is what the average educated Englishman knew of Russia. For most Britons, Russia was an exotic and mysterious land.² Russian xenophobia and the difficulties posed by the language meant that from the earliest contacts with Russia in Elizabethan times, ‘Englishmen could never be well-informed about the country or its people’.³ Although by the nineteenth century Russia had ceased to be a land populated by fabulous creatures, as A. G. Cross notes, ‘perhaps on a psychological level, however, the transition from the strange to the familiar was never completed’.⁴ Even the great sensation caused in European circles prior to the war by Russian ballet and opera – the latter with its ‘brilliant quasioriental exoticism’ in colour and costume – must only have reinforced the impression that Russia was somehow barbarous and extra-European.⁵

More important for a study of Anglo-Russian relations was the existence of several firmly held beliefs about Russia. The first was that Russian government was arbitrary and oriental in nature.⁶ As a result of this misgovernment, the average Russian was felt to be drunken and boorish, and kept so deliberately as a consequence of repressive governmental policy. The advantages which Britons felt they enjoyed in terms of government had changed little since the eighteenth century.⁷ The second important belief was that Russia was ‘invulnerable’ militarily and that her soldiers were capable of inhuman feats of bravery and endurance. A British evaluation of Russian soldiers in the Seven Years’ War – ‘they cannot be defeated; they must be killed’ – was not appreciably different from remarks made of their performance in the Russo-Japanese war 140 years later or, indeed, in the First World War itself.⁸

A final word should be said about British public opinion and Russia, since Anglo-Russian relations depended in the last resort on some sort of public acceptance of Russia as an ally.⁹ In many ways Russia was both an unlikely and an embarrassing ally in 1914. Many of the reasons which had led to a virulent Russophobia in the nineteenth century still existed upon the outbreak of war.¹⁰ To a British public weaned on the beliefs of liberalism, autocratic Russia seemed a socially and politically reactionary backwater. As well, Russia was a long-time rival of the British Empire, a rival which over the last half-century had swallowed Central Asia and now threatened India from the borders of Persia. Indeed the rapprochement between the two powers signalled by the signing of the Anglo-Russian convention in 1907 was unique in that it united the more extreme elements of both political parties in opposition: the Liberal Radical faction, because of their revulsion for reactionary Russia, and the Unionist circle, because of their dislike for expansionist Russia.¹¹

On the other hand, many of those qualities which made Russia an unattractive partner before 1914 made her a desirable ally upon the outbreak of war. By September of that year, one of the more enduring myths of the war, the ‘Russian soldiers with snow on their boots’, had already come into existence, as the once-dreaded Russians had become the handmaidens of righteousness against the fiendish Hun. Special precautions taken by the Foreign Office to prevent any unwarranted reports of ‘Cossack outrages’ of the sort that had inflamed prewar opinion against Russia proved unnecessary after hostilities commenced, as British public opinion readily accepted the value of Russia as an ally.¹² With Parliament mostly dormant during the war, public opinion generally set no limits to British policy with respect to Russia.¹³ That policy was the province of a small group of men.

The widened range of contacts – military, financial, economic and diplomatic – between Britain and Russia during the war caused a major problem in the creation of British policy towards her eastern ally. Prior to the war British foreign policy was determined, nearly exclusively, by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and his advisers within the Foreign Office.¹⁴ Operating in what A. J. P. Taylor has called a ‘government of departments’, Sir Edward Grey, as Foreign Secretary, established foreign policy in the personal fashion which Canning, Palmerston and Salisbury had enjoyed before him.¹⁵ With Russia as an ally, the nature of relations between the two countries changed and became less a matter of traditional foreign policy and more a matter of total governmental policy directed towards winning the war. Thus the Foreign Office was compelled to seek advice from other departments of state to a degree unthinkable prior to 1914.¹⁶ As these departments, particularly the Treasury, the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions, had little if any experience in dealing with Russia, the Foreign Office continued to administer British policy; but that policy was no longer the exclusive creation of the Foreign Office.

Keeping this in mind, the problem arises of pinpointing the individuals who established British policy towards Russia. This is difficult, as the responsibility for creating this policy was spread widely. Still, this is not a reason (or at least not a satisfactory reason) for not attempting to do so. While there was no single body within the government which had exclusive control over Britain’s relations with Russia, there was a group of individuals who by dint of position, knowledge and influence tended to determine the policy. In the sense suggested by D. C. Watt, these individuals constituted an élite group concerned with the formulation of Britain’s policy towards Russia.¹⁷ It was their ‘unspoken assumptions’ which were significant for British policy.

As Watt argues, this élite group centred on the Cabinet and found the rest of its members among the diplomatists, civil servants and military men who dealt with Russia. The aim of this élite was to manage relations with Russia in such a fashion that she might be the strong ally necessary to help win the war. This much was agreed on by all members of the élite. Little else was. Differences in political affiliation, in departmental responsibility, in strategical opinion and in temperament all combined to ensure a wide divergence of conviction when the means to make, and the possibility of making, Russia an effective ally were discussed. Nor was this élite group static throughout the war. The political portion had a large turnover as the Liberal government turned into a coalition in 1915 and later, in 1916, into a second coalition with more drastic changes in personnel. Such shuffling of position was not confined to the politicians, for the bureaucracy of government was also affected by the war.¹⁸ The decline of the Foreign Office has been mentioned, but other changes, like the creation of the Ministry of Munitions and the rise of the Treasury’s influence in the functioning of the alliance, also had a major impact on the composition of the policy-making élite.

Despite such caveats, it is not impossible to discern the élite which established British policy towards Russia. Certain individuals played, and continued to play for long periods, prominent roles in shaping and implementing this policy. For convenience they can be divided into three main categories, roughly by the function which they performed in creating policy. The first category includes those politicians who either took a major interest in forming policy with respect to Russia – generally due to the portfolio which they held – or whose influence in the government was such that they affected what policy was adopted. These men made the final decisions with respect to British policy and, on occasion, even were responsible for its inception. Generally, however, the creation of policy initiatives was the responsibility of the second category of the élite, the civil servants who dealt with Russia and Russian matters. With some important additions, this meant the staff at the Foreign Office, the filter through which information from and communications with Russia passed. Although the role of the Foreign Office with respect to policy concerning Russia declined sharply in 1917, its influence remained substantial throughout the period under consideration. This was particularly true with respect to the interpretation of the information about Russia provided by the third category of the élite. This was comprised of the individuals who represented Britain in Russia and who were the source of the fact (and occasionally the fiction) upon which the other members of the élite based their decisions.

Before going on to discuss the individuals who made up this élite, it is necessary to explain why certain other people have been excluded from it. Among the political élite, one would expect to find the Secretary of State for War, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister of Munitions, given the importance which these departments had for Anglo-Russian relations. However, not all those who occupied these posts have been included here. Lord Derby, Secretary of State for War under Lloyd George, has been omitted because of his lack of initiative with respect to Russian policy. General Haig, the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in France, once contemptuously dismissed Derby as ‘the feather pillow [who] bears the mark of the last person who sat on him’; when it came to Russia, the ‘last person’ was normally General Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS).¹⁹ In a similar fashion neither Reginald McKenna nor Andrew Bonar Law, successively Chancellors of the Exchequer, have been included since neither put forward much in the way of policy with respect to Russian finances. McKenna also lacked the political clout to make his suggestions heard.²⁰ Christopher Addison, who succeeded Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions, never became more than a caretaker, the man who kept running the Ministry that Lloyd George had created.²¹

The exclusion of Lord Milner from the political élite requires special explanation. Milner virtually became Lloyd George’s ‘Minister for Russia’ in 1917, travelling to Petrograd for the inter-Allied conference and then heading the interdepartmental committee set up to deal with Russian matters which bore his name. There are two reasons for his omission. First, the Petrograd conference was of such significance that it will be dealt with in a separate chapter making treatment here unnecessary. Second, the Milner committee was largely an administrative body which carried out decisions made elsewhere and was rarely invo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Men and Ideas
• 2. Waiting for the Steamroller
• 3. The End of the Promise
• 4. The General Staff and Russia
• 5. Russian Desires; British Capabilities
• 6. The Petrograd Conference
• 7. Between the Revolutions
• 8. Conclusion
• Select Bibliography
• Index