Handbook of US-Middle East Relations

Robert Looney

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781135165918
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Divided into three sections, the Handbook of US-Middle East Relations provides a thorough and up-to-date overview of contemporary US-Middle East relations in historical perspective. With chapters contributed by leading experts in the field, this Handbook will be of use to academics, students and researchers in international relations, policy analysts, media professionals and government officials.

Part I: Factors Affecting US Relations contains essays including Globalization, Energy Security, Wars and Revolution, Peace Processes, US Foreign Aid Policy to the Middle East, and US Relations with Islamic Groups in the Middle East.

Part II: Perceptions of US Relations contains essays on how US policies are viewed, including The View from the Arab Street, The View from Palestine, The View from Pakistan and The View from Kurdistan.

Part III: US Relations at the Country Level comprise essays detailing relations between the USA and countries and areas in the Middle East and North Africa, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Tunisia, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Bahrain.

A comprehensive index completes the volume.

Part I
Overview/setting

1
Introduction

Robert E. Looney

Historically, the United States has enjoyed close relations with most countries in the Middle East. US economic and military assistance has played a major role in supporting the growth and security of regional states such as Egypt and Jordan. Traditionally, the oil-rich kingdoms in the Persian Gulf region have maintained close economic and security relationships with the US—supplying that country with essential energy supplies while being a major market for US military equipment. Over the years, these ties have created an elaborate network of organizational relationships, official and personal contacts, bilateral economic and military commissions, and joint commercial endeavors between the US and key countries throughout the region.

Despite this extensive co-operation, serious tensions have often marred US relations with Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East, at both governmental and popular levels. Some governments and sub-national groups in the region are avowedly hostile to the US, oppose its policies on a broad spectrum of issues, and seek to undermine US interests in the region, sometimes through violence. This is particularly the case of those governments that the US State Department identified as supporters of international terrorism, as well as a number of militia-type groups that the State Department lists as foreign terrorist organizations. Even friendly governments in the region are often ambivalent in their relations with the US, either because they disagree with specific aspects of US policy (such as the Arab-Israeli conflict) or because they are constrained by anti-US sentiment simmering within their own populations.

popular attitudes are even more complex and difficult to assess. Regional views of the US as a land of freedom and opportunity often co-exist with another image of moral decadence and hostility to Islamic society. These conflicting images can lead to wide swings in popular attitudes towards the US. The friendliness that many Americans encounter through personal and commercial contacts with ordinary citizens of Middle Eastern countries can turn quickly to hostility and, on occasion, to violence when the US adopts a policy perceived by locals as acting contrary to Arab or Muslim interests.

As the Obama administration settles in, one of its main tasks will be to improve America’s image in the Middle East region. During the previous Bush administration, US relations with most countries in the region declined to an all-time low. In many countries considered central to the war on terror, the general public deeply distrusts the US. Even in countries such as Kuwait that have long been considered relatively pro-American, support for the US image has declined dramatically.

What drives these anti-American sentiments? In large part, it is opposition to American foreign policy rather than value divides or religious-based enmity. The war in Iraq both solidified anti-Americanism in the Arab Middle East and extended it to other parts of the Muslim world. But it is not just Iraq—other key features of American foreign policy are widely unpopular.

Most of the Muslim world overwhelmingly opposes the US-led war on terrorism. That includes countries such as Pakistan, Egypt and Jordan, usually considered key partners in the fight against al-Qaeda and like-minded groups. Specifically, many Muslims think Americans’ fears about terrorism are simply overblown. Similarly, perceptions of US policy in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict also feed anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East. Large majorities of citizens in most Arab countries feel that American foreign policy is too pro-Israel.

But concerns about the US go beyond any single policy. To a large extent, America is disliked in the Muslim world because of its power—and especially because of the manner in which it is perceived to be wielded. Unrivaled since the end of the cold war and on the offensive since the 9/11 attacks, the US is seen as a menacing giant, using its considerable strength without regard for others.

Muslims also worry that America’s military strength might someday be directed at them. This sentiment has prevailed even in Turkey—a country that has been a NATO ally of the US for over half a century. The notion of a US military action on Turkey may seem far-fetched to many Americans, but in 2004, Turkish authors Burak Turna and Orkum Ucar tapped into these fears with great commercial success. Their novel Metal Storm was one of the fastest selling books in the country’s history. It was reportedly widely read in the Turkish Cabinet and Foreign Ministry.

In short, American power is deeply resented across the Middle East. Many feel as though there is no real check on US power. Due to its status as the sole superpower, when the US decides to carry out a policy, the region must simply live with the consequences.

There is also considerable distrust of American intentions. Numerous surveys report that majorities in several countries feel the US-led war on terrorism was not a sincere effort. Instead, sentiment was that the US had a range of ulterior motives: controlling Middle Eastern oil, protecting Israel, targeting unfriendly Muslim governments and, most ominously, dominating the world.

Finally, many do not even trust American explanations regarding the event that led to the war on terror—the 9/11 attacks. Suspicion of American motives runs so deep that many now question al-Qaeda’s responsibility for the tragedy.

US foreign policy is only one source of anti-Americanism. Many Muslims tend to believe that the US is inconsistent when it comes to democracy. Here the feeling is that the US promotes democracy whenever it can or mostly where it serves its interests. Accounts of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have added to the perception that America does not always practice the respect for the individual rights it espouses.

Another source of resentment toward the US is globalization, a process often seen as American inspired and driven. There is growing concern about the gap between rich and poor, a process many in the region see as associated with globalization. Another downside to globalization is the risk to the environment posed by economic growth. Rightly or wrongly, many in the region generally think the US is doing more to harm the environment than any other country.

A final concern about globalization is its impact on traditional cultures. On this issue, globalization equals “Americanization.” Vast numbers of Muslims worry about losing their traditions. In particular, they worry about having their traditions supplanted by American customs and ideas. People feel like they are getting a little too much America in their own communities and lives. In short, because of to its role as the dominant power in the world, politically, militarily and culturally, the US bears the brunt of international frustrations about the negative features of a globalized world.

Despite these negative patterns, improving America’s relations with the region is not impossible. However, as in many situations, once trust is lost, it takes time and effort to restore. Also, as long as the US remains the world’s dominant power, there will always be some trepidation about its intentions and actions. Still, because of the unpopularity of President Bush, the new Obama administration is likely to be given a fresh look by many Muslims.

Clearly, however, before significant progress can be made in US-Middle East relations, a necessary first step is a deeper understanding of the sources of past frictions and mistrust. With this in mind, the chapters that follow are divided into three main parts. In the first part, broad issues impacting on US-Middle East relations are examined. In particular, Lawrence Korb and Daniel de Wit (Chapter 3) assess many of the themes and issues currently affecting US- Middle East relations. Many of these are assessed in detail in the chapters that follow including: (1) the rise of militant Sunni extremism; (2) the increasingly militant activism of the Iranian-inspired Shi’ite Islamists in Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere throughout the greater Middle East; (3) US oil security and US dependence on Middle East sources of oil; (4) the Israel-Palestine conflict; and (5) the final problem that the US faces in the region, and one that which in many ways exacerbates the difficulties posed by the others, the chronic economic and political underdevelopment throughout much of the greater Middle East. As they note, how the US responds to these challenges will shape, for better or worse, the US role in the region.

As they conclude, “the confluence of these issues in this strategically vital region of the world means that US policy must be broad based and made with a view towards long-term success rather than short-term solutions that only postpone problems that must be eventually resolved if regional peace and prosperity is to take hold.” Moreover, they stress a reality often neglected by policymakers outside the region: “each of these issues is closely linked with the others. Because this interdependence has often been overlooked by US policy makers, their actions taken to resolve problems in one area have often served to exacerbate difficulties elsewhere.”

Korb and de Wit’s final challenge for the US, the region’s chronic economic and political underdevelopment, has been the focus of aid efforts over the years discussed earlier by Root, Li, and Balasuriya (Chapter 4). In the post-Saddam era, economic and political reform has taken on increased importance. Broad programs such as the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMEI) have been well designed to address many of the region’s long-standing deficiencies in governance and economic freedom. As the analysis of US reform efforts (Chapter 13) suggests, these efforts, through encouraging improved economic freedom and governance, have the potential to jump start many of the region’s poorer economies and, in doing so, lift many to a higher stage of development. Unfortunately, as is often the case in the Middle East, well-intended outside ideas are treated with suspicion and mistrust. Until the US is able to attain more credibility with broad segments of Middle Eastern populations, major movements toward more liberal economic and political systems are highly unlikely.

In the end, therefore, perceptions, especially in the post-Saddam era, are likely to play an increasing role in shaping US-Middle East relations. Doubters of US initiatives, especially in the reform areas (Chapter 13), fall into three distinct groups: (1) Cautious optimists. This group sees the US reform initiatives as a positive project in principle with the potential to help the region modernize itself politically and economically, but only if certain preconditions are met—these involve acceptability of the core concepts of the regional actors. Just as importantly, participation would be wise only with the understanding that each country has its own special needs and aspirations and that these must be respected. (2) Pessimists. This view dismisses the project as unwise and undoable. A foreign-made project designed to transform Muslim countries through foreign social engineering will trigger deep regional resistance. (3) Rejectionists/conspiracy theorists. This group is largely composed of Islamists who believe that the GMEI is simply another ploy by Western imperialists designed to destroy their culture and identity.

Because of the important role of perceptions in affecting the success or failure of US actions and initiatives throughout the region, the next section starting with Chapter 14 on the Arab Street provides a more detailed sample of views both within the region and in neighboring countries. Clearly, the Arab Street is one of those constructs that means different things to different people. As Stephen Glain, who has walked these streets for many years, knows “they provide invaluable insights to the mass views most of the region’s leaders would just as soon sweep under the rug.”

Glain sadly concludes that leaders in the West have not listened carefully to the Street and thus missed the insights needed to appreciate the complexity throughout the region. As he notes: “More often than not the Street has only provided ma...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• Preface
• PART I Overview/setting
• PART II Perceptions
• PART III Country studies
• Index