Governing Insecurity in Japan

The Domestic Discourse and Policy Response

Wilhelm Vosse, Reinhard Drifte, Verena Blechinger-Talcott

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781138629127
• eBook ISBN: 9781135091507
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Economy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's security environment has changed significantly. While, on the global level, the United States is still Japan's most important security partner, the nature of the partnership has changed as a result of shifting demands from the United States, new international challenges such as the North Korean nuclear programme and the rapid rise of China. At the same time, Japan has been confronted with new, 'non-traditional' security threats such as international terrorism, the spread of infectious diseases, and global environmental problems. On the domestic level, demographic change, labour migration, economic decline, workplace insecurity, and a weakening impact of policy initiatives challenge the sustainability of the lifestyle of many Japanese and have led to a heightened sense of insecurity among the Japanese public.

This book focuses on the domestic discourse on insecurity in Japan and goes beyond military security. The chapters cover issues such as Japan's growing perception of regional and global insecurity; the changing role of military forces; the perceived risk of Chinese foreign investment; societal, cultural and labour insecurity and how it is affected by demographic changes and migration; as well as food insecurity and its challenges to health and public policy. Each chapter asks how the Japanese public perceives these insecurities; how these perceptions influence the public discourse, the main stakeholders of this discourse, and how this affects state-society relations and government policies.

Governing Insecurity in Japan provides new insights into Japanese and international discourses on security and insecurity, and the ways in which security is conceptualized in Japan. As such, it will be of interest to students and scholars working on Japanese politics, security studies and international relations.

Part I

Societal and individual dimensions

1 Increasing threat perceptions and anti-militarist norms

Wilhelm Vosse

Introduction

National security in postwar Japan was based on the US–Japan Security Treaty and Japan’s own defense capabilities (Yoshida doctrine), and this arrangement was flanked by diplomatic attempts to build an international reputation and role as a civilian power whose ambition was more in the area of trade and development assistance (comprehensive security, Fukuda doctrine). This arrangement allowed Japan to focus on economic development and developing bi- and multilateral relations while limiting its own defense capabilities (three non-nuclear principles, defensive defense) and defense expenditure of less than 1 percent of GDP.

Despite strong protests following the establishment of the SDF in 1954 and the revision of the AMPO Treaty in 1960, by the mid-1960s, the vast majority of Japanese supported this security arrangement because it not only provided for Japan’s national security, but it also ensured that Japan could develop economically and provide a generally positive image as a peaceful state with no ambitions to threaten its neighbors again (Berger 1998). Such foreign and defense policies hinge on public support.

Thomas Berger (1998), Peter Katzenstein (1996), Glenn Hook (1996) and others have emphasized that Japanese national security identity throughout the postwar period was based on a strong preference of anti-militarist norms among the elite and general public alike. However, the question they raised just a few years after the end of the Cold War was whether Japan had become a genuinely “non-militarist” country with strong public support for peaceful and multilateral ways to deal with international conflicts and a country that has perhaps “learned from history” (Berger 1998), or whether Japan’s foreign and defense policy, given the changes in the post-Cold War security environment, might now be open to change. Indeed, the post-Cold War development of Japanese foreign and defense policy seems to indicate that Japan has been trying to come to terms with a changed international system and has begun to re-assess the value of the Yoshida doctrine and comprehensive security.

Triggered in part by accusations of “checkbook diplomacy” and “hiding behind article 9” after Japan’s inability to dispatch its SDF to assist the alliance forces in liberating Kuwait in 1990/1991, there was sufficient international pressure on the government and the Diet to act. The 1992 so-called PKO (peace-keeping operation) law, which, for the first time, enabled Japanese SDF to be deployed in UNPKOs abroad seemed to be the first step to demonstrate that Japan is capable of adopting greater international responsibility. After the first successful missions to Cambodia, Angola and Mozambique, the 1993 change of the election system, the Japan Socialist Party’s renunciation of the unconstitutionality of the SDF and the US-Japan Security Treaty, and after the subsequent de-ideologization of foreign policy issues, it was time for Japan to re-assess its international role. What followed, was a series of changes. Beginning with the revised defense guidelines in 1997, which included the infamous expansion of Japanese defense responsibilities to “areas surrounding Japan,” the changes included rear-area support for US troops during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, recent further integration of the Japanese military in the US command structure, and the deployment of SDF to Iraq in 2004.¹

Although two-thirds of the Japanese public was still opposed to the Iraq mission in late 2003 and early 2004, the Iraq deployment triggered only relatively small protests in Tokyo and a few other Japanese cities. Once Japanese SDF soldiers arrived in Samawah, and pictures of them and the positive reaction of the local population appeared on Japanese television, public opinion turned around. In March 2004, a small majority now supported the deployment. It seemed like a classical “boots on the ground” effect (Vosse 2012; Midford, 2011). Moreover, the public image of SDF has long been quite positive (in the 1970s and 1980s between 60 percent and 75 percent), but has improved even further in the post-Cold War era. In a Cabinet Office (CAO) poll, 67 percent expressed a positive image about the SDF in 1991, this number has risen to 91 percent in 2012 (CAO, Government of Japan 2012). This positive image is equally shared among all age groups and is virtually equally strong for both men and women. In another survey in 2003, 44 percent of the Japanese claimed they were proud of their military forces.² The level of pride for the armed forces in Japan was higher than in (West) Germany (35 percent) or South Korea (33 percent), two countries where soldiers are much more visible and where their recent achievements are more likely to be reported in the media. The level in Japan is comparable to that in Russia (45 percent), but significantly lower than in the United States (93 percent), the United Kingdom (90 percent), and Australia (87 percent), where support and a feeling of being proud is almost universal (ISSP 2003).

On the other hand, the majority of Japanese do not want to see a significant change in the size of the SDF or the defense budget. From 1990 to 2012, around 65 percent wanted to keep its size and capability unchanged. However, between 1997 and 2000, the share of those who prefer an increase of the SDF capabilities almost doubled from 7.5 percent to 13.5 percent. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the SDF deployment to Iraq had very little influence on support for increased military capacity. However, between 2009 and 2012, support to increase military capacity almost doubled again from 14.1 percent (2009) to 24.8 percent (2012) (CAO, Government of Japan 2012).

In 2004, the Japanese government decided to join the United States in developing and deploying a missile defense system. For Japan, this not only meant a heavy financial burden, but it also carried the potential risk that it might trigger a Chinese reaction and possibly an arms race in East Asia. This is more likely now, given the increasingly strained relations between China and Japan in recent years. Although missile defense is still a rather new issue for most Japanese, support for it has increased since the two North Korean missile incidents in 1997 and 1998.³ The majority of Japanese are in favor of Japan joining a missile defense system (MDS). In February 2006, 56 percent supported it,⁴ and only 24 percent were opposed.⁵ Support for MDS is shared almost equally among all age groups.

These policy developments and the reaction or non-reaction of the Japanese public triggered the two questions in this chapter:

1 Does this mean the end of Japanese anti-militarism or at least a dwindling effect of the widely assumed anti-militarist norms on Japanese foreign and defense policy?

In other words, do the recent changes mean that Japan will continue in this development and indeed become a “normal state,” the “Britain of Asia,” or perhaps the “Germany of Asia”? Does this mean that the Japanese government will use the precedence of the Iraq deployment to gradually convince the public that its anti-militarist stance is outdated and that Japan must develop a more independent defense capability as a reaction to an increased threat scenario in East Asia? Does this mean that after the North Korean missile tests, its possession of nuclear weapons, and the double-digit growth of China’s military budget to a level five-times as high as Japan’s⁶ (2012), that the Japanese people are scared enough to allow the government to go forward with the militarization of Japan?

2 What triggered these changes in public perception and are they sustainable?

There are a large number of factors that may potentially affect public opinion and public attitudes towards, and the subsequent changes in, foreign and security policies. These range from prior involvement in conflicts and wars, military capabilities, the positions of political parties, trust and respect towards armed forces (Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002; Frühstück 2007), the ability of political leaders to convince the general public about the necessity of security policy considerations or decisions (Eldridge and Midford 2008; Midford 2011; Rousseau 2006), changing international norms (Leheny 2006), alliance obligations, or national identity (Catalinac 2007), to the prevalence and societal salience of specific foreign or domestic threats (Hook 2010; Sjoberg 2008) and the perception of these general or specific threats by political leaders or the general public. While public attitudes towards defense and security policies might be shaped and influenced by a combination of factors and might change over time triggered by specific events, for example the North Korean nuclear tests or rocket launches, Chinese ships and submarines invading Japanese territorial waters near the Senkakus, or the increase of Chinese military capabilities, this chapter attempts to identify more enduring factors by analyzing individual level data of the Japanese general public.

This chapter raises two hypotheses. The first is related to increased threat perception, the second to the possibility that an increase in nationalist sentiment after the end of the Cold War might be responsible for changes in public support for these defense policies.

Hypotheses

1 Heightened individual-level feelings of insecurity and higher risk perception increases support for more assertive military options.

2 Increased support for nationalist values or patriotism increases support for a more assertive defense posture.

The following analysis takes advantage of the first representative and nationwide public opinion poll on threat perception and feelings of insecurity in Japan and the United States, namely “An International Study of Attitudes and Global Engagement 2004” (from here called: SAGE 2004). It was conducted in Japan (n = 581) and the United States (n = 970) in late 2004 and early 2005, and, for the first time, provided representative data allowing the detailed analysis of, among others, personal, national and international threat perception of the Japanese public and how these perceptions correlate with other attitudes and demographic factors (Appleton and Vosse 2004).

Changing risk perceptions in Japan⁷

This chapter hypothesizes that threat and risk perceptions are important factors that can explain policy preferences. Among others, it is assumed that increased levels of personal fear or personal threat perception and high levels of threat perception for national security in the broadest sense of the word – not just military, but also economic and social – might increase the likelihood of supporting, for example, an increase in military expenditure, or more generally, a more Hobbesian world view. The chapter will also analyze the types and levels of threats and risks that are perceived by Japanese today and how they have changed over the last 20 years. The chapter will then take up some of these threat factors and ask whether they have been important in explaining certain changes in foreign and defense policy preferences.

The danger of war and national security

The fear that Japan might become involved in a war is now significantly higher than during the Cold War. In 1969,25 percent of Japanese felt war was likely, but after normalization of relations with China and the end of the Vietnam War, the level fell to 14 percent in 1975.⁸ After a peak of 31 percent after the Soviet attack on Afgha...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Figures
• Tables
• Notes on Contributors
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I Societal and individual dimensions
• Part II International and economic dimensions
• Index