Social Theory and the Family (RLE Social Theory)

D.H.J. Morgan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781138782440
• eBook ISBN: 9781317651055
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

An experienced teacher of courses on the sociology of the family, D.H.J. Morgan frequently encounters a gulf between 'the family' as it is often treated in sociological texts and 'the family' as it is usually experienced. In this book he provides an extremely valuable bridge between the two by presenting an encounter between some of the mainstream theoretical approaches and concerns in the sociology of the family and what he terms as 'critical' perspectives on the family.

This is the first British book on a basic social institution that takes into account the literature outside the mainstream of sociological analysis that deals with the subject. The first half examines the varieties of functional theorizing embedded in many texts, the over-concern with the question of kinship in modern society and the treatment of the family as a 'success story'. In the second half Dr Morgan presents a critical account of some of the counter-theories: those derived from the radical feminist movement, the existential psycho-analytical approach associated with Laing, and the critical analyses of sex in an advanced capitalist society. A final chapter suggests some themes and orientations, derived from this encounter of theoretical approaches and modern perspectives, which can be usefully developed.

part one

1 Varieties of functionalism

Introduction

The functionalist perspective has had a long and controversial part to play in the development of sociological theory. For various reasons it appears to have been more deeply entrenched in the field of the sociology of the family than in some other sub-disciplines. Few textbooks of the family (or general text-books which almost invariably include a chapter on the family) fail to include a discussion of the functions of the family or a reference to the change in or loss of these functions. Thus, for example, the recent material developed for the Open University foundation course in the Social Sciences includes a comprehensive list of the functions of the family, although a footnote indicates some of the difficulties involved in a functional approach.¹ A widely adopted text-book, also used in conjunction with this Open University material, contains a similar account of the functions of the family.² The juxtaposition of the words ‘family’ and ‘function’ appears almost inevitably irrespective of the degree of commitment or otherwise to an overall functionalist theory of Society.³

My intention in this chapter is to consider the various functional approaches in so far as they have a bearing on the development of the sociology of the family, and I do not intend to consider at any length the wider controversies. I shall confine a general discussion to the provision of a few introductory distinctions.

In the first place, a distinction can be made between two major contexts in which the functional approach has been developed. The first, identified largely with Durkheim and Parsons, is that of a general macro-theory of society. The concern is with developing some model of a society or a social system and the examination of the way in which the various parts or levels are linked together. Here we are interested in the relationships between the individual and society, between the various parts or institutions that go to make up a society, between the personality system, the cultural system and the social system. The problem is the ‘problem of order’,⁴ seen largely from a perspective which emphasizes consensus and integration. At a very general level it may be said that functionalism, in this context, is concerned with the relationships between ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’.

The second context in which functionalism has developed is as a mode of enquiry. Functionalism here provides a set of orientations which guide the sociologist in the investigation of particular problems and which direct him to ask particular questions. The emphasis here is on particular problems or institutions, the theoretical level is roughly that of the ‘middle range’. Merton’s reformulation and development of the functionalist perspective may be seen as providing a set of analytical tools within this kind of context.⁵ The test of the value of functionalism here tends to be a pragmatic one: does it direct us to asking questions which are illuminating or helpful?

These two contexts are, of course, interdependent. A functionalist approach to a particular problem derives, directly or indirectly, from a wider theory. But a functional approach or orientation can also, to some extent, exist independently of an assent to an overall functionalist theory. Thus we may ask, as a research strategy, what are the functions and dysfunctions of, say, organized crime, without necessarily committing ourselves to a functionalist model of society as a whole or to an assumption that ‘everything must have a function’. It follows, therefore, that the criticisms we may direct at functionalism as a theory need not necessarily apply to functionalism as a research strategy.

A second distinction that we may make is between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ functionalism or between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ functionalism. ‘Hard’ or ‘explicit’ functionalism implies either a definite commitment to a functionalist theory or a clearly articulated set of propositions couched in functionalist terms, or both. ‘Soft’ or ‘implicit’ functionalism implies an unarticulated or unexamined functionalist perspective which is latent in the work concerned. The presence of a ‘soft’ version of functionalism may often be discerned through the use of phrases such as ‘serves to’, ‘has the role of ‘, or sometimes ‘has the consequence’, where this is not a specifically historical statement.

Functionalism and the family

It is my impression that functional statements are more likely to be presented as self-evident propositions in the study of the family than in any other area of sociology. What is objectionable about many statements about ‘the functions of the family’ is not merely the actual list of functions presented but the lack of critical awareness as to what kind of question is being asked and whether it is a meaningful question at all.

There are some possible reasons for the continued presence of often unexamined functionalist statements in the study of the family. One is the apparent universality of the family. Another is the apparent connection between the institution of the family and certain biological imperatives. Such imperatives would include the fact that sexual reproduction requires a male and a female, that women bear children, that while the identity of the biological mother is never in doubt, that of the biological father may be, and the fact that human infants require a long period of care and protection by more senior members of the human species.

Thus the simplest statement about the functions of the family will be roughly that the family is a universal institution and must therefore perform some universal functions. This appears to be the position of Murdock, and will be examined in more detail in the next section. A slightly more sophisticated—and reversed—version of this assumption is that there are certain basic functional prerequisites that must be met if society is to survive and the institution of the family is uniquely or best able to meet these functions. This version does imply, however, that it might be possible for other institutions to fulfil some or all of these functions at least at some stage in the future.

These rather simplistic perspectives are, however, opposed by another functionalist orientation which recognizes that the family can lose some of its functions or that the functions can change. Thus the institution of the family is not inextricably bound up with some universal and necessary functions. This approach, most clearly represented by Parsons, is linked to an evolutionary perspective. Briefly, this states that societies evolve through a process of structural differentiation whereby social institutions become differentiated from each other and develop some measure of autonomy in relation to society as a whole. Thus, for example, work becomes separate from the home in modern society. This implies that the functions of the family can change as the relationship between the family and society as a whole changes. The implication of this perspective is that statements about the universality of the institution of the family are, in principle at least, separable from statements about its changing functions.

Enough should have been said in this brief introduction to indicate that the label ‘functionalist’ as applied to the study of the family can encompass a wide variety of perspectives between which there is not necessarily any high degree of agreement. This chapter is concerned with the variety of functional approaches that have been developed and the general criticisms that can be applied to them all. I shall not attempt a complete survey of the literature but, rather, I shall attempt to pick some of the most influential and representative figures: Murdock, Coser, Parsons (together with Bell and Vogel) and Goode. Finally I shall provide an example of a functional approach to a specific problem, that of the emotionally disturbed child as a scapegoat. I shall also look at a recent version of role theory as it is applied to the study of the family. On the basis of these accounts I shall present some general critical comments.

Murdock

Murdock’s list of the four functions of the nuclear family, or some close variation on this theme, has been widely reprinted since it was first presented. A statement which begins ‘the functions of the family are …’ has a deceptively simple ring about it, indicating that we are in the presence of a universal empirical generalization. When in a contribution to a collectively written text-book, I listed Murdock’s functions largely in order to present a critical evaluation of them, I did not intend that many of my students would reproduce this list of functions without mentioning the criticisms.⁶ Yet any statement listing the functions of the family is a theoretical and ideological statement rather than a simple empirical statement.

In spite of the influential nature of Murdock’s list, he cannot be described as a ‘hard’ functionalist. Indeed, at several points in his Social Structure he is critical of the functionalist school of anthropology; he argues, for example, that the functionalist school makes no provision for the analysis of social change.⁷ Murdock, therefore, holds no overall functional theory of society as a whole and he does not list the functions of the family in terms of any such theory. Rather his study is based upon the cross-cultural analysis of data from ‘250 representative human societies’ and his statement about the functions of the nuclear family is presented as if it derives from this empirical study.

Murdock defines the family, in general, in these terms:⁸

The family is a social group characterised by common residence, economic co-operation, and reproduction. It includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted, of the sexually cohabiting adults.

More specifically, the nuclear family is defined as being, typically: ‘a married man and woman with their offspring, although in individual cases one or more additional persons may reside with them.’⁹

On the basis of his cross cultural material, Murdock concludes that the nuclear family as defined is a ‘universal human grouping’.¹⁰ This universality is bound up with the basic functions which the family is said to perform:¹¹

In the nuclear family or its constituent relationships we thus see assembled four functions fundamental to human social life—the sexual, the economic, the reproductive, and the educational. Without provision for the first and third, society would become extinct; for the second, life itself would cease; for the fourth, culture would come to an end. The immense social utility of the nuclear family and the basic reason for its universality thus begin to emerge in strong relief.

It is, of course, no difficult task to take these functions one by one and to demonstrate that in very few, if any, cultures does the institution of the nuclear family have exclusive command over these functions. Thus, for example, in very few societies is sex, either ideally or in practice, exclusively and legitimately carried out only between married partners. However, it might be argued that this line of attack is a little unfair in that it picks on the functions singly and fails to see that the unique importance of the family lies in the fact that it is the only institution which fulfils all these functions together. As Murdock argues, other institutions may take over some aspects of some of the functions but no institution has yet been devised to replace all these functions. Furthermore, Murdock would argue that all these functions reinforce each other. Fulfilment of the sexual function leads to achievement of the reproductive function (and hence also the socialization function) and children may later become economic assets for the family. We are still, however, faced with the problem that a set of essential functions (sexual, reproductive and educational) are linked to a particular institution (the family) in a way that appears to be inevitable and unchangeable. In sum, what this list is saying is that any society must make provisions for its present survival and for its biological and social continuity, features which might almost be seen as an essential part of any definition of a ‘society’. The central and unanswered question here is to what extent these basic functions are inevitably linked with the institution of the nuclear family.

Ignoring here the methodological difficulties involved in the use of the cross-cultural comparative method which in this case appears to give equal weighting to China and the Cheyenne,¹² there are one or two more general criticisms that may be made against Murdock’s argument. In the first place he is not so much writing about functions as ‘eufunctions’, that is successful adaptations to the needs and survival of society.¹³ Murdock’s nuclear family is a remarkably harmonious institution. Husband and wife have an integrated division of labour and have a good time in bed. The resultant children contribute to this overall domestic harmony: ‘Any factor which strengthens the tie between one member and a second also operates indirectly to bind the former to a third member with whom the second maintains a close relationship.’¹⁴ Even if we accept that these functions are closely integrated and connected with each other, does this also not imply the possibility of a vicious circle as well as a virtuous circle ? Quarrels break out between husband and wife over who should do what in the fields. They refuse to sleep with each other and use the children as a weapon in their marital battles. Thus integration of function does not necessarily lead to harmony of relationships.

Further, we cannot necessarily assume—as Murdock appears to assume—that what is functional for society is also functional for the individual and vice versa. ‘Society’ may need new members to survive but an additional pregnancy may be an almost intolerable burden on a particular mother or family. Or an additional child may be proof of my virility but society as a whole may be overpopulated. Murdock assumes an almost automatic coincidence between what is ‘good’ for the individual or the individual nuclear family and what is good for society as a whole.

Many of the criticisms that can be levelled at Murdock’s list of functions of the family can also be levelled at similar lists.¹⁵ In so far as they direct us in a general way to consider problems of the relationships between the institution of the family and other institutions in society there is little harm in these lists. Furthermore, again in a general way, few people would dissent from the argument that in most societies there is an overlap, in many cases a close overlap, between the institutions of the family and the activities of sexual intercourse, reproduction and primary socialization. But it would appear that statements listing the functions of the family appear to carry greater theoretical weight than they should in fact bear, and that there is an almost inevitable slide into apparent statements of universality, necessity and inevitability.

Coser

Coser uses an explicit functionalist framework in presenting her collection of readings.¹⁶ Up to a point it is unfair to criticize something which has the relatively modest aim of introducing a useful set of articles and which is not developed at any great length. However, Coser’s collection is probably a widely used text (it has been reprinted in paperback form) and the argument, brief as it is, does have the virtue of illustrating further some of the varieties, and ambiguities, of functionalist argument as it is appli...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• part one
• part two
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Author index
• Subject index