Marx and Mead (RLE Social Theory)

Contributions to a Sociology of Knowledge

Tom Goff

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781317651536
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Sozialwissenschaften
• Subtopic: Soziologie

It has often been suggested that a resolution of issues generated by the sociological study of ideas might be reached through a synthesis of specific insights to be found in the works of Karl Marx and George Herbert Mead. The present study originated in an investigation of this hypothesis, particularly as it bears on the central issue of sociological relativism.

The author began by delineating the specific problems such a synthesis might resolve, and in the process became aware that the nature and depth of differences separating the sociology of knowledge and its critics have never been fully analysed or understood. This volume therefore opens with a clarification of these differences, a clarification which leads to considerable redefinition of the problem as it has traditionally been understood by critics and proponents of the discipline alike. The author points out in particular that it is less a debate than a thorough-going contradiction which characterizes the literature dealing with the inadequacies of various formulations of the sociology of knowledge.

In consequence, the study of Marx and Mead presented here is not simply yet another effort to discover a perspective which will satisfy the particular demands of the critics. Rather, it argues that an adequate perspective fully consistent with the central insight of the discipline – that knowledge is radically social in character – is to be found in a synthesis of elements in the perspectives of Marx and Mead.

chapter 1

The critique of the sociology of knowledge

It has been suggested by many writers, though often for very different reasons, that the problems facing the development of the sociology of knowledge might be resolved through a synthesis of the insights of Karl Marx and the American social pragmatist, George Herbert Mead.¹ This suggestion has never been pursued in anything approaching the necessary detail, yet its promise becomes increasingly important and for a number of reasons.

Of all the areas within sociology, the sociology of knowledge is of essential importance and yet seems to present the greatest number of difficulties and to have achieved the least. The elaboration of the guiding assumption underlying the discipline as a whole – that persons are fundamentally social in nature – demands a clear, precise and useable elaboration of the specific and important relationship between our sociality and our consciousness. Despite this fundamental importance, however, it must be admitted that much less agreement has been reached in this particular area than in any other branch of the discipline as a whole. Furthermore, though sociology itself has gradually gained credibility and acceptance despite its failure to achieve a single and generally agreed upon paradigm, the sociology of knowledge has remained highly suspect. Its various efforts continue to be subjected to the strongest and most persistent criticism from both within and without the sociological enterprise.

The basic, most damaging and persistent criticism is that none of the conceptual frameworks so far developed has managed to deal adequately with the apparent relativistic and self-contradictory implications of the insight that human consciousness, knowledge and social factors are somehow integrally related. Most, if not all of the major figures in the area, including Marx and Mead, have contributed to the elaboration of the basic insight and thus to the development of a social theory of knowledge. However, every attempt to take the insight beyond common-sense appreciation and unquestioned assumption is demonstrably deficient with respect to this and to other less basic problems.

Given the perennial impasse between proponents and critics of the sociology of knowledge, it may not be immediately apparent why one should seriously consider the particular suggestion that a Marx/Mead synthesis holds the key to advancement of the discipline. None the less, there are some very basic reasons to suppose that this particular suggestion has merit and is worth pursuing.² In the first place, most criticism of the discipline has been indirect if not direct criticism of what have been taken to be Marx’s pronouncements on the subject. However, given the numerous and recent re-evaluations and re-interpretations of his work, it is no longer clear that the critique adequately comprehends the elements of a sociology of knowledge to be found in Marx’s writing.³ Specifically, it has become necessary to consider the implications for a social theory of knowledge of the distinction drawn between Marx as an a-critical, economic and historical determinist, and Marx as a critical, humanistic thinker.

Mead’s work is also receiving long-overdue reconsideration. Broader analysis of his writing is generating new interpretations of the relevance of his ideas to sociology in general and, in all likelihood, this has implications for the sociology of knowledge in particular. In any case it is clear that the focus of Mead’s interest and writing lies in areas that were undeveloped by Marx, and thus it is reasonable to pursue a determination of the degree of useful complementarity of their different insights.

Before proceeding with the analysis of their ideas, however, it is first essential to delineate the current impasse in more detail and to analyse the character, meaning and implications of the critique. Too often this step has been overlooked or ignored and the critique accepted too readily and quite uncritically by many of those who have worked and written within the discipline.⁴ However, it is only on the basis of such analysis that certain historically repeated pitfalls can be avoided.

ELEMENTS OF THE CRITIQUE

Merton has argued that the most general statement describing the sociology of knowledge is that it is ‘concerned with the relationships between knowledge and other existential factors in the society or culture’.⁵ While there are severe reservations regarding the adequacy of this formulation,⁶ it will suffice for the moment, if only because the majority of writers have perceived their task in these or in very similar terms – that is, as a task concerned with conceptualizing ‘knowledge’; with conceptualizing the ‘existential’ factors of society or culture that affect knowledge; and with the question of the specific relationships between knowledge and these particular existential factors. A final question is that of the approach and method to be utilized in analysis. These questions have been provided with answers, indeed a variety of answers. However, none of the conceptual frameworks so far established has satisfied the critics.

The critics justifiably argue that individual writers and the area in general provide no clarity or agreement on the appropriate conceptualization of the terms of the relationship. Just what mental productions are related to social factors and which, if any, are free of such influence? What is the character of ‘knowledge’ that it can be so integrally influenced as claimed? Equally, it is seldom clear in the literature just what the social factors are that influence belief, or what the character of such factors is that they can have such influence or (reciprocally) be so influenced.⁷

Second, and of more central concern, critics argue that the relationship itself is poorly defined in the literature. This criticism concerns the problem of imputation-the problem of clarifying the relationship between knowledge and social factors such that particular ideas (or the perspective in which they are based) may be non-tautologically imputed to the appropriate social context. Is the relationship immediate or mediated, a one-way causal connection, a functional or reciprocal relation, or perhaps a dialectical relationship? What criteria allow one to demonstrate ‘unequivocally’ that the imputed relationship between specific ideas and a specific social context does indeed hold?⁸

In terms of these criticisms, the sociology of knowledge is, of course, not fundamentally impugned. To argue that no framework has been developed that is conceptually adequate, consistent and empirically testable, is insufficient ground to conclude that it could not be so developed. However, the third and central criticism is of this nature and is therefore of more fundamental importance to this study. Even should the problem of conceptual clarity be overcome, there remains the issue of the implications of the idea of social elements in thought: the closer a position or perspective is to adequate formulation and consistency with the insight, the more likely it is to be charged with committing the genetic fallacy and thus with relativism.⁹

This element of the critique argues that if it is held that the intellectual sphere is totally rooted in ‘existential’ factors and therefore that it can and must be ‘extrinsically’ interpreted or explained, then all statements of ‘fact’ must be regarded as but relative statements of opinion or simple rationalizations, statements which reflect the social biography, social location and social interests of an individual or group. If this is true, then clearly even those statements about social conditioning uttered by the sociologist of knowledge must themselves be reflections of a particular social biography. If the status of fact, of objectivity or of truth is claimed for such statements, then they are self-contradictory. Either such statements are true, thereby refuting their own claims about existential conditioning, or they are false and the position is obviously refuted.

Such a position is, in these terms, clearly nihilistic. It commits the apparent ‘sin’ of connecting validity and origin (the genetic fallacy) and, at worst, it represents thought as pure epiphenomenon or legitimation; the view devalues reason, destroys the concepts of responsibility, freedom, morality, creativity, etc. – all ideas that have historically been associated with our very capacity for reflection.¹⁰

Taken this far, if the sociology of knowledge is to serve any function at all, it apparently cannot be a scientific one; it becomes pure ‘debunking’ and an historical moment along the ‘road to suspicion’¹¹ of all thought. Marx, for example, may have ‘exposed’ the bourgeoisie by demonstrating the apparently ideological, ‘interest-supportive’ character of their thought; but it would appear that his own mode of argument ultimately loses all credibility when it is turned against him via Mannheim’s development of the concept of total ideology.¹²

To express this third and most important element of the critique in slightly different terms, it is basically the argument that a total acceptance of the insight underlying the discipline is, at the same time, a denial of all absolutes; a denial of all criteria in terms of which any statements could be judged as ultimately true or false. Criteria of truth or objectivity are themselves intellectual products, at least within the epistemological tradition of the West. If these criteria are socially relative then ‘truth’ loses its traditionally accepted meaning and the objectivity of particular statements would appear to become but a ‘relative objectivity’ tied to the specific socio-historical context in which these statements are made. In these terms it would appear that one must accept as many ‘truths’ as there are essentially different socio-cultural milieux, and this renders the adjudication of disputes not only over policy but also over fact, matters of force and violence, despite any ‘gloss’ of intellectual ‘rationalization’ or justification.

This third element of the critique leads immediately to the fourth: that the sociology of knowledge, understood as an empirical science, is theoretically impossible unless it accepts a very severely restricted meaning. The insight can and has been taken to mean that knowledge is radically social; that thought itself and all ideas are inextricably rooted in the social context or process. But since this implies the socially determined character, and thus the relativity of even the accepted criteria of validity and truth, the discipline is in essence self-contradictory, self-refuting and therefore theoretically impossible. In other words, the critics must ultimately argue that one cannot rationally adhere to the insight in its radical form for such complete adherence runs counter to or contradicts the possibility of attaining an a-temporal objectivity or truth. To be consistent the critique must render this verdict, although not all critics have done so.¹³

From this standpoint the only ‘valid’ sociological analysis of knowledge, if it can still be called that, appears to be the much less radical study of the ‘functional’ interrelationships of specific ideas and perspectives and the specific social group that factually holds and acts according to these ideas. However, such functional analysis bears little relation to traditional concerns of the discipline. Furthermore, even such restricted versions of the insight do not ultimately escape the criticisms they were thought to resolve.¹⁴

If one briefly considers but a few of the range of major contributions to the sociology of knowledge, the sense and basis of these criticisms becomes more readily apparent. Durkheim, for example, was one of the first sociologists to address the question of the social rootedness of consciousness and knowledge in a direct and fairly detailed manner. However, though he appeared to appreciate the basic difficulties that would eventually be pointed out, he failed to develop a conceptual framework that would be acceptable to the critics.

In keeping with his basic belief that society could and must be treated as a ‘reality sui generis’;¹⁵ and that actors were to be viewed as derivatives of their prior social and physical contexts,¹⁶ Durkheim argued that the thought of individuals must also be viewed as a derivative phenomenon. Specific ideas were conceived of as reflecting particular conceptual frameworks or categorical structures consisting of basic ‘collective representations’. These, in turn, were to be interpreted as rooted in and determined by the underlying ‘social reality’.¹⁷ Durkheim also argued that ideas both existed and found their ‘truth’ in relation to their functionality for society and its evolutionary change and development.¹⁸

The extent to which Durkheim adhered to the radical implications of the basic insight is most evident in his discussion of traditional epistemologies.¹⁹ He rejected empiricism on the grounds that all thought proceeds in terms of basic and shared categories and concepts, and is therefore never purely inductive. However, despite this apparent agreement with the Kantian stance, he could not accept the idealist aspect of this view – that these basic categories existed a priori and universally in time and space. He held, in contrast, that the basic categories necessary to thought must themselves be explained, and that such explanation could and must be obtained through a demonstration of their emergence from the prior and evolving social context.²⁰

Leaving aside for the moment the method by which Durkheim hoped to achieve this demonstration, it is obvious that the charges levelled by the critics are applicable to his position. Clearly, by arguing that all of our thought, including the basic categories in terms of which specific ideas have their meaning, are temporal and relative to specific historical social circumstances, Durkheim could not logically claim, as he did, that his own ideas about thought were themselves true. As the critics claim, the sociology of knowledge has a tendency to talk itself into this apparently obvious self-contradiction.

The same is true of Mannheim’s work – a favourite target of the critics in their effort to demonstrate the inadequacies of the discipline. Like Durkheim, Mannheim adhered very largely to the radical implications of the insight. He accepted the common-sense appreciation that there are ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• 1 The critique of the sociology of knowledge
• 2 Marx: elements of a sociology of knowledge
• 3 G. H. Mead: the perspective of social behaviourism and the sociology of knowledge
• 4 Marx and Mead: towards a critical sociology of knowledge
• 5 Conclusion: the critical perspective
• Notes
• Select bibliography
• Index