Talcott Parsons and the Social Image of Man (RLE Social Theory)

Ken Menzies

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781138782587
• eBook ISBN: 9781317650546
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

This account of Talcott Parsons's work clarifies his basic concepts and sets out their correlation. Dr Menzies believes that the philosophy of science working within the confines of the analytic-synthetic distinction tends to provide a rigid, static and sterile account of theories. He presents a more dynamic account of the scientific enterprise in order to come to grips with the amorphous nature of theory, and to provide the basic framework for his analysis of Parsons. Menzies argues that Parsons's central problematic in The Structure of Social Action is utilitarianism in general and the classical economists' account of the rise of capitalism in particular, and as such the book is not a reconciliation of positivistic and idealistic elements and these run throughout his subsequent work. Two major strands in Parsons's work – the social action theory and the systems theory (structural-functionalism) – are separated and examined individually.

1 The framework for analysing Parsons

The current image of science is one of men in laboratories conducting experiments, not one of men in offices wielding pens. Philosophers of science in particular paint a picture of science that leaves no real place for the thinker in his armchair. Sociologists often have accepted the philosopher’s view of scientific activity as being that of men in white coats. In attempting to come to grips with Parsons, it is essential to have a view of science that gives a place to somebody who describes himself in the dedication of one of his books (SS) as ‘an incurable theorist’.

Analysis of a sociologist’s writings must involve implicitly or explicitly a view of the philosophy of science as one must select, order and criticize. Frequently this is done on the basis of an implicit view of how one should go about analysing a work. This seems dangerous, as the deficiencies of the analysis may lie not in the person’s ability to analyse, but in the way he goes about doing it. Some examples may make this clearer. Should one focus on the person’s values and state the political implications of his position as Foss (1963) does, or do a sociology of sociology as Gouldner (1971) (1) does? What would count as setting out and criticizing a theory? Should one, as Black (1964) and Dahrendorf (1966, ch.5) do, set out the premises from which (they claim) the whole position can be generated? Alternatively should one start from the key facts the person accepts or discovers? This range of possibilities indicates that a choice exists as to how to analyse Parsons and that the approach taken will affect what is treated as important in his work.

If I felt that any major school in the philosophy of science provided a satisfactory framework for analysing sociological ideas, then I would briefly elaborate this school’s position and defend it against major criticisms. However the major philosophies of science have accepted a view of science that leaves no real place for the theorist. They have certain fundamental problems in them which come from the use of the analytic-synthetic distinction. An attempt will be made in this chapter to lay the groundwork of an approach to analysing man’s ideas about the world that does not rest on this distinction. While I shall use this as the framework for discussing Parsons, this chapter is not intended as special pleading for a framework of analysis suited to Parsons in particular and sociology in general. Philosophers of science have accepted too positivistic a view of the scientific enterprise. To analyse Parsons or anybody else satisfactorily, it seems necessary to break out of the limits the philosophers’ world view imposes and see how the investigation of the world is a more flexible undertaking.

THE ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC DISTINCTION

The framework of much of present epistemology, (2) philosophy of science, and modern Anglo-American linguistic philosophy is the analytic-synthetic distinction. It can be traced back to Aristotle’s conception of logic. As a prelude to breaking out of this approach, I shall look at how it leads men to see science and some of the problems this involves. For this purpose Kant provides a convenient starting point. He defines analytic and synthetic statements thus (1966, p.7):

Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something contained (though covertly) in the concept A; or B lies outside the sphere of the concept A, though somehow connected with it. In the former case I call the judgment analytical, in the latter synthetical. Analytical judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is conceived through identity, while others in which that connection is conceived without identity, may be called synthetical. (3)

Kant’s other important distinction is between ‘a priori’ and the ‘a posteriori’. (4) For Kant all ‘a priori’ propositions were characterized by ‘necessity’ and ‘strict universality’ (p.3). If we are to have any secure knowledge, it must be ‘a priori’, Kant argues, and the basic question for Kant was, ‘How are synthetic judgments “a priori” possible?’ (p.13). For the world to be intelligible men must accept certain principles that order their experience. (5) These synthetic ‘a priori’ truths make the world comprehensible. What Kant appears to have overlooked (6) is that men do not always find the world intelligible. Often men find that their frameworks fail to order the world in a satisfactory (7) way. The implication of this is that either the principles that men have for ordering their experience may be true or false, or truth and falsity are not applicable to such principles. This will provide one of my starting points.

Since Kant’s death in 1804, several of the assertions he claimed to be synthetic ‘a priori’ truths have been contradicted by scientific developments. (8) Believing that there can be no grounds for the truth of such assertions, many philosophers now reject their existence. Schlick (9) is typical of many in saying (1949, p.281):

propositions are either synthetic ‘a posteriori’ or tautologous; synthetic ‘a priori’ propositions seem to it [Schlick’s position] to be a logical impossibility.

Going back to the definition of ‘synthetic’ given by Kant it can be seen to be defined as a residual category. Most philosophers have, however, equated synthetic assertions defined residually (all nonanalytic ones) with a positively defined category of ‘empirical’. (10) Having satisfied themselves that there are no grounds for the truth of synthetic ‘a priori’ truths, they have concluded that all synthetic assertions are ‘a posteriori’ and empirical. One assumption in this whole line of reasoning is that no assertion (except for analytic ones) that is not directly related to facts, is capable of playing any part in men’s understanding of the world. Stated another way, this premise is that all assertions that form a legitimate part of men’s knowledge are definitions or propositions that can be in some way assigned a truth value in terms of the facts. (11) If one accepts this (and I shall not), then the equation of synthetic with empirical seems more reasonable. By focusing on types of truths, Kant formulated the question in such a way as to preclude the consideration that there might be synthetic ‘a priori’ assertions which it does not make sense to call true or false (in the way these terms are understood by positivists) but which nevertheless have a part to play in our understanding of the world.

The type of position just discussed is positivistic. It is based on the acceptance of a world of facts outside of and independent of the observer in terms of which the legitimacy of all parts of science is to be determined. As this world of facts is the determinant of all scientific knowledge, this approach focuses on the experimenter determining these facts. Most philosophers of science have explicitly accepted this view that science is composed of definitions (analytic) (12) and synthetic propositions which are empirical. A typical instance of this position is Popper’s statement that (1968, p.47)

there can be no statements in science which cannot be tested, and therefore none which cannot in principle be refuted, by falsifying some of the conclusions which can be deduced from them. (13)

This view of science sees scientific laws as empirical generalizations of the type that, in principle, can be contradicted by a counter-instance (deductivism or falsificationism) or induced from observation statements. Popper explains the procedure he sees scientists as using thus (1960, pp.132–3):

From a hypothesis to be tested – for example, a universal law – together with some other statements which for this purpose are not considered as problematic – for example, some initial conditions – we deduce some prognosis. We then confront this prognosis whenever possible with the results of experimental or other observations. Agreement with them is taken as corroboration of the hypothesis, though not as final proof; clear disagreement is considered as refutation or falsification.

Watkins, one of his followers, elaborates this view to get a hierarchy of empirical statements (1957, p.115):

Observation-statements are the primary empirical statements. Instantial hypotheses, are empirical statements if they directly give rise to observational statements… A non-instantial hypothesis, or system of hypotheses like Newton’s three laws which cannot be directly tested, is empirical if it in conjunction with empirical instantial hypotheses, gives rise to further instantial hypotheses.

Let us look at the process of trying to test Newton’s law of motion by combining it with several empirical statements. Newton’s first law of motion is: ‘Every body continues in a state of uniform motion in a straight line or in a state of rest, unless acted upon by an outside force.’ Add to this the following observation statement: ‘This body is not in a state of rest.’ The conclusion that follows from these premises is that the body is being acted on by an outside force. If the concept of force used in the formulation of Newton’s first law is a closed (14) concept, then it will be possible to ascertain whether the situation we are examining is a confirmation or a refutation of Newton’s first law. On the other hand if force is a more open concept, then whether we have a falsification of Newton’s law is unclear. If ‘force’ is an open concept, then when one says ‘Here is a body that is accelerating, and I am not aware of an outside force acting on it’ a Newtonian can reply, ‘Keep looking for something that might count as a force in the situation for this may be a clue to a new force that we are unaware of now.’ What turns out to be crucial in the quotation just given from Popper is the term ‘clear disagreement’. How does one tell ‘clear disagreement’ from ‘disagreement’?

In order to work within the analytic-synthetic (= empirical) distinction, philosophies of science must see scientific laws as clearly specified generalizations about clearly specified facts. (15) Scientists must be seen as working with closed concepts. This yields a static picture of science where what is included under each category used is specified for the current state of science. Not to do so leads to a breakdown of the analytic-synthetic distinction and a more dynamic view of science.

Historically Newton did not state his laws with a list of what outside forces were and an operationalization for each. This led scientists to look for forces instead of rejecting the law on the basis of some ‘falsification’. A supposedly exhaustive list of forces would have limited the vision of scientists, hot expanded it. (16) Philosophers who accept the analytic-synthetic (= empirical) distinction, account for this by saying that when a new force is discovered either one has a new empirical generalization or a new definition of force. They contrast two static views – that before the force was discovered and that afterwards. Their problem is that they cannot account for the shift except in an ‘ad hoc’ way. In other words they can only state that there was such-and-such a definition of, or empirical generalization about force, and then later there was another definition or empirical generalization. They cannot explain why the new definition is a definition of force or why the new empirical generalization is one about force. No rationale for the shift can be given. A more dynamic view of science that will allow an understanding of these changes in a non ‘ad hoc’ way seems desirable.

One can see the dispute about operationalization in this context. (17) Philosophers who accept the analytic-synthetic (= empirical) distinction want to settle this dispute in such a way that the meaning of a term is (or is determined by) its operationalization. They want this in order to work with closed concepts that allow generalizations that are about clearly specified things. For instance, Carnap’s method of establishing the empirical significance of terms shows only their empirical significance in one context (Schlesinger, 1968, p.50). He does not tell us how we know that we are talking about the same type of thing when we talk about the temperature in the middle of the sun, and temperature as measured by a mercury thermometer. Only if we distinguish between the operationalization of a term, and the meaning of the term itself, can we claim we are talking about the same thing in two different contexts. A clear understanding of how one term can have several operationalizations is required.

This would provide a non ‘ad hoc’ and dynamic account of how, for example, the concept of force was extended into areas like electro-magnetism. (18)

Having accepted Kant’s definition of the situation, while rejecting his analysis of it, philosophers are in a strait-jacket of closed concepts imposed by the analytic-synthetic (= empirical) distinction. The way out will lie in an analysis that allows some assertions to be open and allows for numerous different operationalizations of scientific concepts.

PROGRAMMATIC ASSERTIONS AND PROGRAMMES

‘The meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (Wittgenstein, 1967, p.20). (19)

Wittgenstein’s analysis of the word ‘game’ in his ‘Philosophical Investigations’ suggests that there is a family of cases covered by the term. While there are certain core applications (20) of the term which, to continue the analogy we might call the ‘nuclear family’, the range of potential application is not specified (which has its analogy in the uncertainty about how far to apply kinship terms). The existing set of uses of a word do not exhaust its possible uses. Wittgenstein, on the basis of this and similar examples, concludes that words do not have the sort of clear cut boundaries or consistent uses that would make a definition possible in the way that positivists want. All that is possible, Wittgenstein argues, is to describe the uses to which a word is put.

What then is the use of a definition in science? I suggest that its core use is to isolate what are the key features of the core use of the word being defined. Definitions give what we understand at present to be the essential features of the core usage. They are theories about use. With a new understanding of the use of a word, a new definition of the word will come about. This is a dynamic view of words which allows us to see the extension of the meaning of words in a way which is not ‘ad hoc’. It does not involve simply contrasting the meaning of words at different times. Instead of the change in meaning being arbitrary, possible changes are built into the word. Reasons can be given for extending a word to cover new phenomena.

There are two aspects of the process of deciding whether a case comes under the word in question – isolating what are the key features of the core applications, and isolating what are the key features of the case in question. What counts is a similarity between the core usages and the case in question, but what exactly will count as a similarity is not given in advance but is a matter of thought, consideration, and analysis. As the criteria of what is to count as ‘the same’ are not given in advance, concepts are open and not closed.

A consideration of the term ‘political party’ may help to illustrate this approach. (21) In the late nineteenth century the core applications of the term ‘political party’ were to groups like the Liberals and Conservatives. Their key features were seen to be that they were one of two or more groups competing to hold power in a state. When Lenin came to power the concept was extended to include a group that had once been a group competing with other groups to hold power, despite the fact that competing groups no longer exist (or no longer exist within the state). With the rise of one party states in the third world the term came to be seen in terms of political mobilization systems. The key feature of the core case is no longer seen as being one of several competing groups for power, but as a political mobilization system. The core usage remains but is seen in a different light. To apply the term ‘political party’ to both the groups in late nineteenth century Europe and the third world now has involved a reinterpretation of both. The first is no longer seen as one of several groups competing for power but as a mobilizer of different interest groups, while the latter is not identified simply as a dictatorship and its hierarchy, but seen as a channel that feeds demands into and aggregates them for the political system.

Language is a flexible tool for coming to grips with the world. If political scientists had approached the concept of political party as the holders of the analytic-synthetic (= empirical) distinction would wish, they they would ha...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 The framework for analysing Parsons
• 2 Parsons’ voluntaristic theory
• 3 Tying man to society the partially social image of man
• 4 The social image of man
• 5 The patterning of meaning: pattern variables and functional dimensions
• 6 Socialization
• 7 Social order: a problem solved too well
• 8 Open social systems theory or structural-functionalism
• 9 Some analyses using both the action and systems programmes
• 10 Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index