Stormtroopers (RLE Nazi Germany & Holocaust)

A Social, Economic and Ideological Analysis 1929-35

Conan Fischer

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9781138794436
• eBook ISBN: 9781317638438
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: German History
• Index: History

This examination of Hitler's stormtroopers provides vital insights into the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the establishment of the Nazi state. Drawing on a wide range of archival sources and extensive biographical material left by the stormtroopers themselves, the author challenges the belief that Hitler's SA was predominantly lower-middle class.

This revealing study of street politics during an era of economic and political dislocation and is an important contribution to the history of inter-war Germany which will appeal to the advanced undergraduate and postgraduate reader alike.

1 Introduction

The NSDAP rose to prominence in German politics over half a century ago, but despite the passage of time, the debate over the causes and character of Nazism and its wider historical significance continues unabated, not least because of the sheer enormity of the phenomenon. Any analysis invites examination of other elements in German social and political life and comparison with other political systems and ideologies, sometimes tainting them, at least implicitly, and often exposing the raw nerves of current ideological standpoints.

The social background of the NSDAP’s adherents has been central to this debate, since, by the early 1930s, the Nazi movement enjoyed substantial popular support. This alone did not bring Hitler to power, but it was certainly a necessary precondition for his success. Even before the republic collapsed, observers noted the NSDAP’s attraction for sections of the lower middle class, particularly the peasantry and small proprietors of non-urban Protestant Germany, and salaried employees.¹ The NSDAP undertook its own survey of party members in 1935, the results of which, although treated with caution, are broadly accepted. These confirmed its attraction for the lower middle classes. While under half the population could in a broad sense be so defined, of the party’s members 55·1 per cent were lower middle class by the same token in January 1933 and 57·8 per cent in January 1935. Similarly, a substantial section of the Nazi electorate stemmed from lower-middle-class backgrounds, although the exact proportions remain debatable. The NSDAP fared less well in recruiting workers. Although 46 per cent of the population were so defined, the proportion of workers in the party was 31·5 per cent in January 1933 and 30·3 per cent in January 1935.² In the electoral arena the relative level of working-class support for the NSDAP was possibly lower still.

If these figures are generally accepted, their significance remains controversial. There have been isolated attempts to demonstrate strong working-class support for Nazism,³ but the main debate has centred on whether National Socialism is definable as a lower-middle-class movement, or whether its basis of support was sufficiently broad to invite its characterisation as a populist mass movement.

Advocates of the former interpretation acknowledge that their argument faces difficulties. Conceptual problems attach to the term ‘lower middle class’ as its limits are not immediately clear and the class lacked sufficient social and economic coherence for identical interests to prevail. Furthermore, among the Catholic third of the lower middle classes there was relatively little support for Nazism, at least until 1933.⁴ None the less it is argued that the crises of the Weimar era squeezed, or appeared to squeeze, much of the lower middle class between big business and organised labour and that the Protestants, at least, responded by supporting Nazism in the early 1930s.⁵

Other historians place greater emphasis on differences within the lower middle class. White-collar staff were not especially predisposed to vote Nazi,⁶ although the same group was over-represented within the party itself.⁷ Furthermore, while much has been made of the NSDAP’s attraction for the peasantry, peasants were heavily under-represented within the party membership nationally.⁸ Regarding the lower middle class’s social coherence, the working-class backgrounds of many clerical staff has been noted,⁹ while the small peasantry, it is argued, possibly shared more in common with other manual occupations than with the rest of the lower middle class.¹⁰ The NSDAP’s ability to gain a third of its membership from the working class is also regarded as significant. No one disputes that the NSDAP was relatively unsuccessful in recruiting workers, at least in those constituencies where the SPD had traditionally done well, but the demographic structure of German society meant that in absolute terms the NSDAP had gained 267,423 workers as members by January 1933 even if that did only represent 31·5 per cent of party membership.¹¹ In the same month the KPD had a membership of barely 300,000¹² which was not exclusively working class.

This socially diverse party was, therefore, arguably ‘a catch-all party of protest’¹³ which, as Moore puts it, cannot be forced ‘into the sociological strait jacket of mere lower-middle-class resentment’.¹⁴ Such a party simultaneously faced great risks and enjoyed great potential. During the mid-1920s the NSDAP, still recovering from the effects of the failed Munich putsch and operating in a period of relative economic prosperity, failed to attract mass backing, but its increasingly successful political exploitation of the rural economic crisis in Lower Saxony during 1928 and 1929 showed its capabilities.¹⁵ With the onset of the depression it came into its own. The conventional parties were ill-placed to appeal to a plurality of interests during a crisis. They had originated in the imperial era (or before) when, given the absence of a fully developed parliamentary system, parties operated predominantly as pressure groups for specific interests, be these the organised labour movement, agriculture, big business, Roman Catholicism or whatever. Despite the constitutional advance represented by Weimar, the parties were slow to change, while the NSDAP with its radical, nationalist rhetoric and a compelling, dynamic leader could appeal to many voters in a defeated, partially occupied country which had slid into rapid economic decline. In contrast with those of other parties, the NSDAP’s adversaries were sufficiently narrowly or sufficiently vaguely defined to leave ample potential support across a broad sweep of society and the NSDAP succeeded in rapidly occupying any vacant political ground. The maintenance of this diverse support was another matter. Once the depression showed signs of easing in late 1932, support for the NSDAP wavered as people began to revert to former loyalties or simply failed to vote. Furthermore, as the Nazi movement’s confidence faltered, the contradictions inherent in its range of policies and electoral promises became evident and took their toll. Hitler assumed office with his movement in disarray, at the invitation of conservative politicians who planned to exploit the NSDAP’s considerable (if declining) electoral strength to conduct conservative policies. Instead, by giving Hitler the chancellorship, they provided the Nazi movement with the one success which could – and did – rally it in 1933.

The diversity and breadth of the Nazi movement has prompted some historians to question whether the organisation displayed essentially similar characteristics throughout Germany during the years of its political offensive. Buchloh’s study of the NSDAP in Duisburg demonstrates that Hitler avoided detailed interference in issues concerning economic policy, which allowed ‘the local NS-organisations sufficient maneouvrability to orientate their propaganda and activities to the specific political and socio-economic attributes of the town’.¹⁶ This meant mobilising working-class as well as lower-middle-class support and here the Nazi movement succeeded. Looking elsewhere in Germany, Nazism assumed various forms socially and ideologically which partly reflected the political flexibility demonstrated by Buchloh. Where mass support was obtainable from an impoverished peasantry – as in Schleswig-Holstein – the NSDAP succeeded in mobilising such support.¹⁷ In Westphalia, where workers comprised more than half the economically active population, the NSDAP took care to woo their support, not without success.¹⁸

The NSDAP’s relative failure among the working class nationally is better explained by the political character of a section of that class – industrial employees – than by characteristics inherent in Nazism itself. Much of the industrial working class had long been organised within the trade union movement (usually socialist, but sometimes Catholic) and within the SPD, or sometimes the Catholic Centre Party. It would require a certain naïveté to expect the destruction of such loyalties within a couple of years by the NSDAP, but there were openings for the Nazi movement even among people associated with this group. The young, and particularly the jobless young who had little personal experience of working-class politics, were an obvious target for the Nazi Party. Among the quarter of the working class employed in crafts and small firms where unionisation and political organisation had made less headway, it seems that the NSDAP fared reasonably well electorally.¹⁹

Thus Nazi strategy and, consequently, support varied from place to place. The NSDAP might conceivably have further enhanced its appeal by using particular sections of the movement to appeal to particular social groups. Next to the party the Storm Troops (Sturmabteilung) or SA represented the largest Nazi formation until 1933 and was actually larger than the party during 1933 and 1934. The party itself was aggressively dynamic, but th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Dedication
• Abbreviations
• Glossary of German Terms Used in Text
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The SA and German Society: Problems of Interpretation
• 3 The SA’s Social Composition
• 4 The SA and the Employment Question
• 5 The SA and its Sources of Financial and Welfare Assistance
• 6 Ideology and Politics of the SA
• 7 Targets for SA Radicalism
• 8 The SA in the Radical Camp: Stormtroopers and Communists
• 9 Conclusion
• Sources
• Index