The Policies of Genocide (RLE Nazi Germany & Holocaust)

Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany

Gerhard Hirschfeld

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781317625711
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: German History
• Index: History

One of the darkest passages in German history is examined in this book (originally published in 1986) by five leading German historians of the Third Reich. The authors establish that a direct link existed between the widespread deaths of Soviet prisoners of war and the extermination of Jews and implicate the German army in the policies of genocide to a far greater degree than was previously thought. The situation of the inmates of camps is analysed and evidence provided of resistance action even among those facing death.

1

The German Army and the Policies of Genocide

CHRISTIAN STREIT

The genesis of the decision to exterminate the European Jews still to a large extent lies in the dark, in spite of historians’ efforts.¹ For a long time it was thought that a direct order to exterminate all the Jews had been given by Hitler. As any such order would have been very similar to the liquidation orders on record, such as the Commissar Order for example, it was assumed that it had been given in the spring of 1941.² This assumption was based partly on statements by those responsible who pleaded a Führer order³ and partly on the postulate that, in the totalitarian National Socialist state, Hitler himself must have given the order for the extermination of all Jews. This postulate was temptingly plausible because of the seemingly ‘logical’ development of Hitler’s radical anti-semitism, from the gradual deprivation of rights to the extermination of all Jews.

On the other hand, in his study of National Socialist policy towards the Jews, published in 1972, Uwe Dietrich Adam denied that there had been such an order from Hitler before September 1941.⁴ In 1977 Martin Broszat argued that ‘the physical liquidation of the Jews was set in motion, not by a single decision, but far more by degrees’. In the same article he convincingly refutes David Irving’s thesis that the extermination of the Jews had been set in motion by Himmler and Heydrich without Hitler’s knowledge.⁵

I am not in a position to answer the question of how the decision to exterminate the Jews originated, but I believe that I can contribute further material to corroborate the theses of Adam and Broszat.

The goal of removing the Jews from all areas of the world under German control already existed in general terms at the beginning of 1941, although the way in which this objective was to be realized was not clear. The development to be outlined here makes it necessary to assume that at this point the ‘territorial final solution’ – the so-called Madagascar Plan – was uppermost in the thoughts of the National Socialist leaders and that the total annihilation of the European Jews had not yet been seriously considered.

By the autumn of 1941, however, a situation had been created in which the elimination of all Jews within the German sphere of influence was made possible. This was due not only to the intellectual disposition of the power elite in the German Reich, but also to technical and infrastructural developments. An important factor also seems to have been that the circle of collaborators as well as the circle of victims was extended only gradually.

The turning-point in this development was the war against the Soviet Union, which in the planning phase had been conceptualized as an ideological war of annihilation, without, however, implying the extermination of the Jews. In this context the orders that had been worked out by the political and military leadership of the Reich for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war and the civilian population played a vital role. These orders and their execution by the majority of the Wehrmacht in the East contributed – in my opinion decisively – to the development of a situation in which the Final Solution (Endlösung) became possible.⁶

The first reference on record to the later extermination policy was a statement made by Goering on 26 February 1941 to the head of the Economics and Armaments Office (Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt) in the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), General Thomas. In the occupation of the Soviet Union, Goering said, the point was first of all to do away with the Bolshevik leaders quickly.⁷ A few days later, in a directive to the Wehrmachtführungsstab (operation staff of the OKW) Hitler demanded that, as a condition for the establishment of states dependent on Germany instead of Russia, the Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia should be eliminated as former oppressors of the people. This was such a difficult task, Hitler’s directive said, ‘that it could not be demanded from the regular army’. The head of the Wehrmachtführungsstab, General Jodl, specified:

Whether it is necessary to engage agents of the Reichsführer-SS already there as well, alongside the Secret Police, must be checked with the Reichsführer-SS. The necessity of liquidating all Bolshevik chiefs [alle Bolschewistenhäuptlinge] and commissars speaks for it.⁸

Ten days later, on 13 March 1941, the decision had been taken: in the basic directive for the war in the East, Himmler was ‘entrusted, on behalf of the Führer, with special tasks resulting from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems’.⁹ Thus the engagement of Einsatzgruppen (‘Special Forces’) of the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police, SiPo) and the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, SD) became possible in principle – with the assistance of the High Command of the Wehrmacht and without the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, having offered any resistance to the restricting of his authority. Until the end of April 1941, the Quartermaster General of the Army, General Wagner, and the head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Head Office), SS-Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, were working on an agreement about the powers of the Einsatzgruppen.

This decision can, of course, in no way be equated with the decision to exterminate the Russian Jews. On 17 March Hitler had once more stated the objective to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Halder: the ‘intelligentsia’ engaged by Stalin must be eliminated.¹⁰ The powers of the Einsatzgruppen, as formulated by Wagner and Heydrich, were in line with this. In the rear Army areas they allowed only the ‘securing’ of materials and ‘especially important individuals (leading emigrants, saboteurs, terrorists, etc.)’. For the rear Army Group areas the task was broadly formulated as ‘the investigation and combating of activities hostile to the Reich’.¹¹

In March 1941, no resistance having been forthcoming, Hitler expressed his ideas on how the war against the Soviet Union was to be waged in front of approximately 250 high-ranking Wehrmacht officers, mainly troop commanders of the Eastern Army. What was new here was the demand that the Wehrmacht itself should take a part in the war of annihilation: ‘The troops must defend themselves with the same methods as those with which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU members are criminals and must be treated as such.’¹² However, the officers accepted Hitler’s demands without protest. After the war some of those involved stated that there had been protests from von Brauchitsch. A careful analysis of the sources available shows that this was not the case.¹³

In the following weeks Hitler’s demands were translated into orders by the High Command of the Wehrmacht and the Army with the result that the Wehrmacht was fully drawn into the war of annihilation. According to the Commissar Order, the troops were to shoot captured Red Army commissars and some of the civilian commissars on the spot. According to the Barbarossa Directive, the military courts were deprived of their jurisdiction for all offences committed by Soviet civilians. ‘Suspect elements’ were to be executed at once. Moreover, ideologically motivated offences committed by German soldiers against the Soviet population were to remain exempt from prosecution. Before the first shot was fired, the circle of potential victims had grown enormously. Where originally ‘only’ the liquidation of the ‘Bolshevik leaders’ had been mentioned, with the Commissar Order it extended to all the commissars, and with the Barbarossa Directive to all those who resisted in any way. This provided the basis for the subsequent policy of extermination. In this context it is significant that, at least in the case of the Commissar Order, the Army leadership initiated the expression of Hitler’s demand as a formal order and also introduced aggravating elements in the formulation of the Barbarossa Directive.

Judging from the surviving records, by the beginning of June 1941 there had been no suggestion that Jews should be among the victims. On 30 March Hitler had avoided arguing in terms of National Socialist racial dogma. The inclusion of the Jews in the annihilation policy was mentioned for the first time in orders on the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, which were issued during the first weeks of the war in the East. The Chief of the General Wehrmacht Office in the High Command, General Reinecke, was also in charge of the Prisoner of War Department in the OKW. From at least 28 June onwards, only a few days after the beginning of the campaign in the East,¹⁴ he was negotiating with Heydrich about the selection and execution of certain groups in the prisoner-of-war camps by Einsatzkommandos (‘Special Units’). A draft of the agreement of 28 June shows how the circle of victims was enlarged once more. Not only were commissars and functionaries of all ranks to be ‘eliminated’, but also ‘all persons who could be established as being agitators or fanatical Communists’ and ‘all Jews’.¹⁵

This agreement came into force on 17 July 1941. The Army’s theatre of operations was expressly included, although only the Army High Command had direct authority to issue orders. In this case, however, the Army leadership was not immediately prepared to widen the responsibilities of the Einsatzgruppen. On 24 July, Quartermaster General Wagner by express order forbade the Einsatzkommandos to participate in the ‘selection’ of prisoners of war; although in practice he did allow it to happen: ‘politically intolerable elements, commissars and agitators’ were to be shot. The Jews were to be separated from the other prisoners and made available to work at the front. This decision shows that the Army leadership, unlike that of the Wehrmacht, was prepared to participate in exterminating the political enemy, but not in the extermination of the ‘racial enemy’.¹⁶

Reinecke’s approval of the liquidation of all Jews among the prisoners of war is remarkable – all the more so as a detailed analysis of the decisions made during the first weeks of the Eastern campaign shows that Heydrich initially proceeded cautiously in employing the Einsatzgruppen. Some commanders of Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos stated after the war that, in his briefing of June 1941, Heydrich had passed on Hitler’s order to eliminate all Jews. Contemporary sources cast considerable doubt on these statements.

Four Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer (Higher SS- and Police Leaders) were assigned to the Reich Commissariats planned for the occupied territories. There they were to have the same responsibilities as the Einsatzgruppen in the Army’s theatre of operations. Because of an organizational mishap, Heydrich was able to pass on his directives to them only in writing. These directives have survived, and from them we can see that Heydrich did not exceed the demands of the Commissar Order and Barbarossa Directive in essential points. All party functionaries of higher, middle and ‘radical lower’ rank were to be executed, as well as all ‘other radical elements’ and ‘all Jews in state and party positions’.¹⁷

The fact that the four Einsatzgruppen commanders as well as the Higher SS- and Police Leaders were asked expressly to observe the agreement between Wagner and Heydrich scrupulously and thus ‘ensure the most loyal co-operation with the Wehrmacht’¹⁸ also suggests that Heydrich was proceeding carefully. This agreement was formulated relatively openly. The general execution of all Jews in the rear Army areas, as happened later, was certainly not permitted by the agreement.

Furthermore, Heydrich had demanded in his oral briefing, and repeated in a further order to the E...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction
• 1 The German Army and the Policies of Genocide
• 2 The German Army and the Ideological War against the Soviet Union
• 3 Resistance and Resignation in Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camps
• 4 Hitler’s Final Solution and its Rationalization
• 5 The Realization of the Unthinkable: The ‘Final Solution of the fewish Question’in the Third Reich
• Chronology of Destruction
• Appendices:
• Glossary and List of Abbreviations
• Suggestions for Further Reading
• Index