Contextualising Chinese engagement in Africa
Dominik Kopiński, Andrzej Polus and Ian Taylor
University of Wroclaw and University of St Andrews/University of Stellenbosch
In seeking to cultivate external relations with African countries, China has long stressed its commonly shared roots with African nations as a developing country rather than a Western state, and as such the symbolic attraction of China clearly reverberates with many African elites who seem to look on China as a positive development model. However, it should be noted that this has not been embraced solely by dictatorial or authoritarian regimes but in fact China’s approach to noninterference has struck a chord even with those democratically elected leaders in Africa. While such practices clearly benefit African elites, it is remains doubtful that they do so for ordinary Africans, although sustained analysis suggests that the potential exists, albeit hampered by the modalities of governance on the continent.
The growing presence of Chinese economic and political actors in Africa reflects what is, perhaps, the most important set of dynamics to shape Africa’s external relations since the end of the Cold War. The political dimension of this upsurge in interest from Beijing can be traced from the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, where China found itself under pressure from its erstwhile economic partners in the West (Taylor 1998, 447). Notably, several African countries rallied around Beijing and expressed support for the measures employed by the Chinese military. In the context where Western powers (temporarily) ostracised Beijing, the Chinese leadership’s view of Africa in China’s broader foreign policy was subsequently transformed from ‘one of benign neglect to one of renewed emphasis … the developing world was elevated in Chinese thinking to become a “cornerstone” of Beijing’s foreign policy’ (Taylor 1998, 447).
Beijing found in Africa a supportive constituency. Many African leaders viewed – and continue to view – China as a success story in that it has risen from backwardness to staggering economic growth without following the prescriptions of the West (Alden 2005, 156). Notably, China’s leaders have avoided the calls for democracy and good governance that the West ostensibly demands. Equally, China’s leadership has in recent years actively courted African leaders with a return to the rhetoric of a shared colonial history of repression. Though this rhetoric harks back to the 1960s and it is doubtful whether it matters that a capitalist exploiter is French, Polish or Chinese (he is still an exploiter), this discourse is lapped up by many African elites, attracted by its intrinsically anti-Western sentiment. A heightened emphasis on the importance of state sovereignty has also chimed with African leaders who have felt under pressure from Western demands for reform. At the same time, the Chinese have seen in Africa a useful arena where it can continue to isolate Taiwan (a struggle China has won hands-down) and as an increasingly important economic resource.
Indeed, the urgent need for oil has been a major impetus in the recent economic surge in Chinese activity in Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 2005, 7). While Beijing has been criticised in Africa that its trade practices significantly benefit the Chinese economy even if this is to the detriment of African countries, the importation of oil from Africa to China has in fact leveled the playing field to a degree between China and Africa. The annual growth rate on the Africa continent has increased in recent years and this is due in large part to the impact of China’s economic ventures in the region and its purchase of oil specifically (Taylor 2006, 951). China’s renewed interest in Africa has seen many Chinese businesspeople travelling to Africa to pursue their entrepreneurial agendas, and some analysts – as well as many African governments – believe that this will greatly increase the development prospects of local African economies, while also allowing access to a new range of products and services (Tull 2006, 472). Economic growth in Africa has also been furthered by a steady increase in Chinese tourism and this increase has occurred largely through the Chinese government’s promotion of many African states as ‘officially approved travel destinations,’ bringing a much needed boost to the tourism industry in over a dozen countries on the African continent (Alden 2005, 154). Ultimately, it might be said that ‘in the short term, China’s trade with and investment in Africa are of assistance to the development of the continent, if for no other reason than that little investment is forthcoming from other sources. [Furthermore,] China’s investment in Africa’s crumbling infrastructure is needed’ (Taylor 2006, 949).
In seeking to cultivate external relations with African countries, China has long stressed its commonly shared roots with African nations as a developing country rather than a Western state, and as such ‘the symbolic attraction of China, a once-impoverished country victimised by Western imperialism and held back by its own pursuit of disastrous forms of socialism, clearly resonates with African elites looking for a positive development model from the Third World’ (Alden 2005, 156). China has provided an economic development model that many African leaders have found to be an attractive alternative to the ‘free’ and ‘open’ market economies of both the United States and the European Union (EU). Unlike the aid given to Africa from Western-oriented organisations and countries, Chinese aid rarely comes to Africa with conditional stipulations stressing the importance of tenets such as good governance or a heightened respect for human rights (Tull 2006, 463). Many African elites then have favoured and appreciated such a practice, as this has greatly aided them in legitimising and consolidating their rule (Muekalia 2004, 11). However, it should be noted that this has not been embraced solely by dictatorial or authoritarian regimes but in fact ‘China’s traditionalist approach to non-interference in domestic affairs accords well with the outlook even of democratically elected leaders in Africa, who view the unity of the state as a sine qua non of effective governance’ (Alden 2005, 156). While such practices clearly benefit African elites, it is remains doubtful that they do so for ordinary Africans (Tull 2006, 459).
Contested discourses
In the academic, as well as the political arena, there have been mixed reactions to China’s flourishing relations with Africa. One discourse, reflecting the official Chinese view, argues that this partnership will prove to be beneficial for the long-exploited African people in that China is offering a strategic relationship based on mutual benefit, one in which Africa cannot lose. Academics who subscribe to this argument generally talk up how favourable Africans seemingly view China. However, the opposite discourse argues that China, as an ever-aspiring world power, is no different from any other external actor that has shown an interest in cultivating relationships with Africa. By this it is meant that China gains a significant amount more from the relationship than Africa does. In fairness, as Wilson (2005, 7) points out, China and Africa have complementary economic and commercial needs. Africa is short on capital, has a low manufacturing base, is highly import dependent, lacks basic infrastructures and exports a lot of natural resources. China has ample investment capital, a huge manufacturing exporting base, is willing to build infrastructure and imports a significant amount of petroleum and other natural resources. Here, we must be careful to heed Wilson’s warning to not generalise Beijing’s relationship with a handful of African states to reflect China’s ties with the entire African continent.
Having said this, what should Africa be gaining from this increased engagement? If the Chinese promise that it is committed to expanding ‘Sino-African trade and economic relations on the basis of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation’ (Luo Guijin 2006) is to be trusted, then Africa should expect to experience a fundamental surge in economic growth and development, but this remains highly contested and various facets of Sino-African relations reflect both the positive and negative aspects of this relationship.
For examples, with regard to trade, Chinese companies and corporations have increasingly begun to look abroad for new markets and Africa has emerged as an attractive destination. Beijing has been keen to promote the idea that China should be given privileged access to African markets on the basis of South-South ‘solidarity’ and as a concrete manifestation of a broader counter-hegemonic strategy that China is keen to encourage within Africa. The self-serving nature of this stance is obvious. This, coupled with the end of the Multi-Fibre Agreement which had long imposed quotas on Beijing, has meant that cheap Chinese goods, textiles in particular, are flooding Africa markets, causing the academic and political world alike to talk of a textile ‘tsunami’ (Wilson 2005, 9). This has had a devastating effect on local industry in some countries in various ways. Firstly, most African producers cannot compete with Chinese companies even in Africa’s domestic markets, as they are unable to undercut Chinese production costs and prices. Secondly, the growth of Chinese exports to the United States has arguably shut down the promising (albeit artificial) growth of African exports to Washington (Taylor 2009). At present, ‘nothing indicates that Africa will be able to compete successfully with China, a result of which is that its exports to China are by and large limited to capital-intensive commodities’ (Tull 2006, 472). Tull acknowledges that whilst this is the result of legitimate market competition, it contravenes Beijing’s statements that enhanced Chinese–African interaction will always result in win-win situations (ibid.). As a consequence, there has been visible domestic reaction by the labour and business sector across the continent, which Kopinski and Polus discuss with regard to the situation in Zambia.
Resource security is undoubtedly the biggest driving force behind China’s increased involvement in Africa. Realists would argue that, as an aspiring world power, China is vying to attain material preponderance in order to increase its power and further its campaign for super power status. The volatility of the Middle East, as well as competition from other economies, has forced Beijing to encourage Chinese oil companies to seek other sources of oil to fuel China’s rapidly growing economy. Thus Chinese oil companies have turned towards oil producing regions where risks and challenges have meant that the major international companies have overlooked their potential. Africa is one such arguable region. This engagement has had some positive economic impact on the African oil-producing states as the subsequent growth in demand has meant that mineral prices are reaching record highs, reversing a long decline for many of Africa’s major exports over the past few decades. For African oil producers, in particular, there has been a substantial windfall. Indeed, as Corkin shows in this volume, African states such as Angola have been quite adept in managing this scenario.
However, the positive implications have the potential to be overshadowed by the negative. Dependency theorists would see Africa as being involved in a classic core-periphery dependency relationship, where the core subordinates and exploits the periphery, whose function it is to supply the former with primary products. The periphery is therefore trapped in a dependent relationship; its economy is entirely reliant on the demand of the core’s economy, making it very vulnerable to fluctuations (Taylor 2006, 251). By focusing primarily on exporting natural resources, in particular oil, African states may find themselves open to market shocks which may devastate fragile developing economies. Naidu and Davies (2006, 81) argue that in order to avoid this, Africa must shift its current activities in the natural resource sector towards secondary and tertiary production. Whether this will occur very much depends on the political economies and modalities of governance in various African countries and has little per se to do with China.
Motives and messages
China, like any other state, is concerned with advancing itself on the international stage. This means securing energy resources and new markets, in order to drive the Chinese economy. Ultimately, any economic engagements that Beijing undertakes will be with profit securely in mind. However, it is the political context of these economic arrangements that need to be analysed.
At the rhetorical source of the political implications of the Sino-African relationship lie China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. These effectively lay out how Beijing will conduct its foreign policy, and are: respect for each state’s sovereignty; a pact of mutual non-aggression; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; equality and mutual benefit; and finally, peaceful coexistence with states by seeking common interests. Out of these, it is the policies of non-interference and in turn the respect for sovereignty, which has proven to be the most controversial in the international arena. In a continent that has been wrecked by corrupt and dictatorial leaders, this is a widely criticised political stance. Indeed, critics have suggested that the long-term consequences of Chinese alleged indifference towards the internal affairs of its partners could have problematic results, not least for Chinese business concerns. Yet equally, as Wu Zhengyu and Taylor point out, the policy of strict non-interference is increasingly flexible and is demonstrated through China’s increased willingness to partake in peacekeeping operations.
On the international level, it is clear that China is attempting to increase its bargaining power by positioning itself ‘at the helm of a coalition of African developing countries’ (Muekalia 2004, 10). In doing so, Beijing is hoping to leverage its position on the UN Security Council as well as improving its bargaining power in other international institutions. Beijing is genuinely worried about Washington’s long term objectives, and it views any criticism of its domestic policies as imperialist in nature. This concern manifests itself in a search, a ‘breaking with the traditional aloofness of Chinese foreign policy’ (Alden 2005, 152), for strategic partners. It is in Africa that China has targeted one area where this is to be done. Thus, as China’s power and influence grows, Beijing is becoming more and more willing to challenge incumbent powers and protect its interests in Africa. As mentioned, the Chinese effectively win over African elites by emphasising South-South solidarity, asserting that China and Africa share identical or similar opinions on many major international affairs as well as common interests. In doing so, China promises to raise the status of African voices on the international level, and this may be partially true. On the political level, Chinese and American competition over Africa has enhanced Africa’s profile in the international arena. Certainly, in the last few years, Western politicians have placed Africa higher and higher on their agenda. This competition may also allow the African governments to play one power off against the other and thus Africa has regained some of the strategic importance that it had lost after the Cold War.
Whether African governments will take advantage of this position, or squander it, is in the hands of Africans themselves and here the picture is frustrating. China’s renewed interest in Africa and the concomitant attention it has provoked from other countries could offer African governments the perfect opportunity to exploit the various sides. Ideally, leaders could get their voices heard in the international arena, they could increase the value of foreign aid by getting the donors to actually listen to what is needed and they could utilise the upsurge in receipts to promote development. The fundamental problem, however, lies in the leaders themselves. So long as Africa remains in the grip of corrupt and predatory dictators, these opportunities will always be largely wasted. It is then in the political economy of Africa that one must really look to see how and where China’s upsurge in Africa will play out and who will benefit from this engagement and, conversely, who will not.
Overview of the collection
The collection of studies on China–Africa relations starts with Wu Zhengyu and Ian Taylor’s contribution on Chinese involvement in peacekeeping in Africa. As the two authors note, China has, in the past decade or so, emerged as an important contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, with Chinese peacekeepers serving in places as diverse as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Sudan. Indeed, China currently sends more peacekeeping troops abroad than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. This is a major development in Sino-African relations given that historically, Beijing has held a highly hostile attitude towards the notion of ‘interference’ of any type in a country’s affairs. And due to the role of the UN in the Korean War (1950–1953), China’s attitude towards the UN sanctioning military missions was, for decades, considerably antagonistic. China’s stance on peace operations is – and always has been – closely tied to its attitude on state sovereignty. This has meant that China has set limits on the type of interventions that Beijing is prepared to sanction vis-à-vis its role in peacekeeping missions. Yet it appears that Chinese policy in this regard is evolving. Wu and Taylor discuss why and how China’s role in peacekeeping in Africa has played out and the likely directions this is to take in the future.
The discussion then shifts towards the commonly-held idea that China is some sort of voracious ‘dragon’ intent on grabbing as much of Africa’s natural resources as possible and being a pivotal actor in the so-called new scramble for Africa. The security dimensions of this and the suggested possibilities that this will provoke conflict in the future are addressed by Péter Marton and Tamás Matura’s study, which notes that Western reactions to China’s increasing investment in a number of countries in Africa, as well as Chinese counter-reactions, are often conceptualised as symptoms of a ‘honey pot’ conflict. Such an impression, as noted, stems from viewing contemporary African development as a ‘new scramble’ for the continent’s natural resources. However, Marton and Matura critically unpack these claims in various fundamental ways, demonstrating how it is untenable. Their objections are based on a survey of Chinese discourses regarding Western criticisms as well empirical objections based on the supposedly ‘conflictual’ cases of Angola and Sudan, where one in fact finds mutual toleration between Western and Chinese actors. These realities contradict the assumptions of a honey pot conflict. Marton and Matura conclude their analysis with the alternative proposition that any Sino-Western conflict can be more aptly described as partly self-interest-driven, but at the same time normative, and is much more related to Western concerns about a ‘spoiler’ role played by China in Africa than by any real security threat per se.
The collection then continues with two contributions related to energy issues involving Chinese actors in Africa, with concentrations on two specific case studies: Angola and Zambia. First, Lucy Corkin discusses China’s evolving relations with Angola. As she notes, conventional accounts suggest that there exists something entitled the so-called ‘Angola Model’, whereby the Chinese government is heavily involved in the national reconstruction programme through various financial institutions as a means to ensure closer relations with Angola and thus access to oil. In this light, China’s strategy is thus ostensibly to accumulate political capital through the provision of infrastructure, financed by oil-backed concessional loans extended by Chinese state-owned banks. Corkin’s study, however, traces the history of China’s relations with Angola before examining the various parallel structures involved in the two countries’ co-operation over infrastructure, loans and oil. It examines the so-called ‘Angola Model’ by looking at three key assumptions surrounding risk, access to oil and China’s political access in Angola. The study also evaluates the nature of the so-called ‘strategic partnership’ for both Angola and China. Political posturing indicates tha...