The changing nature of the European Unionâs external relations
The European Union (EU) is a historically novel type of polity. As the outcome of the disastrous experiences of great wars in Europe, the EU not only offers a unique way of organizing relations between the states of Europe, but also represents their distinctive collective voice and influence in the world. The distinct contribution of the EU in international relations, which has its foundations in the narrative of a shared European history and responsibilities, is most apparent in the Unionâs relations with its neighbors and the wider world, and symbolized by the international identity of the EU as a global actor. This has been conceptualized in a number of ways over the years: various accounts of the nature/identity of the EU as a civilian (DuchĂȘne 1972), normative (Manners 2002), ethical (Aggestam 2008), Kantian power â by choice or by necessity (Kagan 2003; NikolaĂŻdis 2004), or as a quiet superpower (Moravcsik 2002) focused on the role played by the EU in the international arena and its impact on world politics. In this respect, the term EU identity, which was often used interchangeably with European identity with its historic and cultural heritage, came to be assessed on the basis of the Unionâs foreign policy performance: âthe EUâs role as an international actor and its international identity are considered a function of the significance of the EU and its Member States in international affairs and of the effectiveness of its policy practiceâ (Sedelmeier 2004: 125). The formulation and implementation of a coherent and effective foreign policy by the EU was thus seen as the chief means through which its international role and identity could be strengthened.
Over the years, a number of studies have analysed to what extent the EU succeeded in acting as an autonomous and effective actor in international politics, particularly in comparison to other key global powers such as the United States.1 It was often argued that while the EU had the potential to become a major actor on the world stage, a number of factors hindered the achievement of its full potential, such as the lack of a strong military capacity, the limited nature of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and the difficulties associated with speaking and acting in unison in response to international developments and crises. Yet, it has to be kept in mind that the traditional and state-based understanding of foreign policy covers but a small part of the Unionâs relations with the wider world. There are a number of areas in the policy portfolio of the EU that have external impact and can be categorized under the broader framework of Unionâs external relations, which include policy areas such as trade, neighbourhood, enlargement and humanitarian aid.
In this broad category of external relations, it is often argued that the EUâs enlargement policy has proven to be its most unique and successful policy tool. The notion that, through a process of reform and change regulated and guided by the Union, states could transform themselves into EU members and reap the benefits of membership in the European family puts the Union in a very strong position vis-Ă -vis potential candidates. In instances where the promise of membership is imminent, the EU exercises considerable influence over the candidate states in the difficult period of âapprenticeshipâ during which âthey strive to approximate their institutions, policies and values to those of the Unionâ with the financial help and guidance of the EU (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 137). The promise of EU membership has thus served as a strong driving force for domestic reform and change in many countries.
Yet, it is not only the prospective Member States that go through a process of transformation on the path to becoming part of the EU. It is also the EUâs composition and nature that change along the way, as well as its policy areas. Through enlargement, the EU not only extends its zone of peace, prosperity and stability to other parts of Europe, it also becomes a stronger, more competitive and diversified actor in its region and the wider world economically and politically. Another clear example of this transformation with respect to policy change concerns the rules and standards that candidate states should adhere to as part of the enlargement process, particularly in the run up to the so-called âbig-bang enlargementâ in 2004. As a policy area that initially started with the sole criterion of potential members being âEuropean statesâ, Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, the enlargement policy of the EU evolved into its current form as a response to the features of the countries that joined the Union in seven enlargement rounds, as Erhan İçener and David Phinnemore demonstrate in Chapter 3 of this volume. These enlargement rounds resulted in states with different histories, and political and economic features joining the European family. These new members of the family had distinct lineages and qualities; some were similar to the existing Member States politically and economically while a number of them had a separate history of being on the other side of the Iron Curtain and were qualitatively different compared to the existing members in terms of their political and economic standards. As a response, the EU had to develop new means and criteria through which to assess their progress and transform these countries on the path to membership. The 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargements, which brought 11 Central and Eastern European (CEE) states into the EU,2 were seen as quite a success both for the EU and its Member States, as well as the countries that joined the Union. In addition to the political will of both the new and the existing Member States to widen the European family, this peaceful transformation process demonstrated the success of the EUâs enlargement policy and accession regime in the form of the Copenhagen Criteria, at least in the years prior to the financial crisis.
The EUâs Western Balkan enlargement3
The 2000s were the decade that witnessed the outcomes of the EUâs âtransformative powerâ over the post-communist countries of CEE (Grabbe 2006). While this power was not equally successful in cases such as Bulgaria and Romania, on the whole, the EUâs eastern enlargement was considered to be a success in terms of creating a peaceful and harmonious union in Europe based on shared values, norms and principles. Numerous references, both on the part of the existing and potential Member States, to the theme of âreturning to Europeâ, coupled with the clear promise of eventual membership, implied that the policy had a teleological nature and that the candidate countries would eventually join the Union. Yet, as the financial crisis, which has been at the heart of discussions in Europe since 2009, demonstrated, economic diversity and weak economic and social structures in a number of EU Member States pointed towards the need for stricter conditions for future members, and more EU control over economic planning and government spending. Hence, it is important to keep in mind that, while the EU discourse still has a normative aspect, as a result of the recent developments, economic interests also occupy a key place in the process of European integration, and with it EU enlargement. The economic interests of the EU are currently being redefined in the wake of the financial crises in numerous Member States, and these discussions also affect the future enlargement of the Union, as Will Bartlett argues in Chapter 11 on the economic transformation of the Western Balkans.
The Western Balkan countries, on the other hand, lack a clear timeline and perspective. In fact, in the aftermath of the violent break-up of the Yugoslav Federation, the EU was caught off-guard in its foreign policy and failed to put an end to the bloodshed. It was only later that it âstepped up its engagement in the region in the 2000s, extending the prospect of EU membership in the hope of replicating the success in Central and Eastern Europeâ (Noutcheva 2012: 1). In its policy towards the Western Balkans, the EU adapted the model it originally developed for its Eastern enlargement and at the same time created a series of ânetworks of bilateral and multilateral relations through a process of Stabilization and Associationâ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 144). The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) was further strengthened at the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003, which concluded that all Western Balkan countries were considered potential future members of the EU. Since then, they have been moving on the path to membership with varying levels of success: while the candidacies of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro have been recognized, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are still considered to be potential candidates. Croatia joined the Union in July 2013.
From the perspective of EU enlargement, the predominantly weaker nature of the states in the region, coupled with their conflictual pasts, implied that the relationship between the EU and the potential candidate countries was to be qualitatively different. The EU now needed to behave in a considerably different manner as the host compared to its previous enlargement rounds in preparing and assessing the Western Balkan states on the path to eventual accession. Moreover, the prior involvement of the Union in the region and its special representatives and agencies on the ground put the EU in an asymmetrically strong position regarding the local political elite. With the carrot of eventual membership, the EU often dictated its own standards, norms and rules in the region, sometimes with ambiguous success. It was claimed that, as a response to âalleged crisesâ in the region, the EU intervened directly in the domestic politics of the Western Balkan states and âon the grounds that âEuropean valuesâ, âEuropean identityâ, or âEuropean securityâ are at stakeâ (Chandler 2008: 69). Chandler (2006) argues that the West, including the EU, has focused on institutional design and state building in non-Western societies without a deeper consideration of local practices and long-term legitimacy. The contributions in this book extend this argument. Not only is the EU an empire in denial, it is indeed a state-builder in denial. As Soeren Keil and Zeynep Arkan outline in the Chapter 2 of this volume, EU Member State building has become the most important element of the enlargement process in the Western Balkans. The EU is no longer just involved in processes of adjusting the Western Balkan statesâ economies, legislation and policy areas according to European standards. Instead, the EU has become an active state-builder, promoting specific institutional arrangements and adjusting political systems in Southeastern Europe.
In order to explore the centrality of Member State building in the enlargement process, the framework used in this volume treats enlargement policy as a foreign policy practice. Accordingly, in the next two parts the contributors to the volume analyse how the EU continuously promoted solutions to political questions that go well beyond the framework of the acquis communautaire, the EUâs legal body. From police reform in Bosnia to the installation of the Union between Serbia and Montenegro, the EU has clearly been involved in state-building practices, albeit with mixed results (Bieber 2011). EU Member State building is thus seen as the extension of the EUâs foreign policy to the enlargement process. It includes the traditional focus on the implementation of the acquis, but at the same time goes well beyond this. It is a reaction to existing and perceived state weaknesses in the Western Balkans, and an attempt by the EU to build states that fit the standardized model of a âEuropean stateâ. Yet, as most authors point out in this book, there is no such thing as a standard âEuropean stateâ. Among the EU Member States, we find unitary, federal and decentralized states, states with numerous political parties or with two or three dominant ones. We also find states with unicameral or bicameral legislatures, monarchies and republics, states where human rights are protected by strong courts and others where different institutions, including Human Rights Commissions, play a key role. In some countries, minorities are well integrated and part of governing coalitions, in others there remains a conflictual relation between the majority and the minority. The same is true for the economic models of Member States. Some, such as Germany and the Benelux countries, have strong social welfare systems, while others have weaker provisions. In the United Kingdom, the economy is dominated by the banking sector, while Germany still has a strong industrial base. Unemployment differs from well below 10 per cent in most of Western Europe to over 20â30 per cent in Eastern and Southern Europe.4 Hence, many of the reforms and initiatives that the EU has promoted in the Western Balkans are not based on a standardized model, but on what the EU considers to be ânormalâ, i.e. what should be the standard. This normative focus links the EUâs state-building activities in Southeastern Europe to its overall foreign policy, which is also driven by the assumption that there are standard models for such contested ideas as the rule of law, free market, human rights and democracy (Manners 2002).
As a response, political elites in the Western Balkan states resist the EUâs push for standardized models in contested policy areas, not only because it would threaten their privileges within their own states, but also because they know that the EUâs insistence on reforms is based on a norm-driven rather than practical consideration. This does not mean that all suggestions coming from the EU as part of its state-building agenda are necessarily bad or will have negative consequences. Indeed, a police reform along the lines suggested by the EU would probably have increased the efficiency and the independence of policing in Bosnia. Similarly, the EUâs insistence on a dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo has resulted in a calming of the situation between the two neighbors, and the EU has been successful as an arbitrator between Macedonians and Albanians, as Simonida Kacarska demonstrates in Chapter 6. However, the elites in these countries often have their own agendas, which usually are centred on them staying in power. As Jelena DĆŸankiÄ demonstrates vividly in Chapter 5, in the case of Montenegro, reforms were only implemented when they did not threaten the dominance of the Democratic ...
