Women and Heroin Addiction in China's Changing Society

Huan Gao

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781136661563
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

Accompanying China's economic reform and open-door policy in 1978, illicit drug use emerged in the late 1980s, and gradually developed into a serious social problem. Heroin was the dominant illicit drug consumed in the new drug epidemic, and the number of female heroin users has increased rapidly in the country. While heroin use in China is soaring, little is known about women's heroin use in the context of China's rapidly changing society.

Using intensive interviews with 131 female heroin users, this book explores the careers of female heroin users in China under changing social contexts in the reform era. It investigates the impacts of sociological and individual factors on women's heroin use in each developing stage of their drug use careers. It also examines the social consequences of women's heroin use by looking at connections between women's heroin use and criminality, and the change in women's social relations after heroin use. Lastly, the book analyzes and ascertains the impact of current narcotics control policies on women's drug use careers.

This groundbreaking book has important policy implications for both China and the international society in the context of increasing global concern about women's substance abuse.

1 Social Changes and Illicit Drug Use in China

One of the most important events in all of China’s history was the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.¹ Led by the Communist Party of China (CPC), China, a country recognized for its long history of opium abuse, had not only eradicated illicit drug use, gambling and prostitution within only a few years after 1949, but also continued as a drug free society for several decades (Zhou 2000).² However, after China launched its economic reform and an open-door policy to modernize its economy in 1978, the nation was no longer immune to illicit drug abuse.

China’s economic reform has led to increasing economic gains for its people, accompanied by changes in the social, cultural and political spheres of their lives. Crime rates in all categories have escalated tremendously, particularly, illicit drug trafficking since the early 1980s. With the emergence of a soaring drug trafficking trade, illicit drug use made its appearance in the border areas between China and the Golden Triangle, and quickly spread, first among the southwest provinces, and then to other provinces in the country. The dominant illicit drug consumed in China in this new drug epidemic is heroin. In the past two decades, rapidly increasing heroin abuse has caused unprecedented social problems in the country.

While, in the beginning, heroin users were predominately males, as the drug-using population in the country has been growing, the number of female drug users nationwide has also been rising rapidly. Heroin use by women, in particular by injection, and related income-generating activity—specifically prostitution—has not only caused individual lives to take a down turn, but also brought great harm to Chinese society. The most significant social consequence of this new epidemic is a rapidly growing HIV infection rate in the country. Unfortunately, while heroin use and related social problems are increasing in China, the study of women heroin users has remained largely unaddressed. In an effort to advance the understanding of heroin use by women in China, this study begins its discussion about women’s drug-use careers with an overview of the changing social context in China in the reform era.

SOCIAL CHANGES IN THE REFORM ERA

After the PRC was founded in 1949, all aspects of Chinese society, including politics, the economy, culture and ideology gradually came under the strict control of Mao Zedong. Developing the nation’s economy was not a priority in Mao’s regime; instead, the concept of “politics to take command” was not only a political slogan, but also a primary concern of national policies.³ China launched several politically-oriented mass mobilizations, in particular, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), with disastrous consequences for Chinese society. Thirty years after liberation, the Chinese people as a whole were still living in poverty. The supreme concentration of power personified in Mao ended with his death in 1976, an event that propelled China into both an economic crisis as well as a crisis of faith. Meanwhile, China was virtually isolated and had almost no normal economic, political or cultural contacts with countries in the West. By the end of the Cultural Revolution, the country’s economy was on the verge of collapse.⁴,⁵ After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping regained his political power in the CPC and began economic reform, launching the open-door policy in 1978. Since then, advancing the nation’s economic prosperity became the number one priority of the Party-State. One of the most important aspects of urban economic reform was to transform the country’s economic structure, laying the foundations, beginning in 1993, for the building of a market economy.

After the events of 1949, the country’s privately-run economy was virtually wiped out and replaced by state-owned enterprises and collective sectors. The central government controlled the nation’s economy through a highly centralized and controlled economic system. As a downside, the central government had to assume responsibility for losses incurred in the state-owned enterprises. People were not strongly motivated to be industrious, and therefore productivity was very low. After Mao’s death, in order to encourage a variety of domestic sectors to participate in developing the country’s economy, private ownership was endorsed by the central government;⁶ this striking change in policy was exemplified by Deng Xiaoping’s metaphor “It does not matter whether it is a black cat or white cat. As long as they can catch rats, they are all good cats.”⁷ With the development of multiple economic sectors in the marketplace, the CPC seemed to wholeheartedly approve the transformation of China’s economic structure from the planned economy of the past to a socialist market economy from 1993 onward. These changes were written into the revised Constitution in that same year. To provide a fertile environment for investment, the central government decided to open Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai and Xiamen as Special Economic Zones in 1980.⁸ When Hainan Province was established in 1988, it became China’s largest Special Economic Zone. These Special Economic Zones have been viewed as “windows” of the economic reform and open-door policy, and have played a critical role in stimulating economic development in other inland areas.

While the so-called “socialist market economy system with Chinese characteristics” is still evolving, China’s remarkable economic development has been widely recognized by international society.⁹ At the same time, the economic reform and open-door policy have not only developed China’s domestic economy, but also brought about dramatic social changes in the country. In a short period of time, China has evolved from a closed agricultural country into an open, industrialized one, and has witnessed rapid urbanization. Most importantly, the Chinese people have experienced two radical transformations since the economic reform: in economic status and in social values.

In 1949, with the establishment of the new China, an affluent social class, typically capitalists in the cities, and landlords in the rural areas, was completely eradicated. An individual’s place in society was primarily determined by his/her political status (social class of the family). Since then, egalitarianism, rather than wealth, was instilled in the social/political culture of the time (Deng and Cordilia 1999). In the reform era, however, the social constraints prevailing during Mao’s regime gradually gave way to more social and political support for the pursuit of financial gain. As a result of Deng Xiaoping’s economic initiatives—aimed at achieving a common prosperity for all—new social and economic groups reemerged in Chinese society. In the early 1980s wan yuan hu (a household with 10,000 yuan) was indicative of people who were rich. At the present time, billionaires who own large corporations have become the most important social and political players in the country. China is now returning to a society with economic stratification and a new social hierarchy (Wang 2004).

According to Inglehart (1997), economic, cultural and political changes are mutually supportive within a country’s modernization process. The core process of modernization manifests at both the societal and individual levels: “economic growth becomes the dominant societal goal and achievement motivation becomes the dominant individual-level goal” (Inglehart 1997, 5). While advancing economic growth had been laid out as a governing goal at the societal level, social values, in particular, the spread of materialism together with individualism gradually superseded collective social values. Along with China’s rapid increase in economic growth, people are highly motivated by individual success in the modernization process. In Mao’s era, communitarian values based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought were institutionalized, and served as social norms. To a certain degree, the communist ideology was endowed with “a functional equivalent to religion” in constraining the behavior of individuals (Inglehart 1997, 38). Although in Deng Xiaoping’s ideological legacy, Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought were still viewed as the foundation and assurance of a socialist political system (Kang 2004), his symbolic speech—to “get rich is glorious” and “let some people get rich first”—acted as precursors to promote individuals’ materialism and individualism (Deng and Cordilia 1999). Eventually, extreme materialism and individualism led to a significant breakdown in social norms; mutually shared social norms, which had sustained Chinese society for decades, largely disappeared (Fisac 2003). As demonstrated by the results from the third (2003), the fourth (2004) and the fifth (2005) National Survey on Concerned Social Issues, the erosion of social convention (she hui feng qi) was reported as one of the most serious social problems the public was concerned with over three consecutive years (Wang 2005; Liu 2006).

The Party has constantly emphasized the importance of both spiritual, as well as material civilization in an effort to restore its control of social norms in the reform era, but it no longer has the power to spread the socialist ideology in all spheres of social life as before. The unique informal social control mechanisms, which played an important role in Chinese society, gradually lost their influence on individuals’ beliefs and social behaviors due to frequent population migration. In particular, the increasing influence of Western culture also became more intense after the economic reform. Younger generations were more likely to be driven by individualistic goals than by collective values. A study conducted in Shanghai (and its suburbs) in the late 1980s concludes that the stronger the Western influence, the stronger the endorsement of individualism (Chu and Ju 1993). The experiences of other socialist countries (the former Soviet Union and East European countries) illustrated that the state has largely lost the power to “accommodate individualism and pluralism when simultaneously confronted with the fragmenting forces of globalization, modernization, capitalism and commercialism” (Ogden 2002, 240). The weakening of collective social values coincided with increasing materialism and individualism in Chinese society. Wealth was no longer merely gratifying in itself; it also represented prestige and reputation. Extreme individualism, where the interests of the individual take precedence over those of society, has produced unprecedented social harm.

DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE REFORM ERA

The reform era has seen crime in China increase at an alarming rate. The relationship between modernization and an increasing crime rate was first formulated by Durkheim. In his anomie theory, Durkheim (1893/1965) linked the high crime rates with the state of anomie in a society undergoing rapid social change accompanied by modernization.¹⁰ Durkheim viewed the breakdown of social norms as the key to understanding an increasing crime rate in the modernization process (Vold, Bernard and Snipes 1998). Differing from Durkheim, some scholars explained increasing crime rates in the modernization era by economic factors. Shelley’s (1981) modernization theory concludes that it is the economic gap between rich and poor that has fostered the sense of deprivation. Neuman and Berger (1988) argue that social inequality was the reason for rising crime rates rather than the breakdown of collective values caused by modernization. In spite of disagreements as to how modernization is connected with crime, it is evident that modernization itself is a fundamental factor in explaining changing crime rates across different societies (Vold et al. 1998).

In studying crime trends in China, the most challenging part is to gather crime data, in particular, crime data before the economic reform. Although studies on crime trends in China have repeatedly reported that China had long maintained a very low crime rate before economic reform, these conclusions are largely based on estimates rather than on annually published official data. Except for crime rates reported in 1950—93.02 per 100,000 population (Bakken 1993; Zhang 2002) studies on crime rates between 1951 and 1977 generally do not show consistency. According to the information posted by the Ministry of the Public Security of China (2006), the total number of criminal cases (from 1950–late 1970s) was estimated to be between 160,000 and 600,000. Given the population in the country during the same period, crime rates were calculated at being at approximately 30 to 60 per 100,000 members of the population. The figures were quite consistent with other available studies, which confirmed the low crime rates before the reform era (ibid).

Since economic reform, crime rates in China have been rising at a disturbing rate (see Figure 1.1). There has been a significant increase in crime rates between 1978 and 2009: in fact, three significant waves were identified. The first one started in 1978 and ended by 1981. The change in the crime rate was from 55 per 100,000 to 89 per 100,000. The second wave, seven years after the first wave ended, occurred in 1988, beginning with a rate of 76 per 100,000. Like the first wave, the second wave lasted only three years, but crime rates increased substantially by 1991, with a rate of 204 per 100,000 of the population. After another seven years of steadiness, the third wave started in 1998 and reached a historical peak in 2009, with an increase to 397 per 100,000 of the population. The lower crime rates between these waves of crime were partially attributed to major crackdowns on serious crimes in 1983, 1991 and 1996 (Feng 2001; Liu and Messner 2001). On the whole, in the past three decades, three crime waves have set crime rates in China at a significantly high level. Each crime wave set up the conditions for a further expansion in criminal activity. Observing the similarity of offenses, and acknowledging Shelley’s (1981) modernization theory, Liu and Messner (2001, 18) proposed that “China is in the early stages of modernization process.”

Figure 1.1 Criminal cases filed by law enforcement in China, 1978–2009.

Data sources: crime data from 1978–1980 drawn from Zhang (2002), also from Bakken (1993) as reference; crime data from 1981–2009 drawn from Law Yearbook of China (1981–2008); crime data in 2009 taken from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2010); the annual population data drawn from National Bureau of Statistics of China (1978–2009).

Emerging Drug Trafficking Business

Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Lao PDR are the top three opium-producing countries in the world; Vietnam has also played an important role in opium production (UNODC 2006). The Golden Triangle overlaps the mountains of these four countries. Traditionally, illicit drugs from the Golden Triangle were first trafficked to Thailand, Singapore, and then Hong Kong. Using Hong Kong as a transit center, illicit drugs would eventually be shipped to destination countries in Southeast Asia and North America. In the early 1980s, due to the presence of military forces in the Golden Triangle and harsh strikes on drug trafficking by Thailand, Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries, drug trafficking organizations began seeking new drug trafficking routes (Cui 1999; Ma Mina 1999).

Historically, the southwestern region of China, especially Yunnan Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region had been gateways to the Southeast Asian countries.¹¹ While Guangxi is adjacent to Vietnam, Yunnan Province by itself shares a 4,000 kilometer border with Myanmar (formerly Burma), Lao PDR and Vietnam. The southwestern flank of the Xingjiang Autonomous Region in the northwest of China borders Afghanistan. As we have seen, following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, opium production, trafficking and consumption had been eradicated from Chinese society. In the early 1980s, however, the ongoing open-door policy created numerous open ports and channels of trade between southwestern provinces on the border and neighboring countries. The long borders between China and countries with drug sources, the increase in the number of open ports, and the harsh strikes on drug trafficking by Southeast Asian countries were factors that together created new opportunities for drug trafficking organizations beyond China’s borders.

As crime rates rose in the country, the nature of crime itself changed, from individual crime to group-oriented crime. After 1949, criminal gangs and criminal organizations—the major perpetrators of serious crime—had been quickly uprooted from Chinese society. By the 1980s, however, criminal groups had quickly reemerged in the country. Between 1986 and 1990, the total number of criminal groups burgeoned from 30,476 to over one million (He 2001). Criminal groups, as the prototypes for organized crime, provided the basis for large-scale drug trafficking networks in China. Documented drug trafficking cases indicate that large-scale drug trafficking businesses were mainly operated by well-organized criminal gangs both inside the country and beyond its borders (Ma Minai 1999). Loosely knit criminal groups began playing more important roles in the drug trafficking trade in the recent years (NNCC 2006).¹²

Figure 1.2 Map of the People’s Republic of China.

Data Source: http://www.esri.wm

ESRI®Date & Maps Series. Published by ESRI on April 1, 2008.

Due to its geographical proximity to the Golden Triangle, illicit drug trafficking in China occurs predominantly in the country’s southwest region.¹³ Illicit drug trafficking across the border between Yunnan and Myanmar was still occurring on a small scale in the early 1980s, but by the mid-1980s, drug trafficking in the area had increased in frequency and intensity (Cui 1999).¹⁴ Before the drug consumption market developed within China, the country was only considered a place of transit between the Golden Triangle, Hong Kong and other foreign destinations. Within a few years, three major drug trafficking routes, known as the “China Passage,” were developed inside China. These routes all used Yunnan Province as a gateway, and its capital city, Kunming, as a distribution center. Illegal drugs were eventually trafficked to other inland provinces and coastal provinces, mainly Guangdong and Fujian, either as destinations or transit centers to Hong Kong or other countries (Ma Hongbo 1999; Liao and Li 2003). Gradually, several large-scale local distribution centers were also identified in the northwest provinces, including Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia (Hua...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1. Social Changes and Illicit Drug Use in China
• 2. Reaching Out to Women Subjects
• 3. Family, School and Post-School Life
• 4. Initiation into Heroin
• 5. Continued Use and Crime
• 6. Desistance
• 7. Conclusions and Policy Implications
• Epilogue
• Notes
• References
• Index