Toward midnight, late June of 2001, a police team comprised of Han Chinese and Tibetan officers surrounded a humble inn nestled in the foothills below the Larung Five Sciences Buddhist Academy (ą½ą¾³ą¼ą½¢ą½“ą½ą¼ą½ą½ą¼ą½ą½¦ą¾ą½ą¼ą½ą½¼ą½¦ą¼ą½ą¾³ą½²ą½ą¼ą¼) in Larung Gar (ą½ą½¦ą½ŗą½¢ą¼ą½¢ą¾ą¼ą½ą¾³ą¼ą½¢ą½“ą½ą¼ą½¦ą¾ą½¢); these foothills lie in Sertar County of the Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan Province. There, both Han and Tibetan pilgrims were awakened abruptly from their sleep and ordered to show their identification cards. The police commanded everyone to leave the area before 6:00 the next morning. This group of pilgrims, gathered together from different regions all across Tibet and China, had traveled from afar in hopes of paying homage to Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok (ą½ą½ą½ą¼ą½ą½¼ą¼ą½ ą½ą½²ą½ą½¦ą¼ą½ą½ŗą½ą¼ą½ą½“ą½ą¼ą½ą½¼ą½ą½¦ą¼), the renowned and charismatic Tibetan Buddhist teacher who founded the Academy.
Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok and his Academy were primarily responsible for the revitalization of Tibetan Buddhism in Kham and Amdo, two eastern Tibetan regions in current Sichuan and Qinghai Provinces. Many monks, nuns, and pilgrims affectionately addressed him as chos rgyal (ą½ą½¼ą½¦ą¼ą½¢ą¾ą¾±ą½£ą¼), which means the King of Dharma. In 1980, he informally founded a small monastic college at Larung Gar. At the time, the handful of students were all Tibetan. The official establishment of the Academy did not take place until 1987, when the late 10th Panchen Lama requested Sertar County to grant it recognition. Khenpo Jigme Phuntsokās revival of Tibetan Buddhism was not limited to Tibetans, it also strongly emphasized cross-cultural and cross-regional outreach. There were two landmark events which permanently connected this revival of Tibetan Buddhism to non-Tibetans. In 1987, Khenpo led over 10,000 Tibetan monks on a pilgrimage to Mt. Wutai in Shanxi Province. Mt. Wutai is a sacred Buddhist site, considered the abode of Bodhisattva Manjusri. Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok himself is revered as an incarnation of Manjusri, and according to a few of Khenpoās close disciples who were present then, this particular pilgrimage created a spectacular scene. Crowds of Chinese pilgrims and onlookers tagged along. Upon returning to Sertar, Khenpo and the monks found that a large number of Han Chinese lay and monastic practitioners then followed them into the mountains of Kham. In the history of Tibetan Buddhism, this was the largest number of Han Buddhists to become part of a Tibetan Buddhist order in an organized fashion (Sonam Darje 2000).
Although the sectarian association of Khenpoās Academy is Nyingmapa (ą½¢ą¾ą½²ą½ą¼ą½ą¼ą½ą¼), the oldest branch of Tibetan Buddhism, it has, since its founding in the 1980s, become the largest center of the contemporary non-sectarian movement of Tibetan Buddhism outside of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. In addition to its profound religious significance, this non-sectarian movement has also become a movement toward the revitalization of Tibetan culture. In concordance with this cultural revitalization, long-term monastic residents at the Academy increased from the handful of Khenpo Jigme Phuntsokās initial disciples to more than 12,000, including approximately 2,000 Han Chinese monks, nuns, and lay practitioners, as well as a number of practitioners from North America and Western Europe. It became the largest Buddhist academy in the world and one of the most popular pilgrimage destinations in cultural Tibet.
However, when the Chinese stateās personnel descended on this remote Tibetan region in the summer of 2001, the regular instructional schedule of the Academy was disrupted. The state personnel came as a āwork teamā (å·„ä½ē» gongzuozu) consisting of staff from the State Administration for Religious Affairs, the United Front Work Department, and local and provincial policemen. āWork teamsā are a common tool used by the state in order to suppress social occurrences which take place within Chinaās constitutional and legal framework, but which the state perceives as a threat to its definition of social order or its ideological framework. Time again, the Chinese state was not agreeable with large gatherings of religious adherents. This time a large Tibetan Buddhist group was its target. Thus the objective of the work team was to disperse the growing population of both Tibetan and non-Tibetan residents of Khenpo Jigme Phuntsokās Academy.
The Chinese stateās attempt to suppress the Academy did not last long. Since the passing of Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok in 2004, the academy has not only gradually resumed its instructional routines but has also expanded its outreach to non-Tibetans. Pilgrims and students intending long-term residence continue to stream into the Academy. Meanwhile, the Academy has extended their systematic Dharma teachings from the Larung Valley into the cyberspace. Its website, Wisdom and Compassion Buddhism Web in Chinese, English, and Tibetan languages has become one of the most interactive Buddhist teaching-oriented websites in the world. It facilitates off-campus study-groups in different parts of China by archiving audio and visual records of Dharma teachings as well as by broadcasting live teaching sessions by its important monastic instructors. In addition to this cyber-outreach effort, the public lectures of Khenpo Sonam Darje (ą½ą½¦ą½ą½¼ ą¼ą½ą½ą½¦ą¼ą½ą½¢ą¼ą½¢ą½¦ą¾±ą¾ ą¼), one of Khenpo Jigme Phuntsokās first disciples, at Peking University, Fudan University, and Nanjing University in 2010 and 2011 have further contributed to the popularity of the Academy and Tibetan Buddhism on both local and global scales.
I do not intend this book to be a narrative concerning the rise of Khenpo Jigme Phuntsokās Academy in China or the global religious landscape. Other scholars, Buddhist practitioners, and activist organizations, such as David Germano, Karma Phuntsok, and the International Campaign for Tibet have already made these important contributions. Instead, I am concerned with contemporary Sino-Tibetan Buddhist interactions as understood within the contexts of the politics of religion, the sociocultural ramifications of the market economy in China, and the globalization of Tibetan Buddhism. I wish to explore these three facets of Tibetan Buddhist revitalization, and particularly that of the Nyingmapa sect, based on my fieldwork in both eastern Tibetan regions and urban China.
First, the global market system has played a critical role in the revitalization of Tibetan Buddhist traditions. The Tibetans involved in this unprecedented religious revitalization are not static and localized, nor do they lack agency in determining the course of changes brought about by the global economic system via Chinaās modernization program. In the last fifteen years, there has been a consensus in Western scholarly research in which Chinaās āliberalizing policyā toward Tibetans was the primary backdrop of the Tibetan Buddhist revitalization. This contention was particularly expressed in many of the works collected in Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Cultural Identity, edited by Melvyn Goldstein and Matthew Kapstein (Goldstein and Kapstein 1998). This assessment was most pertinent to the sociopolitical reality of China in the decades of the 1980s and the 1990s. During this time period a cultural phenomenon arose among Tibetans called āTibetanization,ā which, according to Robert Barnett, refers to the then āconverging interestsā of the Chinese state and the Tibetans (Barnett 2006:38). Out of its globally strategic moves to reverse the negative image of Chinaās human rights and ethnic minority issues, and to attract foreign investments, the Chinese state encouraged Tibetan cultural expressions throughout Tibetan regions within its political territory. Meanwhile, Tibetans also wanted to revive their severely injured cultural traditions, as Barnett remarks, āTibetan officials were thus able to embark upon and facilitate new initiatives that involved specifically Tibetan cultural expressionā (ibid.:38).
The rapid growth of the late Khenpo Jigme Phuntsokās Academy was part and parcel of this Tibetanization era. Its official establishment was congratulated in 1993 by Zhao Puchu, the late chairman of Chinaās National Buddhist Association. When Germano went to the Academy in the late 1990s, the revitalization of Tibetan Buddhism on the campus of the Academy was inevitably equated with the revitalization of Tibetan cultural identity (Germano 1998:53ā94). However, since the turn of the twenty-first century, Chinaās āliberalizingā posture has become rather questionable. The state has taken various measures to suppress or contain the ongoing Tibetan Buddhist revitalization. āTibetanizationā in this respect is no longer encouraged, but rather suppressed because of the obviously now diverging interests of the Chinese state and Tibetans. The stateās suppressive attitude reached a climax during the Tibetan uprisings in March 2008.
However, the cessation of state-sanctioned āTibetanizationā does not mean that Tibetan religious and cultural revivals have also stopped. They continue, though mostly within Chinaās globally-linked market. The force of change brought by economic globalization is also initiating simultaneous cultural globalization and localization especially in Chinaās popular realm which, according to Yunxiang Yanās research, is left aside by the Chinese state ābecause it can be used to lessen the social tensions of the post-1989 era and to create an image of prosperity and happinessā (Yunxiang Yan 2002:39). The logic of how the state exercises its power in the popular realm is similar to that of āTibetanization.ā Its lessening control over the popular realm inadvertently permits cultural, religious, and political interstices as alternative social space in which the revitalization of Tibetan Buddhism, especially Nyingmapa, is inextricably linked with economic and cultural globalization. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Tibetan Buddhism under the rule of the Chinese has rapidly entered what I call its āmarketing eraā in which it is reviving but paying the price of being commercialized.
The second facet that I wish to recapitulate is that the ongoing Tibetan Buddhist revitalization has not been uniform everywhere in Tibetan regions. Its teleology and expressions vary from sect to sect. In particular, it is worthwhile to compare the Nyingmapa with the Gelukpa. While the revival of the Gelukpa has manifested in street demonstrations against the rule of the Chinese state since the 1980s, the Nyingmapa have mostly focused on reconstructing their ruined monasteries and engaging in lineage-based teachings to both Tibetans and non-Tibetans. Nyingma monastic personnel have not been overtly confrontational toward the Chinese state. Germano noticed that the revival of the Nyingmapa distanced itself from āany involvement with overt political protestsā (ibid.:71). This seemingly apolitical aspect of the Nyingmapa revival has remained unchanged in the ten years since Germanoās observation in Kham.
As for Gelukpa monasteries, in Circle of Protest: Political Ritual in the Tibetan Uprising (Schwartz 1994), Ronald Schwartz points out that during the late 1980s, Geluk monks in large monastic establishments in Lhasa, including the Drepung, Gandan, and Sera monasteries, visibly involved themselves in the cause of Tibetan nationalism that is closely linked with the 14th Dalai Lamaās Tibetan government in exile. Buddhism obviously became a means of protest against the rule of the Chinese state. Tibetan nationalism was loudly pronounced by the political activities of Tibetan monks and nuns. Schwartz also found that both monastic and lay populations in Lhasa utilized khorra (ą½¦ą¾ą½¼ą½¢ą¼ą½¢ą¼), or circumambulation of sacred sites, in marching around the Jokhang Monastery and shouting slogans for Tibetan independence (ibid.:26). This political orientation of a Buddhist practice was instrumental in creating a critical mass of protestors in Lhasa. Schwartz says, āBy combining bskor-ba [khorra] with symbols of Tibetan nationhood ā the Dalai Lama, the flag ā the Drepung monks forged a link between the powerful motivation that underlies religious ritual and the national consciousness that divides Tibetans from Chineseā (Schwartz 1999:236). However, in the end, these demonstrations were ruthlessly suppressed by the Chinese armed police and military. The religious aspect of Gelukpa in Lhasa suffered a large setback (Goldstein 1998:46ā8), although it has gained tremendous political momentum internationally. The same circumstances were repeated during the Tibetan uprisings in March 2008, the majority of which occurred in places where Gelukpa monasteries are the centers of local communities.
I find that the Nyingmapa revitalization in Kham and Amdo runs on its own course and differs significantly from its Gelukpa counterpart. The teleologies of the sectsā revitalizations appear to have divergent orientations, despite their doctrinal commonalities. To the Gelukpa, the revival of Tibetan Buddhism is synonymous with the revival of Tibetan cultural identity. Gelukpa monksā and nunsā overt confrontations with the Chinese state are recognized as acts of cultural and political resistance, whereas the regional and global activities of Nyingmapa lamas suggest their more soteriological intent to globalize Tibetan Buddhism. In this respect, Tibetan Buddhism overlaps with Tibetan identity in both sects; however, in the Nyingmapa revival the former is not merely eclipsed by the latter but is rather imbued with soteriological and cross-cultural goals ā involving a worldwide dissemination of Nyingmapa-based teachings as well as a raising of public awareness for the Chinese about the positive values of Tibetan religion and culture.
And last but not least, the presence of Han Chinese Buddhists in the Nyingmapa revitalization reflects the complex social, political, and psychological conditions of Tibetan Buddhist revivals in particular, and religion in general, within contemporary China. The presence of these Han Chinese Buddhists has been minimally discussed in scholarly literature. Among the very few works concerning Buddhist interactions between Tibet and China, Gray Tuttleās Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (2005) and Matthew Kapsteinās edited volume Buddhism between Tibet and China (2009) mostly focus on the Sino-Tibetan Buddhist ties prior to the founding of the PRC. In Goldstein and Kapsteinās edited volume (1998), Germano is the only contributor who mentions Chinese Buddhists who were studying the Nyingmapa version of Tibetan Buddhism in Kham. According to his recollection about his stay at Khenpo Jigme Phuntsokās Academy, he saw Chinese Buddhists āwho made the long trek from their home-land to visit Khenpo in his residence; some of them [were] considered to be very advanced students ā¦ ā (Germano 1998:68). Following on the presence of Han Chinese in Kham, Germano briefly touched on āmodernism,ā ācommunism,ā and āHan imperialismā (ibid.:90). These phrases, to me, have indexical value in helping us understand modern and contemporary Sino-Tibetan relations. They deserve a deeper and broader analysis.
Herewith, what I see in the complexity of the ongoing Tibetan Buddhist revitalization, especially at the turn of the twenty-first century, is that Han Chinese Buddhists, in addition to their partaking in pilgrimage activities in Tibetan monasteries, have been among the primary financial sources for Tibetan monastic reconstruction and cross-regional teaching activities. Han Chinese Buddhists from metropolitan centers of China are serving as an integral part of the regional and global connectivity of Tibetan Buddhism in Kham and Amdo. They are responsible for introducing Web technologies to Tibetan lamas as a wide-reaching means to disseminate Buddhist teachings, re-educate the Chinese public about Tibetan history and culture, and raise resources to aid recovery from the past destruction by the Chinese state, while subversively dodging more recently suppressive acts.
The increasing number of Han Chinese who embrace Tibetan Buddhism also mirrors the current state of religion in China, where a perceived āspiritual crisisā is widely acknowledged in popular discourses concerning the Chinese stateās marginalization of religion and the deterioration of state-sanctioned socialist morals. The alliance of Han Chinese Buddhists with Tibetans compels us to engage in a new way of looking at the intricacy of contemporary Sino-Tibetan relations, which, for the West, have been traditionally represented by the relationship between the Chinese state and the Tibetan government in exile. This limited perception of governments as sole representations of their citizens has contributed to both scholarly and popular conceptions of Tibetans and Chinese that are essentialized. Thus, in the West, Tibetans are identified as religious whereas the Chinese are atheistic, Tibetans are the victims and the Chinese are villains of Communism. In an inversed fashion, the Chinese state has portrayed the Tibetans as ābackwardsā and āfeudalisticā while promoting itself as modern, progressive, and therefore advanced. However, the growing alliance between Chinese Buddhists and their Tibetan teachersā communities in the twenty-first century is subverting this rigid dichotomization. Through the popular Buddhist culture of China, both Tibetans and Chinese are starting to see each otherās humanness and humanity. Tibetan lamas find it effective to utilize traditional Chinese stories of morality and modern scientific terms as analogies and metaphors in teaching their Chinese disciples. Meanwhile, Chinese Buddhists host private meetings and create Web pages to highlight the spiritual significance of Tibetan Buddhist civilization. This popular Sino-Tibetan Buddhist alliance is undoubtedly undermining the Chinese stateās constructs of Old and New Tibet, which serve only to glorify socialist Chinaās role in the creation of Tibetansā current state of well-being in contrast to that of the demonized, backward, traditional Tibet.
The 14th Dalai Lama has in fact noticed the increasing conversion of Chinese to Tibetan Buddhism, both in and outside China. His global campaign for the Tibetan cause is thus emphasizing a more nuanced understanding of the Chinese population and is making efforts to build political alliance with those who have converted to Tibetan Buddhism as well as those who are concerned about the Chinese stateās human rights violations. Since the late 1990s, the Dalai Lama and his representative institutions, such as the International Campaign for Tibet, have sustained their ongoing effort to initiate public forums and round-table dialogues with numerous individual Chinese Buddhists, Tibet enthusiasts, and political dissidents, in addition to their annual official negotiation activities with the Chinese state. These contemporary Buddhist interactions between the Tibetans and the Chinese concerning the politics of the Tibet Question and Tibetan religious revivals are rarely discussed among scholars.
The Charismatic Theme of Tibetan Buddhist Revivals
The central theme of the book is what I call the āKhenpo Jigme Phuntsok phenomenonā as an integral part of Tibetan religious revitalization in Kham and Amdo regions, currently placed in Sichuan and Qinghai Provinces. The attributes of this phenomenon are charismatic, trans-cultural, cross-regional, tech-savvy, conversant with modern science and familiar with the economic system, awareness-raising, and seemingly non-confrontational toward the state. The heart of this phenomenon is the charisma of prominent Tibetan lamas actively transmitting tantric teachings to both Tibetans and non-Tibetans in China. This type of charisma is what Stanley Tambiah calls āreligious charismaā (1984:325) with a transcendental orientation; however, dissimilar to the conventional understanding of charisma, it is not exclusively a property of religious personalities in the context of the current trans-cultural Tibetan Buddhist revitalization. Instead, this unique religious charisma of Tibetan lamas, especially tulkus (ą½¦ą¾¤ą¾²ą½“ą½£ą¼ą½¦ą¾ą½“ą¼), or reincarnate lamas, has heterogeneous incarnations and manifestations in both the personal and the collective sense. This charisma is reborn in a person but reinstates itself in a collective environment, s...
