Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet Split

Ideological Dilemma

Mingjiang Li

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781136455438
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s was one of the most significant events of the Cold War. Why did the Sino-Soviet alliance, hailed by its creators as "unbreakable", "eternal", and as representing "brotherly solidarity", break up? Why did their relations eventually evolve into open hostility and military confrontation? With the publication of several works on the subject in the past decade, we are now in a better position to understand and explain the origins of the Sino-Soviet split. But at the same time new questions and puzzles have also emerged. The scholarly debate on this issue is still fierce. This book, the result of extensive research on declassified documents at the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and on numerous other new Chinese materials, sheds new light on the problem and makes a significant contribution to the debate. More than simply an empirical case study, by theorising the concept of the ideological dilemma, Mingjiang Li's book attempts to address the relationship between ideology and foreign policy and discusses such pressing questions as why it is that an ideology can sometimes effectively dictate foreign policy, whilst at other times exercises almost no significant influence at all.

This book will be of essential reading to anyone interested in Chinese-Soviet history, Cold War history, International Relations and the theory of ideology.

1 Introduction

The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s was one of the most significant events of the Cold War. Why did the Sino-Soviet alliance, hailed by its creators as a “brotherly solidarity” that was “unbreakable” and “eternal,”¹ break up? Why did their relations eventually evolve into open hostility and military confrontation? With the publication of several works on the subject in the past decade, we are now in a better position to understand and explain the origins of the Sino-Soviet split. But, at the same time, new questions and puzzles have also emerged. The scholarly debate on this issue is still fierce.² This book, the result of extensive research on declassified documents at the Chinese Foreign Ministry and on numerous other new Chinese materials, attempts to shed new light on the problem and to make a significant contribution to the debate.

This book, however, is more than simply an empirical case study on Sino-Soviet relations during the Cold War. It is also an attempt to address the relationship between ideology and foreign policy. It tries to answer this general and perplexing question: why is it that an ideology can sometimes exert such an assertive role that it effectively dictates foreign policy orientations, and at other times exercises almost no significant influence at all? In other words, why does the strength of ideological influence on foreign strategies ebb and flow so dramatically at times? I attempt to answer this question by carefully studying the evolution of the Sino-Soviet split from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. From this case study, I develop a two-level game approach with a focus on the concept of an ideological dilemma. The theoretical approach developed in this book is essentially an attempt to bridge the gap between Comparative Politics and International Relations.

This book attempts to theorize the notion of ideological dilemma. When ideological differences exist between two countries, political leaders in one country are likely to regard the ideological and political orientation of the other country as a challenge and even a threat to their own domestic ideological and political program and goals. This is so because political leaders have to be concerned about the legitimacy of their political power and policy. Such concern can easily lead political elites to make efforts to justify and in many cases enhance the legitimacy of their power and policy. Any move that political leaders in one country makes to defend its ideological and political position is perceived by the other as a threat to the legitimacy of its own domestic political line, and invites criticism from the other side. Any step that the other side takes to argue or to employ punitive actions against its rival begets counter measures. A vicious circle similar to that of the security dilemma in general international relations, is thus formed. The ideological dilemma can further aggravate bilateral relations if there is domestic leadership competition and rivalry. Factions in either country will be strongly tempted to use the ideological differences with the other country for their own domestic political purposes. Consequently, the ideological recriminations between the two countries are likely to intensify, which may lead bilateral relations to open hostility and even military confrontation.

I contend in this book that the ideological dilemma framework helps to explain the Sino-Soviet split better, and can be a very useful approach to the study of the role of political ideology in international politics. I suggest that instead of debating whether ideology has any impact on foreign policy, we should focus instead on why and how ideological influence on foreign policy ebbs and flows. Drawing intellectual inspiration from analytical liberalism, neoclassical realism, and the two-level game theoretical approach,³ I propose a new two-level game model for the study of the interaction of ideology and foreign policy, with an emphasis on ideological dilemma. As this book will illustrate, the conceptualization of an ideological dilemma is very relevant to the scholarly debate on many major issues, for example, the relationship between domestic and international politics, the interactions between ideological dilemma and security dilemma, and research linkages between Comparative Politics and International Politics.

A Review and Critique of Existing Approaches to the Sino-Soviet Rupture⁴

Among the major approaches to the study of the Sino-Soviet rupture, the realist perspective emphasizes different national interests.⁵ The Chinese historian Yang, for instance, argues that even at the very beginning of the Sino-Soviet alliance when Mao and Stalin were discussing the alliance treaty in early 1950, the differences in national interests was a factor in bilateral relations.⁶ Zhang believes that the American embargo on China played an important role in the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s. The prolonged U.S. embargo, Zhang argues, led to Beijing’s overdependence on Moscow’s support and assistance, which not only caused China’s increasing frustration with Moscow’s heavy-handed approach to the alliance, but also resulted in an ever-greater burden on the Soviet Union. Ultimately, as tensions rose, the alliance collapsed under mounting conflicts.⁷ While this approach is able to account for some specific events, it fails to provide a convincing explanation for the whole picture. A commonsensible observation that the policy of opposing both superpowers did not serve China’s national security interests renders the realist paradigm largely inapplicable.

Other scholars examine the ideological differences between the two Communist Parties. By ideological differences, they refer to the different interpretations of orthodox Marxism and Leninism by the two parties and this paper follows this definition. Many Chinese scholars believe that Moscow was to blame for the stresses in bilateral relations, arguing that the Soviet Union transferred ideological differences to state-to-state relations, and attempted to control and subjugate China in order to serve its own interests and hegemonic ambitions.⁸ Haas argues that the root cause of the Sino-Soviet split was Mao Zedong’s ideological radicalization as exemplified by the Great Leap Forward in 1958.⁹ This emphasis on ideological difference is helpful in elucidating the general pattern of bilateral relations, but it does not explain the changing intensities of disputes and confrontations at different times, nor does it address the origin of the ideological differences between the two parties. Moscow started to alter many of Stalin’s ideological and policy programs after his death in 1953, creating ideological differences with Beijing; yet this growing ideological gap did not have any significant negative impact on the alliance from 1953 to 1957. Moreover, this perspective cannot explain why China was willing to engage with France in 1964, and later with the United States, even though the ideological discrepancies between China and these two countries were much more notable than the differences between Beijing and Moscow. In this perspective, Mao is often described as an ideological dogmatist. However, for most of his lifetime, Mao was a very pragmatic political leader and it was his pragmatism that made the victory of the Chinese Communist revolution possible.¹⁰

Others argue that the rupture between the Soviet Union and China was largely due to the ambition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly that of Mao, to compete for leadership of the international communist movement.¹¹ Lo, for instance, argues that historical animosity was a significant factor in the Sino-Soviet split. He further suggests that the Sino-Soviet differences had deeper causes in China’s displeasure and resentment over the asymmetrical relationship between Moscow and Beijing. Mao was simply not willing to accept “subordinate status” in the alliance.¹² Radchenko, in his book Two Suns in the Heavens, highlights this point. He argues that it was this intrinsic inequality and China’s strenuous efforts to alter its status in the alliance that brought it to an end.¹³ He specifically argues that “Mao’s failure to endorse the implicit Soviet leadership was a cause for Khrushchev’s dissatisfaction with China. It was the main reason for the Sino-Soviet split.”¹⁴ But, as we know now, much of the contention for allies and sympathizers in the socialist bloc and the third world took place after the split. Not only did the competition for leadership in the international communist movement take place after the split became a reality, much of the competition took place because both parties wanted to enhance their ideological authority and support from other socialist countries and parties in order to prove that their domestic political and ideological programs were correct. In other words, competition for influence in the international communist movement and the third world was the manifestation of the deterioration of the alliance, rather than the origin of the split. If it were simply for power, why did Mao and his supporters continue and even further escalate the struggle with the Soviets after 1966 when it was apparent that China was losing allies and influence in the international arena? It makes little sense for Mao to pursue a strategy of opposing both superpowers in the mid-1960s if he was attempting to increase China’s influence overseas. Also during the Cultural Revolution, when relations between China and a majority of countries that it had diplomatic ties with soured, Beijing was not notably concerned about the decline of its international power.

Very often this school of thought also falls back on the ideological difference approach. Thus some scholars stress idiosyncratic conflicts and contentions between Chinese and Soviet leaders, especially Mao and Khrushchev.¹⁵ Hinton emphasizes differences in the political culture and traditions of China and the Soviet Union in the breakup of the alliance.¹⁶ Yang emphasizes the historical animosity between Mao and the Soviet leaders that led to the Sino-Soviet split.¹⁷ The leaders of the two countries truly had a lot of personality conflicts, yet they were able to get along with each other before 1958, and although Khrushchev stepped down in 1964, Sino-Soviet conflicts further deepened and plunged into open hostility and military confrontation by the end of the decade.

Other scholars study the Sino-Soviet rupture from a structural approach. The main argument of this school of thought is that political relations between Moscow and other socialist countries were based on Leninist party doctrine that stressed hierarchical authority, discipline, and obedience. This rigid structure could hardly tolerate the existence of major differences in national interests, national policies, ideological interpretations, or personalities between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and other communist parties. When differences emerged, political tensions in the socialist world were inevitable.¹⁸ This structural approach makes more sense than other schools of thought because it has the capacity to incorporate a multiplicity of variables, including all the factors discussed above. The shortcoming of this approach, however, is that it treats these differences as givens. It fails to give sufficient weight to human agency. It does not explain why on numerous occasions differences within the socialist camp were hammered out relatively smoothly.

Decades ago, Zagoria suggested that “the dispute must be viewed as a manifestation of tension between common ideological goals on the one hand and different national revolutionary imperatives on the other.”¹⁹ He further argued that any serious effort to analyze Sino-Soviet relations “must take into account differences of view within the Chinese and Soviet leadership.”²⁰ Given that more documentary sources have been made available in recent years, scholars particularly from China, have devoted much more attention to China’s domestic politics with good results.²¹ Chen Jian has convincingly argued that the Sino-Soviet split was largely utilized by Mao to push for his doctrine of “continuous revolution.”²² Kong argues that the Sino-Soviet split originated largely from divergent models of socialist construction.²³ Niu Jun argues that the failure of the Great Leap Forward and Soviet criticisms of Mao’s radical program became entangled with Sino-Soviet differences on foreign policy and national security interests. The interactions between domestic and international politics propelled the bilateral alliance into a negative spiral.²⁴ Lüthi’s book, the Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, makes the case that the ideological differences between Beijing and Moscow were conveniently exploited by Mao Zedong in China’s internal leadership political struggles.²⁵ Despite the progress that has been made in this line of research, more work is needed to explore how domestic politics impacted the Sino-Soviet rift, and to make more explicit the causal mechanisms between factors on the domestic and international level.

Ideological Dilemma and the Two-Level Game

In light of the shortcomings of existing studies and important unanswered questions, this book, while acknowledging the merits of existing approaches, examines factors on both the international and domestic levels with a focus on ideology. Making full use of new Chinese archival and other documents, this book builds on research that has attempted to find better explanations from the perspective of Chinese domestic politics, and attempts to propose a more coherent theoretical approach to the Sino-Soviet split as well as the role of ideology in foreign policy in general. It promises to shed new light on the CCP’s internal assessments of Sino-Soviet relations and seeks to better explain the causal mechanisms between China’s domestic politics and Beijing’s Soviet policy. It explores the changing intensities of ideological friction between Beijing and Moscow, the dynamics of China’s domestic politics, and particularly the interactions of the two areas. This study reveals that an ideological dilemma was in play.

In the case of contemporary China, scholars have been telling two familiar but constantly amended stories for a long time, which relate to: (1) the ideological divergence between Moscow and Beijing after Khrushchev and Mao started to embark on vastly different programs of domestic development; (2) the ever-intensifying political struggles in China between Mao and his comrades throughout the 1960s. Could there be some linkage between the two stories? This book concludes that the dynamics of this ideological dilemma were well demonstrated in the Sino-Soviet split. Mao intentionally linked his foreign and internal political ideological struggles and, to a large extent, manipulated and escalated Sino-Soviet ideological disputes for domestic political purposes; pushing for his domestic radical programs; asserting his own ideological supremacy; and, perhaps most importantly, checking the power and influence of his political rivals, whom Mao denounced for committing the same revisionist ideological crimes as those of the Soviet leaders. The whole pattern of Sino-Soviet relations, from disagreement and open dispute to complete separation and hostile confrontation, can then be better explained by the interactions of factors at the international and domestic levels linked by the ideological dilemma.

This is not to contend that China is solely responsible for the breakup of the alliance. The same ideological dilemma logic applies to the Soviet Union as well. From Moscow’s perspective, Mao’s choice of a leftist socio-economic development approach represented a challenge to Moscow’s own ideological and political program. According to Lukin, some leaders in the CPSU Central Committee were critical of China’s “leftist” deviation from the conventional Soviet model of economic development during the Great Leap Forward. On the other hand, some left-minded party officials praised the Great Leap Forward. The journal Sovetskoe Kitaevedenie was closed by the Soviet authorities because of its open enthusiasm for China’s radical socio-economic programs. The Soviet ruling elite spared no effort to criticize China. In the 1960s, the Institute of the Far East was set up within the Soviet Academy of Sciences in order to criticize China’s domestic radicalization, leadership fights, and potential threat to world peace, often in an exaggerated manner.²⁶ Throughout the years of Sino-Soviet polemics in the early 1960s, anti-Stalinist reformers in the Soviet ruling and intellectual elite became enthusiastic critics of China. “Ironically, their criticism, aimed more at conservatives at home, was highly detrimental to Soviet-Chinese relations.”²⁷ Wishnick argues that ever since Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization, Moscow had to pursue a China policy premised on the need to maintain the legitimacy of the Soviet model of socialism, as well as the Soviet Union’s leadership of the communist movement.²⁸

In the account of Georgii Arbatov, a Soviet participant in the Sino-Soviet polemic and a former senior official at the Department for Relations with Communist and Workers’ Parties of the CPSU Central Committee, events in China during the late 1950s were already playing a role in the political thinking of the Soviet intellectual elite. ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Ideological dilemma in international politics
• 3. The Soviet 20th Party Congress and emerging disputes in 1958
• 4. Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Sino-Soviet disputes, 1959–1960
• 5. Temporary calm and deterioration in relations, 1960–1962
• 6. The growth of domestic radicalism and polemics with Moscow, 1963–1964
• 7. Short-lived détente and the end of party relations, 1965–1966
• 8. Sino-Soviet confrontation during the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1969
• 9. Conclusions
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index