Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention
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Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention

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eBook - ePub

Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention

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Information

Publisher
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
eBook ISBN
9781589063778
Year
2005

References

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Table of contents

  1. Cover Page
  2. Title Page
  3. Copyright Page
  4. Contents
  5. Preface
  6. I Overview
  7. II Facts on Existing Public Debt Structures
  8. III Rendering Debt Structures Less Crisis Prone with Existing Instruments
  9. IV Explicit Seniority in Privately Held Sovereign Debt
  10. V Expanding the Set of Instruments: Indexation to Real Variables
  11. VI Past and Future of Innovation in Sovereign Borrowing
  12. VII Conclusions
  13. Appendix Investors’ Attitudes Toward Growth-Linked and Other Innovative Financial Instruments for Sovereign Borrowers: Results of a Survey
  14. References
  15. Boxes
  16. Footnotes