1 A Genealogy of Cartography, A Genealogy of Space
âThe world needs Cartographers,â he said softly, âbecause if they didnât have Cartographers the fools wouldnât know where they were. They wouldnât know if they were up themselves if they didnât have a Cartographer to tell them whatâs happening.â1
âWhat is that big book?â said the little prince. âWhat are you doing?â
âI am a geographer,â said the old gentleman.
âWhat is a geographer?â asked the little prince.
âA geographer is a scholar who knows the location of all the seas, rivers, towns, mountains, and deserts.â
âThat is very interesting,â said the little prince. âHere at last is a man who has a real profession!â And he cast a look around him at the planet of the geographer. It was the most magnificent and stately planet that he had ever seen.
âYour planet is very beautiful,â he said. âHas it any oceans?â
âI couldnât tell you,â said the geographer.
âAh!â The little prince was disappointed. âHas it any mountains?â
âI couldnât tell you,â said the geographer.
âAnd towns, and rivers, and deserts?â
âI couldnât tell you that, either.â2
The importance of an enquiry into the history of âscientificâ cartography rests on its ability to constructâin Foucaultâs wordsâa âhistory of the present.â3 An understanding of where cartography âstandsâ today, therefore, must be informed by an analysis of its history. This chapter will provide a Foucauldian genealogy of the socio-historical forces contributing to the formation of various cartographic and spatial epistemes over the past 600 years. The phrase âcartographic epistemesâ is not intended to imply that the particular epistemes discussed are essentially cartographic, rather that both the practice of cartography and the metaphorization of knowledge in cartographic terms figure strongly in them. To this end, a genealogical analysis of the history of cartography has as its aim not a linear narrative of scientific progress, but a foregrounding of the samenesses and differences, the rejections, emergences, and formalizations played out in that history. This chapter, once more, will limn the intersections between cartography and metaphor, but, by examining them by way of a spatialized history and a historicized spatiality, will also introduce the concepts of relativity and space-time curvilinearity that will come into play in later chapters.
Foucaultâs genealogical approach to history is opposed to a search for origins, thus resisting the representation of history as an unfolding series of events in the narrative of progress. Derived from Nietzscheâs historical method in On the Genealogy of Morals,4 genealogy emphasizes that all history is perspectival and involves a strategic struggle for domination that plays itself out at the level of language. For these reasons, in this chapter, I will employ the term âepistemeâ in its Foucauldian senseârather than purely temporal terms such as âperiod,â âepoch,â or âeraââin order to discuss medievalism, the Enlightenment, Modernism, and postmodernism as discursive formations. The termâs usefulness lies in its ability to imply systems of knowingâor epistemologiesâthat are not simply time-bound. It allows for âemergencesâ without being a search for âoriginsâ or âessences,â as emergences are not understood to be part of the narrative of progress. Emphasized in this approach is the possibility (or even necessity) of counter-discursive formations that disrupt the paradigm, so that the epistemes analyzed here are less discrete than in a traditional periodic approach to historicization.
After analyzing Foucaultâs genealogical method and its particular appropriateness to the history of cartography, I will then explore five cartographic epistemesâmedieval, Renaissance, Enlightenment, imperial, and âpostmodern.â5 The cartographic episteme of the Enlightenment is the point at which the Renaissanceâs emergent discourse of scientificity âattain[s] the norms of scientificityâ and âreach[es] the threshold of formalizationâ (AK, 191), resulting in a discursive formation. I examine the Renaissance ârediscoveryâ of the Classical cosmographer Ptolemy in the 1400s, the development of linear perspective, and the resultant emergence of the âscienceâ of cartography. By contrasting the Enlightenmentâs âobjective,â scientific maps to the overtly figurative, multi-perspectival, and experiential maps of the Medieval period, this analysis will emphasize the reactive nature of Enlightenment epistemology, which privileged reason, progress, and visuality over the âDark Agesâ of medievalism. The concept of space that emerged in the Enlightenment is a global and passive one of pure extension. The formalization of this spatial practice, moreover, fed neatly into the expansionist drive to conquer landâconceived of as âempty,â âunclaimed,â or âunknownâ extensive spaceâthat characterized the Age of Empire. This section of the chapter will examine, through the lens of postcolonialism, the use of maps as ideological tools in the building of empires and the modern nation-state. Again, the scientific-political map will be shown to construct a certain âlegitimateâ knowledge of the world and the subject, while denigrating other cultural knowledges. Finally, I will demonstrate that, along with the development of non-Euclidean geometry and post-Newtonian physics, Marxist and poststructuralist critiques of the âuneven developmentâ engendered by the Western imperialist/capitalist project and geographyâs âquantitative revolutionâ of the 1960s heralded the advent of various âpostmodernâ geographies and cartographiesâMarxist, feminist, human, cultural, and social.
Genealogy-Archaeology and the Spatializing of History
In his fourth major work, published in 1969, Foucault articulated what he termed an âarchaeologicalâ method of historical inquiryâone he reworked soon after as âgenealogyâ in âNietzsche, Genealogy, History.â Douglas Smith, in his introduction to Nietzscheâs On the Genealogy of Morals, writes that Nietzscheâs historical method ârejects the progressive notion of history as a necessary, rule-governed development which finds its fulfilment either in the present or in some deferred future.â6 Opposed to both the Enlightenment understanding of history as linear progress and the more recent one of history as âa given object of neutral scientific description,â Nietzsche presents the genealogical method as one that studies âthe multiple intersecting forces which produce the meaning of a given phenomenon or practice.â7 As such, Smith adds, âthe study of these forces reconstructs a metaphorical rather than a literal kinship network.â8
Similarly, Foucaultâs genealogical-archaeological method stands in contradistinction to traditional historicism founded upon the interrelated narratives of linear time and progress, the essential rationality of the self-constituting subject, and the historical a priori of âthe originâ revealed through a depth hermeneutics. Foucault argues that these narratives of modernity, which make âhistorical analysis the discourse of the continuous and [âŚ] human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and action,â result in the reign of time (AK, 12). Historyâs âfunction,â in this case, âis to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself,â9 rendering time as only able to be âconceived in terms of totalizationâ (AK, 12).
If historyâs âperspective on all that precedes it implies the end of time, a completed development,â the search for the âoriginâ becomes of utmost importance: â[f]rom the vantage point of an absolute distance, free from the restraints of positive knowledge [connaissance], the origin makes possible a field of knowledge [savoir] whose function is to recover it.â10 Described in such a way, the historianâs role seems much like that of the âobjectiveâ and âscientificâ cartographer described in the previous chapter, and indeed Foucault refers to the âhistorianâs historyâ as assuming a âsuprahistorical perspective [âŚ] outside of time and claim[ing] to base its judgments on an apocalyptic objectivity.â11
However, as Foucault argues, history is not an inert field of past events that can be comprehensively mapped by the historian, and certainly not one that sits easily on the traditional, linear timeline. History, instead, is âthe concrete body of becoming; with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells, and,â he concludes, âonly a metaphysician would seek its soul in the distant ideality of the origin.â12 A proper analysis of history, according to Foucault, should take into account its chaotic, rather than predictable, nature and examine it in terms of âemergences,â or entries of forces.13
In this sense, genealogy-archaeology seeks to âsystematically dismantleâ those âtraditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development.â14 It does not seek to âneutralize discourse,â as does the depth hermeneutics of traditional historicism in its attempt to âpierce through its densityâ (AK, 47). Rather, it is concerned with allowing discourse to âemerge in its own complexity,â and expresses a desire âto write a history of discursive objects that does not plunge them into the common depth of a primal soil, but deploys the nexus of regularities that govern their dispersionâ (AK, 47â48). Thus, against traditional historicismâs obsessions with temporality and depth, genealogy-archaeology is defined in terms of spatiality and surface. Space becomes the basis of discourse, allowing the historian to release discursive objects from the time-bound constraints of âpermanence and uniqueness,â to examine how they âemerge and are continuously transformedâ (AK, 32). Foucault describes discursive events as being âdeployedâ in space, leaving the historian âfree to describe the interplay of relations within and outside [them]â (AK, 29).
Genealogy-archaeology is also a practice of the surface. The metaphor of archaeology implies a certain amount of digging, a certain amount of depth. However, according to Foucault, the term âdoes not relate analysis to geological excavation,â but implies instead the âuncoveringâ of the shallowly buried archive and the âmappingâ of discursive formations (AK, 131, 114). Similarly, Foucault initially describes genealogy in âNietzsche, Genealogy, Historyâ as âoperat[ing] on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.â15 By metaphorizing genealogy in terms of the palimpsest, Foucault again draws together and foregrounds the interconnected concepts of space and surface. As Thomas Flynn explains, âworking on the âsurfaceâ of things, Foucault displaces metaphysics with a âtopologyâ of social practices, charting the limits, exclusions and specific âconditions of existenceâ of these practices in their actual occurrence.â16
It is important to note that Foucaultâs emphasis on spatiality and surface is not a complete negation of time and history, but rather allows for an opening up of a field of enquiry ignored by the dialectics of history: the field of power. The recognition of space, Foucault argues, throws into relief âprocessesâhistorical ones, needless to sayâof power,â adding that a âspatialising description of discursive realities gives on to the analysis of related effects of power.â17 In addition, Foucaultâs genealogical method favors short-sightedness over the distant perspective of the âobjectiveâ historian, as the fore-shortening of vision exposes the dispersal of power relations in discursive formations. Foucaultâs âadvocacy of a shortness of visionâ is, according to Michael Shapiro,
supplemented by a glance at the past, a glance aimed not at the production of a developmental narrative but at showing what we are now. This âwhat we are nowâ is not meant as a simple description of the current state of things. Rather, it is an attempt to show that the ânowâ is an unstable victory had at the expense of other possible nows.18
Foucaultâs historical method is not a retrospective construction of the futureâa search for the origin that implies completed development at the end of timeâbut instead writes a âhistory of the present.â As Shapiro explains, genealogy reveals the present not as âa product of accumulated wisdom or other dynamics reaching into the distant past,â but âcom[ing] about as one possible emergence from an interpretive agonistics.â19
In this respect, Foucaultâs genealogical-archaeological method offers itself as an appropriate tool in an analysis of the history of cartography. Genealogy shows that the history of the map as object and metaphor is not a continuous progression toward greater realism and transparency, but is rather a history of continuities and discontinuities; of emergences, formalizations, and rejections; of âmetamorphoses and restructurings.â20 Moreover, as the history of cartography is traditionally viewed as the triumph of science over supers...