Russia's Battle with Crime, Corruption and Terrorism

Robert Orttung, Anthony Latta

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134089000
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia rusa

This book examines Russia's attempts to tackle the challenges of the new and increasing security threats of rising crime, corruption and terrorism that it has experienced since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. It demonstrates the close links between the rising drug trade, border problems, migration issues, organised crime, corruption and terrorism.

Uncovering information not seen before by Western audiences, this book:

• shows how Russia's porous borders have facilitated the operation of transnational crime groups
• explores the specific features that make particular regions such as Siberia important for the drug trade and other forms of smuggling, analysing the character of the different criminal groups and networks, and investigating the informal links and collusion between these organizations and police officials
• considers the operation of corrupt practices in the military sector, one of the most closed parts of the economy
• analyzes the ways in which Russia is fighting crime, corruption and terrorism, and the implications for civil liberties
• argues that the extensive flows of illegal immigrants into Russia are creating ever more fertile grounds for corruption, crime and terrorism, while the immigrants themselves are often the victims of this crime.

1 Introduction

Robert W. Orttung

While journalists, academics, and contemporary crime novelists make frequent reference to the Russian mafia and Russia’s extensive corruption, there have been few serious attempts by citizens of Russia to look past the sensationalist headlines and examine what is really going on in Russia’s underworld. This book provides several carefully crafted analyses of the acute problems of corruption, organized crime, and terrorism in Russia. It examines the threat these problems present to Russian society and the Russian authorities’ great difficulties in responding to the challenges of extensive illegal migration, a significant drug trade, and the pervasive informal economy. The chapters here present a selection of work done by Russian scholars from diverse locales in Russia whose research was sponsored by the Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center (TraCCC) in Washington, DC.

Each of the chapters included here presents research that was conducted on the ground in Russia. The studies have generated extensive new and original empirical data that is not available elsewhere. Naturally, the authors use Russian government statistics, but go beyond them by conducting numerous interviews with law-enforcement officers, members of criminal groups, illegal migrants and their employers, businessmen who regularly encounter corruption, and intermediaries who facilitate the corruption. The contributors, by combining this primary data with cutting-edge analytical techniques, provide incisive analyses of current problems.

This brief introductory chapter provides a roadmap for the rest of the book. After laying out TraCCC’s history and describing its work in Russia, it concisely summarizes each of the substantive chapters in the book, giving the reader a sense of their overall argument and content. In conclusion, it ties together the main themes running through the substantive chapters, identifying the common linkages for problems of terrorism, organized crime, and corruption in Russia.

TraCCC’s activities in Russia

In the early 1990s, organized crime emerged as a very serious Russian problem and there was extremely limited capacity in Russia to analyze or respond effectively to the threat it posed. In 1995 the MacArthur Foundation provided funding to establish research centers with distinguished Russian criminologists across Russia to study the problem, teach and train colleagues, and formulate policy. Within two years, the Department of Justice adopted the program and provided additional support to make the centers more effective. With these centers as its core programs, TraCCC was established in 1998.

The Russian program has moved from its original locations in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, and Irkutsk. It currently has three main research centers in Saratov, Vladivostok, and the more recently opened center in Chelyabinsk. Yet the impact of the centers is much broader, as they support the research work of senior and junior scholars from across Russia through grant competitions. Summer schools bring together senior professors from a variety of locations to teach graduate students and young faculty from law schools and police institutions on the problems of organized crime, terrorism, and corruption. In the more than a decade of their existence, the centers have produced dozens of scholarly books, textbooks, and articles. These research and instructional materials are widely used in universities across Russia and by government policy makers. TraCCC’s Russian-language websites currently have approximately a million unique visitors a year.

TraCCC’s work has not been confined to academic circles. The Russian centers have worked with non-governmental organizations, the media, diverse law-enforcement bodies, judges, legislators at the regional and national levels, officials at all levels of government, as well as members of the business community. The results of research and conferences are regularly reported in both the local and national media. Many of the researchers have presented their findings at conferences, think tanks, and international fora sponsored by the United Nations and OSCE in a variety of countries. TraCCC scholars and practitioners have testified before the Russian Federation Council, the State Duma, and served as members of the Duma legislative working group on human trafficking.

The topics of research have changed significantly since 1995. This evolution reflects the increased understanding of the problem, as well as the changing nature of organized crime in Russia. Initially much of the research focused on the violent aspects of organized crime, the criminalization of the privatization process, and on money laundering and economic crime. The privatization of state property is complete and many of the most violent criminals died off in the criminal battles of the 1990s. But certain themes have been consistent subjects of research and analysis in Russia over the decade, such as human trafficking, environmental crime, and the impact of corruption. Many of the problems that are the subject of in-depth research today were not particularly problematic a decade ago. At that time, Russia’s drug problem was much more limited, Russians were leaving Russia and few foreigners were entering the country, and terrorism had yet to claim many victims in Russia. Many of the topics of research represented in the collection are relatively new for Russia, including illegal migration, border control and the large-scale drug trade. Other topics, such as corruption in the military and business and the ties between the police and criminals, the topics of three chapters included here, are of longstanding concern to TraCCC researchers in Russia.

This book represents the second English-language volume of TraCCC’s Russian research. The first focused exclusively on human trafficking, whereas this volume examines crime problems that represent national security concerns. The nature of these studies reflects Russia’s globalization and its integration into the international economy. Russia is now one of the largest recipients of migrants in the world, and much of this migration is illegal. Russia is also now one of the larger markets for illegal drugs in the world. Therefore, Russia’s transnational crime problems are no longer those of a transitional society.

The researchers whose studies were chosen for inclusion in this collection have spent significant periods of time working outside of Russia. Therefore, they are able to address their topics in ways that are particularly accessible to western readers. Based in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Kazan, Novosibirsk, and Volgograd, their experiences reflect the crime problems of the largest cities in Russia. Kazan, as the capital of Tatarstan, represents a distinctive region that has a strong Muslim influence. Volgograd is close to the Kazakh–Russian border, reflecting the particular problems of this critical border region. Therefore, the collection represents some of the geographic diversity and variety of topics that make up TraCCC’s research in Russia.

Roadmap for the book

Seven chapters comprise the substantive section of this book. In the first chapter, Elena Tyuryukanova and Elena Kostyrya examine the impact of migration on the crime situations in Russia’s large cities. Their overall argument is that migrants do add to the overall level of crime in Russian cities, but they demonstrate convincingly that individual migrants are much more likely to be victims of crime than its perpetrators.

Migrants contribute to Russian crime in a number of ways, most importantly through trafficking narcotics, guns, and human beings. Migrants also expand the linkages between Russian cities and transnational crime groups which have operations across the entire CIS and throughout the world. Tyuryukanova and Kostyrya, however, show that crimes committed by foreigners make up only a very small percentage of the overall number of crimes in Russian cities. The extent of crime in Russian metropolises is determined much more by local conditions than by the actions of the migrants. Accordingly, this work debunks the arguments of populists who seek to blame Russia’s crime problem on foreigners.

Since migrants typically are working in Russia illegally, they are frequently at the mercy of organized crime groups. These groups help the migrants come into Russia and find work for them. In exchange, the migrants often must take low-level jobs, with long hours, poor working conditions, and extremely small salaries. In some cases, the migrants are held in conditions of slavery and are sexually exploited. Lack of adequate legislation and enforcement of existing laws makes it difficult for the migrants to improve their position within Russian society. The Russian authorities will have to pay much more attention to legislation and enforcement in this area to address the problems of large scale migration more effectively.

In the second chapter, Valerii V. Sobolnikov examines the impact of migrant criminality on Siberia. His chapter reflects a deep concern that the extensive migration coming into Russia is having serious consequences for the country’s security. His chapter lays out a typology of migrants and classifies the various forms of migrant crime. Additionally, he lays out the variety of causes for migrant criminality.

Sobolnikov suggests that migrant crime is the result of many problems, ranging from the appearance of poor new states just south of Siberia following the collapse of the Soviet Union to the growing economic and political power of China. Sobolnikov is careful to relate these larger changes back to how they influence the development of individual criminals.

His chapter shows how ethnically based migrant crime groups have been much quicker to take advantage of new opportunities to travel and communicate than the state authorities. Accordingly, there are now extensive networks of ethnic crime groups operating across Russia. He details how some of these ethnic crime groups are now operating in the Siberian context.

Sobolnikov’s analysis leads to a number of recommendations on how to prevent the occurrence of migrant crime. He criticizes the state for focusing so far on repressive measures and calls instead for a new approach that emphasizes economic and social reforms as well as measures to reduce the conditions that lead migrants to commit crimes.

In the third chapter, Sergei V. Golunov and his colleagues focus on the drug trade within Russia emanating from Kazakhstan across the long Russian–Kazakh border. Golunov’s work on this topic won first prize in the 2006 “World Power” section of the prestigious Derzhava (Great Power) competition organized by the “Unity in the Name of Russia” foundation and the Russian Public Chamber.¹ Because it offered a generous monetary prize, this contest stimulated intense competition in Russia. Its sponsors represent some of Russia’s highest official authorities and it was notable that Golunov’s work succeeded because he is often critical of official policies.

In their chapter, the authors pay particular attention to the lucrative heroin trade from Afghanistan that transits through Central Asia and Russia and continues on to wealthy markets in Europe. This problem is only getting worse as opium production in Afghanistan increased 43 percent in 2006 over 2005, reaching 6,610 metric tons.² Increasingly, the heroin flowing out of Afghanistan is staying inside Russia, particularly in regions where there is a high level of personal income and little social mobility. In particular, the drug trade is increasingly heading east to high-wealth regions in Siberia and the Far East. As more drugs continue to flow out of Afghanistan, addiction rates inside Russia are increasing, posing a serious threat to the health of the country’s young people, further exacerbating Russia’s demographic crisis, and imperiling the quality of its work force and the ranks of its military. The drug trade is possibly the most negative consequence of Russia’s inclusion into the global economy.³

The Russian–Kazakh border is the longest in the world and presents a variety of opportunities for smugglers, though most of the narcotics transit through official border checkpoints along existing roads and railroad routes. Smugglers employ a wide variety of means to get the drugs across the border, ranging from building special hiding places into trucks to paying bribes to border guards. Over time, the nature of the groups involved in moving the drugs is evolving, from the lone smugglers who were typical of the mid-1990s, to the larger groups that are more common today. These groups seek to run integrated businesses controlling the drugs from the smuggling stage to the ultimate sales of the drugs. Frequently, the criminals engage in a variety of criminal activities and smuggle different goods besides drugs. Nevertheless, despite the trend toward greater organization, there are no large drug cartels working on the Russian–Kazakh border. While a variety of ethnic groups are involved in different segments of the drug trade, Russian official statements and media often overstate the role of non-Russian minorities. In fact, ethnic Russians frequently stand at the top of the drug-smuggling pyramids. The role of Russian crime groups is increasing in the cross-border trade and the coordinating center for narcotics trafficking is moving from Central Asia to Moscow.

Most of Russia’s efforts to combat the drug trade involve law-enforcement, military, and intelligence agency responses to curtail the supply of drugs coming into Russia. The consequence of this policy is greater funding for these agencies and new efforts to establish border checkpoints and other forms of protection. Unfortunately, most of these methods are extremely ineffective, blocking only a tiny proportion of the drugs coming into Russia. In particular, law-enforcement has great difficulty identifying the criminal networks behind the drug trade. Larger amounts of money spent do not necessarily translate into a greater proportion of the drugs being captured. Russia could achieve better results, according to the authors, in addressing the drug trade by working harder to reduce the demand for drugs inside the country, though European countries would also have to cut their demand for drugs for this strategy to be effective. Other areas that need attention are improving living conditions for border guards and the migrants who now come into the country.

Alexander Salagaev, Alexander Shashkin, and Alexey Konnov examine corruption in Russia by looking at the particular case of ties between law-enforcement agencies and organized crime groups in the republic of Tatarstan. Based on extensive interviews with a variety of law-enforcement officers, crime group members, and businessmen, their research shows how pervasive and deeply engrained these ties are. They analyze the origins of these ties, how they are maintained, and what kinds of benefits they bring to each side. Information and a variety of services are exchanged in mutually beneficial ways that go well beyond simple monetary rewards. The police and crime group members often know each other from youth. The police and crime group members often develop friendly relations as a result of their interactions, further extending these ties.

The research presented here shows that the informal ties between the police and gang members are extensive and will be extremely difficult to eradicate. Such ties help both sides build social capital in contemporary Russia.

The numerous interviews the authors conducted demonstrate that the connections are becoming increasingly commercialized so that it will be easier for many more people to purchase the informal services that police and gang members can provide. This commercialization is particularly apparent in big cities like Moscow and Kazan. These processes will have an impact on the regular economy as many crime group members are legalizing their property holdings and trying to work within the framework of the law. Often police are willing to cleanse their crime records in order to help them make the transition from the shadow economy to the legitimate one.

In his chapter, Andrei S. Makarychev examines the extent of corruption in Russia’s military-industrial sector. His purpose is to find ways to make it easier for civilians to root out this corruption. Makarychev argues that Russia could increase the effectiveness of its military sector by improving the level of transparency there.⁴

Like other sectors of the Russian economy, different clans battle to control the military-industrial sector and the money it generates. Russian arms procurement leaves extensive room for corruption, with the state and Russian tax payers usually being the main losers. For example, defense enterprises are often not paid fully for their output. This situation leads them to use the money they do receive in non-transparent ways to cover their most pressing expenses. There are numerous ways corruption enters the procurement process, including the selection of enterprises to fulfill weapons orders and the establishment of prices in the contracts. Likewise, classifying the defense budget outlays as a state secret creates fertile ground for corruption. As a result, bureaucrats and defense enterprises have developed numerous ways to hide their costs within the various different pieces of the defense budget.

During the last few years, Russia has introduced a number of reforms in the military-industrial sector. Now defense budgets are constrained by realistic cost accounting and the free-spending days of the Soviet era are over. Additionally, civilians have a greater voice in the management of the militaryindustrial sector.

Despite this evolution, considerable gains could be achieved by giving Russia’s non-governmental sector a larger role in the defense industrial sector. Such actors include big business groups, professional associations, the media, and independent think tanks. These groups can make a major contribution to improving transparency by monitoring budget activities, investigating abuses, educating the public about corruption, and a host of other activities. By trying to remove the Russian military-industrial complex from this type of social oversight, the Russian authorities have provided the basis for extensive corruption, which limits the effectiveness of this sector. In effect, administrative procedures replace political processes leading to extensive abuses. Ultimately, Makarychev argues, efforts to remove “politics” from the procurement process lead to “hyper-politicization,” understood as the absence of “structural limits on the use of military resources for the realization of the political will of the state elite.” In short, Russia is paying too high a price in defending itself against outside threats and not doing enough to take advantage of possible solutions existing within Russian society.

Irina Olimpieva and Oleg Pachenkov examine the question: Who fights corruption in Russia? They concentrate on non-govern...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The socio-economic and criminal effects of contemporary migration in large Russian cities
• 3. Crime and migration in Siberia
• 4. Drug trafficking along the Russian–Kazakh border: Challenges of enforcement
• 5. One hand washes the other: Informal ties among organized crime groups and law-enforcement agencies in Russia
• 6. Addressing corruption in Russia’s civil–military relations
• 7. Who fights corruption in Russia?
• 8. Trade-offs between security and civil liberties in Russia’s counter-terrorist campaign in 2000–2004: Six regional case studies
• Index