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1 Methodic doubt and the abyss
of scepticism
if we begin with certainties, we will end in doubt, but if we begin with doubts and bear them patiently, we may end in certainty.
Francis Bacon, Of the Advancement of Learning
The First Meditation is very short, and its arguments seem at first sight relatively easy to understand. On closer inspection, it is very dense and involves âan arduous undertakingâ (AT VII 23). Neither the length nor the apparently simple arguments prepare us for what we are invited to embark on: a laborious and mentally exhausting journey involving strenuous effort of both reason and the will. The journey is neither âsimply routineâ nor âless portentous than it may soundâ.1 Beneath the gentle surface there is an undertaking that is both a plea for a new beginning of analytic rigour, and a scrutiny of the principles of sense-based opinions (opiniones), of mathematics and geometry, of the opinion concerning God's existence, and shakes the metaphysical foundations of Scholasticism.
Descartes is concerned with metaphysics rather than with a sceptically-driven epistemology. That he takes scepticism seriously, however, while at the same time being determined to rebut (one form of) scepticism, can be seen in an important passage in which he summarises the position reached in the First Meditation, once the opinion that God exists was suspended. â[I] am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former opinions about which a doubt may not properly be raised; and this is not a flippant or ill-considered conclusion, but is based on powerful and well thought-out reasonsâ (AT VII 21). It is not flippant because the methodic scrutiny provided good reasons for withholding assent âfrom these former beliefs [credidi] just as carefully as I would from obvious falsehoods, if I want to discover any certainty in the sciences [scientiis]â (AT VII 22).2 By âgood reasonsâ Descartes does not mean just any reasons, however strong: âThere may be reasons which are strong enough to compel us to doubt, even though these reasons are themselves doubtful, and hence not be retained later onâ (Seventh Set of Objections with Replies AT VII 473â74). Rather, having been scrutinised by the method, they withstood that scrutiny. It is in this sense that reasons are good, powerful, and well thought-out, since the supposition upon which they are based is itself good â the methodic scrutiny.
Through the methodic scrutiny the meditator aims to remove the taint of dogmatism, to free himself from partiality and prejudice in preparation for the search for truth and for the âsupreme goodâ (Letter to Queen Christina, 20 November 1647 AT V 83; CSMK:325), for new metaphysics, and for the possibility of the nature of reality being intelligible to reason. This is not ârashnessâ and âdogmatism of pure reasonâ,3 but reason's open-mindedness in search of such possibilities. Methodic scrutiny requires that if any serious thinker is to explore the emerging new science, which is challenging the methods, metaphysics, physics of Scholasticism, such a thinker must ask: are the hitherto accepted principles adequate and stable enough to face up to such challenge and turmoil? If there are good reasons to doubt, such a thinker must begin not from such principles (AT VII 12), but with the search for first principles. Freedom from bias, partiality, and unscrutinised doctrines precedes that search.
The First Meditation therefore deserves and requires painstaking examination, as Descartes requests: âI should like my readers not just to take the short time needed to go through it, but to devote several months, or at least weeks, to considering the topics dealt with, before going to the rest of the bookâ (Second Set of Replies AT VII 130).
Knowledge and freedom
The Meditation opens by raising two major problems: the possibility of new metaphysical knowledge, and the possibility of freedom. The primary concern is the threat that pertains to one of the most central elements in his quest, without which his entire project will not get off the ground: freedom. The attainability of knowledge is not independent of the attainability of freedom. The problem of knowledge is one of instability and transience; the problem of freedom is one of bondage and subjugation. The first problem arose in the course of reflecting on âthe large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood, and [ ⌠] the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on themâ (AT VII 17). This is a dramatic way of stressing how preconceived opinions can come about âwhich most of us never subsequently abandonâ (Principles I 47), and of indicating that the problem arose as a result not only of his dissatisfaction with the tenets of prevailing doctrines, but also of taking seriously the new sciences that were challenging them.
The second problem â the possibility of freedom â arose out of his reflecting on the question of whether there is an active power in us, a will, and whether it can be free. But why is freedom so essential to the inquiry that without it the entire project would not get off the ground? Contemporary analytic philosophy in pursuit of knowledge (or knowledge-claims) is insensitive to the question of freedom. But embarking on a philosophical inquiry of the magnitude and kind proposed by Descartes is a special undertaking of reason. Adopting the methodic doubt as the best instrument for scrutiny requires not only reason's acceptance, but also a determination of the will freed from the trammels of prevailing doctrines. Thus the question of whether the will can turn and consider matters differently from its customary ways, whether it can be motivated to act in a way required by the method, is paramount.4 Suspending assent to dubitable opinions is constitutive of the method, the employment of which presupposes reason's recognition of the instability of such doctrines. But the method's purpose is also to enable reason to assert its authority, and the will to demonstrate its autonomy by freeing itself from any complacent ways of acting â to realise its true nature. This requires that the will be resolutely at one with, not external to, reason's special undertaking, neither pulling in the opposite direction, nor being indifferent.
Freedom's centrality is two-fold: epistemically, freedom is necessary for affirming or denying in general, for assenting to the true and the good, for withholding assent in the face of uncertainty, and for responsibility and accountability; freedom from imposed authority, from unexamined doctrines, is key to unblocking scientific inquiry and progress. Metaphysically, freedom is indispensable to the nature of the self and of an infinite being, if there is such a being. The very idea of freedom raises a fundamental question regarding three relations: self and the corporeal world; reason and the will; self and the infinite.
Metaphysical inquiry, no less than moral and scientific inquiry, requires that we try to attain a view of the world that is as free as possible from the bonds and effects of bias, psychological convictions, prejudice. Freeing oneself from all this is a characteristic virtue we normally consider constitutive of objectivity. Freedom is conceived not merely negatively as the liberation from such fetters but also, and importantly, positively as the autonomous power to assent to the true and the good. What would enable the will to turn from its accustomed habits is not Scholastic syllogisms, but an immense force.
The parallel between the problem of the metaphysics of knowledge and the problem of the metaphysics of freedom is clear, and the two are addressed together with the declaration in the First Meditation: âMy habitual opinions keep coming back, and, despite my wishes, they capture my belief, which is as it were bound over to them as a result of long occupation and the law of customâ (AT VII 22).5 The concern seems to be, at first glance, with the occasional influence of overwhelming, or unreflective, opinions. On closer examination we find that what is likely to undermine the meditator's wishes and impede the application of the method of doubt is persistent bias, resulting from long occupation with Scholastic doctrines.6 Freedom takes centre stage and becomes a necessary requirement of the meditator's special undertaking whose metaphysical precondition is an unprejudiced, attentive inquirer in whom the authority of reason and the autonomy of freedom are internally related.
What can be called into doubt?
This is the logical âcanâ since Descartes does not ground modal or any other claims on psychological reasons. He explains: âbefore we can decide to doubt, we need some reason for doubting, and that is why in my First Meditation I put forward the principal reasons for doubtâ (Appendix to Fifth Objections and Replies AT IXA 204). These are normative, not psychological, reasons. Normativity is a matter of why I ought to embark on something; it guides not only actions but acts of the will, and relations â e.g., I ought not to hold contradictory opinions. Descartes is not concerned with psychological reasons, certainty or conviction;7 one's psychological conviction has no bearing on what is true or dubitable. His concern is with what reason leads him to think âbased on powerful and well thought-out reasonsâ (AT VII 18), on âsound reasonsâ (Seventh Set of Objections with Replies AT VII 460), for affirming or denying in the light of reason. Similarly, by âcompelâ (e.g., the assent-compellingness of clear and distinct perceptions) he means rational compellingness (which enhances freedom), not psychological. To think he is concerned with psychological certainty is to misunderstand not just the whole project, but the purpose of the First Meditation in particular, as well as a crucial aspect of the rĂ´le of the evil demon: to free the will from various fetters, including psychological conviction. It is to fail to see the centrality of freedom to the entire project.
Three basic principles
Descartes' undertaking in the Meditations is concerned with an examination not only of truths already accepted, imposed, or derived by some other means, but with much deeper issues: the systematic scrutiny of principles which were accepted by different schools of thought as a basis of knowledge; to assess their cogency by laying bare the degree of their strength in withstanding the methodic doubt. If the principles are found wanting, the rest of the edifice of beliefs (credidi) that presuppose such principles can be called into doubt; the beliefs cannot be certain if the principles they presuppose are dubitable. These are the basic principles of Empiricism, Rationalism, and Theology,8 implying three ways of obtaining knowledge: through the senses, through reason, and through authority. What makes Descartes' undertaking refreshing and radical is his refusal to allow any sympathies to persuade him to accept without scrutiny any one of the basic principles (Principles I 75). Take away this âphilosophical honesty [and] the love of truthâ and we are left with ârhetorical displayâ (Fifth Set of Replies AT VII 350).
The strategy is carried out in three stages with three distinct targets, in a carefully ascending order of complexity; it demands that at each stage of cross-examination there be a backdrop thesis from which the meditator can carry out the scrutiny. Each backdrop thesis is the result of a set of complex steps of the elenctic structure of the method. Each sceptical argument is put forward while holding on to a backdrop which is in turn examined from another backdrop, until scepticism is ultimately pushed to the limit of intelligibility (§8 below).
Principle of empiricism
The investigation begins by stating Empiricism's Principle: âWhatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the sensesâ (AT VII 18). The principle comes under close examination in which three kinds of sceptical argument are deployed, starting, as Rule Three requires, with the easiest and simplest to understand and moving to the more complex, but without losing the connection between them. Descartes is not setting out to prove that the senses are, or are not, reliable. The method is not concerned with proof but with scrutiny, with the suspension of judgement on the basis of having good reasons. Nor is it concerned to show that if p is doubtful, then ~p is certain: no one âof sound mind could interpret what I said in any other way [ ⌠or] pretend that it was my intention to believe the opposite of what is doubtfulâ (Seventh Set of Objections with Replies AT VII 460).
The argument from illusion
The first and simplest argument is the argument from illusion. The cross-examination begins by observing that from time to time the senses deceive us with regard to very small things or things at great distances.9 He spends no time offering examples; it is a familiar problem and examples abound in the literature. Rather, what is important to the inquiry is the meditator's openness to the realisation that at least some sensory opinions may be dubitable, and this provides the impetus to move forward.
The argument from illusion is narrowed down and applied to specific classes: to the qualities of things (a tower looks round from a distance though it is square); to very small things (a tiny insect appears as a speck of dust); to cases of refraction (a bent-looking stick in water). It is not intended to have general applicability; there is no valid inference from the premise that the senses can sometimes deceive us to the conclusion that it is possible they always deceive us. In cases of illusion âthere is both something about the situation to arouse a doubt, and something you can do to settle the doubt when aroused.â10 Nor is the argument dismissed by Descartes; it is part of the method and it will be relevant to our overall assessment of what can and cannot eventually be defeated. Rather, the argument is insufficient to cast doubt on Empiricism's Principle. The most that is concluded is that it would be âprudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even onceâ (AT VII 18).
The argument from illusion is raised against the backdrop thesis that one needs to be on guard on any occasion concerning sense-based opinions. âDescartes is sometimes accused of having mounted the Method of Doubt, or at least its application to [perceptual opinions], on the confusion in that respect about contingency; but this is a mistake about Descartes.â11 He is here dealing with dubitability, not contingency; in fact, the first certainty will be both contingent and indubitable.
The argument from insanity
Given the limitations of the illusion argument, the meditator proceeds by supposing: even if sense-based opinions can sometimes be mistaken, there are many other beliefs acquired from the senses which I find difficult to call into doubt â opinions concerning things which are familiar and close to me, for example, that I am sitting by the fire wearing a gown, that these hands and my body cannot be denied. We normally accept that, in the right circumstances and under suitable conditions, sense-based opinions can be perspicuous, a source of constancy and accuracy. How much closer can one get to anything than to...
