Social Reconstruction Learning

Dualism, Dewey and Philosophy in Schools

Jennifer Bleazby

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135085483
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

This volume argues that educational problems have their basis in an ideology of binary opposites often referred to as dualism, which is deeply embedded in all aspects of Western society and philosophy, and that it is partly because mainstream schooling incorporates dualism that it is unable to facilitate the thinking skills, dispositions and understandings necessary for autonomy, democratic citizenship and leading a meaningful life. Drawing on the philosophy of John Dewey, feminist pragmatism, Matthew Lipman's Philosophy for Children program, and the service learning movement, Bleazby proposes an approach to schooling termed "social reconstruction learning," in which students engage in philosophical inquiries with members of their community in order to reconstruct real social problems, arguing that this pedagogy can better facilitate independent thinking, imaginativeness, emotional intelligence, autonomy, and active citizenship.

1 The Problem of Dualisms

THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY

Western philosophy and culture have been fundamentally shaped by a desire for certainty. As Dewey explains, “Man who lives in a world of hazards is compelled to seek for security”, and the perennial assumption has been that only certainty, in the form of fixed and eternal truths, can provide such security (1930b, 7). A world that is constantly changing is unpredictable, can never be known in its entirety and, consequently, is difficult to manage and control. It is assumed that having certain knowledge of ourselves and the world would enable us to make reliable predictions and live in harmony with our environment rather than fear it. However, experience is corporeal and subjective, and it is experience of a world that is constantly changing, decaying and regenerating.

As such, the desire for certainty has given rise to the notion of an ultimate, eternal, fixed reality (Dewey 1930b, 23). Knowledge of such a reality could be absolute, universal and certain. However, we could not attain such knowledge through embodied experience. Thus, a notion of knowing has been devised that supposedly transcends the particularities and indeterminacies of concrete experience. This is the method of transcendental Reason, sometimes thought to be the only legitimate method of acquiring knowledge.¹ Reason is conceived of as a universal human faculty, located in a disembodied mind. Through Reason, the individual is meant to be able to transcend their embodied situatedness and objectively observe a fixed, eternal reality (Dewey 2004a, 252–255). While other attributes, such as the emotions, imagination and the senses, are also recognised as methods of acquiring information and organising thought, Reason has been conceived of as the only method objective, abstract and universal enough to endow us with untainted, “ultimately true representations of the one real world” (Lloyd 1984, viii). Many philosophers have been preoccupied with trying to understand this ultimate reality and, as such, preoccupied with perfecting the method of Reason, such as through identifying universal logical principles that thinking must adhere to in order to attain and preserve truth (Dewey 1930b, 19). As Dewey explains, it is in philosophy, more so than any other discipline, that the quest for certainty is apparent:

I do not doubt that there was a feeling before the rise of philosophy that the unalterably fixed and the absolutely certain are one, or that change is the source from which comes all our uncertainties and woes. But in philosophy this inchoate feeling was definitely formulated. It was asserted on grounds held to be as demonstrably necessary as are the conclusions of geometry and logic. Thus the predisposition of philosophy toward the universal, invariant and eternal was fixed. It remains the common possession of the entire classic philosophic tradition. (1930b, 23)

THE DUALISTIC NOTION OF REASON

This transcendental ideal of Reason is dualistic in that it is partially defined by its opposition to the emotions, imagination and experience—attributes considered too unreliable to be methods of knowledge acquisition (Dewey 2004a, 252–255). The senses are considered subjective and prone to illusion, while the emotions are thought to be idiosyncratic and are associated with the material body, which is concrete, situated and constantly changing. The imagination is deemed problematic because it is not constrained by reality and is associated with the emotions. Reason's supposed superiority over these other attributes is reflected in the work of many of the great philosophers, such as Descartes’ well-known concerns about the reliability of sense experience and imagination:

Our senses could quite often also mislead us … as when those with jaundice see everything as yellow, or when stars or other very distant bodies appear to us much smaller than they are. For after all … we ought never to let ourselves be convinced except on the evidence of our reason. And it is to be noted that I say ‘our reason,’ and not ‘our imagination’ or ‘our senses’. (2006, 34)

Not only are the imagination, emotions and experience seen as inadequate methods of attaining knowledge, they are also considered to be distractions to Reason. This is reflected in Kant's discussion of the emotions:

The impulses of nature [the passions, emotions], accordingly, are obstacles within man's mind to his observance of duty and forces (sometimes powerful ones) struggling against it. Man must, therefore, judge that he is able to stand up to them and subdue them by reason. (1964, 37)

In the dominant epistemological construct, which is highly influenced by Cartesian epistemology, these other methods of forming beliefs and organising information are seen as unreliable distractions that must be suppressed so that Reason alone can deliver us absolute knowledge. Consequently, the emotions, imagination, intuition and experience are conceived of as dualistically opposed to Reason. Since Reason is thought to provide certainty, while these other methods do not, Reason is considered superior to its oppositional partners and has a privileged role in defining them. Emotion, imagination and the senses are largely defined negatively, as ‘not reason’—capacities incapable of providing us with knowledge and certainty (Gatens 1991, 92).

The Reason/emotion, Reason/experience and Reason/imagination dualisms interlock with other dualistic pairs central to this epistemological ideal, such as mind/body dualism. Since the body belongs to the material world, which is indeterminate and changing, it too is opposed to Reason. The body is also situated in that it must occupy a particular time and space. However, Reason is supposed to provide a transcendental ‘god's eye view’ of reality. Furthermore, because they involve feeling, the emotions are considered physiological and, consequently, the body is also associated with the emotions. Thus, Reason is thought to be situated in a ‘disembodied mind’. As Dewey explains, the body is treated as merely a receptacle for the self-sufficient mind:

Thought has been alleged to be a purely inner activity, intrinsic to mind alone; and according to traditional classic doctrine, “mind” is complete and self-sufficient in itself. Overt action may follow upon its operations but in an external way, a way not intrinsic to its completion. (1930b, 11)

It is not only those philosophers who adhere to a type of Cartesian dualism that accept this disembodied notion of mind. Even though most contemporary philosophers believe that the mind is physical (e.g., that is identical to the brain), much of their writing still implies a type of mind/body dualism. This is because, as Tanesini explains, even materialist accounts of the mind “do not consider properly the implications of the fact that we—our minds, our reason—are embodied” (1999, 216). These implications include the fact that an embodied mind is incompatible with the notion of universal, absolute, ahistorical and certain knowledge. The implication of an embodied mind is a more situated, concrete, emotional and subjective account of knowledge. As far as many materialist philosophers continue to reject such an account of knowledge or, at least, fail to fully comprehend its implications, they still embrace a form of mind/body dualism. Thus, the notion of universal and absolute knowledge still implies a disembodied mind, even when such a concept of mind is explicitly rejected.

Mind/body dualism is also closely connected to theory/practice dualism. Practical activity is dependent on the body and is directly concerned with concrete particularities and the material world. As such, practice is opposed to abstract theory, which is thought to be the product of pure cognition. Dewey describes the inferior status that practical activities have traditionally had:

Practical activity deals with individualized and unique situations which are never exactly duplicable and about which, accordingly, no complete assurance is possible. All activity, moreover, involves change. The intellect, however, according to the traditional doctrine, may grasp universal Being, and Being which is universal is fixed and immutable. Wherever there is practical activity we human beings are involved as partakers in the issue. All the fear, disesteem and lack of confidence which gather about the thought of ourselves, cluster also about the thought of the action in which we are partners. Man's distrust of himself has caused him to desire to get beyond and above himself; in pure knowledge he has thought he could attain this self-transcendence. (1930b, 10)

The mind/body, theory/practice, Reason/emotion, Reason/imagination and Reason/experience dualisms are at the centre of an extensive system of interlocking and mutually reinforcing dualistic pairs. This system underpins dominant ideas in Western epistemology and culture (Plumwood 2002, 20; F. Mathews 1998, 519). The following are other dualistic pairs in this system, some of which will be examined in detail throughout the book:

Male	Female
Reason	Intuition
Reason	Emotion
Reason	Sense Experience
Reason	Imagination
Master	Slave
Mind	Body
Individual	Community
Culture	Nature
Civilised	Primitive
Independence	Dependency
Adult	Child
Rationality	Animality
Form	Matter
Human	Animal
Spirit	Matter
General	Specific
Universal	Particular
Abstract	Concrete
Absolute	Relative
Theoretical	Practical
Self	Other
White	Black
Subject	Object
Public	Private
Production	Reproduction^2

Those attributes on the left are associated with knowledge and all the things knowledge entails, such as personhood, autonomy, public life, education and citizenship. Those attributes on the right are thought to be opposed to knowledge, education, autonomy and so on.

Thus, the attributes associated with knowledge, autonomy, education and citizenship are also associated with masculinity, while the attributes opposed to knowledge are traditionally associated with women, non-whites, children and other marginalised groups. Many of the attributes opposed to knowledge and autonomy are also associated with the working class, including practicality, concreteness, dependency and the body (e.g., manual labour). This system appears to legitimise denying members of these groups full access to education, citizenship and public life. That is, dualism helps legitimise and naturalise the marginalisation and oppression of these groups and the superiority of white, Western, middle-class males (Plumwood 2002; Oliver 2002). If those who possess the capacity for Reason have access to knowledge, it follows that those same individuals should control and manage society. Those who don't have direct access to knowledge should presumably submit to those who do (Oliver 2002, 219; Plumwood 2002, 11). This idea is explicit in Plato's Republic (1998), where it is argued that the most capable Reasoners (the Guardians or Philosopher Kings) should rule over other groups in the state, who are more suited to bodily, practical activities (e.g., craftspeople, artisans, soldiers, merchants). Plato's just state mirrors his notion of the just person, whose capacity for reason should rule over other parts of the self, namely, the body and the passions.

While Dewey was aware of the way these dualisms were related to various types of social and political inequalities, this aspect of dualism has been more comprehensively explained by contemporary feminists. Dewey identified how this dualistic system, especially the theory/practice dualism, was related to class inequalities. However, he did not explicitly connect dualism to gender and racial inequalities, even though he was involved in these civil rights movements during his lifetime. He has been criticised for this oversight (see Laird 1988, 112). Nonetheless, Dewey's philosophy is highly compatible with many contemporary feminist philosophies. By integrating various feminist theories and Dewey's philosophy, we can more fully explain the epistemological, educational, political and social consequences of these dualisms and develop a method for reconstructing them.

THE NATURE OF THE DUALISTIC RELATIONSHIP

Feminist philosophers have also provided a more comprehensive and detailed analysis of the nature of the dualistic relationship than Dewey did. Understanding the nature of the dualistic relationship is important because characteristics of the relationship are also incorporated into dominant Western epistemology and culture, along with the dualisms themselves. Articulating the nature of this dualistic relationship will also indicate a means for reconstructing dualism.

Dualism is not synonymous with merely dichotomous or oppositional thinking, which is actually a valuable analytic tool. As Plumwood explains,

The term ‘dualism’ is often used in ways which do not distinguish it from dichotomy. But if we mean by “dichotomy” what is commonly meant, simply making a division or drawing a distinction, it is essential to distinguish between dualism and dichotomy. Equating them would either cripple all thought (if we were forced to abandon dichotomy along with dualism) or collapse the concept of dualism (if we were forced to retain dualism along with dichotomy). In either case escape form dualism becomes impossible. (2002, 22)

It is not the making of distinctions that is problematic but the nature of the distinction made and the way that distinction is treated which results in a relationship of domination.

First, the dualistic relationship is a hierarchical one. A dichotomy may oppose two categories that are considered to be equally valuable. However, in a dualistic relationship, one category is assumed to be superior to, and dominates, the other. In general, the superior nature of the attributes on the left side of the table of dualisms is justified on the grounds that those attributes are associated with knowledge, certainty and personhood. As we have seen, those attributes on the right side of the table are considered inferior, not only because they aren't associated with knowledge but also because they are seen as obstacles to attaining knowledge. Just as certainty is intended to provide control and domination over everything else, those attributes that enable certainty dominate those that are opposed to it.

The differentiation between the two categories in a dualistic pair also requires, not just a mere distinction, but complete separation, what Plum-wood describes as ‘hyperseparation’ or ‘radical exclusion’ (2002, 24–26). Whereas any two opposites may be differentiated by the identification of one differentiating characteristic, in a dualistic relationship, the differences are magnified, maximised and emphasised. Any commonalities, continuity and similarities between dualistic opposites are denied or trivialised (Plumwood 2002, 24–25; F. Mathews 1998, 520). The purpose of this polarisation is to enforce the supremacy and domination of one faculty over the other. If one category in the dualism is to be superior and dominate the other it must appear to hold nothing in common with its inferior partner (Plumwood 2002, 25). Descartes’ distinction between the soul and the body typifies hyperseparation: “the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even easier to know than the body; and would not stop being everything it is, even if the body were not to exist” (2006, 24). Anything or anyone who seems to transgress the rigid boundaries of dualistic categories is either denied or labelled subversive, abnormal and problematic, such as individuals who don't adhere to dualistic gender categories.

In actuality, the attributes that make up these dualistic pairs are interdependent. First, because they are defined in opposition to each other, they are dependent on each other for their identity and definitional boundaries. The inferior attribute in the dualistic partnership is defined negatively as lacking the essential attributes of its dominant partner (Plumwood 2002, 26–27). The superior attribute is also partially defined via its exclusion of its inferior partner. Second, the two categories in a dualism are materially and/or operationally dependent on each other in that they cannot function properly or exist without each other. For example, the mind is materially dependent on the body for survival. Masters are dependent on their slaves in order to have their desires met and, as shall be argued throughout the following chapters, the experience, imagination, emotions and reason are operationally co-dependent in that neither one can produce meaning and knowledge without the others.

However, in order to remain dominant, the superior categories in a dualistic relationship must deny any definitional, material and functional dep...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Social Reconstruction Learning
• Routledge International Studies in the Philosophy of Education
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1 The Problem of Dualisms
• 2 Dewey’s Community of Inquiry: A Response to Dualism
• 3 A Response to Absolute/Relative Dualism: Truth and Meaning in Dewey and Philosophy for Children
• 4 A Response to Reason/Imagination Dualism: The Imagination in Dewey and Philosophy for Children
• 5 A Response to Reason/Emotion Dualism: The Emotions in Dewey and Philosophy for Children
• 6 A Response to Individual/Community Dualism: Community, Autonomy and Democracy in Dewey and Philosophy for Children
• 7 A Response to Male/Female Dualism: Reconstructing Gender in Philosophy for Children
• 8 A Response to Theory/Practice Dualism: Social Reconstruction Learning
• Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index