From Adult Education to the Learning Society

21 Years of the International Journal of Lifelong Education

Peter Jarvis

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781134217946
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Adult Education

This unique text provides a valuable route map to the development of thinking in adult education and lifelong learning. It includes more than twenty-five seminal articles from the first two decades of the International Journal of Lifelong Education, written by leading authors in the field from the UK, the USA, Australia and Europe.

Compiled to show the development of the field, the articles are divided into four sections:

From Ault Education…
…to Lifelong Education
…and Lifelong Learning
…to the Learning Society and Beyond.

The specially written Introduction by the editor contextualises the selection and introduces readers to the main issues and current thinking in the field. This is the only text of its kind to demonstrate practice and policy internationally over this period, and as the collection of articles are now available in one easy-access place, this is an excellent resource for students and scholars.

Part 1 From Adult Education…

Deontological liberalism The political philosophy of liberal adult education

Kenneth Lawson

DOI: 10.4324/9780203015988-1

A philosophy of individualism runs through liberal adult education. It can be seen in such educational goals as personal development and the idea of developing ‘autonomous man’. It is implicit in the vocabulary of ‘educational rights’ and in claims for ‘equality of educational opportunity’.

For some, this philosophy represents a strength while for others such as Colin Griffin (1983) and Nell Keddie (1980) the ‘ideology of individualism’ is a matter for reproach and criticism. Such criticism must be taken seriously as a challenge at the theoretical level and one which is as important as the more practical challenges to liberal adult education such as the withdrawal of public funds and the growing emphasis upon vocational education.

In the older traditions of adult education there was a strong ‘utilitarian’ element in the ideal of social purpose, the furtherance of social progress and the enhancement of the public good. More recently, however, there have been signs of a significant shift away from utilitarian forms of liberalism and liberalism in the Greek tradition based on the idea of the pursuit of ‘the good’. There has instead been a movement towards a ‘deontological’ type of liberalism which is highly individualistic in character and which is based upon the ideas of ‘rights’ and justice’. It is a philosophy which denies that there can be a general, as distinct from a private, idea of ‘the good’.

Deontological liberalism can now be seen as the dominant political and ethical philosophy underpinning liberal adult education and which provides much of its theoretical base. This paper is an attempt to explore the connections between adult education and its underlying philosophy.

The deontological tradition is not new. It goes back at least to John Locke in the 17th century but it has been very influentially restated by John Rawls (1972) and by Richard Nozick (1974) and it is the ideas of these writers that form the main subject for discussion.

The ‘individual' in adult education

In a direct and obvious sense, it is individuals who are educated and this is likely to be denied only by those who believe that in some sense it is the ‘community’ or ‘social classes’ which are the subject of education.

‘Education’ according to Paterson (1979: 15) ‘directly touches us in our personal being, tending our identity at its roots and ministering directly to our condition as conscious selves aspiring in all our undertakings to a greater fullness and completeness of being’.

For Wiltshire (1976: 139) ‘individuation’ is the goal of adult education in the sense of ‘self-discovery and self-development voluntarily undertaken’.

Such views, to which many in adult education respond, might seem to be statements of fact but they are really prescriptions about the way in which individuals should be viewed and treated in education. ‘Individuality’ and ‘self-identity’ are not simply empirical facts. They represent implicit claims for a certain kind of status and they are ethical concepts. How are such claims justified and how are they related to the idea of ‘rights’ and to education as a process of ‘individuation’?

The idea of a freely choosing ‘autonomous self is at the centre of much of our thinking. The integrity of a unique self and a concern for its preservation, literally a concern for ‘self-interest’, are important values. But there are other ways of seeing things, and in cultures such as in China it is the commonality rather than individuality which is the major concern.

Nevertheless, in adult education, theories and practices have emerged which are allegedly based on ‘the way that we are’. These include the idea of ‘student centredness’ and the rights of adults to education and the right to choose their own educational goals.

Such ideas have led us toward a more subjective personal view of knowledge and away from the idea of publicly shared and tested knowledge as an epistemological paradigm. How we have arrived at this position may be a political as much as a philosophical question and it is to the boundaries of philosophy and socio-political theory that we must turn our attention.

Some basic tenets of deontological liberalism

Deontological liberalism, which is highly consistent with theories in adult education, is based upon the idea of justice and rights rather than upon a conception of a good society. The traditional virtues of tolerance, open-mindedness and a rejection of dogma are carried to their extreme in a refusal to define what is good for society. It is argued that no man can define what is good for another person and that no one has a right to impose anything upon others for their own good. Freedom of choice and the right to determine one’s own future are deemed to be of a morally higher order than any imposed goals which are intended to serve the greatest good of the greatest number.

As Sandel (1982: 1) neatly expresses it, ‘the core thesis’ of deontological liberalism assumes that ‘society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own views, interests and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any conception of the good’. Therefore, instead of seeking general criteria for ‘the good’ such as the maximization of ‘welfare’ or ‘utility’ as the basis of social policy, some independent criterion has to be sought. Such a criterion is the moral and legal category of ‘rights’ and ‘right’ is prior to ‘the good’.

Of all rights, the ‘right to choose’ is the most important, a view derived from Kant which assumes that our moral capacity resides in our ability to choose. Being free to choose is a minimum necessary requirement for being a moral agent.

Although autonomy is fundamental to deontological liberalism, it does not exclude the possibility of people agreeing on a particular policy. This happens when they combine for the purpose of defence or to provide common welfare services, but what they choose is irrelevant except insofar as it is an expression of free choice and conducive to the self-interest of each member of the group. Having chosen, the central concern is for the maintenance of their individual rights. Fairness as a regulating principle for the regulation of conduct and transactions between individuals or between individuals and the State is what really matters from the deontological point of view. This means that, in the last resort, whatever policy has been agreed upon by members of a group must be sacrificed if any individual is treated unjustly in order to maintain the policy.

Such a view is by no means as unrealistic as it might appear and it is exemplified in the argument that public expenditure should not be financed out of higher taxes on individuals even if some vital service such as education has to be cut as a consequence. In many respects, the deontological principle is operative in Britain under the present government. The case against taxation is presented in terms of its disincentive effects on effort or on investment but the claim in effect is that of Nozick who argues that it is a violation of a person’s rights if he is forced to do certain things. In his view ‘the State may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others’. For Nozick (1974: 169), ‘Taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour’ and it is by no means clear that claims to welfare rights over-ride rights to property. Conflicting claims have to be reconciled in the light of justice and not with reference to the worthwhileness of what is being claimed as a right.

Such a philosophy is essentially a defence of self-interest against State interests and as such it was an important piece of intellectual equipment in the 17th century. It continues to be important, but it conflicts with other points of view on both the left and the right which emphasize society and the State as being of greater importance than the individuals who comprise them.

John Locke's contribution

In order to understand more recent deontological theory, it might help if we consider some of its origins and John Locke is an obvious starting point.

Locke’s thought is set within a framework of ‘natural law’ which is unfamiliar to most present-day readers, but the problems with which he deals are familiar ones.

In establishing a defence against an absolute monarchy, Locke tries to establish the supremacy of individuals each of whom has a fundamental natural-law right to existence. Following from this, they have additional supporting rights to those possessions which are necessary to secure their existence and a right to choose on matters which affect their individuality.

Locke’s starting point is a prima facie case against absolute governments and he postulates a minimal role for the State or Commonwealth. For Locke, the State is an institution for the protection of individuals. It is not and does not have, in the Hegelian sense, an entity with a prior existence to which individuals owe an overriding obligation.

In his Letter on Toleration, Locke (1689 and 1956: 128) states that ‘The Commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving and advancing of their own civil interests’. These interests are defined as ‘liberty, health and indolency of body; and the provision of outward things such as money, lands, houses, furniture and the like’. Furthermore: ‘It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all people in general and every one of his subjects in particular, the just possession of these things belonging to this life.’

In effect, Locke has committed himself to a political platform which has to be theoretically justified. His justification is derived initially from Biblical texts, but the underlying principles, which are to be seen as a priori, do not necessarily depend upon Biblical authority. What Locke tries to demonstrate is the existence of ‘rights’ possessed by all individuals which are antecedent to the establishment of society. These rights are the product of social contracts agreed by individuals of equal status.

The idea of antecedent natural rights requires Locke (1689 and 1956: 4) to postulate a natural state of man prior to any form of social organization. He claims that men are in a ‘state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man’. Locke also considers it ‘reasonable and just’ to be allowed to destroy that which threatens an individual with destruction.

It might be objected that, in claiming antecedent rights, Locke is already drawing upon social concepts and that ‘rights’, ‘freedom’ and ‘property’ pre-suppose the existence of rules which define and protect them. We might say that a wild animal has a right to ‘kill’ but to talk in terms of property rights in such contexts is to use the terms metaphorically.

In order to escape from such objections, Locke (1689 and 1956: 14) is obliged to introduce the idea of the right to self-preservation based on God’s law. We are deemed to possess ‘natural reason’ as a gift from God which ‘tells us that men being born have a right to their preservation and consequently to meat and drink and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence’. We have therefore ‘a property’ in our own person and in those things necessary to our preservation. Furthermore, we have a duty to God to preserve ourselves.

These are no more than a priori assumptions but they are logically necessary in support of Locke’s political position. If it is not accepted as a starting point that all individuals are worthy of preservation then further claims about their welfare become irrelevant because there is no basis on which to justify them.

It should be noted that Locke has introduced a strongly normative element into his case in the concept of ‘property’. The term includes both material possession and health and liberty. The right to self-preservation is thereby extended to cover not merely the right to exist but the right to exist in a particular qualitative sense for which material possessions and other forms of property are necessary. It is not even enough to be provided with such things. Ownership must be vested in them. As society becomes more sophisticated and things like education are added to what is deemed necessary for a qualitative or normative view of ‘existence’ it is easy to see how they are then assimilated into the list of things to which we are said to have a right. Politically speaking, therefore, Locke has cleverly secured his position.

Because Locke’s State is concerned only with the protection of individuals and the maintenance of justice, it is not necessary for him to consider any other possible ends or purposes. Each individual is free to choose his own ‘good life’ and it is in no way incumbent upon the state to provide for people beyond a framework of justice’. For the State to play any part in defining social policy would be regarded as an infringement of individual liberty; therefore the powers of government must be contained within very strict limits.

The idea of a ‘minimal State’ has been reviewed and restated in recent years by Richard Nozick in his book Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). It has attracted a good deal of attention, partly because of the rigour of the argument presented, and also because it is so much in tune with present-day political thinking.

What is significant about such views, and it is central to the deontological philosophy, is that the absence of governmental influence in social policy is regarded as a virtue which over-rides considerations of general welfare. It is regarded as more important that individual freedom should be extended and maintained even though this might lead to reductions in publicly provided welfare services, including education. The furtherance of ‘the good’ is seen as a personal rather than a collective concern, and the defence of ‘rights’ is more important than, say, the amelioration of poverty.

Rawls and Nozick

Although each of these writers arrives at different political conclusions, they both start from similar philosophical presuppositions about the ‘rights-based’ ethic. Both writers draw upon the Kantian view that as ‘centres of consciousness’ each person should be regarded as an end and never as a means. We can never meaningfully ask ‘for what purpose should a person be allowed to choose?’ or ‘why is self-development important?’. These are ends deemed to be self-evidently worthwhile.

The relevance of this to liberal adult education should be obvious because it too is defended as a worthwhile end which need not be justified by reference to instrumental purposes. On this view ‘education’ is a ‘good’, not something which furthers the good.

For Nozick (1974: 93), as for Locke,

there is no social entity with a good to which individuals contribute. There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others … To use him in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.

This robust defence of the individual has to be reconciled with the fact that in most situations, an individual’s decisions about his own life are likely to react upon the interests of other people. Locke in fact recognized this point and qualified an individual’s right to possession and the fruits of his labour except in conditions where there is an abundance of resources. We can only claim an absolute right to possessions such as land ‘where there is...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• PART 1 From Adult Education…
• PART 2 … to lifelong education
• PART 3 … and lifelong learning
• PART 4 … to the learning society and beyond
• Index