Oppression

A Study in Social and Criminal Psychology

Tadesuz Grygier

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781135034979
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Published in 1998, Oppression is a valuable contribution to the field of Sociology and Social Policy.

PART ONE

THE PROBLEM AND METHOD

Chapter 1

THE PROBLEM

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the research described in the following pages is to examine the psychological changes in people subjected to various forms of oppression. It is assumed here that the complicated set of environmental conditions which may be termed ‘oppression’ has been rapidly increasing in strength and frequency during the past years. Its influence on the human mind must be deep, its effect grave enough to upset the existing patterns of culture. As such, the influence of oppression warrants investigation, both clinical and experimental, even if the experiment is only a pilot one and its results are modest in relation to the magnitude of the problem.

During recent years we have witnessed the development of new systems and gigantic, totalitarian states. Almost the whole of Europe and a great part of Asia have been invaded, millions of people have undergone all kinds of oppression, and have been deprived of freedom, of food and clothing, of home and privacy. Millions have been displaced, whether they travelled as members of the invading armies or as refugees; others have suffered starvation and slavery, in concentration camps, or as prisoners of war. We have lived through two world wars, and through one world crisis, and seem now to be in the midst of a second one, of a different origin but with possibly no less serious consequences. All these catastrophes must have produced deep changes. In the words of Leon Blum (89)¹ ‘no crisis in a people’s history leaves the previous equilibrium undisturbed. That is why a crisis is always something of a revolution, whatever its material consequences may be. At the end of a long war, victory, like defeat, changes everything.’

In order to make an experimental study of oppression which would offer some contribution to the study of cultural changes we must select: first, those features of thought and behaviour which are important for cultural patterns, are changing rapidly and thus creating tensions, and can be measured or, at least, directly observed in controlled situations; and secondly, those environmental forces—especially of the oppressive kind—which may be held responsible for the changes in the selected aspects of personality.

When we have selected the main conditions hypothetically responsible for the apparent changes in human behaviour, the task is to establish the existence of a definite relationship between this set of conditions, and a certain pattern of behaviour. If we take a representative sample of the population, and measure, with the aid of personality tests and other techniques, the mental changes that occur in them under conditions by which many people have been affected, we may get some idea of psychological changes of a more universal nature. The measurement may be inexact, the ideas few and less brilliant than the situation demands: but these ideas will at least be based on research and experiment, not merely on speculation. The results, however modest, will be concrete, and may bring us a few steps towards the establishment of a rational and empirical, that is, scientific, control of human affairs, which, as Malinowski once said (435, p. 199), is the only way out of the straits.

It has been accepted that we must experiment in order to widen our knowledge. But here the problems concerned are very general in nature and the task becomes much more complex, and calls for a careful selection both of the questions and of the subjects. If we want to know anything about the value of the social institutions we have created, or of the actual possibilities of creating new ones—we must study individuals who have been formed by the institutions of the present, and will create those of the future.

We cannot possibly study all the aspects of the human mind. Nor can we trace all the changes in the numerous social institutions which are being transformed in the present crisis. We may find that recent developments affect very many aspects of life which either cannot be investigated experimentally at all, or only with extreme difficulty. We considered it necessary to limit our study of the human mind to certain of its features (their importance, rapidity of change, and measurability being the main criteria), and we must similarly restrict our selection of environmental conditions to those which are widespread, seem to be changing rapidly, and might be held responsible for whichever psychological changes we select.

This selection of the material to be studied constitutes one of the limitations of this research. As the aim of this work is to attack certain aspects of the recent changes, with the aid of sociological and psychological techniques, the other aspects, however important, must be left aside.

Secondly, as Sir Frederick Bartlett rightly remarked (51, p. 304), all research must be given an arbitrary end somewhere. If we consider purely technical difficulties, the limitations of the present work must be considerable. Still greater will they become when we pass from the general problems to the technique employed and material collected. The particular interests and qualifications of the writer also determine—even if unconsciously—the direction of thought and the scope of research.

In order to select the features of personality, whose changes under oppression are to be examined, I shall first make clear what I think are the various aspects of civilization, and what, in particular, is its psychological aspect.

2. SELECTION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCES

(a) A four-dimensional concept of culture

The following definitions may help to clarify the concept:

We use the words ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ synonymously. That is, unfortunately, the common usage, and the distinctions introduced by various writers differ between themselves. For Malinowski, for instance, civilization is ‘a special aspect of more advanced cultures’ (436, p. 621). For Alfred Weber (707), it seems to be the opposite.¹

We distinguish four aspects of civilization:

The creative aspect: of intellectual and artistic achievements, including the amount of knowledge, technical equipment, or power over nature. This aspect has in itself an element of striving and construction as well as of cognition.

The sociological aspect: the institutions.²

The historical aspect: the dimension of time.³

The psychological aspect, with which we are mainly concerned.

Both the sociological and the psychological aspects seem to have the character of a dynamic equilibrium. It is not an equilibrium between material and spiritual values, but rather one within the set of institutions, and within the personality structure of every individual. Thus sociologically civilization is the child of the marriage of law and force’ (232), or a hierarchy of freedoms, by which the less valuable are relinquished for the more valuable (34). One of the functions of law (in Kant’s philosophy the function of law) is to organize and harmonize these freedoms.¹ In order to examine more closely the problem of psychological equilibrium, we have first of all to clarify the relations between culture and neurosis.

(b) Culture, neurosis and crime

As the relation between civilization and neurosis has been investigated mainly by Freud, and by both orthodox and unorthodox followers of the psycho-analytic school, we will begin the discussion by a brief presentation of Freud’s views.

In view of the fact that his main work on the subject (257) is widely known, our summary might appear superfluous. There are, however, two reasons why it must be presented:

Firstly, Freud’s concept of civilization has been strongly criticized, mainly by Fromm (264), and Horney (337), as being static, and identifying culture with repression, thereby implying the growth of neurosis in the process of civilization. If that were true, Freud’s conception of civilization would be one-sided, and represent the opposite of that dynamic equilibrium which I believe to be the basis of the psychological aspect of civilization. I think, however, that the above mentioned authors misrepresented Freud’s views, and accordingly I should like to present them once more, using quotations to avoid further misunderstanding.

Secondly, although I cannot claim adherence to any of the psycho-analytic schools, I must make it clear that Freud’s views on civilization gave me directly and indirectly—mainly through the experimental work of H. A. Murray and S. Rosenzweig—the general foundation for my research. Practically none of Freud’s assertions were taken for granted; some of them, as will be shown in later chapters, seem to have been confirmed, others not. It is necessary, however, to make clear what I understand by Freud’s ideas, and in what way I want to use them.

Freud starts with the assertion that ‘Human life in communities only becomes possible when a number of men unite together in strength superior to any single individual and remain united against all single individuals. The strength of this united body is then opposed as “Right” against the strength of any individual which is condemned as “brute force”. This substitution of the power of a united number for the power of a single man is the decisive step towards civilization. The essence of it lies in the circumstance that the members of the community have restricted their possibilities of gratification, whereas the individual recognized no such restrictions. The first requisite of culture, therefore, is justice—that is the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favour of any individual. This implies nothing about the ethical value of any such law.’ (257, p. 59).

Although Freud maintains that liberty of the individual is not a benefit of culture, and was greater, although not so valuable, before any culture existed, he allows that the desire for freedom may prove favourable to a further development of civilization (Ibidem, p. 60). ‘A great part of the struggles of mankind centres round the single task of finding some expedient (i.e. satisfying) solution between these individual claims, and those of the civilized community.’¹

He emphasizes the role of sublimation in the development of culture: ‘Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural evolution; this it is that makes it possible for the higher mental operations, scientific, artistic, ideological activities, to play such an important part in civilized life.’ (p. 63). It must be noted here that sublimation may be regarded as a satisfactory compromise between impulses and conscience.² As the conscience is largely formed, according to psycho-analytic theory, through the ‘introjection’, or incorporation, of the moral standards of the family³ and (though this is insufficiently recognized by most authors of this school) of the community as a whole, sublimation seems to produce an equilibrium between the original wishes of the individual and those of society.⁴

Later Freud deals with the sexual and aggressive instincts which make the existence of culture necessary: ‘Homo homini lupus; who has the courage to dispute it in the face of all the evidence in his own life and in history?’ As aggression constitutes ‘the most powerful obstacle to culture’ (p. 102), civilization takes certain measures to check it. The most important is the introjection or internalization of aggressiveness: ‘it is sent back where it came from. i.e. directed against the ego.’ Then the super-ego, ‘in the form of ‘‘conscience”, exercises the same propensity to harsh aggressiveness against the ego that the ego would have liked to enjoy against others. The tension between the strict super-ego and the subordinate ego we call the sense of guilt; it manifests itself as the need for punishment.’ (p. 105).

Freud distinguishes the two stages, and two sources of feelings of guilt; ‘that arising from the dread of authority and the later one from the dread of the super-ego’ (p. 111). At this second stage of development ‘the more righteous a man is the stricter and more suspicious will his conscience be, so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried holiness farthest who reproach themselves with the deepest sinfulness’.

According to Freud, a savage, instead of throwing the blame on himself, throws it on his fetish,¹ where in the development of civilization ‘the sense of guilt may swell to a magnitude that individuals can hardly support’, (pp. 121–2).

Thus, in Freud’s view the sense of guilt is ‘the most important problem in the evolution of culture’ (p. 123); and we might formulate the first questions to be answered in our research as:

(a) Is it true that there is a positive relationship between the strength of conscience expressed in social behaviour, and the strength of guilt feelings? In other words, is social behaviour accompanied by a tendency to direct aggression inwards, blaming oneself instead of others, and vice versa? Here a study of criminal and non-criminal groups seems to be most appropriate.

If this relationship can be established, we come to the next questions:

(b) Do men under oppression tend to direct their aggression (whether a primary instinct or a reaction towards frustration) more and more outwards, or inwards; or do they tend to repress it?

Do they react flexibly and differently in different social situations, or rigidly and inadequately?

In other words, are they becoming more balanced, more neurotic, or more antisocial and savage?

Strictly speaking the first question implies a hypothesis of a positive relationship between social behaviour and the tendency to direct aggression inwards, and between antisocial behaviour and the tendency to direct aggression outwards. The subsequent questions imply three mutually incompatible hypotheses of positive relationships between oppression in the environment and (i) excessive outward aggression, (ii) excessive inward aggression, and (iii) balanced personality structure. Confirmation of one of these hypotheses automatically disproves the other two.

To clarify these questions; and relate them to the concept of civilization as a dynamic equilibrium, let us attempt to distinguish between neurotic, psychopathic and criminal personalities.

I shall not try to base this distinction on any theory of crime and neurosis. I shall only make certain definitions or descriptions in order to delimit concepts as they are used in the following pages.

I consider all three above concepts as describing maladjusted personalities, with abnormalities of character.

Social adjustment as a test of sanity, and still more as a test of moral values, has often been criticized, and the paradox that Freud might have been regarded as insane until his theories came to be sufficiently accepted to be a source of income (594, p. 185) has certainly a grain of truth. But the difficulty, theoretically insurmountable, loses much weight in practice, especially when we consider larger groups of individuals, and we can hardly conceive a community composed solely of Freuds continuously psychoanalysing each other as being sane.

Similar is the weakness of Fromm’s criticism (264, p. 119) that in a well-adapted person all genuine individuality and spontaneity may have been lost, while a neurotic is one who is not ready to surrender completely in the battle for his self.¹ ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Preface
• Part I: The Problem and Method
• Part II: Results
• Index